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Williams v. Ryan
623 F.3d 1258
9th Cir.
2010
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Docket

*1 results demon- suggests further “folly in be- sentencing judge’s

strate Smith,” but testimony Cheryl

lieving the all, testimony none of her or part,

whether credible, to his Landrigan confessed

was in a “put the victim that he

psychologist lock, hit him until he partner

head and his [Landrigan] The client unconscious. place, original his robbing

went back

intention, took an elec- partner while the him to to choke began

tric cord Thus, Landrigan present

death.” Enmund), (unlike he has

the scene major his

admitted facts demonstrate in, and reckless indifference

participation

to, Dyer’s murder. Landrigan’s second conclude that

We application presents

and successive habeas relief ground on which

no substantial of the rec-

might granted. Our review exploration that further

ord convinces us Ac-

by the district court is unwarranted.

cordingly, deny application. we This request stay.7

moots the for a REQUEST DENIED.

APPLICATION

FOR STAY DISMISSED.

Aryon WILLIAMS, Petitioner-

Appellant, RYAN, Respondent- L.

Charles

Appellee.

No. 07-99013. Appeals, States Court of

United

Ninth Circuit. 5, 2009.

Argued and Submitted Nov.

Filed Oct. hearing a writ of certiorari.” 28 U.S.C. appealable and or for 7. Our denial "shall not be 2244(b)(3)(E). § subject petition re- shall not be the of a *2 (1963), the failure of the state court sentencing evidence at mitigating consider Ohio, *3 of Lockett v. 438 U.S. violation (1978) 2954, Oklahoma, Eddings (1982). 71 L.Ed.2d the testi- The evidence at trial included then mony Deloney, of Michelle Williams’ to had confessed girlfriend, Williams he murdered DeLao. The murder her relatively in a remote area of occurred there no County, Pinal Arizona and were eyewitnesses physical and little evidence. charge, robbery/attempted murder On Oracle, AZ, Hall, for petitioner- Julie victim, Soto, Norma testified at trial Aryon appellant, Williams. as her attacker. and identified Williams Zick, Phoenix, AZ, respon- Jeffrey A. for after the convictions were years Two Ryan. L. dent-appellee, Charles Attorney an Assistant appeal, affirmed on Arizona over General for turned attorney packet jailhouse a of Williams’ trial that suggested letters written before not the actual murderer. that Williams was suggested These letters that Williams had man, Fields, Patrick to do the paid another SCHROEDER, M. Before: MARY job. jailhouse letters led Williams to BERZON and SANDRA S. MARSHA S. they had seen two witnesses who said IKUTA, Judges. Circuit disposing bloody clothing park in a Fields morning a around the time of the murder. SCHROEDER; Opinion by Judge history turned out to have a Fields Partial and Partial Dissent Concurrеnce assaulting women. by Judge IKUTA.

By the time became aware of Williams evidence, pro- OPINION this these federal habeas ceedings had been instituted. The district SCHROEDER, Judge: Circuit stayed proceedings court so in Arizona Aryon Williams was convicted could, court, in state exhaust a Williams court in 1992 and sentenced to death jailhouse let- arising claim from the the first murder of his former degree court, however, refused to ters. The state DeLao, Rita and for the later girlfriend request for a first extension of grant robbery attempted murder of Norma petition. prepare postconviction time to appellate upheld The Arizona courts Soto. was, therefore, to exhaust unable Williams and sentence. See State v. his convictions he returned to fed- state remedies. When Williams, Ariz. 904 P.2d 437 court, rejected eral district proceeding, In this habeas claim was position State’s claim of significant barred, issues concern a most but denied the claim procedurally evi- court we partially exculpatory concealment of on the merits. Like the district regard this claim without Brady Maryland, in violation of consider dence opinion deferential strictures the Antiterrorism Court’s on direct appeal. State v. Penalty Effective Death Act of 1996 Williams, 183 Ariz. 904 P.2d 437 (“AEDPA”). agree the district We (1995). We summarize them here. appropriate court that it is not to view the Saturday, January On procedurally claim as barred because and DeLao plans spend made the night opportunity did not have an together at apartment Williams’ in Casa it in raise stаte court. The district court called, Grande. though, When DeLao granted appealability certificate (“COA”) and Williams told her we have determined that this not to come over since evidentiary hearing. warrants girlfriend Deloney was still at his *4 apartment. DeLao came over nonetheless granted

The district court also a COA argument and had an out- Williams trial for the court violated building. side the pulled gun DeLao a on process rights by failing Williams’ due provide expert Williams, funds for a mental health but Williams was able to disarm sentencing to drug dependence establish briefly her. Williams apart- returned to his mitigating as a factor. Like the district ment, it, then left and did not return until court, agree we that the state court’s re- following morning. jection contrary of this claim was not to or Sunday morning, On a hunter discover- application Supreme an unreasonable of body ed DeLao’s on a dirt road about precedent. Court twenty minutes from apartment. Williams’ Of numerous claims had not DeLao had been shot three times and her certified, been that have been but briefed body had suffered a gruesome number of rules, pursuant to our we find one to be injuries. beaten, She had been and tire meritorious. offered his Williams addic tracks across her stomach indicated that mitigating tion to crack cocaine as a factor sentencing. by The Arizona she had been run over an Supreme automobile. Court refused to this as a mitigat consider Bullets recovered at the scene were consis- ing applicable factor under Arizona law gun tent with the Williams had taken from because Williams did not show he was shortly DeLao her death. before drugs under the influence of at the time of Deloney testified Williams confess- the murder. challenge Because Williams’ Monday ed to her on that he was with to this determination raises a substantial several friends who killed DeLao. Accord- issue, 2253(c)(2), § constitutional 28 U.S.C. ing to Deloney, only Williams said he had certify we the issue and decide it. As we DeLao, have done in other kicked and that his emanating cases from friends had period, Arizona courts in the same we find killed her. Williams denied ever confess- that the state court erred its refusal to ing in involvement DeLao’s death. Also mitigating consider all evidence. See Ed Monday, Deloney Williams drove 114-15, 869; dings, 455 102 S.Ct. place where car DeLao’s had been aban- Lockett, 604-05, 2954; 438 U.S. at doned, less than a apartment mile from his Schriro, Lambright v. in approached Casa Grande. As Williams (9th Cir.2007). 1114-15 car, police processing a officer car them, stopped told the Williams officer AND FACTUAL PROCEDURAL thought it he was DeLao’s car. BACKGROUND Deloney testified two weeks after underlying The facts of this case are set murder, out Supreme detail the Arizona told her that he Williams had her, case, reject these claims as DeLao, that he shot of this we admitting killed well.”). iron, and ran over her hit her with told De- his car. Williams repeatedly with also offered his addiction anyone, told he if ever loney that she circumstance at sen- mitigating crack as a kill her.

would trial court refused to consid- tencing. The murder, Norma after the Five weeks mitigation. drug use er Williams’ clerk, Soto, store convenience a Circle-K agreеd, holding Arizona Court during robbery times was shot several “[wjithout impair- showing of some and identified survived the store. Soto offense, drug at the time use ment attacker, testifying that he as her mitigating circumstance of cannot be stop spreading her to telling her after shot kind.” Id. at 453. killed DeLao. Police story that he had post- filing After two unsuccessful mur- for both the arrested Williams soon petitions conviction which he raised the robbery/attempted and the der of DeLao sentencing claims of erroneous denial of a murder Soto. expert mental health and the refusal to *5 trial, in a consolidated jury, An Arizona mitigating his addiction as a fac- consider in 1992 of the murder convicted Williams tor, pro- instituted federal habeas Williams DeLao, robbery, at- armed and the ceedings. peti- In while his federal trial, Deloney At tempted murder Soto. Attorney an pending, tion was Assistant witness on the principal was the State’s for Arizona turned over to defense General testified about charge. She murder letters, they counsel a series of and stated pre- also confessions. The State Williams’ “by secretary during an were discovered murder, prior sented evidence cleaning annual house at the Coun- [Pinal] car, DeLao’s shot at had Williams burned ty Attorney’s Office.” The State said the her tires. Soto apartment, her and slashed evidentiary had “no value.” letters as the testified and identified Williams purported The letters to have been writ- man who robbed the store and shot her. jail prior to ten from Williams’ defense and testified his own Williams Sweat, Beverly a woman namеd to in either criminal denied involvement Solis, investigator Tom the lead Detective have a criminal episode. Williams did not letters, in the DeLao murder. In the record, although the introduced evi- State in- expressed provide the desire to Sweat that crack cocaine dence he had abused murder, in formation she had about a re- Deloney. physically become abusive to and early jail. turn for an release from Solis stand, using drugs On the Williams denied letters, having seen these has denied ever day on the of the murder. given or a statement but has not testified sentencing, sought At Williams to have under oath to this effect. provide expert the state a mental health The contained information Sweat explore drug usage whether his had affect- letters inmate, obtained from a fellow allegedly ed his mental state when he killed DeLao. motion, McKaney, paid that Williams had The trial court denied this and the Yolanda that the deci- Patrick Fields to kill Rita DeLao and Supreme upheld Arizona Court McKaney had seen a bloodied Fields on sion without discussion. See 904 P.2d (“Defendant morning ... the time of the mur- also asserts that the one around letter stated that Sweat was expert trial court’s denial of funds for an der. One McKaney Yolanda “tell right process equal going [her] to due to have violated his story Rita and Patrick Fields.” under the the facts about protection law. Under In (appar- placed that “Aaron” the district court also noted The letter Aryon proceedings abeyance to allow petitioner federal ently a reference Williams) claim “going get” people: two Williams to exhaust a based According to upon subsequent Barnett. letters and the Fields and Milton Sweat letter, McKaney told Sweat The Arizona courts never investigation. this Grande, murder, claim, in Casa day of the DeLao considered the merits of this howev- bloody” er, “all Superior Fields who was because the Court denied she saw “Aaron” had him a paid an extension of time to file his who stated According kill petition, finding dollars to DeLao. had thousand Sweat, McKaney Fields told that he had Arizona good failed to show cause under 32.4(c). eyes out and run over her cut DeLao’s Rule of Criminal Procedure also stated that she moped. summarily with a Sweat Arizona Court then it,” part of some guilty knew “Aaron is denied review. letters, subsequent promised court, Back in federal Williams moved could obtain additional informa-

