Williams v. StateWilliams v. State
Appellant, Mrs. Jewel Williams, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Calhoun County of arson, first degree, under Code of 1942, Sec. 2006, which provides that “any
Appellant is a white woman sixty-tliree years of age. She is a widow, her husband having died several years prior to the fire in question. For about twenty-one years she has owned a small building on the southeast corner of the square in Calhoun City, facing north. The front part of this building is of brick construction, and was used as a cafe, operated by Mrs. Williams. The east and south sides of the building, of wood construction, contained five bedrooms and a bath. These were added by appellant to the original brick structure a number of years ago. The fire occurred around 11 P. M. on Sunday night, December 7, 1952. Apparently the building, particularly the living quarters in the rear, ivas substantially damaged by the fire.
The State’s case was based upon the testimony of two principal witnesses, Miss Gene Davh and Glenis Coker. Miss Davis testified that she had been working as a waitress in the Williams Cafe for about three months prior to the fire. She lived in a room in the cafe building. She said that Mrs. Williams had one of those rooms, Miss Neamy Wooten, a sister of appellant, occupied another, the witness occupied a third and the other two were rented to Fred Sheffield and Lloyd Vance. On the Sunday night in question she left the cafe about 6 or 6:30 P. M., at which time Mrs. Williams was there. She returned about 9 or 9:30 P. M., and saw some newspapers on the floor in the bathroom and on the front
Miss Davis stated that she had asked appellant to let her off that night, and appellant had agreed; and that whenever she stayed at the cafe at night, with one exception, either appellant or Miss Neamy, appellant’s sister, would be there. At the time of the fire Miss Neamy had been in Memphis for several days. There was no shade over the glass front door, only the newspaper. She said that during the period she was working there appellant made a number of trips to Memphis, where her daughter-in-law and grandson lived. Appellant’s son had died several years before the fire. Miss Davis said that the general understanding was that appellant was living in Memphis; that she was away for some little time, and for part of this period Mrs. Barker had charge of the cafe for Mrs. Williams, and for part of this period the witness would run the cafe, and Mrs. Williams would come back on weekends to see about it; and that Mrs. Williams had told her a number of times that she was broke.
The other principal witness for the State was Grlenis Coker, a white man thirty-eight years of age, who lived
“By: District Attorney:
“Q. Grlenis, I believe when the jury left you were testifying about Shine Collins leaving the truck and Mose said something to you, what did he want you to do ?
“A. To go and get some coal oil.
“Q. Why did he want you to get it?
“A. Mrs. Williams was going to give him $200.00 to burn the building.
“Objected to his stating what someone wanted him to do, but state- what he said.
“By the Court: That is right, state what was said or done.
“By: District Attorney :
“Q. What did Mose tell you about Mrs. Williams, if anything ?
“A. He told me she wanted the place burned.
“Q. And what would she give him to burn it ?
“A. Two hundred dollars.
“Q. And what did he tell you?
“A. That she would give me ten dollars and he would give me one dollar to go and get the oil.”
The trial court ruled that this testimony was admissible as being part of the “res gestae”, and that anything that happened that night concerning the crime is “part of the res gestae regardless of who said it . . .”
The city marshal testified that two weeks after the fire he found a five gallon tin can on the ground immediately behind the small bathroom in the dwelling part of the house. He did not know whether the can was there before the fire or whether it was placed there after the fire. The only part of the building burned close to the floor was in the extreme back room. The balance of the fire’s destruction seemed to be from about two feet from the floor up to the ceiling. There was a clothes cleaning establishment about ten feet to the east of the Williams Cafe. Two witnesses for the State testified that the fire was rather an odd one, in that it would burn awhile at the back, and when that would seem to be pretty well
For the defense, Mrs. Jewel Williams testified that when she was in town she occupied a bedroom east of the cafe area; that she had been back home from Memphis in active charge of the cafe for about a week; that prior to that time and since September she had been staying in Memphis with her grandson, four and one-half years of age, and her daughter-in-law. She closed the cafe that Sunday night around 6 P. M. and stayed there until 8 P. M., during which period she was cleaning the place up. Another woman was helping her, but she was unavailable at the trial. Mrs. Williams said that Miss Davis did not work on that Sunday, and that the last time she saw her that night was about 8 o’clock. She put the papers over the door to keep people from coming in while she was working. She had put papers in the bathroom for sanitary purposes. There were no papers spread on any other floors. She denied that she burned, or caused anyone else to burn, the building; and denied that she had any conversation with Sheffield or anyone else about burning it. She said that one Spencer had offered her $10,000 cash for the cafe about two months before it burned. She said that she left the building about 8 P. M. and went to the home of her sister in Calhoun City, Mrs. Hugh Hyde, where she remained until 2 A. M., Monday morning, when she was taken to the hospital. She was at Mrs. Hyde’s house when her sister, Miss Neamy, her grandson, and Sam Huffstickler of Memphis arrived at the Hydes’ home at about 9 P. M. that Sunday night. They had driven down from Memphis that evening.
Mrs. Williams has diabetes, and shortly after 11 P. M. her sister, Miss Neamy, telephoned Dr. L. D. Wehh re
Dr. L. D. Webb confirmed defendant’s testimony that he was at the Hyde home that night about 11:40 P. M. He said appellant’s blood pressure and pulse were up some, her temperature normal, and that she complained
On rebuttal for the State, Homer Edgeworth, an employee of the State Fire Marshal, testified that in January, 1953 he was investigating the fire; that Mrs. Williams was called to the courthouse for interrogation, and she asked him that if she would drop the insurance claim, whether they would forget about “this whole mess, I don’t want to go to court.” Mrs. Williams stated that she did not remember asking that.
The foregoing is a summary of the evidence. The first question is whether the court erred in permitting Grlenis Coker to testify as quoted above: that Sheffield told him that Mrs. Williams was going to give him $200 to burn the building, and told him that Mrs. Williams stated to Sheffield that she wanted the place burned, and that Sheffield said that Mrs. Williams said that she would give Coker $10 to go get the coal oil. The trial court
In the absence of the testimony of Coker referred to above, none of the State’s witnesses connected appellant with the burning of the building. The testimony of Miss Davis does not do so, nor does that of Coker. The State’s evidence is wholly circumstantial, and could create, if anything, only a suspicion of guilt in the minds of the jury. But where the evidence is wholly circumstantial, the rule is that the defendant must be proved guilty not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but also to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with her innocence. Hardy v. State,
We have considered carefully in several conferences the evidence in this case, and have concluded that, excluding Coker’s inadmissible hearsay testimony, there is not enough evidence to go to the jury on the issue of guilt vel
non;
that there is no evidence of any logical probative value to connect appellant with the alleged offense; and that therefore she was entitled to her requested peremptory instruction. So the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment is rendered here discharging appellant. Compare Luker v. State,
Reversed and judgment rendered discharging appellant.