delivered the opinion of the court.
Dеfendant appeals from a judgment for $600 entered against hér in an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of a collision between the automobile in which plaintiff was riding and an automobile driven by defendant.
The collision occurred in the north bound section of Lake Shore Drive, about a block south of Addison street in Chicago. At this point Lake Shore Drive is divided into north and south bound drives, separated by a parkwаy. Each section consists of four driving lanes. Defendant was driving north in the second lane from the east. Plaintiff’s husband was driving the automobile in which plaintiff was riding аt about the same speed at which defendant was driving, and approximately 40 feet behind defendant’s car. Defendant stopped suddenly. Plaintiff’s husband immediately saw that she was stopping, and within a fraction of a second after defendant had applied her brakes he applied his brakes but his car collided with defendant’s before coming to a stop. Defendant claims that she stopped suddenly to avoid hitting a dog running across thе driveway immediately in front of her car. Witnesses for plaintiff claim that they saw no dog. The questions of defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s contributоry negligence or want of due care were questions of fact to be determined by the jury. Orr v. Herzog,
On cross-examination of plaintiff’s husband the defеndant submitted to him a statement prepared by an investigator, for the purpose of impeaching the witness. On redirect examination, in answer to a question by plaintiff’s counsel as to who wrote the statement, the witness replied that it was written by one of the men representing the Chicago Mоtor Club. Defendant objects that this was an improper injection of the insurance company into the case. This objection is not tenablе. Here the defendant sought to take advantage of an alleged impeaching statement signed by plaintiff’s witness but prepared and obtainеd by an agent of the insurer. The identity of the person preparing the statement, the nature of his employment and by whom employed becamе material for the purpose of showing his interest, if any, in the litigation. As said in Gegan v. Kemp,
Defendant contends that the court erred in receiving in evidence bills rendered by plaintiff’s physician and which she testified werе paid by her, because of failure to prove the reasonableness of the bill. As said in Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co.,
Objection is made that the argument of plaintiff’s counsel to the jury was improper and inflammatory, resulting in a verdict for excessive damages. Plaintiff’s counsel should not have referred to the employment by the insurer of the investigator who took the statement from plaintiff’s husband, after the court had instructed the jury to disregаrd the testimony on that point. As we have held this action of the court was erroneous, we do .not consider the conduct of counsel reversible error.
It is also objected that plaintiff’s counsel erroneously told the jury that plaintiff’s physician was in the armed service of the United States or he would have been in court to testify to plaintiff’s injuries. The evidence showed that the physician was in the Philippine Islands with the United States Navy at the time of the trial, and, if plaintiff had not shown his absence, defendant would have been enthusiastically demanding to know why he had not been produced. There was no error in this argument.
The court gave a stock instruction^ directing the jury, if they-found the issues for plaintiff, to find for her such sum as “in the judgment of the jury, under the instructions of the court, will be fair compensation for the damages she has sustained, if any, on account of said injuries, so far as such damаges are claimed and alleged by the plaintiff in the declaration and proven by a preponderance of the evidence undеr the instructions of the court to have directly resulted from the accident in question.” Defendant rightly contends that the practice of referring tо the complaint in an instruction, unless the jury are instructed as to what issues are raised by the complaint, has been criticized, citing Bernier v. Illinois Cent. R. Cо.,
Objection is made to the refusal of a stock instruction that if the jury believed “from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was injured as a result of аn accident which occurred without the fault either of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or either of them, then you are instructed the plaintiff cannot recover and you should find the defendant not guilty.” We agree with the statement of the Third Division of this court in Rzeszewski v. Barth,
Objection is also made to the refusal of an instruction tendered by defendant, stating in substance that if the jury found that plaintiff’s husband operated his automobile nearer to defendant’s automobile ‘1 than was reasonable and proper, having due regard to the speed of both vehicles and the traffic сonditions upon the highway,” and that the proximate cause of the collision and the resulting injuries to plaintiff were due to such action, the jury should find thе defendant not guilty. Defendant’s contention is that an emergency justified the sudden stopping of her car, and that the proximate cause of thе collision was the negligence of plaintiff’s husband in driving his car too near to defendant’s car. There was evidence tending to support defеndant’s theory. The instruction correctly stated the law, and as the case is close on the evidence it was reversible error to refuse, the instruction.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Matchett, P. J., and O’Connor, J., concur.