709 F. App'x 92
2d Cir.
2018

Valerie WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LONG BEACH MORTGAGE COMPANY, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, (as Trustee for Long Beach Mortgage Trust 2006-2), J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, Pitnick & Margolin LLP, C. Lance Margolin, Defendants-Appellees, Steven J. Baum, Dawn Hanzlik-Hexemer, Unknown Others, Defendants.

16-3646

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 22, 2018

Moreover, the Appellees’ refusal to provide certain documents to Rodas following the termination of his 2014 action does not transform his present action into a “new” claim. Rodas argues in both actions that he had a liberty interest in staying in the RISC program—and thus out of jail—and Appellees deprived him of that interest without due process. Rodas has not established that he has a separate liberty interest in the documents he later tried to obtain from them.

We have considered Rodas’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court‘s judgment.

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Valerie Williams, Mount Vernon, NY.

FOR DEUTSCHE BANK AND J.P MORGAN: Jonathan E. Samon, McGlinchey Stafford, New York, NY.

FOR PITNICK & MORGOLIN LLP AND C. LANCE MARGOLIN: Alan H. Weinreb, The Margolin & Weinreb Law Group, LLP, Syosset, NY.

FOR LONG BEACH MORTGAGE CO.: No appearance.

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, PETER W. HALL, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Valerie Williams, pro se, appeals from a judgment dismissing her amended complaint. Williams sued various financial institutions and law firms for fraud stemming from a mortgage foreclosure. The district court dismissed for lack* of subject matter jurisdiction. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 824 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Williams affirmatively waives any challenge to the district court‘s determination that it lacked original federal jurisdiction. She argues that the district court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims, asserting that she submitted substantial evidence of her equitable interest in her home. As we recently reaffirmed, “a district court ‘cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless there is first a proper basis for original federal jurisdiction.‘” Cohen v. Postal Holdings, LLC, 873 F.3d 394, 399 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). The district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Williams‘s purported federal claims, and was “thereby precluded from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims.” Id.

We have considered Williams‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court‘s judgment.

Notes

*
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as set forth above.