Williams v. StateWilliams v. State
Latundra Williams petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition seeking review of an order that denied her motion for discharge from prosecution which was filed after the speedy trial period expired without the State having filed an information. By order dated August 1, 2000, we granted the petition indicating that this opinion would follow.
Williams was arrested on October 8, 1999, and charged with two felonies. The State filed an information against her on May 3, 2000, which was 206 days after the arrest. On June 26, 2000, Williams filed a motion for discharge asserting a violation of her right to speedy trial. The trial court conducted a hearing, treated the motion as a notice of expiration of speedy
The supreme court addressed an analogous situation in Genden v. Fuller, 648 So.2d 1183 (Fla.1994). In Genden, the State announced it would bring no action against a defendant after the defendant was arrested. More than six months after the first arrest, the State filed an information against the defendant based on the same events for which he had been arrested. Five weeks later, the defendant was arrested again and, two weeks after the second arrest, he moved for discharge under the speedy trial rule. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the State had the fifteen-day recapture period prescribed by
The district court granted the defendant‘s petition on the authority of State v. Agee, 622 So.2d 473 (Fla.1993), and certified the following question:
WHETHER THE HOLDING OF STATE v. AGEE APPLIES WHEN THE PROSECUTION IS TERMINATED BY A VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL BEFORE AN INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION RATHER THAN A “NOLLE PROSSE” FILED AFTER AN INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT?
Fuller v. Genden, 630 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). The supreme court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that “the speedy trial time begins to run when an accused is first taken into custody and continues to run when the State voluntarily terminates prosecution before formal charges are filed and the State may not file charges based on the same conduct after the speedy trial period has expired.” Genden, 648 So.2d at 1185. In reaching its conclusion, the court reasoned that to interpret the rule as the State urged would provide the State with a means by which to unilaterally toll the running of the speedy trial period, which the court declined to do. The court observed that “[t]he State would be able to avoid the speedy trial rule by waiting to formally charge an arrestee.” Id.
We find no legally cognizable difference between Genden, in which the State filed an information after the speedy trial period expired but after announcing it would bring “no action,” and this case in which the State made no announcements and simply waited to file the information until after the speedy trial period expired. The speedy trial period began to run when Williams was taken into custody and expired before the State took action of any kind. Under Genden, the State may not avoid the speedy trial rule by waiting to formally charge an arrestee.
Our reliance on Genden is not without hesitation. As Justice Wells points out in his persuasive dissent, “[b]y the express language of
Nevertheless, we are compelled to follow Genden, which appears to require that we grant Williams’ petition. However, we certify the following question as being of great public importance:
WHETHER THE HOLDING OF GENDEN v. FULLER, 648 SO.2D 1183 (FLA. 1995), APPLIES WHERE THE STATE TAKES NO ACTION PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL PERIOD AND THEN FILES AN INFORMATION AFTER THE PERIOD HAS EXPIRED?
Petition granted by order dated August 1, 2000; trial court‘s order quashed; case remanded for discharge; question certified.
DAVIS, and STRINGER, JJ., Concurring.
Although I have concurred with the granting of the petition for writ of prohibition, I am not totally convinced that Genden should be applied in a case where the State has taken no action to indicate an intention not to prosecute. There is nothing in
In cases such as Agee and Genden, where the State voluntarily terminates prosecution by either filing a nolle prosequi or announcing a “no action” report, the case pending on the arrest is closed and no case exists within which the accused can invoke the procedural right to speedy trial. Once the State has taken some action to indicate that it does not intend to prosecute, it is appropriate that the State be charged with the continuous running of the clock if it later changes it mind. Where the State has taken no action at all, the accused is on notice that a case is pending and is protected against inordinate delay by the ability to invoke the rights to speedy trial provided by both the rule and the