that she “Discovery, Expansion for of the Record tion, early if release. she obtained Evidentiary Hearing” on [an] the Bra- dy claim. opposed in- The State on the conducted an Counsel Williams ground procedurally this vestigation on the basis of the Sweat let- barred. in 1999 obtained declarations ters and in the people from three mentioned letters: The district court refused to treat Barnett, and McKaney, Fields. McKa- barred, procedurally claim as hold *6 ney’s declaration stated around the ing effect that the state courts had murder, time of the DeLao she saw Fields prevented following exhaustion without park in ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍a the small town of Casа any well established rule that would have Grande, Arizona, less than a mile from untimely. the petition rendered The dis aban- police

where discovered DeLao’s trict court noted that the State had failed morning doned car the after the murder. any denying to cite case a for request first bloody a saw a bloodied Fields throw She an extension of time in a case. To capital it. dumpster into a and burn Barnett shirt contrary, a Williams cited number of time, same and a stated that about this few examples where the state courts had Fields, McKaney from where saw blocks Thus, granted requests. such the district something a shirtless Fields throw he saw 32.4(c) found that Rule was not court dumpster. into a Barnett said while “firmly regularly established and fol Fields, cigarette a he noticed sharing Georgia, v. lowed.” See Ford 498 U.S. clothing. on Fields’ Barnett asked blood 411, 423-24, 850, 112 blood, and Fields fled. Fields about this (1991). mur- Barnett said he learned of DeLao’s day. granted The district court also der the next declaration stat- Fields’ county jail discovery at the time of the additional related to the investi- ed he was murder, gation but the later con- of the Sweat letters. The court DeLao State custody hearing, not in declined to order an in-court find- ceded that Fields was it documenta- ing appropriate that time. In the district court Williams consider evidence, a tion and review written rather produced evidence that Fields had histo- court ry against assaults women. than hear witnesses. The said of sexual that he knows it did so because of what it determined to Williams has admitted Barnett, Sweat, Brady оf the claim. McKaney, and Fields. be the “narrow focus” part thus no failure on the discovery and brief- there was completion After agree with the district court Williams. We Brady court denied the ing, the district 32.4(c) arbitrarily applied that Rule merits, holding that Williams claim on the the district court concluded this case. As the letters did prejudiced because was not for an extension of “every request first material information. not contain granted time in a case” had been of Williams’ new court noted that none in Arizona courts. previously directly impeached or under- information at trial —evi- presented cut the evidence arbitrary a of the state court’s As result to convict. jury found sufficient rules, dence there no state application of its is Rather, found the letters the district court which this court can de- court decision to that Williams provided requires further evidence AEDPA fer. The deference therefore, paid determinations, he had culpable by suggesting court does point- of this claim is de apply Fields to kill DeLao. The court also and our review Morgan, in the various decla- novo. See Pirtle ed to inconsistencies (9th Cir.2002). 1160, 1167 rations, fact the informa- noting that the jailhouse in a undermined originated tion A state commits a viola credibility. its 1) question the evidence in tion where 2) a on the accused, The district issued COA the state “wil favorable to Brady claim and the claim that Williams fully inadvertently” or the in suppressed 3) expert formation, to a mental health suppression preju was entitled sentencing. additionally certify the We diced the defendant. Strickler v. Greene, 263, 281-82, claim that addiction should have been con- mitigating sentencing. Prejudice factor at sidered “materi suppresses exists where the state information; al” evidence is material if had ANALYSIS been disclosed “there is reasonable I. The Claim probability proceed ... the result of the First, we address as threshold ing Kyles would have been different.” *7 matter the renewed contention that State’s Whitley, 514 (1995) (citation omitted). procedurally claim is Williams’ barred, though prevent even was Williams materials here consist raising ed from it because the state trial of the that packet Sweat letters turned court denied him a first extension of time. up Attorney’s years in the District office court, court, In this as in the district trial, after and led counsel to obtain a in single State has not cited to other Barnett, McKaney, declarations of and denying stance of an Arizona court a first Arave, Fields. Paradis v. 240 F.3d petition extension of time to file a habeas (9th Cir.2001) that (noting 1178-79 State, therefore, capital in a case. The has Brady material consists of admissible evi the denial to a pursuant shown dence or inadmissible evidence that could against well rule first established exten impeach government have been used sions in cases. Procedural default witness). suggest The Sweat letters thus application must be based on the of a well who, ed there were witnesses around the Ford, established rule. See 498 U.S. at murder, time of DeLao’s saw a bloodied 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850. disposing bloody clothing Patrick Fields

Because this claim denied in state a half a mile from dumpsters into about inadequate procedural ground, police court on an where found DeLao’s abandoned up car. defense counsel followed on gesting perpetrator When an alternate is “classic these leads after the letters were dis- Brady Boyette material.” v. Lefevre, 246 closed, (2d from Cir.2001); she obtained declarations the F.3d see United witnesses identified in the letters substan- Jernigan, States v. 1056-57 (9th Cir.2007) (en tially reiterating banc) this information. The (“Withholding suggested Sweat letters further that there knowledge of a suspect second conflicts might testify be a witness who could that with the Supreme Court’s directive that did not commit the murder him- the criminal as distinct from the self, paid but Fields to do it. prosecutor’s private deliberations, pre served as the chosen forum for ascertain that

Williams contends this information ing accusations.”) truth about criminal justify is sufficient to habeas relief. The (internal marks, citation, quotation contends, however, State with some validi- omitted). brackets only Not are the Sweat ty, that the new evidence does not under- letters inconsistent with the theory State’s Deloney’s testimony mine that Williams at trial —that only Williams was the indi confessed his involvement in the murder to responsible vidual for DeLao’s murder— it, State, Nor according her. does they but point also to an alternative sus any impact have on the evidence that pect may who himself responsi have been person Williams was the last known to be ble for the brutal crime. DeLao, they and that had an argu- ment when DeLao threatened Williams The two witnesses mentioned in the let- with the firearm that was used in her ters, Barnett, McKaney provided dec- murder. The Sweat letters are also con- pointed only larations to Fields. sistent with Williams’ first confession to There is also reason to believe the declara- Deloney only DeLao, that he had kicked tions from Barnett McKaney are more someone else killed her. See 904 than reliable the Sweat letters. Sweat P.2d at 441. points The State also out that prepared the in hopes letters of obtaining murder, prior to the Williams had burned an early jail, release from and thus had house; DeLao’s car and shot her every police motivation to tell the what she Sweat letters do not conflict with that evi- thought they wanted to hear. Barnett and dence either. contrast, McKaney, in apparent had no motivation to sign

