Williams v. SavoryWilliams v. Savory
OPINION & ORDER
In 2009, plaintiff Marissa Williams’ two daughters were removed from her custody on an emergency basis by employees of the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”), the city agency responsible for child welfare. In 2013, after Williams had regained custody of one daughter, that ■ daughter was again removed from her custody after Williams allegedly struck her multiple times with a belt buckle.
Proceeding pro se and informa pauper-is, Williams now brings this action against 14 defendants pursuant to
Defendants now move for summary judgment as to all claims. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants defendants’ motion in its entirety.
A. The Parties
In 2009, Williams lived in the Bronx with her daughters, I.W. and Y.J.
Of the 12 individual defendants: the three ACS caseworkers (Savory, Jordan, and Ellis) at different times investigated Williams’ care of her children and made recommendations about it; their three supervisors (Ally, Awer, and Del Valle) conferred with the ACS caseworkers as to appropriate action; four others (Mattingly, Richter, Hu, and Lauros) were, as noted, current or former high7ranking officials at ACS; and two others (Stephens and Sokol) are City attorneys who represented ACS in Bronx Family Court proceedings against Williams. The institutional defendants are the NYPD and the City. The NYPD is sued based on the 2009 forcible entry by NYPD officers into Williams’ home to give ACS caseworkers access to her daughters and on the 2013 arrest by an NYPD officer of Williams on charges that were later dropped. The City is sued based on ACS’s investigation and recommendation that Williams’ daughters be removed.
B. The 2009 Removals and Aftermath
1. The Events Surrounding the October 2009 Removal
On October 14, 2009, a report was called into the State Central Register al
At 6 p.m. on October 15, 2009, Jordan conducted an unannounced visit at Williams’ home. Id. at ¶ 9. Jordan knocked and rang the doorbell; there was no answer. Id. Through the window, Jordan saw two dogs inside. Id. Jordan wrote a Notice of Visit and then saw a woman walking towards the home with a dog. Id. at ¶ 10; Compl. ¶ 33. Jordan asked the woman if she was Williams; Williams said yes. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 10. Jordan explained to Williams that ACS had concerns that her children were not attending school regularly, and asked where the children were. Id. Williams replied that the children were in the house. Id. Jordan said that Williams should not leave her children at home alone. Id. Williams responded that her children were mature enough to be home alone. Id. Jordan asked about Y.J.’s attendance at school; Williams replied that Y.J. had not been in school for approximately two weeks bеcause she was ill. Id. at ¶ 11. Jordan asked Williams whether she had sought medical attention for Y.J.; Williams said that she had and would look for documentation. Id. at ¶ 12.
Jordan entered the home with Williams’ permission and interviewed the children. Compl. ¶ 34. According to Jordan, both daughters stated that their mother sometimes left them home alone. Defs’ 56.1 ¶¶ 17-18. The older daughter, I.W., also said that Y.J. had not attended school for two weeks, not because she was ill, but because Williams thought it was too cold outside. Id. at ¶ 17. Y.J. similarly told Jordan that she had not been sick, and that the reason she had not been attending school was that Williams felt it was too cold outside. Id. at ¶ 18. Y.J. also told Jordan that Williams smoked sometimes, but that Y. J. did not know what her mother was smoking. Id.
In the ensuing days, Jordan conducted additional interviews, including of I.W.’s principal and I.W.’s father. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. The principal reported that I.W.’s school attendance had been poor; she had been absent during the 2008-09 school year on approximately 30 occasions. Id. at ¶ 23. To avoid having to repeat the third grade, I.W. had had to attend summer school. Id.
On October 22, 2009 at 6:45 p.m., Jordan conducted another unannounced home visit. Id. at ¶ 28. Jordan told Williams that ACS had several concerns that it wanted to address with her at a child safety conference. Id. at ¶ 29. Jordan again interviewed the children. I.W. told Jordan that Williams had left her and Y.J. home alone more than once. Id. at ¶ 35. I.W. also told Jordan that her mother smoked, but because she smoked in the bathroom with
On October 27, 2009, the conference occurred; Williams did not attend, and attests that she had told Jordan all along that she would not attend. Defs’ 56.1 ¶¶ 43-44; Compl. ¶ 37. Participants included Jordan; ACS CPS Manager Tammy Moore; Child and Family Specialist Facilitator Bolzia Jacobs; and I.W.’s father, Robinson. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 44. The participants discussed the children’s attendance problems, Williams’ alleged smoking, Williams’ having left1 her children home alone, and the children’s use of the stove. Id. at ¶¶ 44^46. I.W.’s father, Robinson, agreed to take both children if removed from Williams. Id. at ¶ 48. The participants decided to remove the children from Williams’ home and file an Article 10 petition seeking Y.J.’s remand and I.W.’s parole to I.W.’s father, Robinson. Id. at ¶ 49. That evening, Jordan removed Y.J. from Williams’ home and brought her to Robinson’s home where I.W. was already staying that night. Id. at ¶50. Jordan did not have a court order to take such action. Compl. ¶ 41.
