Defendant Michael W. Williams appeals his conviction for selling cocaine. This case arises from the alleged sale of cocaine to an undercover Chatham County police officer. The officer to whom the drugs *385 were allegedly sold testified that on the night of July 5, 1989, he was working undercover when he was waved down by Bobby V. Weathers, who was originally a co-defendant, who asked him what he needed. When the officer responded that he was looking for a 20, referring to $20 worth of cocaine, Weathers told him to pull over. The officer parked his automobile almost directly across from a red Chevrolet, in which the defendant was seated. Weathers talked to the defendant and returned to the officer and asked “are you the man,” that is, are you a police officer, which the officer denied. The. defendant was then waved over to the officer’s car by Weathers, and the defendant looked at the officer and said “[t]hat’s the man,” at which point he backed away from the officer’s car. The officer again assured Weathers that he was not “the man.” Weathers obtained an object from the defendant. After further deliberations, Weathers told the officer he would lay the object on the curb and the officer could put his money down beside it. The officer testified he laid down a $20 bill, the serial number of which had been recorded for later identification, and took the object, which was later determined to be cocaine. The officer left the scene and the “take down” team moved into the area and arrested the defendant and Weathers. The officer who arrested the defendant testified the defendant had $1,100 in his left front pocket, including the $20 bill the first officer had left in exchange for the cocaine.
1. The evidence in this case is sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Defendant argues that the charge given by the trial court with regard to possession was misleading and would likely lead the jury to believe that they could convict defendant of the sale of cocaine upon a showing of simple possession. “ ‘It is a fundamental rule in Georgia that jury instructions must be read and considered as a whole in determining whether the charge contained error. (Cits.)’
Williams v. State,
To the extent defendant argues the trial court also erred by not charging the jury on the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine, we find that contention to be without merit. The law is well-settled in this state that the trial judge “in his discretion, [may] charge on a lesser crime of that included in the indictment or accusa
*386
tion. However, his failure to do so, without a written request by the state or the accused, is not error.”
State v. Stonaker,
3. Defendant next contends the trial court erred by refusing to grant the defendant’s motion for a continuance based upon the failure of the State to comply with the mandate of OCGA § 17-7-211 and supply him with a copy of scientific reports identifying the substance defendant was charged with selling. Defendant claims that at trial his counsel moved for acquittal or alternatively for a continuance. The trial court denied that motion. In its order denying defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court held that the defendant did not move for a continuance and for that reason its failure to grant one to defendant was not error. A review of the record reveals that after moving for acquittal, defense counsel stated: “In the alternative, if the Court doesn’t see fit to grant that motion and exclude the evidence, I think clearly under the statute that we are entitled to ten days prior to trial to receive the notice which the Court saw us get yesterday.” Although defendant’s request could have been clearer, we find that statement is sufficient to constitute a request for a continuance.
The question remains whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying the defendant’s motion for continuance and by allowing the crime lab report and testimony relating thereto to be admitted at trial. Error must be shown to be harmful before it will be deemed to be reversible error.
Rutledge v. State,
OCGA § 17-7-211 provides in pertinent part: “(b) In all criminal trials, felony and misdemeanor, the defendant shall be entitled to have a complete copy of any written scientific reports in the possession of the prosecution which will be introduced in whole or in part against the defendant by the prosecution in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal. ... If the scientific report is in the possession of or available to the prosecuting attorney, he must comply with this Code section at *387 least ten days prior to the trial of the case, (c) Failure by the prosecution to furnish the defendant with a copy of any written scientific report, when a proper and timely written demand has been made by the defendant, shall result in such report being excluded and suppressed from evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief or in rebuttal.” (Indentions omitted.)
In
Rodriguez v. State,
4. The defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in admitting a photostatic copy of the $20 bill allegedly used in the commission of the crime into evidence is without merit.
5. Defendant cites no authority for his position that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that they should not consider the absence of Weathers, who was originally a co-defendant. The record shows Weathers and his counsel were present during the jury selection process, but before trial began, Weathers pleaded guilty. We hold that the lack of an instruction concerning the absence *388 of Weathers at trial in this case does not constitute reversible error.
6. Defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to question a character witness for defendant regarding a pending indictment of the defendant for armed robbery. In
State v. Clark,
Judgment affirmed.