SCOTT WILLIAMS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
NO: 2:24-cv-120
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
March 14, 2025
GREG GERARD GUIDRY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SECTION: T (4)
Before the Court is Claimant’s, Scott Williams, Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny Claimant’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Title II of the Social Security Act,
BACKGROUND
Claimant was born in 1982 and was 37 years old on his amended alleged disability onset date. Tr. 14, 27, 213, 233, 240. He thus qualifies as a “younger individual,” aged 18-49, under the Act. R. Doc. 8 at 31, Tr. 27. He graduated from high school and had previous employment as an administrative clerk and an automobile service station attendant. Tr. 27, 256; Tr. 27, 57, 256-257, 263-270. Claimant alleges he suffers from Generalized Anxiety Disorder (“anxiety”), depression, substance use disorder, and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). See Tr. 16, Finding 3.
Claimant’s amended disability onset date is April 1, 2020. Tr. 27. Defendant, the
At Step 1, the ALJ found Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date of his amended application. Tr. 16, Finding 2. At Step 2, the ALJ determined Claimant had the following severe impairments: anxiety with panic, depression, and substance abuse disorder. Tr. 16-17, Finding 3. The ALJ concluded that Claimant’s ADHD is, at most, a non-severe impairment. Id. At Step 3, the ALJ concluded Claimant does not have impairments that meets or medically equal the severity of listed impairments—notably Listing 12.06 recognized anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders (“the Listing”). Tr. 17-19, Finding 4.
Nеxt, before going to Step 4, the ALJ addressed Claimant’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). The ALJ found that, consistent with his RFC, Claimant has a capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: he can understand, remember, and apply simple, routine instructions and make only simple decisions; must avoid fast-paced quota-based work; can occasionally interact with supervisors and coworkers, but may have no more than incidental interaction with the general public; can adapt to occasional changes in the work setting; and must avoid driving as a function of work. Tr. 19-27, Finding 5. At Step 4, the ALJ determined Claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work. Tr. 27, Finding 6. To conclude, at Step 5, the ALJ found Claimant could perform jobs that exist in
Claimant then sought judicial review under
The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation rejected Claimant’s challenge and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. R. Doc. 16. The Magistrate Judge first concluded that the ALJ’s later reasoning that Claimant’s symptoms were not fully consistent with the record evidence was substantial evidence to conclude that Claimant’s impairments did not medically equal Listing 12.06. R. Doc. 16 at pp. 10-11. The Magistrate Judge determined Claimant’s cited cases are
Claimant now objects to the Report and Recommendation on two grounds. First, Claimant takes issue with the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on SSR 17-2p. R. Doc. 17 at pp. 2-4. Hе claims that under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 at 2261, 2273 (2024) SSR 17-2p is unlawful or should otherwise be disregarded. R. Doc. 17 at p. 4. Claimant submits that the ALJ must instead separately articulate why his limitations do not medically equal a listing in Step 3. Id. at pp. 2-4. Lastly, Claimant re-argues that the ALJ’s failure to incorporate alleged additional limitations in a hypothetical to the VE constitutes reversable error. Id. at pp. 6-7.
LAW & ANALYSIS
1. Legal Standard
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court must conduct a de novo review for the objected to portions. See
Judiciаl review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits is limited to whether the Commissioner’s position is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence. See
An ALJ must follow the five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process for determining disability. Step 1: is the claimant currently working? Step 2: does the claimant have a medically severe impairment? Step 3: does the impairment meet or equal an Appendix 1 listing for presumptive disability? Step 4: does the impairment prevent the claimant from performing past relevant work? Step 5: does the impairment prevent the сlaimant from performing any other work? See Wren, 925 F.2d at 125 (summarizing
“Absent an error that affects the substantial rights of a party, administrative proceedings do not require ‘procedural perfection.’” Wilder v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-3014-P, 2014 WL 2931884, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2014) (quoting Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2012)); see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407–08 (2009) (“The federal ‘harmless-error’ statute ... tells courts to review cases for errors of law ‘without regard to errors’ that do not affect the parties’ ‘substantial rights.’”). “The ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in the record nor must the ALJ follow formalistic rules of articulation.” Hunt v. Astrue, No. 4:12-CV-244-Y, 2013 WL 2392880, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2013) (citing Castillo v. Barnhart, 151 F. App’x 334, 335 (5th Cir. 2005)). “Remand is required only when there is a realistic possibility that the ALJ would have reached a different conclusion absent the procedural error.” Wilder, 2014 WL 2931884, at *5 (citing January v. Astrue, 400 F. App’x 929, 933 (5th Cir. 2010)).