The next morning, Stephens, ACS’s counsel, filed two Article 10 petitions, verified by Jordan, alleging that I.W. and'Y.J. were neglected children. See Dkt. 55 (“Jordan Deck”), Exs. E, F. The petitions alleged that Williams failed to provide her children with (1) adequate education, and (2) proper supervision or guardianship. Id. On October 28, 2009, a hearing was held before Bronx Family Court Judge Sidney Gribetz. Jordan Decl. Ex. G. Williams attended and was represented by an attorney from the Bronx Defenders. Id. Stephens told the Court that the two children had been removed from Williams’ custody on an emergency basis the day before; she asked that the children be paroled to Robinson. Id. The Court granted ACS’s petition and scheduled the next conference for November 5, 2009, before Bronx Family Court Judge Gayle Roberts. Id.
At the November 5, 2009 conference, Judge Roberts ordered Williams to undergo a mental health evaluation. Id. Ex H. After this evaluation did not note any concerns, Judge Roberts found that ACS’s сoncerns were only suspicions and returned the children to Williams’ custody, under ACS supervision. Id. The Court advised Williams that “ACS supervision” meant that, among other things, “caseworkers can make announced and unannounced visits to your home.” Id. The next court hearing was scheduled for December 18, 2009. On November 20, 2009, Robinson and Johnson filed for custody of their respective daughters, see Dkt. 56 (“Kruk Deck”), Ex. A; on December 8, 2009, Williams filed for custody of I.W. only, id. Ex. B.
2. The Events Surrounding the December 2009 Removal
On December 17, 2009, at 4:17 p.m. — the day before the next court conference— Jordan went to Williams’ home to conduct an unannounced visit. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 66. Jordan knocked on the apartment door but received no answer; she left a Notice of Visit asking Williams to contact Jordan
Jordan knocked on the door again and heard the volume of the music playing in the home go up. Id. at ¶ 71. Jordan called Williams’ phone again; this time, she received no answer. Id. Jordan called her supervisor, Ally, and explained her concerns that the children may be home alone. Id. at ¶ 72. Ally told Jordan to call the police to gain entry into the home. Id. Jordan then called 911, seeking the NYPD’s assistance. Id. at ¶ 73. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Jordan observed the lights in Williams’ home flickering on and off, and heard the volume of music fluctuating. Id. at ¶ 74. Jordan continued to see the children through the window, and continued to call Williams’ cell phone and to knock on her front door, both without response. Id.
At about 8 p.m., two NYPD officers, Edward Arjona and Ivanovic Gomez, arrived at the home. Id. at ¶ 75. The officers knocked on the door and yelled for the door to be opened, but no one answered. Id. The officers then began to bang on thе door and the window of the home with their flashlights;, still, no one answered. Id. The officers also called Williams on her cell phone and left a voice-mail. Id. at ¶ 76. Jordan called Ally and said that Williams’ children were seen through the window but that no one was answering the door. Id. at ¶ 77. Jordan told Ally that the officers also suspected that the children were home alone. Id. Ally asked that the police break down the door. Id. Jordan forwarded this request to the police officers, who contacted their lieutenant for authorization to use force to enter a home. Id. Around this time, after a call from Jordan, both children’s fathers arrived at the home. Id. at ¶¶ 79-82. Two more NYPD police officers also arrived, Lieutenant Anand Bhoj and Officer Daniel Tonnessen. Id. at ¶ 80. The officers knocked on the front door and window. Id. No one responded. Id. The officers could hear the volume of music in the home going from low to high. Id. The officers said that they would need to call the NYPD’s Emergency Services Unit (“ESU”) to break down the door. Id. Jordan and an officer went to the apartment downstairs from Williams’ and spoke with the tenants, who said they could hear footsteps coming from Williams’ apartment. Id. at ¶ 83.
At about 8:48 p.m., members of the NYPD’s ESU broke down Williams’ door. Id. at ¶ 84. The officers attempted to open the door but noticed that it was barricaded by, among other things, a shop
The next day, at the scheduled court hearing, the court paroled Williams’ children to their respective fathers. Jordan Deck Ex. I, CNY 386.
