Leroy Christopher WILLIAMS
v.
STATE of Mississippi.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
*17 Roy O. Parker, Jr., Tupelo, MS; for appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Jackson, MS; W. Glenn Watts, Sp. Ass't Attorney General, Jackson, MS; for appellee.
Before PRATHER, P.J., and BANKS and McRAE, JJ.
BANKS, Justice, for the Court.
Here we are called upon to examine the interplay between our spousal competence doctrine and the hearsay exception prescribed in Rule 804(b)3 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Because the statement at issue does not genuinely inculpate the declarant, we conclude that it was erroneously admitted. Accordingly, we reverse. Along the way we examine the impact of the Confrontation Clause on the 804(b)3 exception in the context of the circumstances here and we treat other issues susceptible to recurrence should this matter be retried.
I.
On the early morning of December 6, 1990, in Tupelo, Mississippi the defendant Chris Williams received a knock on his door from Rodney "Knuckles" Richardson. Richardson, appearing to be intoxicated from alcohol and drugs, loudly demanded money that Williams apparently owed Richardson's brother. Williams insisted that Richardson leave, but he refused to comply. Williams testified that he saw Richardson make a gesture as if he were reaching behind his back, at which time Williams grabbed his gun and fatally shot Richardson.
After the defendant shot Richardson, he grabbed Richardson and placed him in the trunk of the defendant's car. It is disputed whether he received help in doing so from Chelsea Williams, who was in the defendant's home at the time of the shooting. He then drove to a garbage dump and disposed of the body. After dumping the body, Williams disposed of his own clothes and attempted to wash the blood out of the trunk of the car. The following day, Williams traded his car and moved into a hotel that night. While attempting to move his furniture out of his home and into a storаge warehouse, he was arrested and charged with the murder of Rodney Richardson.
Prior to trial, the defendant made motions in limine to exclude evidence of the removal of the victim's body from the crime scene and evidence of Williams' flight after the killing, which were both overruled. The defendant also moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the State had failed to comply with the special magistrate's order which required the State to provide two eyewitnesses that the defendant had been unable to locate at the preliminary hearing. This motion was also denied by thе trial court. The defendant was denied a related motion to limit testimony of the eyewitnesses to the statements which they had received from the State.
*18 Williams also attempted to prevent the introduction of a statement made by Chelsea Williams, whom he married just prior to trial. The statement was made while Chelsea was in custody and alleged that Richardson was still alive when he was placed inside of the trunk. The statement further alleged that Chris Williams considered returning to the garbage dump and shooting Richardson again to ensure that he was dead. The trial court allowed the introduction of the statement as a valid exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 804(b)3 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.
The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter and, following the adverse disposition of post verdict motions, Williams now appeals to this Court to consider the following issues:
A) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING CHELSEA BLANCHARD WILLIAMS' STATEMENT;
B) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT DENIED WILLIAMS DUE PROCESS IN HIS AVERY PRELIMINARY HEARING;
C) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF WILLIAMS' REMOVAL OF THE BODY;
D) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF ALLEGED FLIGHT;
E) WHETHER THE JURY VERDICT WAS CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; AND
F) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ISSUING INSTRUCTION D-16 WHICH INSTRUCTS THE JURY THAT ANY REASONABLE DOUBT IS TO BE RESOLVED IN THE FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT.
II.
a.
Williams asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of Chelsea Williams' statement into evidence. He contends that the statement is inadmissible because of the spouse's incompetence to testify, that the statement is inadmissible hearsay, the involuntary nature of the statement, and that the statement violates his right to confrontation under both the Mississippi and the United States Constitutions.
The trial court ruled that Chelsea Williams, the defendant's wife, was unavailable to testify under Rule 804(a)1 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence following Simpson v. State,
Chelsea's statement is clearly inadmissible hearsay under Rule 802 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence unless it falls within one of the hearsay exceptions contained in Rule 804(b). An inquiry into the admissibility of Chelsea Williams' statement should begin with the determination of whether it is a statement against the declarant's penal interest as defined in Rule 804(b)3.
Rule 804(b)3 provides:
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
....
