James WILLIAMS, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Florida.
*513 Charles G. Brackins of the Law Offices of Meldon & Brackins, Gainesville, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gеn., and Gregory C. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
McDONALD, Justice.
The First District Court of Appeal has certified the following question as being of great public importance:
Does the rule of exclusion announced in State v. Sarmiento,397 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1981), and Hoberman v. State,400 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1981), provide grounds for post-conviction relief when raised for the first time in a Rule 3.850 proceeding by a defendant whose conviction became final before these decisions were filed?
Williams v. State,
Williams was charged with two violations of section 893.13 Florida Statutes (1977): (1) possession and (2) sale of marijuana. He was convicted of both charges and on March 5, 1979 was sentenced to five years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal the district court reversed the conviction for possession but affirmed the conviction for the sale of marijuana.[2] This Court denied certiorari,[3] and Williams filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District оf Florida. That court dismissed the writ for failure to exhaust state remedies.
Williams then filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging that the trial court admitted into evidence a tape recording of a conversation in his home in violation of State v. Sarmiento,
The basis of the certified question is whether our decision in Sarmiento should be applied retroactively to cases that were final at the time Sarmiento was rendered. Sarmiento held that "the warrantless, electronic interception by state agents of a conversation between defendant and an undercover police officer in defendant's home is an unreasonable interception of defendant's private communications in violation of article I, section 12, Florida Constitution." Id. at 644. We have applied Sarmiento to cases not yet final when it was rendered, see Hoberman v. State,
The standard applicable in determining whether a judicial decision announcing а change in the law is to be applied retroactively is found in Witt v. State,
This Court wеnt on to state that most of the law changes of "fundamental significance" will fall within two broad categories:
The first are those changes of law which place beyond the аuthority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties. This category is exemplified by Coker v. Georgia,433 U.S. 584 ,97 S.Ct. 2861 ,53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), which held that the imposition of the dеath penalty for the crime of rape of an adult woman is forbidden by the eighth amendment as cruel and unusual punishment. The second are those changes of law which are оf sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall [v. Denno,388 U.S. 293 ,87 S.Ct. 1967 ,18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967)] and Linkletter [v. Walker,381 U.S. 618 ,85 S.Ct. 1731 ,14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)]. Gideon v. Wainwright, [372 U.S. 335 ,83 S.Ct. 792 ,9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963),] of course, is the prime example of a law change included within this category.
In contrast to these jurisprudential upheavals are evolutionary refinements in the criminal law, affording new or different standards for the admissibility of evidеnce, for procedural fairness, for proportionality review of capital cases, and for other like matters. Emergent rights in these categories, or the retraction of former rights of this genre, do not compel an abridgment of the finality of judgments. To allow them that impact would, we are convinced, destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any tolerable limit.
In denying Witt's petition, the court found that thrеe of the alleged law changes were nonconstitutional, evolutionary developments in the law, one alleged change was from an intermediate federal cоurt and therefore ineligible for consideration, the fifth was not a "change of law" because it was not a precedent, and the sixth change was dismissed on factual grounds.
While the rule 3.850 motion in Witt cоncerned a capital conviction, the standards established in Witt are fully applicable to noncapital cases. In the instant case the district court found that Sarmiento constituted merely a refinement in the criminal law insufficient to warrant retroactive application to Williams' conviction.[5]
Williams' challenge meets the first two requirements, that is, the dеcision in Sarmiento came from this Court and concerned the interpretation of Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution. In determining whether Sarmiento constitutes a development of fundamental significance we apply the three-fold test established by the United States Supreme Court in Stovall v. Denno,
The purpose to be served by the rule announced in Sarmiento is to deter illegal police action. An important consideration is that the exclusion of the illegally obtаined evidence would not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process as such evidence is relevant and reliable. The rule has no bearing on guilt and did not involve an аttack on the fairness of the trial because the rule is based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action. The purpose of the new rule can be achieved without applying the rule retroactively.
In determining the extent of reliance on pre-Sarmiento law we look to the law in effect at the time of the decision. As pointed out by Justice Alderman in his dissent to Sarmiento, in recording the conversations the police acted in accordance with section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), and the United States Supreme Court has held that it is not an unreаsonable or unconstitutional search and seizure for an agent to record the conversations he was a party to. United States v. Caceres,
The effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule also strongly supports prospective apрlication. Exclusion of evidence seized before Sarmiento would increase the burden of the administration of justice by requiring hearings on excluding evidence possibly long since destroyеd, misplaced, or deteriorated, and, if excluded, witnesses available at the time of the original trial may not be available or, if located, their memory might be dimmed. Retroаctivity would overturn convictions based on fair reliance upon pre-Sarmiento decisions and would exclude evidence that is relevant and reliable without serving as a deterrent to similar surveillance in the future.
Therefore, we agree with the district court that Sarmiento is not a decision of fundamental significance requiring its retroactive application to cases that were final when the decision was rendered.[6] The certified question is answered in the negative, and the decision of the district court is approved.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
NOTES
Notes
[1] Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
[2]
[3]
[4] The record does not conclusively show that a Sarmiento violation occurred. The state asserts that the informant who worе the bugging device was standing outside the door of Williams' home during the recorded conversation. The district court indicated that the state's position was supported by inferencеs drawn from the testimony of the informant, but the issue was not directly addressed in the testimony and, so, would require an evidentiary hearing if the certified question were answered in the affirmative.
[5] Williams contends that Sarmiento was "foreshadowed, if not preordained," by Tollett v. State,
[6] The recent United States Supreme Court decision of United States v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___,