3. The Events of 2010 to Early 2013
In January and February 2010, Williams and Hu, an ACS chief of staff, exchanged emails, in which Williams complained about the emergency removals of her children. See Kruk Deck Ex. C (emails of Jan. 7, 2010; Feb. 1, 2010; Feb. 1, 2010; Feb. 4, 2010; Feb. 5, 2010; and Feb. 5, 2010).
On April 15, 2010, the Bronx Family Court denied Williams’ application for the return of her children. Kruk Deck Ex. E, CNY 542. The Court reasoned that each incident considered separately might not pose an imminent risk to the children, but when considered together, they indicated imminent risk to the children. Id. at CNY 542-48.
On August 13, 2010, the Court issued a decision, finding that “[a] preponderance of the evidence ... establishes that both [I.W.] and [Y.J.] are neglected children in that their physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of thé failure of Respondent Williams to supply the children with an adequate education.” Id. Ex. H, 11. However, the Court declined to enter a separate finding of inadequate guardianship against Williams on the basis of imminent danger to the children. Id. at 16.
On or about November 15, 2010, Williams moved the Bronx Family Court for an order returning Y.J. to her custody (from Johnson’s). Id. Ex. I, CNY 942. On April 12, 2011, Judge Roberts denied the application, for the reasons she had previously given. Id. Ex. J.
On December 15, 2011, Robinson was awarded temporary custody of I.W.; Williams was granted visitation rights. Id. Ex. O. On August 24, 2012, however, the Court dismissed Robinson’s petition for custody after he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Id. Ex. P.
On November 8, 2012, Williams was awarded custody of I.W. without ACS supervision. Id. Ex. Q. The Court ordered that the children be given sibling visits at their grandmother’s home once a month. Id. Ex. R.
On January 28, 2013, the Court issued a 20-page decision addressing both child neglect and custody. It noted that Williams had not testified during the fact-finding proceedings, filed petitions for custody of or visitation with Y.J., or offered any documents or other evidence. Id. Ex. S. The Court granted custody of Y.J. to her father with no further ACS supervision, finding that the “documentary evidence and witnesses’ testimony makes it abundantly clear that [YJ.’s father] is better suited to provide [Y.J.] with a stable home environment and provide for her physical, emotional and educational needs. It is in [Y.J.’s] best interests to remain in hеr father’s custody.” See id. at 20.
On March 13, 2013, Williams filed a Notice of Claim with the City Comptroller’s Office. Id. Ex. X; Compl. ¶ 80. Williams
C. The March 2013 Removal and Aftermath
On March 18, '2013, at 12:41 p.m., a report was called in to the State Central Register. Ellis Decl. Ex. A. It stated that “on 3/17/13 mother [Williams] hit I[.W.] with a belt multiple times. As a result, the child sustained a welt on her arm.” Id. It added that the child, I.W., had disclosed the incident. Id.
That afternoon, ACS caseworker Ellis was assigned the case. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 132. Ellis contacted the report’s source, who stated that I.W. had come to school and told the principal that she needed to speak with her ACS caseworker. Id. at ¶ 133. I.W. apparently did not want to say why, but she was willing to write it down. Id. According to the source, I.W. had written that her mother (Williams) had hit her with a belt multiple times for no reason. Id. The source said that ACS caseworker Savory was called; when I.W. spoke to Savory, I.W. started to cry. Id. Savory then told the source to report the incident to the State Central Register. Id. Ellis then called Williams and informed her that a report had been made concerning I.W.’s safety; Ellis stated that she needed to see I.W. that evening. Id. at ¶ 135. Williams gave her home address to Ellis. Id.
At about 7:50 p.m. that night, Ellis arrived at Williams’ home. Id. at ¶ 136. Ellis explained that a reрort had been made regarding I.W.’s safety. Id. Williams stated that the report had come about because I.W. had gone to the school nurse to get a band-aid, and the school decided to call in a report. Id. Williams told I.W. to tell Ellis what I.W. had told Williams; I.W. then told Ellis that she went to get a band-aid from the nurse for a cut on her hand, and she had no idea what happened after that. Id. In her declaration, Ellis said, “I.W. gestured to me— out of sight of Ms. Williams — in a manner that I interpreted to mean that she did not want me to say anything about ... what she revealed to the source. I then asked Ms. Williams if I could see the bedroom. Ms. Williams allowed I.W. to show me the bedroom. When we were alone, I asked I.W. if she was okay. I.W. told me she was fine but did not want to speak in the home because she was concerned that I was going to tell her mother that she was the source of the report.” Ellis Decl. ¶ 12; see also id. Ex. B, CNY 200.
