113 F. 382 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota | 1901
(orally). This is a motion to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. A motion o£ this kind does not call for any exercise of discretion on the part of the court. It is a matter of strict right. If the evidence tends to sustain any facts upon which the plaintiff would be entitled to a recovery in case the jury find such facts from the evidence (and upon a motion of this kind the evidence must be construed most strongly in favor óf the plaintiff), then there is a question for the jury, and the motion ought not to be granted. The fact that the son of the plaintiff was injured, so that he died, by a calamity which occurred while in the employ of the defendant, is sustained by the evidence, and is not seriously questioned. The only question is whether there is any evidence tending to show that his death, or the injury which caused his death, was caused by negligence which is imputable to the defendant, and for which the defendant is in law responsible. If there is no such evidence, there is nothing to support a verdict, if one should be rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Now, negligence is the lack of that care which a party is by law required to exercise under the particular circumstances of the case. If a party fails to exercise such care, and the result is an injury to another person, then the party guilty of the negligence is liable to the person injured for damages caused by the injury, providing there was no negligence on the part of the person injured which would prevent his recovery. The law, irrespective of the statute which has been referred to, requires an employer to exercise ordinary care in respect, to the place in which the employé is put to work, and in respect to the appliances which he is to use, and the surroundings, so that they shall be reasonably safe; and with respect to fellow servants who are employed in the same business the duty of the master is to use ordinary care to see that only careful, competent, and suitable men are employed in the business. On the other hand, the employé assumes the ordinary hazards and risks of the business about which he undertakes to work. Some kinds of business are more hazardous than others; but, whatever the degree of hazard, that which is apparent, and belonging to the business that he engages in, is assumed by the employé, and he also assumes the risk of carelessness on the part of fellow servants. If the master uses ordinary care to select competent fellow servants, and, notwithstanding this, a fellow servant commits an act of negligence or carelessness which injures another employé, the master is not liable, because he had done all that the law requires of him if he selected competent and suitable men. Of course, experience shows that, notwithstanding that degree of care, servants will be guilty of negligence which may injure themselves or their fellow servants. Now, with respect to this particular injury, the business in which the deceased was injured is apparently a hazardous business. The handling of logs, loading and assisting in moving them, — they being ponderous articles, liable, if they fall upon a person, to do him great injury, and hazard his life and limb, — is a business which, in its nature, is a hazardous one. The hazard may be and is increased by the danger of carelessness on the part of the employés who are engaged in the business, — in
Section 2701 of the Revised Statutes of Minnesota of 1894 provides that any railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in this state shall be liable for all damages sustained by any agent or servant thereof by reason of the negligence of any other agent or servant thereof without contributory negligence on his part. That would include responsibility on the part of a railroad corporation for negligence of a fellow servant, and it changes the law in that respect, but it does not change, it with respect to the effect of contributory negligence. This statute, as stated in several decisions, would be unconstitutional, as being in the nature of class legislation, imposing a responsibility upon railroad corporations that is not imposed upon other employers of labor, if it were not from a consideration that it is a peculiar regulation with respect to quasi public corporations which have franchises from the state, granted for the reason that the public is interested in the business of these corporations, and for that reason the legality of such regulation by the state is maintained as a.proper regulation for the safety of individuals and of the public generally with respect to corporations of this kind. It .is perhaps a' long stretch of the power of regulation to impose upon these corporations a liability for the acts of their servants that is not imposed upon other corporations or upon individuals, but the courts have sustained this particular regulation. It has been sustained by the supreme court of this state, and like statutes have been sustained in other states, and also by the supreme court of the United States; so it is beyond question now that this is a proper regulation, as far as the scope of this statute extends. So one question presented now is whether this statute applies to a railroad of this kind, which is not a public railroad, used by the public, and which is not a common carrier; for no person has a right to require that he be carried upon it, or to have his private goods carried upon it. It is a private concern, belonging to individuals, or to a company which is not a railroad corporation, and therefore does not come within the category of bodies who are invested with franchises for the use of the public, which
Upon another branch of this case I think that the same result will follow, and that is the matter of contributory negligence. There is no direct evidence as to how this accident or calamity occurred. There is evidence as to how this particular car was loaded, and how cars were io,acled in general. It appears the car was brought up to the skidways to which the logs are hauled from the woods for the purpose of being loaded; that the cars were placed opposite these skidways. But, as I understand the testimony, the cars are detached at these skidways, and are not coupled together, so that the cars would be loaded separately against the skidways, and after-wards coupled together for the purpose of being taken out. It appears that these cars are about 20 feet in length, and the logs to be loaded vary from 10 to 12 feet up to 22 or 24 feet. I think 24 is the longest that the testimony mentions. I do not know but one of the witnesses mentioned 26 feet, but I am inclined to think that 22 or 24 is the longest. So these logs are longer than the
It seems to me, upon both of these grounds, there is no evidence upon which the jury cam lawfully find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. /
Gentlemen of the ji/ry, the court directs that your verdict be for the defendant.