(3) A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
MISS.R.EVID. 804(b)3. The interpretation of this rule has been expanded by the federal courts as well as the Mississippi Supreme Court to include declarations against penal interest as well as those against pecuniary or *19 proprietary interest. See United States v. Sarmiento-Perez,
In order for this statement to qualify under Rule 804(b)3, the declarant, Chelsea Williams, must be unavailable as defined in Rule 804(a). The defense as well as the state have asserted that Chelsea Williams is incompetent to testify as the defendant's spouse. Under Miss. Code Ann. 1972 § 13-1-5 (Supp. 1995), husbands and wives may only be competent as witnesses in their own behalf, in all controversies between them, or in a criminal prosecution of either husband or wife in matters involving the neglect, delinquency, desertion, nonsupport, or abandonment of their children. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that § 13-1-5 prohibits the prosecution from calling the defendant's wife to testify against her husband. See Bayse v. State,
It is apparent that Chelsea Williams is unavailable to testify concerning the subject matter of her statement under Rule 804(a)1. The next relevant inquiry is whether the statement qualifies under Rule 804(b)3 as a statement against the declarant's penal interest. Rule 804(b)3 was adopted by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence in 1986, extending our common law statement against interest exception to statements against penal interest. Since this extension, this Court has looked upon such declarations against penal interest which inculpate others unfavorably and has usually held that such statements are unreliable and untrustworthy. See Mitchell v. State,
The United States Supreme Court has held that the statement must be "sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest `that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.'" Williamson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___,
The Fifth Circuit further stated that "a close examination of all the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement is required in order to determine whether it so contravenes the declarant's penal interest that a reаsonable person in [the declarant's] ... position would not have made the statement accusing a third person unless [she] ... believed it to be true." Id. at 1102. In Sarmiento-Perez, the defendant challenged the admission of a confession of a co-defendant who, while in custody, stated that the defendant was the source of cocaine and an active participant in the sale of cocaine to a government agent. Id. at 1096.
The court found that the confession "was not a spontaneous declaration made to friends and confederates, but a custodial confession, given under potentially coercive circumstances that could not at trial and cannot now be adequately examined." Id. at 1102. Furthermore, the court stated that within such custodial confession there were "obvious motives for falsification, the very natural desire to curry favor from the arresting officers, [and] the desire to alleviate culpability by implicating others,... all [of which] *20 might lead an arrestee-declarant to misrepresent or to exaggerate the role of others in the criminal enterprise." Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded that in considering these factors, "it is reasonable to suppose that this declarant ... might well have viewed the statement as a whole including the ostensibly disserving portions to be in his interest rather than against it." Id. Thus, the court held that the confession was inadmissible. Id.
In Williamson, the United States Supreme Court stated that "whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context." Williamson v. United States, ___ U.S. at ___,
In the present case, the trial court found that the statement of Chelsea Williams contained incriminating statements which could subject her to criminal prosecution as an accessory. The portion of Chelsea Williams' statement which is suggested to have been incriminating states:
"... I held the trunk lid up and Chris threw Knuckles inside of the trunk... . I knew that he was still alive when Chris put Knuckles in the trunk because I could hear Knuckles snoring... ."
There is nothing within this portion of the statement which inculpates the declarant. In fact, when reading the statement as a whole, which was admitted into evidence by the trial court in its entirety, it is сlear that Chelsea Williams completely exculpated herself from criminal liability. Within her statement, she also said that she thought that Chris was taking Knuckles to the hospital, and that Chris told her that he placed Knuckles in the trunk because he did not want to get blood on the seats of the car. She said nothing that would have "clearly and directly" exposed her to criminal liability. Ponthieux v. State,
Furthermore, the statement completely inculpated the defendant by stating that he dumped the victim's body in a garbage yard and that he considered returning back to the garbage yard and shooting him again to ensure that he was dead. Thus, even if some of this information had been incriminating, these statements may also be viewed as an attempt to divert attention from her own culpability to that of the defendant. As this Court stated in Mitchell, "post-arrest statements made by one accused pointing the finger at another are as a matter of common experience among the least trustworthy of statements... ." Mitchell v. State,
It should also be noted that Chelsea Williams' statement was made while she was in custody. Therefore, under Sarmiento-Perez, there existed a "very natural desire to curry favor from the arresting officers ... [as well as a] dеsire to alleviate culpability by implicating others... ." U.S. v. Sarmiento-Perez,
Even if Chelsea Williams' statement had been admissible under a hearsay exception, our inquiry would not end. The defendant asserts that the introduction of this statement is a violation of his right to confrontation under both the United States and *21 the Mississippi Constitutions. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have ruled that the Confrontation Clause may restrict the range of admissible hearsay. See Seales v. State,
The United States Supreme Court has held that reliability can be inferred "where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception ...," otherwise, there must be "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts,
The Court has stated that "`particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' must be shown from the totality of the circumstances ...," including only those relevant circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that "render the declarant worthy of belief." Idaho v. Wright,
The defense also suggests that by admitting Chelsea Williams' statement into evidence, the State effectively forced Mrs. Williams to testify against her husband, thus violating both Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 and Rule 601 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence which generally declare spouses to be incompetent to testify against each other. The strict interpretation of the spousal privilege has been criticized by other jurisdictions as frustrating the principle of "utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." See United States v. Archer,
b.