The following morning, Ellis went to I.W.’s school and spoke with I.W. about the alleged incident. Ellis Decl. ¶ 13. According to Ellis, I.W. said that, on March 17, 2013, her mother, Williams, had beaten her with a belt for holding a Blackberry device. Id. at ¶ 14. Ellis reported:
■I.W. told me that [ ] the beating started because her mother told her that she could not use the Blackberry. But then her mother told I.W. to get up and go into the bedroom, so I.W. took her blanket along with the Blackberry and headed to the bedroom. I.W. told me that her mother had given her the Blackberry so I.W. was surprised and shocked when her mother started hitting her with the buckle of the belt.
I.W. told me that when the belt broke, Ms. Williams went and got another and continued to beat I.W.
I.W. told me that she received the welt marks on her arms when she tried to protect her legs from the beating of the belt.
I.W. told me that after the beating, I.W. found it hard to walk.
I observed and photographed I.W.’s physical injuries. I observed welt marks in the healing phase on both of I.W.’s arms that were about three inches in length. I also observed lacerations on I.W.’s legs and thighs that were also in the healing phase that appeared to be from the buckle of the belts, consistent with I.W.’s explanation. The edges of the lacerations on I.W.’s legs and thighs were jagged and consistent with being caused by a belt buckle.
I asked I.W. if this was the first time that she had been hit by her mother. I learned that this was not the first time that I.W. had been hit by her mother but that it was the first time that it was this severe, which is why I.W. became scared and why she asked the school to call her former ACS caseworker, Frederick Savory.
I called my supervisor, Ms. Awer and told her about my conversation with I.W., as detailed above. I also emailed Ms. Awer the photographs of I.W.’s injuries.
Ellis Deel. ¶¶ 15-21 (citations omitted).
Ellis and her supervisor, Awer, decided that they needed to report the incident'to the police. Id. at ¶ 21. On the afternoon of March 19, 2013, Awer called Williams and asked her to bring I.W. to the 47th Precinct in the Bronx. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 147. There, NYPD Officer Arlene Rivera of the Domestic Victims Unit and Ellis jointly interviewed I.W. Id. at ¶ 148. Williams was not present. Id. I.W. stated that, on March 17, 2013, she had been on a “no electronics” punishment; she was in the living room watching television, and her mother told her that she needed to go to the bedroom. Id. at ¶ 149. I.W. said that she stood up with the Blackberry phone and her blanket; when Williams saw I.W. with the Blackberry, she asked I.W. what she was doing with the phone. Id. I.W. stated that she did not understand why her mother had asked that question because her mother herself had given I.W. the Blackberry earlier. Id. According to I.W., Williams then grabbed a belt and started beating I.W. with the buckle. Id. When that belt broke, Williams went and got another belt and continued to beat I.W. Id. Officer Rivera examined I.W.’s injuries. Id. at ¶ 150. That afternoon, Williams was charged with Assault in the Third Degree, Endangering the Welfare of a Child, and Harassment in the Second Degree. See Dkt. 54 (“Rivera Deck”), Ex. B. (These charges, however, were dropped several months later. See Kruk Deck Ex. Z (“PI. Dep.”), at 88.) '
Ellis called her supervisor, Awer, and informed her that Williams would be arrested. Ellis also noted that I.W.’s comments had been consistent with I.W.’s earlier account, and that I.W. had told Ellis that she did not want to return home with her mother. Awer tоld Ellis that she would seek authorization for I.W. to be removed on an emergency basis; Awer soon obtained this authorization. On March 19, 2013, at about 3 p.m., I.W. was temporarily removed from Williams’ custody on an emergency basis; after being examined by ACS’s medical team, I.W. was taken to the home of her paternal grandmother, Izora Pettway. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 152-56.
The next morning, on March 20, 2013, ACS filed an Article 10 neglect petition in Bronx Family Court alleging that Williams had inflicted excessive corporal punishment on I.W. Id. at ¶ 157. That day, a hearing was held in Bronx Family Court. Id. at ¶ 158. Williams attended and was appointed counsel from the Bronx Defenders. Id. At the hearing, Judge Pitchal held that ACS had been excused from making reasonable efforts to avoid the removal of I.W., because it would have been
On March 25, 2013, the City’s Comptroller’s Office received an amended Notice of Claim from Williams, which claimed that Ellis had entered Williams’ home without permission; that Ellis, Awer, and a police officer had interrogated Williams’ minor child and forced the child to sign documents without a parent or lawyer present; and that Ellis and Awer had removed the child without a court order and without cause. See Kruk Decl. Ex. Y.