Insofar as the letters false declaration suggest impli- cating was involved in the murder in a Fields. Williams has also provided different capacity killer, plausible explanation than as the actual the statement State in the suggest only contends the letters Sweat letters that he was “going alter- *8 theory get” nate Fields was equal culpability, unrelated to the murder. and we have held such Williams believed Fields responsible evidence undermines a was Brady claim for the violent assault long- where the new evidence of one of his fails to show the time friends. guilty.” defendant was “less Ylst, 447 See Morris v. F.3d 740-41 Fields is at a plausible least alternative (9th Cir.2006) (finding no violation suspect: history he had a of violence say where new information “did nоt Peti- against jail women and lied about being guilty, tioner not or that he was at the time of the McKaney murder. and guilty” less suggest did not another Barnett both saw Fields disposing of victim). party “struck” the bloody clothing around the time of the Here, part company we must away the murder and a short walk from where position, sug- police State’s because new evidence discovered DeLao’s car. abandoned Barnett, Williams, Fields, McKaney reweigh we do not evidence assess the [or] credibility lived in the same decide whether [to] one another and witnesses all knew suggest suppressed affidavits that evidence the town. Juror the establishes small juror reluctantly beyond voted to con a guilt party one of a third reasonable least evidentiary on the record. petitioner.” vict on the basis or exonerates Scott v. doubt Mullin, (10th con physical little There was also 303 F.3d Cir. (internal 2002) the crime. This lends necting marks, citation, Williams to quotation omitted). that someone materiality to new evidence critical ques and brackets The possibly solely re else was involved—and suppressed Brady tion is whether the ma Jernigan, See 492 F.3d sponsible. provided terial could have material evi strength prosecu of the (considering the may changed have the result. dence weighing materiality tor’s case The district court concluded on the basis of Roe, evidence); Gantt v. suppressed that Barnett written statements alone (9th Cir.2004) (holding that F.3d McKaney inherently were unbelievable newly information is material discovered witnesses. The court did so without hоld a conviction based when undermines evidentiary ing hearing an in-court or evidence). physical little upon they der to determine whether would have provide been able to material evidence that provided gov letters thus Sweat may changed have the result of Williams’ concerning with information ernment opin trial. This error. follow our We suspect alternative if dis possible Ornoski, in Earp ion defense, would have allowed closed (9th Cir.2005). 1169-70 put whether to McKa decide ney testify. and Barnett on the stand to case, In Earp, penalty also death we recognized principle We have credibility stressed that should be assessed not, government may consistent with Bra of an in-court hearing basis where dy, per suppress information another judge can see and hear the witnesses. son committed the crime for which the There, here, See id. the district court Jernigan, defendant is on trial. had resolved habeas on the basis of at 1056-57. F.3d written declarations and we held that to be error. See id. stated that “[b]ecause We provided The Sweat letters also veracity of signed the witnesses who potential names of two witnesses that Earp the affidavits on which based his could have testified to events that under issue, claim was at the claim could prosecution’s theory cut the that Williams adjudicated evidentiary hearing without an was the lone assailant. Rather than focus disputed on this issue of material fact.” letters, ing on the information at 1170. Id. potential materiality of the witnesses’ testimony that might implicate similarly another are unable to determine on We record, perpetrator, prematurely the district court this limited whether there is a presumptively probability” deemed these two witnesses “reasonable of a different re- not credible on the basis of inconsistencies sult at trial had this information been *9 Yet, Kyles, in their the decla at declarations. two available. See years Although many rations were in nine there are executed fact, questionable aspects after the murder. Given this some in the statements and sources, in necessarily capital inconsistencies do not make their this is case which im that wholly responsibility their stories incredible. More courts’ to ensure due claim, the is criti- portant, analyzing Brady process was afforded defendant “[w]hen opposition evidentiary active to an in-court the execution of an prevent cal in order to disagree that hearing, in the face of evidence the dissent’s individual him innocent of the crime of might show conclusion that invited error Williams Burger Kemp, See “express[ly] disavowing]” conviction. an in-court hearing. (“Our (1987) duty to search for constitu- disagree also with the dissent’s con- We care is never painstaking tional error with clusion that the Sweat letters could not case.”). it in a exacting more than is guilt phase have been material to the in The district court abused its discretion trial because the letters were not Williams’ determining these issues on the basis of 1275-76.) exculpatory. (Dissenting Op. documentary evidence alone. This recognizes, As the dissent the standard for “rare instances” case is not one of the materiality is whether “there is a reason- “credibility may be determined where probability able had the evidence evidentiary hearing.” an without defense, been disclosed the result of Earp, 431 F.3d 1169-70. proceeding would have been different.” that is not The dissent states Williams Kyles, 514 U.S. at 115 S.Ct. 1555 evidentiary hearing to an in-court entitled (citation omitted). The dissent contends “actively he on his claim because that because Sweat claimed in her letters (Dis- one” in the district court. opposed paid that Williams had Fields to kill De- 1278.) Op. at This is not an accu- senting Lao, person and under Arizona law a could of the record. description rate first-degree be convicted of murder if he evidentiary for an hear- expressly moved homicide, hired someone else to commit a claim, the district ing on his provided letters could not have Sweat court found he had satisfied AEDPA’s exculpated evidence that would have requirements obtaining one. See strict culpability Williams from for DeLao’s mur- 2254(e)(2). § The State then 28 U.S.U provided der. But if the account of events argued that the district court should sum- in by McKaney and Barnett their declara- deny holding claim without an marily accurate, altogether clear tions is is evidentiary hearing had because Williams that Williams was involved DeLao’s that he was unaware of the not shown reason, in- murder at all. For that an information about Fields the Sweat let- evidentiary hearing was needed so were not credible. ters and the letters the district court could assess Alternatively, requеsted the State an evi- credibility of these witnesses and deter- dentiary it could conduct hearing so mine whether there was a reasonable discovery develop evidence related to probability guilt phase at the the result counsel’s knowl- Williams’ Williams’ trial would have been different Williams’ edge alleged participation of Field’s had the State disclosed Sweat letters murder, Sweat, McKa- and cross-examine timely in a fashion. the incon- ney, investigate and Barnett to considering The dissent faults us for letters and the dec- sistencies between the McKaney declarations in our and Barnett opposed point, larations. At that analysis of whether the Sweat letters are evidentiary attempt the State’s to use 1279.) (Dissenting Op. material. This discovery hearing investigatory to conduct contention, however, on the premised previously granted the when the court had prosecution faulty assumption investigate a five-month extension to State that the information matters, could not have known and it had failed to do so. these material. Clear- of events as the Sweat letters was We do not view this course *10 1268 Request II. for a Mental would have Williams’

ly, prosecutor a reasonable letters, Expert Mitigat- which identi- known that the Sweat Health to Present an alternative new witnesses and fied two ing Evidence to evidence material to suspect, could lead next contends the state of De- culpability for the murder Williams’ unreasonably applied Ake v. Okla so, confirm is Lao. The declarations homa, 68, 1087, 105 470 U.S. S.Ct. 84 were avail- by indicating that the witnesses (1985), him when denied information possessed material able psychiatric sentencing assistance at to may exculpated have Williams. The which present mitigating related to his explained prose- has that a Supreme Court usage. crack cocaine Because Williams the materi- cutor who has doubt about required failed to make our threshold ality piece of a of evidence favorable issue, showing the evidence. that his mental state was in defendant should disclose (“[A] Kyles, reject S.Ct. we this claim. too

prosecutor tacking anxious about close Court in Ake held that due Supreme piece the wind will disclose a favorable to requires provide the state to process evidence.”); Agurs, United States indigent psychiatric defendant funds for U.S. he makes a preliminary assistance when (1976) (“[T]he prudent prosecutor will re- showing signifi- that his mental state was a in questions solve doubtful favor of disclo- cant factor at the time of the offense. 470 sure.”). appropriate It is therefore to con- 105 S.Ct. 1087. The Arizona McKaney the declarations of sider not Supreme explain Court did its reason- Barnett, any testimony they may pro- ing rejecting in Williams’ Ake claim. remand, We evidentiary hearing vide at an on record, suppres- independently to determine whether therefore review the the State’s AEDPA, sion of the Sweat letters violated only, by Williams’ required may but process rights Brady. due under grant unreasonably relief if the state court applied controlling federal deter- law as by We hold the district court erred Pirtle, Supreme mined Court. See developing further the factual record of 313 F.3d improper claim. It would be to possibility dismiss the The district court denied the Ake claim tending denied access to information First, on two this case bases. the dis implicate guilt perpe- of another in the trict court noted that other circuits have tration of this heinous crime. We thus interpreted require pro Ake to a state to remand this claim order for the expert psychiatric vide a defendant assis decide, district court to on the basis of an sentencing only tance at where the state record, appropriate whether there were rely planned psychiatric also testimo who provided witnesses could have materi- Mitchell, ny. Mason v. See 320 F.3d al evidence favorable to Williams at trial. (6th Cir.2003). Yet, we never have hearing any testimony After from available narrowly. Ake read so Solis, McKaney, Barnett, Fields, Hoffman (9th Cir.2006) Arave, Sweat, the district court will be a better (“[In ],Ake Court held that position newly to assess whether this dis- indigent where an defendant can demon jury’s covered evidence undermines the capacity likely mental verdict, strate government and whether the vio- ‘significant at trial in- be issue’ or Brady principle failing lated the sentencing, right form Williams it before trial. he has an absolute to be about *11 sentencing through state at issue at psychologi mental psychiatric and provided assistance.”), testimony that part Deloney’s on Michelle trial he vacated expert cal 749, 117, murder, 128 S.Ct. day 552 U.S. used crack the before grounds, other (2008); Ronald Williams testimony other that a violent through (9th Stewart, Cir. 441 F.3d change v. in character coincided with his McCormick, 2006) curiam); Smith (per drugs. to the re- starting Applying use (9th Cir.1990). 1153, 1157 914 F.2d deference, level of we find that it quired “objectively not unreasonable” was ruled that also The district courts to determine this an in- state was failed to make a suf- had himself showing. Lockyer v. sufficient threshold his mental showing that ficient threshold Andrade, the time of the mur- was at issue at state (2003); 155 L.Ed.2d 28 U.S.C. in the

