129 Minn. 97 | Minn. | 1915
Action for malicious arrest and criminal prosecution in which plaintiff had a verdict. Defendant appeals from an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
In an action to recover damages for a malicious criminal prosecution plaintiff must prove want of probable cause. All our decisions, from the early case of Chapman v. Dodd, 10 Minn. 277 (350) to Cox v. Lauritsen, 126 Minn. 128, 147 N. W. 1093, are to that effect. The acquittal in the criminal prosecution is not evidence of want of probable cause for its institution. Chapman v. Dodd, supra; Shafer v. Hertzig, 92 Minn. 171, 99 N. W. 796; Hanowitz v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 122 Minn. 241, 142 N. W. 196. It is the rule in this state that the discharge by an examining magistrate of the person accused of crime is, ordinarily, prima facie evidence of want of probable cause to enter the complaint or cause the arrest. Chapman v. Dodd, supra; Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 161 (182); Fiola v. McDonald, 85 Minn. 147, 88 N. W. 431; Blazek v. McCartin, 106 Minn. 461, 119 N. W. 215. The reason for the distinction is obvious, for in the case of a preliminary examination the accused is entitled to a discharge if “it shall appear
What facts, and whether particular facts, constitute probable cause is for the court. This proposition is firmly settled. Burton v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. 33 Minn. 189, 22 N. W. 300; Moore v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 31 Minn. 147, 33 N. W. 334; Gilbertson v. Fuller, 40 Minn. 413, 42 N. W. 203; Smith v. Munch, 65 Minn. 256, 68 N. W. 19; Baldwin v. Capitol Steam Laundry Co. 109 Minn. 38, 122 N. W. 460; Mundal v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. 92 Minn. 26, 99 N. W. 213, 100 N. W. 363; Hanowitz v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 122 Minn. 241, 142 N. W. 196; and Lammers v. Mason, 123 Minn. 204, 143 N. W. 359. In the last cited case is reiterated the rule that when the question of. probable cause “comes before us we consider the evidence as if heard here, and weigh it in order to determine the correctness of the determination below.”
The only facts upon which must rest the claim of want of probable cause are found in plaintiff’s own testimony. Therefrom it appears that plaintiff was in the employ of defendant as a porter on one of its sleeping cars operated by the Great Northern Eailway Co. between St. Paul and Seattle. On his return to St. Paul, in the morning of March 26, 1913, the assistant superintendent, Mr. Healy, told him to go out with the coast train due to leave at 10:45 in the evening. Porters were required to be at their car one hour and forty-five minutes ahead of the leaving time. Plaintiff was 15 or 20 minutes late. One W. C. Williams was in the employ of defendant as night superintendent of its sleeping car porters at the station. Plaintiff was well acquainted with him, knew that his authority was to see that everything pertaining to the cars and the employees thereon was in proper order, that he had power to assign
The order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reversed and judgment ordered for defendant.
[G. S. 1913, § 9083],