On October 3, 2013, the Bronx Family Court held a fact-finding hearing and issued a fact-finding order. It found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that:
[Williams] neglected [I.W.] by inflicting excessive corporal punishment upon her. The record indicates that the mother inflicted a severe beating on the child with the buckle of a belt; when the first belt broke, the mother obtained a second and continued to beat the child. The child sustained lacerations on both legs and arms and was in such pain that she was unable to walk normally the next day and immediately cried out for assistance from school officials. The child’s out-of-court statements are corrobоrated by Ms. Ellis’s eyewitness account of her injuries as well as the photographs of the injuries. Finally, the child stated that she fears her mother; . this statement is corroborated by her behavior on the day the investigator visited the home, when the child motioned to the worker not to ask certain questions.
Dkt..53 (“Boutis Decl.”), Ex. A.
On October 15, 2013, a permanency hearing was held before the Family Court. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 169. Before the hearing, the Court’s “permanency planning goal” had been “Return to Parent.” Id. However, the Court noted, many unsuccessful attempts had been made to reach out to Williams; the Court therefore ordered that a guardianship be planned for and that “KinGAP” placement with I.W.’s paternal grandmother be explored.
On April 7, 2014, a permanency hearing was held as to I.W. Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 172. Williams did not appear; nor had she appeared at any such hearing since March 20, 2013, when she lost custody of I.W. Id. at ¶ 173. In an affidavit in this case, Williams explained that she has not attended hearings or made contact with ACS’s staff because she “is being falsely accused, and should have not have even been in court.” PL Aff. ¶ 25. At the April 7, 2014 hearing, the Family Court changed the permanency planning goal from “Return to Parent” to “KinGAP.” Defs’ 56.1 ¶ 176.
D. Procedural History
On March 25, 2013, Williams, pro se, filed a .Complaint, pursuant to
Following defendants’ answer, see Dkt. 22, and discovery, the defendants, on May 28, 2014, moved for summary judgment, Dkt. 48, submitting a common memorandum of law, see Dkt. 49, and Rule 56.1 Statement, see Dkt. 57, along with declarations in support, see Dkt. 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56. On July 7, 2013, Williams submit- • ted an affidavit in opposition, Dkt. 61 (“PI. Aff.”), and on July 21, 2013, defendants submitted a reply brief, Dkt. 62.
Defendants move for summary judgment as to all claims. Most fundamentally, they argue that a trier of fact could not find that they violated Williams’ rights. In particular, they dispute her claim that her due process rights were violated by the removal of her children at various points. They argue that the facts support that Williаms was afforded due process before losing custody of her children. Defendants also seek summary judgment, as to various claims, based on absolute or qualified immunity and based on the statute of limitations. For her part, Williams disputes these points.
II. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
To survive a summary judgment motion, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record.”
When a pro se litigant is involved, the same standards for summаry judgment apply, but “the pro se litigant should be given special latitude in responding to a summary judgment motion.” Knowles v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Corr.,
III. Discussion
In bringing claims under
A. Preliminary Considerations
1. Williams’ Sixth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendment Claims
The Complaint refers in passing to the Sixth Amendment. See Cornpl., p. 10 (alleging that defendants violated “Plaintiff[’s] rights under the ... Sixth ... Amendment”). The Complaint does not elaborate; the Court interprets Williams to refer to the episode alleged in the Complaint in which I.W. was interviewed in a police station by an NYPD officer, with neither a parent nor an attorney present, and despite Williams’ alleged requests for a lawyer for her child. See Compl. ¶¶ 81, 97.