der, there was so little because 2254(d)(1), use, Deloney’s § Even with indicate, drug to that due record testimony, there was little evidence impaired. The mental state Williams’ drug affirm had in fact affected the granted a COA. We on Williams’ use district court ground. example, crime. For there was no evi the latter of bizarre behavior exhibited dence pro Ake’s due triggering Before at the time of the offense. See assistance, psychiatric a de right cess Williams, 441 F.3d at Ronald 1048-50 trial must “demonstrate!] fendant (holding rely defendant who did not time of the sanity that his at the judge defense, insanity an on had been found Ake, factor.” significant is to be a offense competent, and failed to exhibit “bizarre” at 105 S.Ct. 1087. The defen “psychotic” put or behavior failed to showing threshold dant Ake made this issue); ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍at see also mental state James an phase by relying trial insani for the (10th Gibson, & n. 5 In ty Id. at 105 S.Ct. 1087. defense. Cir.2000) (holding that the defendant had addition, he had exhibited “bizarre” behav showing not made a sufficient that his that he arraignment, ior at and established mental state was at issue at the time of a to control his required heavy medication there was evidence though murder even competency Id. A examination re illness. from a point that at one he had suffered years earlier. begun vealed his illness had disorder). thus made no mental Petitioner sentencing prosecution sought Id. At showing drugs impaired his mental factor, that prove, aggravating as an “at the time the offense.” See posed danger. a future Id. The defendant Ake, 83, 105 470 U.S. at S.Ct. 1087. at placed then his mental state defendant sentencing by relying upon at issue incorrectly suggests that The dissent testimony psychiatrist trial of a that be placed his mental whether a defendant has a future posed cause of mental illness he sentencing. state at issue is irrelevant requested the court to danger. Id. He 1279-80.) Op. at (Dissenting Court appoint expert to assist at the made clear that a defendant must Ake sentencing phase and the Court “signifi- that his mental state was a show ultimately agreed he was entitled to one. guilt penalty cant factor” at both the 86-87,105 S.Ct. 1087. Id. 83-84, 105 S.Ct. 1087. phases. See id. contrast, showing, initial Williams’ affirm the district court’s denial at trial was not thus weak. His defense We trial court Ake claim. The but that of Williams’ insanity capacity, or diminished a mental required appoint put not do it. He contends he his was he did *12 1270 appeal. The court sentencing at because the direct stated expert

health law, any showing showing make that under Arizona of “[w]ithout did not defendant the murder at the of of- impairment mental state at the time of some time his fense, drug drug mitigating at virtue of use. use cannot be a issue any circumstance of kind.” 904 P.2d at Drug Mitigating as a Circum- III. Use 453. The court thus refused to cоnsider stance mitigating this circumstance because showing “offered no evidence Williams sentencing

Williams also asked he was intoxicated when he murdered [De- drug mitigating as a court to treat his use Id. Lao].” factor. The trial court refused and he im Supreme contends the Arizona Court reject- The district court considered and required a direct causal nexus properly merits, holding ed claim on this drug use and the murder be between required state consider drug any use fore it would afford the drug mitigating Williams’ use as a circum- mitigating weight sentencing. at This stance. The district court declined to is- merit, Supreme because the has COA, issue, least, very sue a but the at the repeatedly has held no such nexus is Court jurists upon is one which reasonable could See, required capital e.g., cases. Ten Cockrell, disagree. See Miller-El v. 537 Dretke, 274, 284-87, nard v. 542 124 U.S. 322, 327, U.S. 123 S.Ct. 154 L.Ed.2d (2004). 159 L.Ed.2d 384 certify We therefore this issue Although drug had denied Williams use and consider its merits.

during guilt phase the" of the he may only reverse if the Ari We presented drug mitigating use as factor Supreme zona Court’s decision was con sentencing through testimony at trary clearly federal law. established friend, Deloney Raymundo and a Mendez. 2254(d)(1). § See 28 U.S.C. The federal Deloney testified that was a non- Williams sentencing law that a is clear court must person up violent until the time he started consider all mitigating evidence. The deci to abuse crack. She stated that once he Supreme sion of the Arizona Court drugs progres- started to abuse he became drug could not use be considered as a sively more violent. Mendez testifiеd that kind,” mitigating any contrary factor “of he had known most of his Williams life. Supreme deci Court’s consistent initially He said a reputation had than capital beginning sions cases more a quiet peaceful person. He also a decade before Williams’ trial. See Smith testified that about the time Williams be- Texas, 543 U.S. 125 S.Ct. user, drug came known as a that he be- (2004); Tennard, 542 U.S. carrying came violent and started guns 2562; 284-87, Eddings, 124 S.Ct. testify with him. Williams did not at his 114-15, Lockett, 869; U.S. at 102 S.Ct. sentencing hearing. 604-06, 98 S.Ct. 2954. The trial court ruled drug plurality failed to establish his use as a miti- Lockett 1978 struck gating factor because found “there was down an Ohio statute that allowed courts evidence, including considering no only specified mitigating to consider fac- 597, 609-11, testimony, own to indicate that tors. [Williams’] usage by cocaine was a factor in 2954. The Court held that “in all but the [Williams] case, perpetration Ari- the murder.” The rarest kind of sentencer [the zona ruling precluded considering, Court affirmed this not be from should] rejected in factor, any aspect of a those Tennard and Smith. mitigating aas See, e.g., Djerf character or record State v. 191 Ariz. defendant’s (1998) (“The of the offense the circumstances P.2d trial court as a basis for sen- proffers defendant considered the evidence but found it irrele- *13 than Id. at 98 S.Ct. tence less death.” give weight vant and declined to it because 2954. lacking that proof [the defendant’s] any family background had effect on the majority Eddings A extended court crimes.”). repeatedly This court has or- and held that an Oklahoma court Lockett petitioners dered habeas resentencеd it violated the Constitution when refused penalty upon when the death rested Ari- of a defendant’s abu to consider evidence zona of this courts’ use unconstitutional at 102 S.Ct. sive childhood. U.S. See, at e.g., Lambright, test. 490 F.3d trial stated that a court 869. Court 1114-15; at Styers, 547 F.3d 1035-36. weight given to be “may determine the mitigating evidence that [but it] relevant Supreme The Arizona made the Court by excluding may give weight it no error in this case and we must reach same consideration.” [its] such evidence from By holding “drug result. same 114-15, 102 at S.Ct. 869. a mitigating use cannot be circumstance of any kind” unless Williams demonstrated Tennard, rejected a Fifth In the Court impairment “some at the time of the of- the consideration test barred Circuit fense,” Arizona im- Supreme Court unless “the criminal mitigating posed requirement contrary a “nexus” to perma to this severe act was attributable Lockett, Tennard, 283, 124 Eddings, at S.Ct. Smith. nent condition.” had held that “a State cannot The Arizona courts discretion 2562. The Court weight given drug ... evidence if the addic- bar the consideration of Williams’ reasonably tion, by refusing could find but erred to consider it at sentencer than proved a sentence less death.” Id. all he it was a factor in the warrants unless (internal quotation crime. We thus vacate the death sen- omitted). tence, reverse, and citation marks and remand for issuance of corpus. a writ of “Further sen- habeas rejected a explicitly In Smith Court conduct- tencing by the state court shall be mitigat- court’s refusal to consider Texas applicable law.” ed conformance there was a “nexus” ing evidence unless Lambright, 490 F.3d at 1128. mitigаting between the circumstance the murder. 543 U.S. Remaining Claims IV. Williams’ found that such a “nexus test” The Court brief to this court raised a Williams’ “a never countenanced was a test [it had] court number of issues the district de- rejected.” ... Id. unequivocally and now certify. clined to The district court found retroactively ap- Tennard and Smith are procedurally barred and did Ryan, 606 F.3d these issues plicable. See Schad Cir.2010) curiam) (9th them on the merits. We have (per not consider retroactively ap- are reviewed the district court’s decision and Smith {“Tennard certify to the Arizona Court’s reviewed the record and decline plicable case.”); Styers ... in this see also decision additional issues. (9th Schriro, 1026, 1035-36 CONCLUSION

