44 Minn. 250 | Minn. | 1890
In May, 1888, the plaintiff entered into a written contract with the defendant for the sale to the latter of certain land in this state, in consideration of a price therein specified to be paid. . She
At the time of the making of the contract the plaintiff was the owner of only an undivided one-third of the property, the remaining two-thirds being in her infant children, of whom she was guardian. The contract sought to be enforced was made by the plaintiff, through her agent, as her personal contract of sale, and her personal obligation to convey by good and sufficient warranty deed, upon compliance with the prescribed conditions as to payment. One hundred dollars of the purchase price was paid to her. The contract provided that if the title should be found to be unmarketable, and such defect could not be cured within a reasonable timej the agreement should be void, and the payment made should be refunded. The plaintiff never acquired title to more than the undivided one-third of the property, but, some sis months after the making of the contract, tendered to the defendant a deed of the whole property, executed by her, and a guardian’s deed of the estate owned by her wards. The plaintiff assumed to show, chiefly by the admission of facts by the defendant at the trial, the authority conferred by the probate court to make, this conveyance of the estate of the infants. Without here stating fully the several steps taken, which may be deemed to have been generally regular and in conformity with the statute, we now refer only to such facts thus shown as are deemed to disclose defects which justified the court, in the trial of this cause, in the conclusion that the title so tendered was of such questionable validity that' the defendant should not be compelled to accept it. Some time after the plaintiff had entered into the contract with the defendant, she, as guardian, made her petition to the court for license to sell the estate of the infants at private sale. An order or license was thereupon granted to sell the estate at private sale. The report of the guardian showed that she had sold
The authority of the guardian, it will be seen, was to sell the estate of her wards at private sale. This implied the duty on the part of the guardian, which also her relation to her wards imposed upon her, independent of the express terms of the order, to sell for the best price obtainable, without regard to who might be the purchaser. No sale was ever made by the guardian under that authority, and the recital in the deed of such a sale having been made on the 1st day of December is untrue. When the probate proceedings were completed so far that the guardian had authority to sell, the defendant, upon application being made to her, refused to take the property pursuant to the contract which had been made with the plaintiff personally, and no other contract of sale appears to have been made. Indeed it is apparent from the whole case that there was no attempt by the guardian to sell the property under the order of the court, in the ordinary and proper sense of the term. The fact seems to have been that after the plaintiff had personally contracted to sell the land, of which she only owned an undivided one-third part, this proceeding was instituted in the probate court, with the view of transferring to the other party to that contract, in performance of the personal obligations of the plaintiff, the estate of her infant wards in the same land. This, of course, may have all been done in good faith, and in the belief that it was for the interest of the infants; and it may be assumed that if the whole facts had been presented to the probate court, it might have been justified in authorizing a sale to be made, which would in effect have operated as a performance of the personal obligation of the guardian. But, in view of the apparent conflict between the interests of the plaintiff growing out of her personal obligation to convey the whole land to the defendant for an agreed price, and her duty as guardian to sell the interest of her
The appellant contends that the judgment must be reversed because the court directed it to be entered at the close of the trial, without having made express findings of fact. Similar questions of practice have been presented in cases where the findings of the court have been in terms broader than may have been intended, or not suffi
Judgment affirmed.