Williams v. StateWilliams v. State
The First District Court of Appeal has certified the following question as being of great public importance:
Does the rule of exclusion announced in State v. Sarmiento, 397 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1981), and Hoberman v. State, 400 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1981), provide grounds for post-conviction relief when raised for the first time in a Rule 3.850 proceeding by a defendant whose conviction became final before these decisions were filed?
Williams v. State, 406 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (footnote omitted). We have jurisdiction1 and answer the certified question in the negative.
Williams was charged with two violations of
Williams then filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to
The basis of the certified question is whether our decision in Sarmiento should be applied retroactively to cases that were final at the time Sarmiento was rendered. Sarmiento held that “the warrantless, electronic interception by state agents of a conversation between defendant and an undercover police officer in defendant‘s home is an unreasonable interception of defendant‘s private communications in violation of
The standard applicable in determining whether a judicial decision announcing a change in the law is to be applied retroactivеly is found in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980). In Witt the defendant sought post-conviction relief from his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death. The petition alleged six different changes in the law since the
This Court went on to state that most of the lаw changes of “fundamental significance” will fall within two broad categories:
The first are those changes of law which place beyond the authority of the state the рower to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties. This category is exemplified by Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), which held that the imposition of the death penalty fоr the crime of rape of an adult woman is forbidden by the
eighth amendment as cruel and unusual punishment. The second are those changes of law which are of sufficient magnitude to neсessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall [v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967)] and Linkletter [v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)]. Gideon v. Wainwright, [372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963),] of course, is the prime example of a law change included within this category.In contrast to these jurisprudential upheavals are evolutionary refinements in the criminal law, affording new or different standards for the admissibility of evidence, fоr procedural fairness, for proportionality review of capital cases, and for other like matters. Emergent rights in these categories, or the retraction of former rights of this genre, do not compel an abridgment of the finality of judgments. To allow them that impact would, we are convinced, destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any tolerable limit.
387 So.2d at 929-30 (footnotes omitted).
In denying Witt‘s petition, the cоurt found that three of the alleged law changes were nonconstitutional, evolutionary developments in the law, one alleged change was from an intermediatе federal court and therefore ineligible for consideration, the fifth was not a “change of law” because it was not a precedent, and the sixth change was dismissеd on factual grounds.
While the
Williams’ challеnge meets the first two requirements, that is, the decision in Sarmiento came from this Court and concerned the interpretation of
The purpose to be served by the rule announced in Sarmiento is to deter illegal police action. An important consideration is that the exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence would not enhance the reliability оf the fact-finding process as such evidence is relevant and reliable. The rule has no bearing on guilt and did not involve an attack on the fairness of the trial becausе the rule is based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action. The purpose of the new rule can be achieved without applying the rule retroactively.
In determining the extent of reliance on pre-Sarmiento law we look to the law in effect at the time of the decision. As pointed out by Justice Alderman in his dissent to Sarmiento, in recording the conversations the police acted in accordance with
The effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule also strongly supports prospective application. Exclusion of evidenсe seized before Sarmiento would increase the burden of the administration of justice by requiring hearings on excluding evidence possibly long since destroyed, misplaced, or detеriorated, and, if excluded, witnesses available at the time of the original trial may not be available or, if located, their memory might be dimmed. Retroactivity would overturn сonvictions based on fair reliance upon pre-Sarmiento decisions and would exclude evidence that is relevant and reliable without serving as a deterrent to similar surveillance in the future.
Therefore, we agree with the district court that Sarmiento is not a decision of fundamental significance requiring its retroactive application to cases that were final when the decision was rendered.6 The certified question is answered in the negative, and the decision of the district court is approved.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.