Cir.2008) retroactively). (applying Smith the district judgment vacate the Arizona We At the time of Williams’ denying petition and remand for a nexus test similar to recognized courts peti- offering provide on the information about evidentiary hearing an in-court exchange early for re- challenging the con- DeLao murder claim tioner’s jail. from The letters had been re- with instructions lease also remand viction. We earlier, years by government ceived six petitioner’s grant petition trial begun, before Williams’s had sentencing process of denial of due Beverly a woman named circum- were written mitigating all failure to consider They Sweat. were addressed to Detective affirm the denial of otherwise stances. We Solis, investigator the lead in DeLao’s Tom relief. murder. VACATED in part, AFFIRMED in letters, *14 In the Sweat identified two indi- REMANDED.

part, and with information about DeLao’s viduals murder, jail- McKaney, Yolanda a fellow IKUTA, Judge, dissenting Circuit Sweat, mate of and Milton Barnett. The part: part concurring perpe- an additional letters also identified majori- respectfully I dissent from the murder, trator in the commission of the Aryon ty’s disposition petitioner of Fields, theory Patrick and an alternate Brady Mary- claim based on Williams’s crime, namely paid the that Williams had land, Fields to commit the murder on his behalf. I concur in the While here, Relevant the letters stated: majority result reached Try questioning Milton Barnett Jr. [Yo- claims, I sepa- other two write Williams’s McKaney] landa mention name too my rately express disagreement with WED, may he knows something so last majority’s reasoning. yard to the we went me and Yolan- [McKaney] talking da to [Williams] I people an he said there was two he was majority I agree with the Williams’s -» going get Eloy one from Patrick Brady procedurally claim is not barred Fields one from Casa Grande Milton may I and that we consider its merits. kept asking ques- Barnette [Williams] however, majority’s disagree, with the de- tion about Milton so check it out. cision to remand to the district court for Instead, evidentiary hearing. an in-court I I went ahead an talk to Yolanda [McKa- prosecution’s suppres- would hold ney] an told me what happen she by Beverly sion of the letters written killed, night good Rita she said [DeLao] Brady Sweat rose to the level of a violation walking she was down trekelle Road in respect penalty phase an ran Casa Grande into Patrick [Fields] case, Williams’s but not with re- bloody an him why he was all she ask I spect guilt phase. Accordingly, blоody was he all an he told her he had uphold would the district court’s denial of just killed Rita an [DeLao] [Williams] conviction, the habeas writ as to Williams’s him paid doing had 1000 for it he had a grant but the writ as to his sentence. him, knife on an said he used it to cut eyes mopad her out also used a to run A up over her an her an Patrick burned years Five after was convicted the cloths he had on an the went spent money and sentenced to death for the murder of which took two about DeLao, days. you Rita I prosecution turned over or three think should talk jailhouse I the defense series of letters to her about this know [Williams] given been sufficient government had you I wish part of but of some guilty through the claim dis- investigate time to you before me out of here get would ultimately de- covery. The district it to surface.... bring request to conduct government’s clined the mentally unstable was a Patrick Fields hearing person. who, mur- time of DeLao’s at the person Brady issue on the mer- Reviewing the history with der, criminal had an extensive its, analysis court focused its the district as- including burglary, aggravated charges McKaney and Bar- on the declarations was also sault, assault. Fields and sexual nett, had collect- Williams’s counsel which against a series of attacks responsible for into investigation in the course of an ed mur- months after DeLao’s in the women government’s issue after the der, where DeLao was in the same area letters, years of the after disclosure Sweat killed. sentencing. conviction and Williams’s withholding government’s Based on the McKaney’s reported dеclaration that she letters, attempted to of these burning bloody had witnessed Fields postconvic- in a state raise alley dumpster in an around the time shirt post-conviction The state petition. tion *15 Similarly, Barnett’s of DeLao’s death. not reach the merits of this court did reported that he had seen declaration claim, however, because held Fields, blood, dispose in of some- covered barred. procedurally claim was thing alley dumpster day in an the before of time to file had asked for an extension he heard DeLao had been killed. Arizona Rule of Crimi- petition the under Ultimately, the district court concluded 32.4(c)(1), permits which nal Procedure regarding the information Patrick sixty- grant a defendant state court Brady Fields was not material under be- in to file a successive day which extension impeached cause it neither Michelle Delo- of petition showing post-conviction “[o]n testimony had ney’s that Williams confess- court good cause.” The state determined “exculpate[d] crime nor ed no cause for the ex- good that there was [Williams]; rather it affirm[ed Williams’s] such, and, as denied Williams’s tension in the The district involvement murder.” request. McKaney noted that and Barnett court Presenting issue to the dis- subject testing” be to “adversarial would court, for an eviden- trict moved their the event of a new trial because scope of the tiary hearing explore inconsistent, with declarations were both wrongdoing. The prosecutor’s potential In other and with the Sweat letters. each granted request, but de- district court addition, court observed that the district narrow light of the “[i]n termined erroneously described the Sweat letters claim and “because focus” of the killed, DeLao was the manner which ... indicate d[id] motion [Williams’s] credibility of Sweat and and that requires pres- oral why particular evidence McKaney subject question was because entation,” hearing jailhouse it would conduct the nature of their discussions. evidence” rath- had “through receipt holding of written on its that Williams Based materiality prong, testimony. gov- satisfy Brady’s live failed to through er than habeas relief. the district court denied ruling, arguing this ernment contested necessary to hearing was that an in-court B of Williams’swit- permit cross-examination majority, in- the state responded explained that an As nesses. Williams an request for court’s denial of Williams’s not warranted because hearing was reasonably could put under Arizona Rule of Criminal taken to extension 32.4(c)(1), Procedure which had the effect light the whole case in such a different barring consideration Williams’s to undermine confidence in the verdict.” grounds, was not a procedural claim on Kyles Whitley, 514 U.S. “firmly regularly followed established Here, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 context, in the Ford practice” dispute government there is no 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. Georgia, therefore, letters; suppressed the Sweat (1991) (internal quo- inquiry the court’s is confined to whether omitted), and therefore the ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍tation marks suppressed letters are favorable to ruling inadequate was state court’s bar suppression Williams and whether their habeas relief. Because Williams’s prejudicial pro- to the result of his merits,” “adjudicated

was not on the ceeding. 2254(d)(1), § there is “no state U.S.C. court decision on this issue to which to Williams articulates number of reasons deference,” and I agree accord with the why the Sweat letters are material. The majority that our review of this claim is de identify by letters name additional sus- Morgan, novo. See Pirtle v. pect DeLao’s murder and two individu- (9th Cir.2002) (“[Wjhen 1160, 1167 it is als information about the crime. The clear that a state court has not reached the letters, Fields, perpetrator identified issue, properly merits of a raised we must mentally ill and had an extensive crim- novo.”). review it de history. letters, inal According to the “[Wjhen the State withholds from a McKaney Fields confessed to that he com- *16 criminal defendant evidence that is materi murder, mitted the and this confession oc- guilt punishment, al to his or it violates his night occurred, curred on the the murder right process to due of law in violation of while Fields was still covered in blood. the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cone v. —Bell, U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. that, argues Williams because he was (2009). majority As the convicted and sentenced on the basis of “[tjhere states, are components three of a evidence, circumstantial a there is reason- true violation: The evidence at is probability able pro- that the result of the accused, sue must be favorable to the ei ceeding would have been different had the ther it exculpatory, because is or because First, letters been disclosed. Williams impeaching; that must evidence have that contends disclosurе of the letters State, suppressed by been the either will would have enabled him point to anoth- fully inadvertently; or and prejudice must person crime, er who committed the there- Greene, have ensued.” Strickler v. by supporting his claim of innocence. 263, 281-82, U.S. S.Ct. that, Williams asserts had he known about otherwise, Stated a McKaney, Barnett and he would have been Brady violation results prosecu when the to call they able them to the stand and “material,” suppresses tion evidence that is would have testified regarding their knowl- is, that when proba “there is reasonable edge of participation Fields’s in the crime. bility had the evidence been disclosed Williams claims he also could have intro- defense, to the the proceeding result of the likely duced evidence that Fields awas would have been different.” Id. suspect, instability based on his mental standard, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Under this re history committing of criminal acts in versal of a conviction or sentence is re quired upon “showing that the favorable the area.

