Williams v. State
482 S.W.2d 810
Ark.
1972
Check Treatment
Frank Holt, Justice.

A jury found appellant guilty of possession of stolen property and assessed his punishment at one year аnd a day in the State Penitentiary. For reversal of that judgment, appellant first contends that the proof аdduced by the state as to value of the property is insubstantial. We find no merit in this assertion.

We view the evidenсe on appeal in the light most favorable to the appellee in determining ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍the substantiality of the еvidence to support a jury verdict. Rickie v. State, 250 Ark. 700, 466 S. W. 2d 462 (1971).

The Conway County Coon Hunters Club was broken into and four troрhies along with some soft drinks were taken from the club. Two days later the four trophies were found in the trunk of appellant’s automobile. The secretary of the club testified that he had ordered the trophies which were to be presented as awards to winners of various sporting events sponsored by the club. He describеd the trophies as “new’.’ and testified that their cost “would run somewhere around $10 apiece.” The treasurer of the club testified that he had paid for the trophies and further stated “if the club ordered those four trophies they would cost at least $40,” and he considered them worth $10 apiece before they were stolеn.

Of course, it was necessary to present evidence of a substantial nature that the trophies werе more than $35 in value ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍to sustain a conviction for possessing stolen property. Ark. Stat. Ann § 41-3938 (Repl. 1964). Hammond v. State, 232 Ark. 692, 340 S. W. 2d 280 (1960). Compare Rogers v. State, 248 Ark. 696, 453 S. W. 2d 393 (1970). We are of the view that there was substantial evidence from which the jury could find that the value of the artiсles exceeded the required statutory sum. We note that the jury was instructed on a lesser included offense which is a misdemeanor. It was for the jury to reconcile the evidence and determine the grade of the оffense.

Furthermore, we do not think “the court erred in applying the law with regard ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍to proper proof of value of the stolen property.” In Cowan v. State, 171 Ark. 1018, 287 S. W. 201 (1926), we held that the actual cost of the automobilе license plat was admissible as to the grade of larceny allegedly committed by stealing the platеs from the car. See, also, 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Larceny, §§ 45 and 148, and Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, 2, § 449 (12th Edition, 1957), to the effect that the actual or cost price of an article is admissible as being one factor for the jury to consider along with other factors in determining the market value. It is well established in civil cases that the original cost of property, as in eminent domain cases, is admissible so long as it is not too remote in time and bears а reasonable relation to the present value. Such evidence exists in this case.

Appellant nеxt contends for reversal that the prosecuting attorney’s office failed to divulge information in its or its agеnts’ (sheriff’s office) possession concerning a material witness favorable to the defense. About a mоnth following the appellant’s conviction, the appellant, in support of his motion for a new trial, рresented a witness who testified that, as a retailer, he had sold these or similar trophies to the club; that bеfore the trial the sheriff’s office called him in for identification purposes; and he had expressed his opinion that the total value of the trophies new was less than $35 or at the most $32.50. It appears that onе investigating officer and the secretary of the club were present when the retailer viewed the trophies. The officer testified there was no detailed discussion relating to the price of the trophies; аnd he understood the presence of the retailer was for identification purposes; namely, “if they wеre the ones he sold.” Another deputy testified that he was not present when the retailer saw the proрerty. He filed his investigative report with ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍the prosecuting attorney’s office and he believed he gave thе appellant a copy, also. The secretary of the club testified at the hearing that he had told the deputy prosecuting attorney about this witness and a conversation with him; however, the secretary said that his testimony at the trial, relating to the trophies’ value, was the same which he had imparted to the deputy prosecutor after his conversation with the retailer. There is no evidence that the prosecuting attorney’s office or its agents suppressed any evidence. In fact, appellant agrees nоthing of such a nature was intentionally done. We note that this retailer or witness’ name was mentioned as a source of purchases during presentation of the state’s testimony in chief. No request for a continuance was made. In the circumstances, we hold that the trial court properly denied appellant’s mоtion for a new trial based upon the asserted suppression of evidence favorable to the аppellant. Newly discovered evidence which tends only to impreach other testimony is not necеssarily grounds for a new trial. Murchison v. State, 249 Ark. 861, 462 S. W. 2d 853 (1971). Newly discovered evidence is one of the least favored grounds to justify granting a motion for a new trial and, further, such a motion is addressed to the sound discretionary authority of thе trial judge. Steel v. State, 246 Ark. 75, 436 S. W. 2d 800 (1969). In the case at bar, the appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‍abused its discretionary power in refusing to grant his motion for anew trial.

Affirmed.