Williams v. StateWilliams v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- McMillan, Cobb, Baschab, Wise
[EDITORS’ NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]
The
The following issues are presented for review:
1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution1 or
§ 13A-4-5(b)(3), Ala. Code 1975 ,2 barred the triаl court from convicting and sentencing the appellant both for capital murder and for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery;2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the appellant‘s conviction of capital murder;
3. Whethеr the trial court erred in denying the appellant‘s motion to suppress his statements to the police; and
4. Whether the appellant is entitled to a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct.
With respect to the first issue, the appеllant contends that, because the offense of capital murder required proof that the victim was killed during the commission of a first-degree robbery, he could not be convicted and sentenced both for capital murder and for conspiraсy to commit first-degree robbery. The gravamen of the appellant‘s argument is that the first-degree robbery element of the capital-murder offense and the conspiracy-to-commit-first-degree-robbery offense were both based on and arose out of the same course of conduct; therefore, he says, the first-degree robbery element of the capital-murder offense and the conspiracy-to-commit-first-degree-robbery offense constituted the same offense for purposes of applying the Double Jeopardy Clause. Along this same vein, the appellant contends that he was “`convicted on the basis of the same course of conduct of both the actual commission of an offense [murder made capital pursuant to
The established test for determining whether two offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative punishment was stated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires prоof of an additional fact that the other does not. The test emphasizes the elements of the two offenses. If each offense requires
Under
Neither are we persuaded that the appellant‘s convictions ran afoul of
Based on the evidence presented, the appellant is correct that the jury had to have found him guilty of committing a first-degree robbery in order to have returned a guilty verdict on the capital-murder count. However, the jury also necessarily had to have found that the appellant intentionally killed the victim. Bаsed on the finding of that additional element, the jury found the appellant guilty of the offense of capital murder and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction based on that verdict. The appellant was convicted of murder made capital pursuant to
With respect to the second issuе, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to create an inference that he intentionally killed the victim. However,
As to the third issue, the appellant urges this court to interpret the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as extending the same protections recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), to participants in the “boot camp” program at the Montgomery County Youth Facility. He argues that the statements he made to Montgomery Police Detective Guy Naquin during and subsequent to his transfer from that fаcility3 to the Montgomery Police Department for questioning in relation to his involvement in the death of the victim in this case should have been suppressed because, he says, he made his statements after he had been illegally arrested at the faсility without an arrest warrant.4 We find this argument unpersuasive for several reasons.
Initially, we note that in Payton the United States Supreme Court discussed the enhanced Fourth Amendment prоtection a person enjoys while in his home. In Payton, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect‘s home in order to make a routine felony arrest. The consent necessary in the Payton context is consent to enter, not consent to arrest. See Freeman v. State, 776 So.2d 160, 178 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999), aff‘d, 776 So.2d 203 (Ala. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 400 (2000). Hоwever, we cannot agree with the appellant‘s assertion that the “home” discussed in Payton is akin to the juvenile facility in which the appellant was placed pursuant to a previous adjudication
Furthermore, the appellant‘s statements would have been admissible even if this court were to accept his argument that he was arrested without a warrant in a youth facility with the kind of “home-like” environment contemplаted in Payton. A consensual entry into a suspect‘s home is outside the scope of Payton. See Fortenberry v. State, 545 So.2d 129 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988), aff‘d, 545 So.2d 145 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 911 (1990) (noting that the consent of one who possesses common authority over the premises is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom the authority is shared); seе also the cases cited in La Fave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 6.1(c) (2d ed. 1987) (“the lower courts have rather consistently held that no warrant is needed when the person to be arrested or some other person with a sufficient interest in the premises to admit visitors voluntarily consented to entry by a known police officer“). For all that appears in the record before us, Detective Naquin was given permission to enter the youth facility for the purpose of taking the appellant into custody. In addition, the United States Supreme Court held in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), that “where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State‘s use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton.” Harris, 495 U.S. at 21. See also Parker v. State, 587 So.2d 1072, 1088 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991), aff‘d, 610 So.2d 1181 (Ala. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 929 (1993).
We find no merit in the appellant‘s contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements.
Finally, with respect to the fourth issue, the appellant argues that reversible error oсcurred when the prosecutor referred to the fact that the victim was a veteran and that he had been killed
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
McMillan, P.J., and Cobb, Baschab, and Wise, JJ., concur.