Second, holding that disclo in Jemigan Williams theorizes Our was based on failure that police’s principle “[withholding the letters and the the knowl- sure of Sweat, McKaney, suspect up edge of a second conflicts with the to follow would have furthered his trial the Court’s directive that ‘the crimi- Barnett in police negligent prosecutor’s were their nal as distinct from the ory deliberations, private preserved of the crime. Like the defen as the investigation argues ascertaining in that the forum for the truth Kyles, dant chosen ” per in the would have criminal Id. at 1056- information letters about accusations.’ omitted) (brackets po (quoting Kyles, ] mitted “the defense [to] examine[ 1555). good knowledge Jemigan effect on their of lice to have attacked that credible statements and so indicates information about [Fields’s] reliability failing to a investigation suspect generally of second crime is possible guilt.” to consider material and therefore [Fields’s] even should be disclosed 446, 115 defendant. Last, suppressed Williams contends that he could Like the Jemi- provide to gan, have used the information the letters the Sweat letters information testimony credibly that Deloney’s Michelle indicates the existence of a impeach committing suspect. give confessed to second letters a de- crime, description specific, de- because version events tailed named indi- viduals, by Deloney from that de- at least one of known to scribed differed whom was informant, letters. all of picted part whom were community in the same a small town. At United, en Our recent banc decision one of the in the least individuals identified Jemigan Williams’s ar- supports States v. letters, McKaney, allegedly Yolanda inter- regarding gument information Patrick acted with Fields near the time of perpetrator Patrick Fields as additional reported murder and cov- he was was material to Williams’s defense. 492 in blood and the crime. ered confessed to (9th Cir.2007) (en banc). F.3d 1050 Jemi- Moreover, prosecutor would have dealt with where the gan also a situation *17 at the time of receiving known these lеt- regarding withheld prosecutor information was a plausible suspect, ters that Fields of the crime possible perpetrator another then-recent based on incidents which for which the defendant was on trial. See Fields had attacked other in the women There, at 1051. defendant was id. the Jemigan, area. Under these circum- robbery primari- with bank charged based weigh in favor stances of the letters’ mate- physical eyewitnesses’ her ly on likeness riality. of the descriptions prose- robber. Id. The claim, prevail an alternative cutor withheld evidence of For Williams on this however, fitting descrip- the he must also let suspect physical prove same that the Strickler, him, robbing had been arrested for are “favorable” to tion who ters 1936, al- nearby banks after the defendant was at because either custody. they exculpatory they In re- or have ready Id. at 1054-55. are because 281-82, 119 viewing suppression whether of the value. at impeachment See id. suspect point, consti- 1936. On this case existence of alternative S.Ct. Williams’s violation, diverge. Brady Jemigan sup we determined tuted Unlike pressed Jemigan, the information was material and the Sweat exculpate by pro writ therefore defendant’s habeas letters do Williams an alternative DeLao granted. posing suspect should be Id. at 1057. to the murder; rather, they identify perspective Fields as an from the prosecutor of the at suspect accomplice or to the the time of additional non-disclosure. The Sweat letters, most, McKaney At the lеtters state that not the crime. and Barnett dec- (which act, commit the paid prosecu- Fields to larations were never in the files), they expressly maintain tor’s potential Brady are the materi- guilty part is of some of it.” al. The exculpatory “[Williams] Sweat letters are not crime, culpability as to Williams’s for the identify an accomplice That the letters McKaney post and Barnett’s hoc dec- suspect rather than an alternative is dis- retroactively larations cannot make them positive of Williams’s claim that the letters so. are material as to his conviction. Our case suppressed law advises that evidence is not inquiry, This does not end the however. (and fail) exculpatory claim will if The Court has made clear that merely suggests suppressed the evidence that another evidence which is not material defendant, person “equally guilty” as the guilt may to the defendant’s still be mate- ifor it fails to that “the rial [defendant show to the defendant’s sentence. Cone, guilty, any Indeed, or that is] not he less [is] 1786. such was Ylst, guilty.” Morris v. Brady, 740 the case in in which prosecutor (9th Cir.2006). Arizona, In person may suppressed accomplice’s confession to guilty degree of first murder whether the crime for which the defendant was he hires someone to commit act or convicted and sentenced to death. himself, State, commits it see Ariz.Rev.Stat. 226 Md. 174 A.2d (1989); Carlson, (1961). § 13-1105 e.g., State v. The state court determined that Thus, 202 Ariz. 48 P.3d 1180 nothing accomplice’s confession while the information in the Sweat letters would have reduced the defendant’s of- might changed prosecutor’s have theo- fense to a lesser crime than murder in the ry of the case it would not degree, have first and hence suppression made guilty” “less of first was not material to guilt. the defendant’s degree murder. Accordingly, However, non-dis- Id. the suppression was closure of the letters cannot sentence, constitute a material to the defendant’s Brady violation with respect jury’s therefore the state court ordered a new finding guilt on the charge.1 murder trial on question punishment only. Id.; Cone, (hold- see also 129 S.Ct. at 1786 majority points out that the Sweat ing that suppressed evidence was not ma- letters could be exculpatory terial to the guilt defendant’s but was ma- “if guilt Williams’s the account of events *18 sentence). terial to his The provided by McKaney and Barnett in their 91, Court Brady, affirmed. 373 at U.S. 83 Maj. declarations is Op. accurate.” at S.Ct. 1194. 1267. I disagree. below, As discussed information that light years case, comes to after In this in Brady, as the distinction trial sentencing cannot the alter mate- between the suppressed value of riality potential Brady guilt information be- as to punishment and as to signifi- Brady analysis cause the must be made cant. While the Sweat letters are not 1. impeach loney Nor could the letters be used to testified that Williams confessed to her Strickler, Deloney's credibility. See that he committed the crime. The letters do 281-82, at (suppressed 119 S.Ct. 1936 Deloney’s infor- not bear relation to statements confessed, mation is favorable to the accused when they it is that Williams nor do call into value). exculpatory impeachment question Deloney's veracity or has De- aas witness. slaying and helpless- to Williams’s cul- itous violence of the exculpatory respect with crime, ness of the victim could be they exculpatory are attributed to for the pability actions). his The letters physical suggest, role in the act Sweat to his respect however, Fields, Williams, and not murder, raise a and thus “reasonable disclosed, killing. they been committed the actual There is had probability” nothing to the letters to indicate that not have been sentenced Williams would Cone, present at Williams was even when the mur- 129 S.Ct. death. See der occurred. sentenced Williams to The state court disclosed, presence of two statu- If the had been death based on the Sweat letters (1) that he tory aggravating argued factors: Williams Williams could have did not felony previously involving convicted of commit the crime in a heinous and de- (the manner, of violence armed praved physi- the use or threat because he did robbery murder attempted cally of Norma murder DeLao and was not even 13-703(F)(2) Soto), § Thus, pertains Ariz.Rev.Stat. witness to act. see the to (2) (1989); sentencing, Williams murdered DeLao exculpatory the letters contain depraved in an heinous and information especially that could have the reduced 13-703(F)(6) manner, § Ariz.Rev.Stat. see likelihood that Williams would sen- (1989).2 Williams, 368, 183 Ariz. to government’s State tenced death. The failure 437, su- prejudicial: 904 P.2d to disclose the letters was also preme application of this lat- the upheld aggravating without factor of heinous- only ter because the murder involved ness and depravity, factor the basis for sen- “in gratuitous tencing violence excess of that nec- would death have been kill,” essary conviction, prior felony and because DeLao was violent helpless during the attack. Id. is a probability there reasonable applied trial court not have would Arizona, In “heinous and depraved penalty Thus, death that basis alone. on (F)(6) portion aggravator focuses on of the and not suggesting that Fields state of mind the time of defendant’s murder, physical committed the act of through ... as evidenced crime[ ] [the reasonably letters be taken put “could Carlson, actions.” State v. defendant’s] [sentencing proceeding] the whole in such 1180, (2002) 202 Ariz. 48 P.3d a different to undermine light as confi- (internal omitted); see citation also State Kyles, [penalty applied].” dence Gretzler, 135 Ariz. P.2d such, 1555. As (1983) depraved that “heinous and (holding prosecutor was a for the violation of go to mental state and attitude of the from withhold the letters Williams for perpetrator as reflected his words and sentencing purposes. actions”). ruling The state court’s in an committed murder “[Williams] C manner,” especially depraved heinous or Williams, respectfully majori- I dissent from 904 P.2d based this case for assumption physically ty’s that Williams decision to remand an in- *19 (and hearing. The gratu- evidentiary majority the crime hence the court committed mitigating statutory mitigat- Concluding 2. The found no ter. evidence state court factors, ing mitiga- non-statutory leniency, but found was insufficient to invokе the state Williams, had no tion that Williams criminal record death. court Williams to sentenced prior the murder and that defendant had 904 P.2d at 444. past good conduct displayed and charac- 1278 remand, both of exploring