The Sixth Amendment does not apply here. It provides in pertinent part that “ ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.’ The Amendment thus defines the scope of the right to counsel in three ways: It provides who may assert the right (‘the accused’); when the right may be asserted (‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions’); and what the right guarantees (‘the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence’).” Rothgery v. Gillespie County,
As for Williams’ Eighth Amendment claim, she alleges that defendants “are depriving the Plaintiff of her ... right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” CompL, p. 1; see
Finally, as to the Thirteenth Amendment, it provides thаt “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”
Here, Williams alleges that ACS coerced her to attend a parenting course,
2. The Statute of Limitations
“The statute of limitations for claims brought under
The decisive issue, then, is whether Williams’ claims based on these incidents accrued at the time of these incidents, or instead at some later point on or after March 25, 2010. Williams argues that “August 13, 2010, the date of the Bronx Family Court decision, is the date that the Statu[t]e of Limitation[s] for claims begins in this matter, for it was when the Plaintiff came to know that her Constitutional protections were compromised in October and December 2009.... ” PI. Aff. ¶ 8. That is incorrect. “A
Here, Williams experienced the removal of her children from her custody on the day it happened—she. does not and cannot claim otherwise, and by her own admission, she attended Family Court proceedings the day after the removal. Compl. ¶ 55. In such circumstances, courts have held that the limitations period began to run on the date a parent’s children were removed. See, e.g., Winkler v. Grant, No. 07 Civ. 6280T (MAT),
Williams does not appear to rely on the continuing violation doctrine, see PI. Aff. ¶ 8, but the Court will consider such a theory out of solicitude for Williams as a pro se plaintiff. “The continuing violation doctrine is an exception to the normal knew-or-should-have-known accrual date.” Shomo,
Williams’ claims do not support application of the continuing violation doctrine. To be sure, Williams’ loss of custody continued over time, compounding the pain to Williams from her children’s absence, but their removal did not flow from a series of continuing wrongs. On the contrary, the acts giving rise to Williams’ claim were complete when the police officers forcibly entered Williams’ home without a warrant, woke her up, and took her children away. See PL Aff. ¶ 5. At that moment, Williams knew — or at the very least, should have known — of the alleged wrong. As such, Williams’ claims predating March 25, 2010 are time-barred.
Given that, Williams’ claims are time-barred to the extent she challenges the forcible entry into her house in December 2009, id. at ¶ 5, and the 2009 removals of her children, which she protests on the grounds that “children at home alone is not a crime or emergency in itself,” id. at ¶ 6; see also id. at ¶ 3. These incidents appear to be the basis for most of Williams’ Fourth Amendment claims. See Compl. ¶ 49. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted for defendants on Williams’ claims that predate March 25, 2010.
3. Absolute Immunity of ACS’s Lawyers
Two defendants, Stephens and Sokol, are Special Assistant Corporation Counsels for the City of New York who represented ACS in the Family Court proceed
Even taking these allegations as true, Williams’ claims cannot proceed against Stephens and Sokol because they are entitled, as a matter of law, to absolute immunity. The Supreme Court has held that a state prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability in a
The Second Circuit has applied this doctrine to facts virtually identical to those here. In Walden v. Wishengrad,
4. Supervisory Liability of ACS Commissioners and Chiefs of Staff
Williams has also sued four high-ranking ACS officials: former and current Commissioners Mattingly and Richter; and former and current chiefs of staff Hu and Lauros. Summary judgment is merited for these defendants because Williams has not alleged facts indicating that they were personally involved in any alleged violations.
To state a
Williams’ Complaint lists the Commissioners and chiefs of staff as defendants, see Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11, 'but does not elaborate at all on their acts, except to say generally that the ACS Commissioner is responsible for ensuring ACS’s compliance with the law and “for making and/or approving policies for ACS, including policies regarding the investigation of alleged child abuse or maltreatment, the removal and detention from their families, and the training and supervision of employees in ACS,” id. at ¶ 10. In her deposition, Williams accused former Commissioner Mattingly of failing to “oversee his agency or his employees, adequately ... because [Williams’] case was not handled correctly,” PI. Dep. 107-08; accused Richter of “failfing] to supervise his employees, and to ensure that the agency is acting in accordance with the law,” id. at 119; accused Hu of failing to “make sure that her employees are acting according to their responsibilities and the law,” id. at 109; and alleged that Lauros “has authority over A.C.S. employees, and ensuring that they follow guidelines and procedures, and based on what happened with my most recent run-in with A.C.S. [in March 2013], it doesn’t seem as though she’s doing her job correctly,” id. at 116-17.