2. The Court Identifies No Reversible Error at Step 3
In Step 3, the ALJ must determine whether the impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of a relevant listing in Appendix 1.
“Paragraph B” criteria, referred to as the Psychiatric Review Technique (“PRT”), considers four areas of mental functioning: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information, (2) interacting with others, (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and (4) adapting or managing oneself.
“Paragraph C” requires a showing of a “serious and persistent” mental disorder. Id.
The ALJ uses the PRT to assess whether a mental impairment satisfies the requirements of a specific listing, i.e., Listing 12.06. Claimant’s functional limitations in the four areas of mental functioning are assessed on a five-point scale: none, mild, moderate, marked, or extreme. Id.
Here, the ALJ considered all PRT factors and found with substantial evidence that Claimant’s impairments did not meet paragraph B and C criteria for Listing 12.06. Each of paragraph B criteria are discussed below.
Understanding, remembering, or applying information. The ALJ concluded that the Claimant has a moderate limitation. Tr. 17-18. The ALJ noted that Claimant could adequately follow written and spoken instructions, has a normal memory, no limitations in understanding and remembering simple and detailed instructions, and an “average intellect and good fund of knowledge.” Id. The ALJ considered Claimant’s limitations and indicated his “anxiety could certainly have some impact upon his ability to concentrate, thereby affecting his ability to understand, remember, or apply information at times.” Id. Even accepting these limitations, because Claimant can perform various simple tasks such as personal care activities, the ALJ found no more than a moderate limitation. Id. The ALJ based his conclusion on the entire record, including multiple medical sources—outpatient psychiatry treatment, the Claimant’s therapist, and two consulting psychologist reports. See id. The ALJ’s findings were thus based on substantial
Interacting with others. The ALJ concluded Claimant has a moderate limitation. Tr. 18. The ALJ based this conclusion on multiple sources, including Claimant’s self-report that he has “no problems getting along with others,” the treating and examining physicians’ evaluations—which reported Claimant to be cooperative with normal behavior, normal/intelligible speech, and normal effect, Claimant’s interactions with his neighborhood friends, and attendance at Saints’ games. Id. Although the ALJ did note that the medical evidence suggests limitations from Claimant’s anxiety treatment, because Claimant had a good response to medication, this only warranted a moderate limitation. These ALJ findings are based on substantial evidence consistent with the Listing’s description. See
Concentrating, Persisting, or Maintaining pace. The ALJ also determined Claimant has a moderate limitation in this area. The ALJ considered but concluded that a March/June 2023 evaluation, which denoted Claimant’s “significant ADHD problem,” was not indicative of Plaintiff’s symptoms beсause much of this testing consisted of self-reports. Tr. 18. Additionally, Claimant’s treating source/psychiatrist never noted any defects in attention/concentration nor diagnosed him for ADHD. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Claimant had an ability to sustain an ordinary routine/regular attendance at work because Claimant had enough attention to do simple tasks including driving, managing finances, cleaning, doing laundry, mowing the lawn, and preparing simple meals. Id. A consultive psychologist also noted that Claimant’s tested attention and concentration were within functional limits. Id. Therefore, the ALJ’s findings of a moderate
Adapting or managing oneself. The ALJ also concluded that Claimant had a moderate limitation for this final factor. Tr. 18-19. To justify this conclusion, the ALJ noted that Claimant can adapt and manage himself well enough to perform various personal care activities, manage finances, and spend time with others in person and on the phone. Id. Claimant was still able to perform these activities with the current psychiatry treatments. Id. The ALJ based his findings on multiple sources, including medical treatments, self-reporting, and physician еvaluations. See id. Accordingly, these findings are based on substantial evidence consistent with the Listing’s description. See
The ALJ also addressed the “paragraph C” criteria with specificity. The ALJ concluded Claimant’s limitations failed to satisfy paragraph C. Tr. 19. On marginal adjustment, the ALJ noted Claimant had no emergency room treatment or inpatient hospitalization due to his mental impairments, a good response to medication, and was able to adapt well enough to perform various personal care activities. Id.