errs its decision be- inconsistencies in the McKa- any right ney cause has waived Williams and Barnett declarations. Given because hearing, such does express Williams’s disavowal of an in-court not allow a court to evaluate the materiali- hearing, the district court’s decision not to ty suppressed through evidence the lens hearing in-person hold the was at most testimony gathered error, information and certainly invited not a basis for years after trial. Corp., remand here. See Marx v. Loral (9th Cir.1996) F.3d (stating that First, majority acknowledge fails to appellants “should be barred from assert- right that has waived his to an in- Williams ing theory appeal” on directly [a] evidentiary hearing court claim. this contradicts position their the district appellate only pass- Williams’s brief makes court); Republic Deland v. Old Ins. ing hearing mention of the in-court Life issue Co., (9th Cir.1985) 758 F.2d any analysis legal authority. without or (stating litigant “may that a not on review The rule in this circuit is that “we review complain objection of issues ... where the only issues which argued specifically are is position inconsistent with the taken be- distinctly in a party’s opening brief.” (internal omitted)). quotation low” marks F.A.A., (9th Greenwood v. Cir.1994). “We will not argu- manufacture majority’s reasoning on point this appellant.” ments for an Id. Williams’s misses the majority mark. While the ex- single observation that the district court plains Williams’s motivation for opposing should have in-person conducted an evi- (because the State’s motion in Williams’s dentiary hearing, without supporting rea- view, the State should already have com- soning, is insufficient to raise this issue on pleted its investigation matters), of these Marcos, appeal. See Hilao v. Estate of majority does not make clear how this (9th Cir.1996). n. 4 F.3d additional negates information the fact To the extent this issue is even before expressly opposed Williams an in- us, Williams is barred from arguing for an evidentiary hearing. Maj. Op. at in-person evidentiary hearing. only Not Rather, 1266-67. the majority acknowl- did Williams fail to move the district court edges that the State moved for an in-court in-person for an hearing, actively he op- evidentiary hearing, and that op- Indeed, posed one. given by reason posed Maj. Op. it. at 1266-67. holding district court for a paper hear- Second, in-person ing evidentiary hear- rather than an in-court one was that ing would serve purpose no this Williams’s motion for a context. hearing did “not A reviewing identify specific court’s evaluation of evidence to be whether developed suppression evidentiary particular at an of a hearing, why piece or of ev- indicate particular prosecutor’s idence violated the requires presenta- oral duties un- Later, tion.” when der government based on the character of re- quested that hearing information prosecutor conducted in- known to the person, objected, time, is, trial, the relevant arguing that an before dur- in-person hearing ing trial, was unwarranted be- the course of during sentenc- cause State of Arizona ing. “[t]he has had over Agurs, See United States v. years they fifteen since received the let- issues, (1976) (“[I]n

ters to investigate these and ... advance of and perhaps five provided by additional months during well, [the the course of a trial as district specifically what, court] for” the purpose prosecutor anything, must decide if

1279 evidentiary hearing) and an voluntarily to defense declarations submit he should Wilhoit, counsel.”); Brady v. 368 into determination for an obvi- F.3d the Villasana Cir.2004) (8th (“[T]he prosecutor’s the letters themselves 979 ous reason: Sweat Brady under is duty guilt. to disclose to exculpatory absolute are not as Williams’s prosecu- a to reasonable prosecutor limited evidence have Nor could reasonable being at time perceive would the might tor to known that the Sweat letters lead to the defense.” favorable material and ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍evidence, contrary to because exculpatory added)). Information (emphasis majority’s suggestion, Maj. Op. the see at sentencing to after trial and light comes 1267-68, contradict the the declarations materiality potential of alter the cannot crucial of Sweat letters as to the issue only perspec- from the Brady information Williams’s culpability for the crime. Pros- the of the perspective that matters: tive under to obligation Brady ecutors have no time the of non-disclosure. prosecutor at in weigh the evidence their files whether 427 at 96 S.Ct. 2392 Agurs, U.S. might to future contradicto- somehow lead that, though “significant is a (stating there ry determining whether to dis- evidence pretrial the between practical difference close. To hold would be tanta- otherwise and the prosecutor post- of the decision requiring mount to to disclose prosecutors judge” determining of the trial decision files, everything Brady in their which case disclosed, “[l]ogi- must be what Bagley, States does not do. See United evaluating the eally the same standard [for 87 U.S. times”). apply at both must evidence] (1985) (stating prosecu- holds the pros- true that While is required tor is to “deliver not under determining for wheth- responsible ecutor counsel”). file to Be- entire defense piece seemingly insignificant er some cause themselves are not the Sweat letters may become material in the information guilt the because phase, material to has prosecutor the never course so, make post-hoe evidence will not them foreseeing that responsible been held for require there is no reason to the district information could turn out to be ma- such evidentiary hearing. court to hold developed context of evidence terial the reason, majority’s the reli For the same Kyles, trial. See years after Ornoski, Earp ance 431 F.3d 1158 that, (stating under (9th Cir.2005), proposition which alone can Brady, prosecution, “the be credibility typically must assessed undisclosed, must is be as- know what Maj. Op. at 1266- testimony, live through consequent to signed responsibility may It where misplaced. is likely net of all such evi- gauge the effect issue, сredibility properly is “an in court when the point dence and make disclosure judge can see and hear hearing where reached”). In probability’ is of ‘reasonable Maj. Op. is appropriate. the witnesses” the McKa- principle, of this neither light 1169-70). F.3d at (citing Earp, nor fur- and Barnett declarations ney credibility question But no arises because testimony hearing at an in-court can ther claim, in Williams’s there no basis question light on shed additional hearing hold here. such prosecutor should have whether letters were materi- known that Sweat majority Accordingly, errs both guilt. al as to Williams’s relief which a form of providing entitled, requiring and in Williams is point, this accepting Rather than consider materiali- district smuggle post hoc evi- majority attempts (such in the ty context of the Sweat letters McKaney as the Barnett dence *21 after-acquired evidence that by was not which we can determine whether a known and could not have been known to silent state court decision objectively is government Himes, at the time of trial. The unreasonable.” 336 F.3d at 853. majority’s prosecu- new formulation of the In setting forth the standard for when a Brady obligation tor’s represents a dan- criminal defendant is entitled to a psychi- gerous expansion, one which contrary expert provided state, atric by the Ake the Supreme approach. Court’s balanced distinguishes between the trial and sen- tencing phases of the defendant’s criminal

II proceedings. 83, See 470 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. 1087. At “when a defendant demon- Although I concur the result reached strates to the judge trial sanity that his by majority on Williams’s other two the time of the offense is to a significant claims, namely his claim under AEDPA trial,” factor at Ake holds that “the State unreasonably state court applied must, minimum, at a assure the defendant Oklahoma, 68, Ake v. 470 U.S. access to a competent psychiatrist who 1087, will (1985), and his claim conduct an appropriate examination and under AEDPA that the state court should evaluation, assist in preparation, pres- required have a causal nexus between entation of the defense.” Psychiatric Id. drug use and crime of conviction at assistance in this context is limited its sentencing, I disagree with majority’s terms to the trial defendant’s and trial analysis, for the reasons described below.

preparation, and does not extend to the defendant’s sentencing proceedings. A id. argues that the state court un- respect With to the defendant’s pro- due reasonably Ake, applied 68, cess entitlement to a psychiatric expert at 84 L.Ed.2d when it denied sentencing, provides Ake a separate test. him psychiatric assistance at sentencing to Ake, Under entitlement psychiatric to a present mitigating evidence related to his expert at sentencing is limited to defen- crack cocaine usage. supreme The state charged dants with crimes. See id. claim, court reached this but did not ex- (“We have repeatedly recognized the de- plain its reasoning rejecting agree it. I fendant’s compelling adju- interest fair majority that when the state dication at the sentencing phase capi- of a court denies rеlief on the pro- merits but case.”). tal “[I]n context of a capital vides no decision, rationale for its “per- we sentencing proceeding,” Ake holds that a form an ‘independent review of the record’ defendant is entitled to a mental health ex- to ascertain whether the state court deci- pert only “when the State presents psychi- sion was objectively unreasonable.” atric evidence of the defendant’s future Himes Thompson, 336 F.3d dangerousness.” Id. at 105 S.Ct. 1087. (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Delgado Lewis, The may defendant use psychiatric (9th Cir.2000)). In this expert in this situation to “rebut situation, AEDPA deference applies; still State’s evidence of his dangerous- future “[tjhat is, although we independently re- ness.” Id. record, view the we still defer to the state court’s Pirtle, ultimate decision.” majority fails to even acknowledge F.3d at 1167. “Independent review of the that Ake provided distinct tests for the record is not de novo review of the consti- phase trial and penalty phase of a defen- issue, rather, tutional but only Instead, method dant’s case. majority applies