Williams has adduced no facts to support these generalized claims of misfeasance, let alone that these officials were “personally or directly involved” in the alleged violations at issue here, as the law requires. Harris,
B. Williams’ Remaining Federal Claims
Williams’ remaining federal claims consist of Fourteenth Amendment claims (due process and equal protection) against ACS caseworkers, their direct supervisors, the City of New York and the NYPD, and a
1. Overview of Constitutional Principles Relating to the State’s Removal of Children from Their Homes
“Parents ... have a constitutionally prоtected liberty interest in the care, custody and management of their children.” Southerland v. City of New York,
“First, both the parents and the children may have a cause of action for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under a theory of denial of procedural due process.” Id. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that, “except in emergency circumstances, judicial process must be accorded both parent and child before removal of the child from his or her parent’s custody may be effected.” Id. (citing Kia P. v. McIntyre,
“Second, a parent may also bring suit under a theory of violation of his or her right to substantive due process.” Southerland,
2. Williams’ Due Process Claims
I.W. was undisputedly removed from Williams’ custody on March 19, 2013 without a court order. Because there was no pre-removal judicial process, the decisive issue is whether there was “objectively reasonable” evidence that harm to the child was “imminent.” Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
In reviewing the evidence, the Court notes that the summary judgment record contains defendants’ accounts of the events at issue, but not Williams’. During her deposition, Williams repeatedly invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate herself. PI. Dep. 80-82. The Fifth Amendment protects persons from being compelled to answer questions put to them “in any ... proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate [them] in future criminal proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Turley,
a. Events of March 2013
The events of March 2013 are canvassed in detail above. See supra, pp. 444-47. In short, I.W. came to school on a Monday, told the principal she needed to speak with her ACS caseworker, and wrote out that Williams had hit her with a belt multiple times the day before. A report was called in to the State Central Register, and caseworker Ellis was assigned the case. Ellis visited Williams’ home that evening, where Williams blamed the school for the report. When Ellis and I.W. spoke privately in a bedroom, I.W. said that she did not want Ellis to reveal, to Williams, that it was I.W. who had disclosed the incident. I.W. added that she did not want to speak, in the home, about the incident. The next morning, Ellis visited I.W. at school, where I.W. said that Williams had beaten her with a belt buckle for holding a Blackberry device; that when that belt broke, Williams got another one and continued to beat I.W.; that I.W. received welt marks on her arms when she tried to protect her legs from the beating of the belt; and that after the beating, I.W. found it hard to walk. Ellis observed “welt marks in the healing phase on both of I.W.’s arms that were about three inches in length,” as well as “lacerations on I.W.’s legs and thighs that were also in the healing phase that appeared to be from the buckle of the belts.” Ellis Deck ¶ 19. I.W. told Ellis that this was not the first time her mother had hit her, but it was the most severe. That afternoon, ACS asked Williams to bring I.W. to the 47th Precinct in the Bronx; there, I.W. repeated her account to NYPD ■ Officer Rivera and Ellis. Williams was arrested. That day, I.W. was removed on an emergency basis after Awer obtained authorization.
b. Analysis
Turning first to Williams’ procedural due process claim, due process requires that parents be afforded a hearing before a child is removed from their custody, unless therе is “objectively reasonable” evidence that harm to the child was “imminent.” Nicholson,
To be sure, at one point in her deposition, Williams said, “I never spanked [I.W.].” PI. Dep. 73. But this statement does not call into question the information reported by I.W. to ACS, or observed by ACS, at the time it acted. And this statement merits limited weight, given that Williams otherwise repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment, including in response to questions about the details that I.W. had reported (e.g., about the belt-buckle beatings of I.W., about the use of a second belt to beat I.W., about the “no-electronics” punishment imposed on I.W. whose breach apparently prompted Williams to beat I.W., and about whether I.W. had a Blackberry in her hands). PI. Dep. 80-82. On this record, there is no genuine issue of material fact: It was plainly “objectively reasonable” to conclude that harm to the child was “imminent,” obviating the need for prior court approval. Nicholson,
In so holding, the Court rejects Williams’ argument that, if harm were truly “imminent,” ACS would have rеmoved I.W. immediately rather than permit her to remain with Williams for one more night. PI. Aff. ¶ 21. This argument proves too much; the fact that ACS conscientiously and quickly followed up — and in the process, ensured the accuracy of the report and the consistency of the child’s statements — is a sign of care rather than a sign that the circumstances were not extremely serious. The initial report to the State Central Register was called in on a Monday afternoon; by Tuesday afternoon, ACS had separate, consistent statements from I.W. (to Ellis and Rivera) and had removed I.W. from Williams’ custody on an emergency basis. ACS’s swift but thorough actions are what one would expect in response to “objectively reasonable” evidence that harm to the child was “imminent.” In sum, the Court enters summary judgment for defendants on Williams’ procedural due process claim.