The defendant requested and was granted a preliminary hearing after his indictment on February 5, 1991. He asserts that two of the State's key witnesses, Christy Wells and Eugene Rogers, could not be obtained through the standard means of issuing process and attempted to require the State to produce the witnesses. The trial court hеld that the State was not required to produce such witnesses at the defendant's preliminary hearing. The defendant now contends that the trial court's holding resulted in the denial of the defendant's right to an adequate preliminary hearing.
The defendant has based his argument on this Court's holding in Avery v. State,
*22 c.
The defendant asserts that the trial court committed error in admitting evidence of the removal of the body from the scene of the shooting bеcause of its irrelevance to the "ultimate issue of guilt or innocence." He states that "nothing that happened after the shooting could possibly have an impact on whether or not the shooting was justified."
In asserting this position, the defendant cites Bangren v. State,
In fact, this Court has observed that the demeanor, acts, and conduct of the accused, at the time of and subsequent to the crime are in fact relevant, admissible evidence. Harrelson v. State,
An inquiry into the relevance of evidence must begin with Rule 401 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, which states:
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402 states that "all relevant evidence is admissible." Thus, the question before this Court is whether evidence showing that after shooting Rodney Richardson, the defendant placed his body in the trunk of the defendant's car, drove to a garbage dump, and dumped the body in the garbage yard has a tendency to make any fact that was of consequence to the determination of whether the defendant killed Richardson in self defense more probable or less probable without this evidence.
In Jones v. State,
d.
The defendant claims that the trial court committed error by allowing evidence of Williams' flight. On the day after the shooting, Williams traded his car at Nolan Brothers. He and Chelsea then moved into a hotel and spent two nights there while Williams attempted to move his furniture into a storage warehouse. The defendant suggests that flight evidence is probative only if it is relevant to identify the defendant and to prove that some event did occur, thus it is irrelevant in this case where there is no dispute as tо whether Williams shot the victim. However, in this particular case, evidence of Williams' flight seems to be probative for reasons other than Williams identity.
The defendant cites Dennis v. State,
*23 It is a well-established principle that flight is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Lee v. State,
Evidence of flight is inadmissible where there is an independent reason for flight known by the court which cannot be explained to the jury because of its prejudicial effect upon the defendant. Mack v. State,
e.
The defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of manslaughter. Where the defendant has challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the authority of the Mississippi Supreme Court to interfere with the jury's verdict is quite limited. McFee v. State,
The State asserts that the defendant's claim of self-defense is without merit. There was evidence presented that the defendant shot the victim, placed the victim in the trunk of the defendant's car, drove to a garbage dump, and disposed of the body. There had also been evidence presented that Williams attempted to wash the blood off the carpet of the trunk, disposed of his clothes, traded his car, moved into a hotel, and attempted to store his furniture in a warehouse before he was arrested. The State also presented testimony of eyewitnesses which heard the shooting of the victim and saw Williams place the body in the trunk before leaving the scene of the crime. Furthermore, the written statement of Chelsea Williams was allowed into evidence which alleged that Williams knew the victim was still alive when the victim was placed in the trunk and that Williams said he "... ought to go back and shoot him again to make sure that he was dead."
The defense solicited testimony from a forensic pathologist that the victim had been drinking as well as abusing drugs at the time he was shot. These facts were solicited to show that the defendant could reasonably have been placed in fear for his life. The defendant testified that the victim appeared to be intoxicated and on drugs when he knocked on the door of his apartment loudly demanding his brother's money. The defendant testified that after the victim threatened to kill him, the victim made a gesture as if he were going behind his back, therefore, the defendant shot him to protect himself.
