Williams v. StateWilliams v. State
A jury fоund Tommy Lee Williams guilty of theft by receiving, driving under the influence, attempting to elude a police officer, and being an habitual violator. On appeal, Williams contends that thе trial court erred in excluding the testimony of his expert witness and in admitting into evidence his custodial statement. Williams also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
The record shows that around midnight the morning of March 15, 2000, Officer Dereck Shelton was on patrol when he saw a van run a stoр sign. Shelton activated his lights and siren and pursued the van a short distance, until the driver stopped the van and fled on foot down a wooded path. Although it was night, Shelton testified that the lighting was “good” and that he was able to get a “good look” at the driver, whom Shelton described as thin in stature, wearing whitewashed jeans and a tan, long sleeved sweater.
After securing the van and calling for backup, Shelton pursued the driver. While in pursuit, Shelton encountered Larry Jones, whose house was at the end of the path. Shelton asked if Jones had sеen anyone come down the path, and Jones responded “Tommy Lee” and pointed to Williams, who was walking toward Shelton. According to Shelton, Williams was wearing whitewashеd jeans and a tan, long sleeved sweater, and he was perspiring. Shelton testified that he had “no doubt” Williams was the driver of the van.
Shelton arrested Williams for obstruction and for running the stop sign and took him back to the van. While Shelton was asking Williams for his name and date of birth, Shelton noticed that Williams’ eyes were red, and he smelled alcohol on Williams’ breаth. Believing Williams to be under the influence, Shelton read him the implied consent notice. Williams was subsequently given a breathalyzer test that showed his blood alcohol content tо be 0.115, which is above the legal limit. 1 It was later discovered that Williams had been declared an habitual violator and that his driver’s license had been revoked.
At some point, Shelton learned that Williams did not own the van, which was registered to Miguel Monzon. Monzon testified that he left the van outside of his apartment in Norcross the night of March 14 and that he had nоt given anyone permission to drive the van. Accordingly, Williams was charged with theft by receiving stolen property. 2
1. While Williams was being transported to the police station, he told Shelton “that he was in the van earlier, but wps dropped off.” Williams then informed Shelton that he would appreciate any leniency in treatment. Prior to trial, Williams moved to suрpress this statement. Although Shelton had read Williams his Miranda rights, Williams nonetheless asserted that the statement was involuntary. During the Jackson-Denno hearing, Dr. John Watkins, a clinical psychologist, testified that, with an IQ of 58, Williаms likely did not appreciate the import of his right to remain silent.
The State objected to the admission of Dr. Watkins’ testimony,
asserting that Williams failed to provide a copy of the doctor’s report
Pursuant to
Notwithstanding this error, we find no basis for reversal. “ ‘[E]rror alone is not automatically grounds for a new trial but is subject to scrutiny for harmless error.’ ” 8 We find the admission of Williams’ statement harmless.
The sole purpose fоr the admission of Dr. Watkins’ testimony was to challenge the voluntariness of Williams’ statement. Thus, if the admission of the statement was harmless, so, too, was the exclusion of Dr. Watkins’ testimony. In his statement, Williams never admitted to committing any offense — he merely conceded that he had been in the van at some point and requested leniency. Arguably, this statement is not incriminаting, in which case its admission could not harm Williams. Even assuming that the statement is properly characterized as incriminating, reversal still is not warranted. Officer Shelton unequivocally idеntified Williams as the man driving the van. In light of this evidence of Williams’ guilt, it is highly unlikely that Williams’ statement contributed to the verdict. 9 Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to exclude Dr. Watkins’ testimony was not harmful.
In a related enumeration of error, Williams contends that the trial court erred in admitting his statement because it was involuntary. For the reasons discussed above, however, thе statement’s admission was harmless and presents no basis for reversal.
With respect to Williams’ assertion that his attorney was ineffective for failing to timely provide Dr. Watkins’ report, he is unable to show prejudice for the reasons stated in Division l. Williams also argues that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to object to hearsay testimony. Specifically, Williams points to Shelton’s testimony that Jones identified Williams as “Tommy Lee.” Again, assuming that Williams’ attorney should have objected to this testimony, his failure to do so has not prejudiced Williams.
It is well settled that hearsay lacks probative value. 11 Accordingly, the admission of hearsay even “without objection [,] does not give it any weight or force whatever in establishing a fact.” 12 Thus, the merе fact that Williams’ attorney did not object to the hearsay does not preclude Williams from arguing that it improperly contributed to the verdict or unduly influenced jurors, neither of which Williams contends on appeal. 13 Rather, Williams focuses on his lawyer’s culpability for failing to object to the hearsay. By neglecting to explain how, exactly, the attorney’s alleged failure harmed him, Williams has not shown prejudice.
Moreover, we find the evidence more than ample to support the jury’s verdict, even without the hearsay testimony. Thus, in any event, Williams is unable to establish prejudice, which is necessary to warrant reversal based upon ineffectivе assistance of counsel. 14
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
See
Williams also was charged with theft by taking, but the jury acquitted him of this chargе.
Williams opted into the reciprocal discovery provisions of
Following the Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court concluded that Williams’ statement was voluntary. It is unclear from the trial court’s ruling whethеr it considered Dr. Watkins’ testimony in reaching this issue. For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that the court did not consider the excluded testimony
See
Tucker v. State,
See
Massey v. State,
Compare
Jones v. State,
Thomas v. State,
See
Massey,
supra;
Beck v. State,
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.)
Hooper v. State,
See
Curtis v. State,
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Curtis, supra.
Although Williams asserts that the “case would have come out differently if the trial counsel had objected to the hearsay,” he fails to establish how the result might have differed.
See
Ricarte v. State,