12 Mo. App. 393 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1882
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiffs filed a claim in the probate court, which was allowed and placed in the sixth class. The plaintiffs appealed to the circuit court, where the same judgment was rendered, and they have again appealed to this court. The grounds of their, appeal are, that the claim ought to have been put in the fifth, and not in the sixth class. It is stated that there are assets to pay claims of the fifth class, but none to pay claims of the sixth class.
The claim arose in this way: Walter B. Morris and the defendant’s intestate were sureties on a guardian’s bond. In 1879, a judgment was recovered against Morris on the bond for $1,578. He paid the same and assigned to the plaintiffs his right of contribution against the estate of his co-surety; and this is the demand which the plaintiffs exhibited in the probate court. The record does not show when letters of administration upon the estate of John F. Quisenberry were granted, nor when notice thereof was published.
We have been favored with a copy of the following opinion delivered in this case by the learned judge of the probate court: —
Woerner, J.: “ Walter B. Morris and John F. Quisenberry were the sureties of one Willoughby as curator of Jane Willoughby, now Williams. Willoughby died after Quisenberry, and in January, 1879, judgment was rendered on his
“ The statute places in the fifth class, 4 all demands, without regard to quality, which shall be legally exhibited against the estate within one year after the granting of the first letters on the estate;’ and in the sixth class, 4all demands thus exhibited, after the end of one year, and within two years after letters granted.’ (Rev. Stats., pp. v, vi, sect. 184.
44 The plain letter of this statute seems decisive of the question without recourse to rules or principles of construction. The demand was first4 exhibited, after the end of one year and within two years after letters granted.’ Such demands are assigned to the sixth class by the statute; hence nothing remains for the court to do but to announce, in completion of the syllogism and giving effect to the statute, that the claimant’s demand is placed in the sixth class.
44 But it is earnestly argued that such a judgment would work injustice, because the cause of action did not accrue until the expiration of the first year after the grant of letters, and that it would not, therefore, have been exhibited within that time, thus depriving the claimant of the benefit of participating in the fifth class entirely. It may be answered that if the language of the statute is clear, the injustice of its operation affords no excuse for its disregard. No authority but that of the legislature can amend an unwise or an unjust law. But this provision seems neither unwise nor unjust. The principle underlying the division of debts of a deceased person into the several classes, with priority according to the enumeration, does not rest upon the merits of the claimants, but is dictated by public policy and regard
“We are referred to the decision of the supreme court, that the three (now two) years’ limitation against the presentation of claims against an executor or administrator does not apply when the debt accrued subsequent to the date of the letters. It was so held in Miller v. Woodward (8 Mo. 169) ; and Scott, J., there says that, if the estate has been distributed, a court of equity would afford relief. Other cases to the same effect (of which, Finney v. The State, 9 Mo. 227, and Richardson v. Harrison, 36 Mo. 96) are cited by counsel for claimant. It is argued that, since this is a principle of equity, it applies as well to classification as to limitation. But the sequitor is not apparent: it is true that the law does not hold a party accountable for not doing that which is impossible, and will hence excuse a creditor for not establishing a claim which does not exist; but such excuse does not operate to give the claim an ante factum validity. If it originate or accrue after the distribution, there may be, as Judge Scott suggests, a remedy against the heirs by bill in equity, because their rights are subject to the claims of all creditors ; but there can be none against creditors whose rights have become fixed by compliance with the legal requirements determining the class and the fund out of which they are to be satisfied.
££ The case of Bryan v. Mundy (14 Mo. 459) is quoted as establishing the proposition that classification is the same as allowance. This case is a leading one on the point thereby established, that in presenting a judgment for allowance against an estate, the same notice is required to be given to the administrator as in presenting other demands, without which the allowance is unauthorized and illegal. In arguing the necessity of such notice, Judge Birch says : £ Had
‘ ‘ So far, not a single case has been found which establishes, or even favors, the theory of the claimant. But in Spauld
“ Judgment for claimant, $750, with interest from January 8, 1880.”
It is argued by counsel that the court, in placing this 'demand in the sixth class, is guilty of as great an inconsistency as if it had placed it in the fifth class, because, he says, it was exhibited, not only more than one year after the grant of letters and publication of notice, which would exclude it from the fifth class, but more than two years thereafter, which would exclude it from the sixth class also. There are three answer’s to this. In the first place, this record does not show, as we have already pointed out, when the letters were granted, and when the publication of that fact was made. We do not, therefore, know, except from what we see in the brief of the appellant’s counsel and in the opinion of the judge of the probate court, at what stage of the administration this demand was first exhibited. The appellant’s counsel tells us that it was more than two years after the publication of notice of the grant of letters. The probate judge tells us that it was more than one year, and less that two years after such date. We are not entitled to look to either of these sources for information as to a fact which ought to be conveyed to us through the record, but we must presume, in support of the judgment of the circuit court, that the fact was as the judge of the probate court has stated it.
A second answer to this contention is, that under the de
A third answer is, that the appellants, having got as much as they are entitled to under the law, by having the claim placed in the sixth class, are not in a position to complain that the result is illogical; for a strict and literal compliance with the statute would have rejected it altogether.
We cannot sanction a rule which would disturb the classification of demands prescribed by the statute, in order to let in demands, contingent when the classification was made, but which may have matured long afterwards. Such demands are not to be entirely barred if presented within two years after they accrue, but they must fall into the sixth class and take their chances of payment there. The judgment of the circuit court is accordingly affirmed.