In considering this evidence in the light most consistent with the verdict, we conclude that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of their impartial judgment could *24 have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. It follows that we will not reverse the judgment based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
f.
The defendant asserts that the refusal of suggested instruction D-16 constituted reversible error on the part of the trial court. A jury instruction may be improper if it incorrectly states the law, is without foundation in the evidence, or is stated elsewhere in the instruction. Murphy v. State,
Suggested instruction D-16 states: "[t]he court instructs the jury that every reasonable doubt in reference to any matter connected with this case, which is submitted to the jury for decision, should be resolved by the jury in favor of the defendant and against the state." The defendant cites Hosey v. State,
In giving jury instruction D-7, the trial court stated:
... Before you can return a verdict of guilty, the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendаnt is guilty. The presumption of innocence attends the Defendant throughout the trial and prevails at its close unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant is not required to prove his innocence.
Thus, the trial court did fairly instruct the jury as to the State's burden of proof. A court's jury instructions "will not warrant reversal if the jury was fully and fairly instructed by other instructions." Collins v. State,
For the foregoing reasons, Williams' conviction for the charge of manslaughter will be reversed and remanded because the admission of Chelsea Williams' statement constituted a reversible error on the part of the trial court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DAN M. LEE, C.J., PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and McRAE, J., concur.
JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by PITTMAN, SMITH and MILLS, JJ.
ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting:
I find no reversible error by the trial court leading to the conviction of Leroy Christopher Williams for manslaughter, and I respectfully dissent.
I am in disagreement with the majority's decision that the admission of Chelsea's police station statement was in error. I believe that it was properly admitted pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and find that it does not constitute reversible error.
The majority intimates that Chelsea could not have been charged with Leroy Chris Williams (herеinafter Chris) as an accessory after-the-fact to the killing of "Knuckles" or to any other crime involving this incident. The State certainly could have chosen to *25 prosecute Chelsea, probably as an accessory, if it so desired. The mere fact that the district attorney's office chooses to prosecute is not a guarantee of a finding of guilt. As has always been the case, the local prosecutor's office has the discretion to bring charges against an individual so long as there is substantial credible evidence to do so limited by an arbitrary and capricious standard. It appears sufficient credible evidence existed for the state to consider and/or pursue such charges against Chelsea.
The statement involved, yet not specifically mentioned in the majority, is as follows in pertinent excerpts.
.... [t]here was a knock on the door.... [C]hris went to the door. About four or five minutes after Chris went to the door I heard a gun shot.... [S]hortly after the gun shot, Chris came running upstairs and handed me his pistol and said for me to hold the gun. I took the gun and put it under the mattress... . [H]e said, "come here, hurry up!" So I ran downstairs... . [I] saw Knuckles laying in the street near the car and I asked Chris if he was going to take Knuckles to the hospital and he did not say anything. He hollered for me to come and hold the trunk up and I asked him why he did not put Knuckles inside the car. Chris told me that he did not want to get blood all over the inside of the car. So I held the trunk lid up and Chris threw Knuckles inside of the trunk... . [I] asked Chris where he had been. I asked him if he took Knuckles to the hospital and he said "No". He said he took him and dumped him where they dump garbage somewhere. He said that Knuckles was still alive and that he ought to go back and shoot him again to make sure that he was dead. I knew that Knuckles wаs still alive when Chris put Knuckles in the trunk because I could hear Knuckles snoring.... [C]hris told me when he ran back upstairs after dumping Knuckles he told me to get some pants, shirt, and undershorts.
I believe that the trial court was correct in finding that the above statement, "itself would leave one to conclude that it is in fact contrary to the interest of the maker of the statement; and if that test is sufficiently met, the statement ought to be admissible and that the State ought to be able to use that statement in the trial of this case."
I agree with the majority that Chelsea was "unavailable" within the meaning of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(a)(1). However, I find that the argument could be made that the foregoing statement, even though subject to varying interpretations, when made by Chelsea was against her penal interest and thus properly admissible pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as decided by the trial judge. Since there appears to be no other error(s) warranting reversal, I would affirm.
PITTMAN, SMITH and MILLS, JJ., join this opinion.
NOTES
Notes
[1] Our rule is identical to its federal counter part in the Federal Rules of Evidence and we, therefore, look to federal decisions as informative, though not controlling, as to the proper interpretation. See Brent v. State,