As to Williams’ substantive due process claim, “[s]uch a claim can only be sustained if the removal of the child ‘would have been prohibited by the Constitution
3. Williams’ Equal Protection Claim
Williams’ Complaint fleetingly invoked her right to “equal protection of the laws,” see Compl. ¶ 1, but Williams nowhere explains how this right was infringed. She does not allege that she was subject to differential treatment based on membership in a protected class, see generally Able v. United States,
“A class-of-one claim exists ‘where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently.from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’ ” Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel,
The Court infers that Williams seeks to pursue a class-of-one claim, because her statements suggest she believes that she was singled out for harsh treatment. Cf. id. at 137 (analyzing, under class-of-one doctrine, claims that New York State Department of Health “intentionally and maliciously subjected [plaintiff] to an intense and unwarranted degree of regulatory scrutiny”). Williams alleges that her children were removed “under circumstances that the agency would not remove other New York City parents^] children for,” and that ACS “would not have removed the child of an affluent New Yorker based on the 2009 and 2013 allegations without the legally required efforts.” PI. Aff. ¶ 30'; cf. Compl. ¶ 83. However, she has not come forward with any evidence to support these assertions. Nor has Williams provided any evidence of how “similarly situated” comparators were treated. This prevents her from pursuing a class-of-one claim. See, e.g., Giordano v. City of New York,
4. Williams’ Fourth Amendment Claim
Williams states that “ACS representatives lured [her] to a Bronx Police station”
“To prove the elements of false arrest under New York law, plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Bernard v. United States,
Here, the officers clearly had probable cause to arrest Williams, for the reasons set out above. The assembled evidence, including I.W.’s specific accounts of abuse at Williams’ hands and the defendants’ visual observations of bruisеs on I.W.’s body in places consistent with I.W.’s narrative, see, e.g., Defs’ 56.1 ¶¶ 144, 150, supplied “reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Id. Thus, to the extent Williams brings a false arrest claim, summary judgment for defendants is granted.
C. Qualified Immunity
The Court has held that the ACS caseworkers and supervisors did not violate Williams’ constitutional rights. However, even if the evidence could be viewed to suggest that these officials had engaged in borderline conduct, these officials would still be protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, because they were all “acting in discharge of their duties and within the scope of their employment.”
D. Municipal Liability
Because the Court has not found any violations of Williams’ constitutional rights, there is no basis on which she can pursue a theory of municipal liability. See Segal v. City of New York,
E. Williams’ State-Law Claims
Having granted summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Williams’ state-law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
.The Court’s account of the background is drawn from the parties' submissions, including Williams’ Complaint (Dkt. 2); Defendants’ Local
Although Williams filed a Complaint and an affidavit, she did not dispute (or even mention) the vast majority of the factual propositions on which defendants rely in moving for summary judgment. The Court takes as true the factual propositions propounded by defendants which are supported by admissible evidence and which Williams does not contravene, for this rule of law applies equally to cases involving pro se plaintiffs. See
. Because the daughters are minors, the Court, like the parties, refers to them by their initials.
. As explained below, Williams' claims based on events in 2009 and early 2010 are time-barred. The Court summarizes these events here as context for later events and for Williams’ allegations.
. Williams alleges that this call came from "a disgruntled girlfriend of [her] ex-beau, Percy Robinson,” who is I.W.’s father. Compl. ¶ 32.
. KinGAP — the Kinship Guardianship Assistance Program — "is designed for a foster child to achieve a permanent placement with a relative.” New York State Office of Children & Family Servs., Kinship, available at ocfs.state.ny.us/kinship/kingap.asp (last visited January 7, 2015).
. To the extent that Williams bases this claim on the fact that her daughter was questioned without an attorney, Williams lacks standing to protest that practice, as a pro se plaintiff may generally only "proceed pro se with respect to [her] own claims or claims against [her] personally,” Berrios v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth.,
. Williams chose not to attend most of these hearings because, she explained in her deposition, she felt that these hearings were not "fair.” PL Dep. 61. Her election not to attend the court hearings, however, does not give her a due process claim.
. In granting defendants summary judgment on all federal claims, the Court has also rejected multiple, miscellaneous undeveloped contentions in Williams' Complaint and Affidavit. For instance, Williams "disputes the authenticity” of the March 20, 2013 Court order (Ellis Decl. Ex. G.) in which Judge Pitchal excused ACS from making reasonable efforts to avoid the removal of I.W. because, he found, it would have been contrary to I.W.’s welfare and best interests to remain with Williams. PL Aff. ¶ 21. At summary judgment, however, merely stating that one disputes the authenticity of the opposing party’s evidence is insufficient to produce a genuine issue of material fact; evidence is required. See Anderson,
. Williams’ Complaint refers in passing to state-law claims, see Compl. ¶ 1 (referring to "the New York State Constitution”), but does not specify which of her state-law rights were violated.