Turning to Claimant’s objections. First, contrary tо Claimant’s assertion, the ALJ’s decision on medical equivalence is based on substantial evidence. The ALJ’s paragraph B analysis assessed the “severity of the claimant’s mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, [and concluded they] do not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.11.” Tr. 17. “In making this finding” the ALJ considered Claimant’s limitations in the “paragraph B” criteria. Id. Indeed, the ALJ specifically noted that “the limitations identified in the ‘paragraph B
Regardless, the Sequential Evaluation process does not require the ALJ to analyze separately whether a claimant’s limitations medically equal a listing in Step 3. If the ALJ later articulates why Claimant’s impairments do not render him sufficiently disabled, no further analysis is required. SSR-17p provides that:
If an adjudicator at the hearings or [Appeals Council] level believes that the evidence already received in the record does not reasonably suрport a finding that the individual’s impairment(s) medically equals a listed impairment, the adjudicator is not required to articulate specific evidence supporting his or her finding that the individual’s impairment(s) does not medically equal a listed impairment. Generally, a statement that the individual’s impairment(s) does not medically equal a listed impairment constitutes sufficient articulation for this finding. An adjudicator’s articulation of the reason(s) why the individual is or is not disabled at a later Step in the sequential evaluation process will provide rationale that is sufficient for a subsequent reviewer or court to determine the basis for the finding about medical equivalence at Step 3.
Social Security Ruling (SSR) 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *4 (emphasis added). This district and others have relied on SSR-17p and hold that a general statement that an individual’s impairment(s) does not medically equal a listing is sufficient for Step 3 if the ALJ later provides the necessary rationale. Rixner v. Kijakazi, No. CV 22-419, 2023 WL 2192951, at *16 (E.D. La. Jan. 25, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 22-419, 2023 WL 2185715 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2023); See e.g., Montez v. Kijakazi, No. EP-23-CV-00155-ATB, 2023 WL 8879266, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2023) (citing SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL 3928306, at *4 (SSA Mar. 27, 2017)) (“If an adjudicator ... believes that the evidence already received in the record does not reasonably support
Here, the ALJ already considered evidence from multiple sources on Claimant’s limitations and properly concluded with record citations that his limitations do not meet Listing 12.06. See Tr. 17-19. In fact, Claimant concedes this point. R. Doc. 12 at p. 3 n. 1. He only takes issue that the ALJ allegedly failed to address why Claimant’s limitations do not medically equal Listing 12.06 in Step 3. Claimant however does not explain why his limitations do medically equal the Listing. See generally R. Doc. 17 at pp. 1-4; see also Rixner, 2023 WL 2192951 at * 16 (finding a claimant who failed to explain why the evidence meets or medically equals a listing did not allege a reversible error). At best Claimant’s original brief аsserts, without authority, that because he has moderate limitations in all PRT factors, such limitations should medically equal Listing 12.06. R. Doc. 12 at p. 4. However, on review under
The ALJ properly assessed the severity of Claimant’s limitations in the RFC analysis and concluded, by consulting the whole record, that the symptoms were not as severe as alleged. Tr. 19-26. The RFC analysis spanned multiple pages and evaluated the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms.” Tr. 20. The ALJ first assessed Claimant’s work history, allegations of disability—including anxiety with panic—and medications. Id. He next considered testimony from Claimant’s mother, who indicated that Claimant was previously able to perform part-time work for her without issue. Id. The ALJ then addressed the medical evidence of recоrd starting in April 2020 through November 2022. Tr. 20-26. The ALJ found Claimant had a determinable impairment of anxiety with panic, depression, and substance use disorder which would reasonably be expected to cause Claimant’s alleged symptoms. Tr. 20-21.
Nevertheless, the ALJ noted the record evidence indicated the symptoms were not as severe as alleged. Tr. 20-26. First, the medical evidence showed multiple unremarkable mental status examinations with okay to good mood such that Claimant was able to attend multiple social outings. Tr. 21. Claimant’s limitations also improved with time and treаtment as by August and November 2022, he conquered his previous objection to crossing the Lapalco Bridge and performed household tasks. Id. The ALJ further considered multiple psychological evaluations and
With this extensive analysis, the ALJ thus determined that Claimant’s alleged limitаtions were not consistent with the record because, “despite his anxiety with panic, depression, and substance abuse disorder, the claimant is able to perform a wide range of daily activities, including performing personal care activities independently (grooming, bathing, dressing), preparing simple meals, cleaning, doing laundry, mowing the lawn, driving (but with problems with bridges), watching television, playing video games, doing adult Lego sets, and spending time with others, including hanging out with friends and going to the Saints’ games with his mom.” Tr. 23. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Claimant’s RFC only had some non-exertional limitations including making only simple decisions, avoiding fast-paced quota work, and incidental interaction with the general public. Id.