1281 B phase trial to Williams’s test for the Ake’s psychiatric of a deprived that he was to treat The state court refused Maj. at 1269 sentencing. Op. at expert as a factor drug mitigating use Williams’s govern requiring as the (interpreting Ake con- deciding his sentence. Williams to a expert provide psychiatric a ment court’s was that the state refusal tends defendant, sen capital at trial and both drug that use requirement on a based make the can tencing, when the defendant of a direct cаusal nexus his crime have sanity “his at the showing that threshold conviction, require- that this causal significant the is to be a time of offense contrary to or unreasonable (internal omitted)); ment was mark quotation factor” 12, Netherland, 10, of Court application precedent. v. 516 U.S. Tuggle cf. (1995) 283, See, Oklahoma, L.Ed.2d 251 455 U.S. e.g., Eddings S.Ct. 133 v. 116 (“[W]e ], prose 114-15, 869, a 104, [ held in Ake when 1 71 L.Ed.2d 102 S.Ct. anof presents psychiatric evidence (1982). cutor supreme the state court Because dangerousness future indigent defendant’s on its in a adjudicated this claim merits sentencing proceeding, due capital in a decision, the deferential AEDPA reasoned requires provide that the State process Himes, at applies. standard of an inde with the assistance defendant Therefore, 2254(d)(1), § under we 852-53. Simmons v. South psychiatrist”); pendent only court’s reverse the state decision can 2187, Carolina, 154, 165, 114S.Ct. 512 U.S. to, or an unrea- contrary if it “was involved (1994) Ake (interpreting of, clearly application established sonable ato holding a defendant is entitled as law, determined the Su- Federal sentencing capital at expert psychiatric States.” Court of the United preme presents the State “where proceedings fu of a defendant’s at majority opinion, in the psychiatric evidence As described in majority’s dangerousness”). ture courts time of Williams’s Arizona Ake, view, my is errone terpretation of un- mitigating refused consider ous. a to the crime that evidence had nexus less being was sen- for which the defendant was argues that he

Because Williams See, Ariz. Djerf, v. 191 e.g., tenced. State expert оnly at sen a psychiatric denied (1998). 583, 1274, Following of rejection court’s P.2d 1289 tencing, state 959 contrary to rule, could de- sentencing Ake claim court Williams’s state this only Ake application of or an unreasonable a drug use as to consider Williams’s clined psychiatric government presented if factor because it determined mitigating dangerous of future evidence Williams’s “[wjithout showing impair- of some proceedings. capital sentencing in his ness offense, drug use at the time of the ment 86, 105 (holding 1087 S.Ct. 470 U.S. mitigating circumstance cannot be psychiatric entitled to a the defendant was Williams, P.2d at 904 kind.” “future sentencing because his expert majority that this deci- agree I with the significant factor dangerousness was contrary by the state court sion Here, govern sentencing phase”). Supreme Court hold- clearly established required level Applying did not. ment Ohio, 438 98 U.S. ings Lockett deference, therefore AEDPA (1978) (plurali- 57 973 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. objectively unreasonable 104, 102 455 U.S. S.Ct. 2254(d)(1); ty), Eddings, § claim. See deny this from prohibit courts 63, 75, both which Andrade, 123 Lockyer (2003). excluding mitigating evidence 1166, 155 categorically L.Ed.2d S.Ct. its sentencing from consideration ducted review. v. Taylor, See Williams Eddings, 455 U.S. at proceedings. See (“[The

114-15, sentencing cannot fault We *23 may weight determine the to be court] for failing apply precedent state court mitigating relevant evidence. But given that did not come into until existence after give weight by may not no [the court] petitioner’s its consideration of a case. excluding such evidence from consid- [its] See id. Lockett, eration.”); 604, 438 at U.S. 98 Here, the supreme state court rendered (“[I]n 2954 all but the rarest kind of S.Ct. 26, its dеcision on September case, sentencing court [the should] Williams, Therefore, 904 P.2d 437. at the precluded considering, not be from as a decision, time its supreme of the state factor, any mitigating aspect of the defen- court had the of Supreme benefit record of dant’s character or and Lockett, holdings 586, Court’s 438 U.S. circumstances of the offense de- 2954, 104, Eddings, 98 S.Ct. and 455 U.S. proffers fendant as a basis for a sentence 869, 102 which S.Ct. were issued in 1978 (emphasis than less death.” and footnote 1982, and respectively. Those cases con omitted)). “clearly stitute established Federal law” however, I separately, write because I 2254(d)(1); § under AEDPA. See Lock disagree majority’s with the reliance on yer, 71-72, at By 538 U.S. 123 S.Ct. 1166. Dretke, 274, 284-87, Tennard v. 542 U.S. contrast, the supreme state court did not 2562, 159 (2004), 124 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 384 and Smith, 37, have the benefit of 543 125 U.S. Texas, 37, 45, Smith 543 U.S. 125 S.Ct. 400, Tennard, 274, S.Ct. 542 U.S. 124 400, (2004), 160 “clearly as 2562, both of which were decided established law” Federal relevant to ana 2004, almost a decade after the state court lyzing the state court’s decision under reviewed Williams’s claim. Smith and

AEDPA. Supreme The Court has made are “clearly Tennard therefore not estab “ ‘clearly clear that established Federal law,” lished Federal and the state court’s law’ under governing is the legal [AEDPA] decision cannot judged against the prin principle principles or set forth ciples announced those cases. See Mur Supreme Court at time the doch, 609 F.3d at 990. Lockyer, renders its decision.” majority’s reasoning ‍​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‍that “Tennard 71-72, added); (emphasis 123 S.Ct. 1166 retroactively applicable” Smith are Castro, 983, see also Murdoch v. claim, Maj. Williams’s Op. at (9th (en is be- Cir.2010) banc) (“The 990 Su point. side the The issue is whether those preme Court has restricted ‘clearly estab “clearly cases are 2254(d)(1) Supreme established” § lished Federal under law’ precedents AEDPA, Court under holdings, opposed dicta, ‘the 2254(d)(1); § they whether announced Supreme] ret- [the Court’s decisions as of roactively applicable principles poses time relevant state-court decision.’” (internal omitted) (em quotation entirely question, different which marks is not added) here, Musladin, raised phasis (quoting Ryan, Schad v. 606 Carey v. F.3d cf. (9th Cir.2010). Williams, 549 1045 U.S. 166 L.Ed.2d (2006))). such, (explaining As federal court re S.Ct. 1495 viewing a precedent state court’s decision under that whether a Court AEDPA only retroactively must consider is applicable those Su to a defendant’s preme precedents Court avail poses question were different than able to the state court at the it con- precedent “clearly time whether the estab- Smith purposes). AEDPA lished” for McNEAL, Troy Petitioner- Terrell relevant, most, because are

Tennard Appellant, announced Ed the rule they reiterate Schriro, Styers v. dings Lockett. See Cir.2008) (9th (per F.3d Warden; ADAMS, Attorney Darrell G. curiam) principle for the ar (citing Smith California, of the General State beyond But this in Eddings). ticulated Respondents-Appellees. and Tennard applicability, Smith limited No. 08-16472. be consid not and cannot themselves are *24 law” Federal for “clearly established ered Appeals, States Court of United analysis court’s this purposes Ninth Circuit. claim. Williams’s Argued and Submitted Feb. 26, 2010. Filed Oct. Ill erroneously remands to majority evidentia- court for an in-court the district on matters not relevant de-

ry hearing Brady only claim. Not

ciding Williams’s evidentiary hearing not war-

an in-court here, relief that but it is a form of

ranted request before properly did court, disavowed before expressly

this view, my govern- In

the district court. the defense failure to disclose to

ment’s concerning an alter- information

credible the murder constitut- perpetrator

native respect violation with

ed sentence, and Williams’s writ

Williams’s I granted punishment. to his

should be respectfully dissent from ma-

therefore of Williams’s

jority’s treatment the issues identified Except

claim.

above, my colleagues’ decision as to join I

the remainder claims. Williams’s

Case Details

Case Name: Williams v. Ryan
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Oct 26, 2010
Citation: 623 F.3d 1258
Docket Number: 07-99013
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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