With this RFC and considering Claimant’s age, education, and work experience, the ALJ concluded Claimant was not disabled at Step 5 because he is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 28. The ALJ conclusion that Claimant is not disabled, which incorporated the extensive RFC analysis, is based on substantial evidence—“more than a mere scintilla”—and fully assessed Claimant’s limitаtions. In sum, the ALJ’s rationale in the RFC that Claimant’s limitations are not as severe as alleged is substantial evidence that Claimant’s limitations do not medically equal Listing 12.06. See Tr. 16-27.
3. The Court Finds No Reversible Error at Step 5
At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show there is other gainful employment available in the national economy that the claimant is capable of performing. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). This burden may be satisfied either by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines of the regulations, VE testimony, or other similar evidence. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987). Before going from Step 3 to Step 4, the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s RFC. Kneeland v. Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 2017). “The claimant’s RFC assessment is a determination of the most the claimant can still do despite ... [his] physical and mental limitations аnd is based on all relevant evidence in the claimant’s record.” Id. (cleaned up); see also
When assessing the RFC, an ALJ must “consider ... all medically determinable impairments,” whether “severe” or not.
To start, Claimant’s issue with the Magistrate Judge’s definition of a “moderate limitation” is meritless. See R. Doc. 17 at pp. 4-6. The Magistrate Judge’s order properly identified the definition of a moderate limitation in
Secondly, the ALJ’s written decision reveals that he expressly considered Claimant’s limitations in the RFC analysis. As discussed above, the ALJ properly incorporated and considered all relevant medical and non-medical evidence—including an evaluation by Dr. Constantin, the State agency psychologist at the reconsideration level. See Tr. 19-26. The ALJ noted that Dr. Constantin evaluated Claimant to have moderate limitations in the four PRT functional factors. Tr. 24. Claimant alleges however that the ALJ did not consider other limitations recognized by Dr. Constantin. R. Doc. 17 at p. 6. But these specific sustained concentration and persistence sub-questions in Dr. Constantin’s evaluation wеre incorporated into the RFC analysis. Tr. 24, 67. These questions “help determine the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities. However, the actual mental residual functional capacity assessment is recorded in the narrative discussion(s), which describes how the evidence supports each conclusion.” Tr. 67 (emphasis added). Dr. Constantin considered these questions when fashioning her narrative discussion on Claimant’s RFC, noting that “while deficits exist, the consensus of the data suggests the claimant is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple tasks with routine training and supervision. Claimant can relate to supervisors, peers, and customers on a superficial work basis only and would likely do better in settings with minimal social requirements…[and]…can adapt appropriately to a low stress and predictable work situation.” Tr. 24, 85.
As discussed above, the ALJ considered Dr. Constantin’s evaluation and all other medical and non-medical evidence in the records for his RFC determination. See Tr. 19-26. Indeed, the ALJ found Dr. Constantin’s opinion only “partially persuasive,” because the record evidence
ALJ: “For my first hypothetical, please assume an individual at the same age, education and work history as the claimant, the individual can perform the full range of work at all exertional levels. He has the following limitations. He can understand, remember and apply simple, routine instructions and make only simple decisions. He must avoid fast paced quote based work. He can occasionally interact with supervisors, coworkers and the general public. He can adapt to occasional changes in work setting and hе must avoid driving as a function of work. Would such an individual be able to perform the claimant’s past work.
VE: No
ALJ: Would there be any other work available in the national economy for an individual with that RFC?
VE: Yes.”
Tr. 58. Even for a hypothetical that added more limitations, the conclusion does not change.
ALJ: “If I were to alter that hypothetical with regard to the social interaction…it’s still occasionally interact with supervisors and coworkers but I’m going to the interaction to the general public so that it would be no more than incidental interaction with the general public and by that, I mean no sustained substantive interaction with the general public. Would that alter your prior opinion?
VE: No.”
Thus, there was no neеd to explicitly mention such sub-questions in the ALJ’s hypothetical because they are not Claimant’s limitations. The questions help guide the ALJ’s determination of the Claimant’s RFC. See Tr. 68. Given that the ALJ properly considered the record evidence and articulated hypothetical questions that reasonably incorporated the restrictions that he recognized in the RFC, the Court finds no reversible error at Step 5. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Court DENIES Claimant’s Objections to the Report and Recommendations. R. Doc. 17.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decision of Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of March 2025.
GREG GERARD GUIDRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE