Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.

Here, parents seek relief for their damages on loss of services and tial based loss, representatives as child’s own and expenses as result of the on the incurred a .they seek for child’s loss. We find relief injury is distinct from the child’s child’s that under Political Sub-division Tort injuries. for his or her right of action own (51 O.S.Supp.1982, et Claims Act Okl., See, Boyett v. Airline Lumber person seq.), seeking is a re “claimant” (1954); Stinchcomb v. Hold 277 P.2d 676 losses, particular loss or lief for or her his er, Reth (1941); 116 P.2d 891 189 Okl. repre relief in a or for whom another seeks Co., Okl., P.2d v. Halliburton erford Thus, parents’ capacity. sentative because O.S.1981, (1977); 5. separate and constitute caus child’s losses action, in effect two es of there are claim statutory requirement There is no single ants claimant in this rather than damages claim of a child for it read at case. Under 154 as the time personal injury parents and the claim of arose, each their causes of action claimant joined. expenses be Nor will medical $50,000.00 up is entitled to recover from judicata parent of res bar a doctrine District Plaintiffs thus 1-29. recover bringing expenses a suit for medical subse $100,000.00 from a maximum of District quent to an action on behalf of 1-29. v. injuries. See, Smittle personal child 1-29 and Because District two other de- Eberle, (1960). jointly severally fendants held were $100,000.00, are liable the sum of affirm Where there common issues judgment. the trial court’s law, case, may in this fact or join .action in desirable to both causes of AFFIRMED. potential to avoid one suit order estoppel the doctrine of effect of collateral All the Justices concur. See, Oklahomans for case. a second Oklahoma, Inc., Life, Inc. v. Fair State (1981). However, 634 P.2d 704

joinder parties and of causes of action §§ (12 265, 323), O.S.1981, compulsory merger sepa not effect a

and does that may

rate causes of action be asserted by the parents child. “claimant” is not

The word defined WILLIAMS, Appellant, Act, Tort Sub-division Claims Jimmie L. Political previously has not addressed the this Court properly a claim- issue of who is considered FREIGHT, LEE WAY INC. a MOTOR However, per- under the Act. we find ant Corporation, Delaware and John E. holding of the suasive the Oklahoma Court individual, Vincent, Appellees. 2,No. in Gleason Appeals, Division City, P.2d City Oklahoma Okl.App., 666 No. 61175. denied. (1983), certiorari The Court Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Appeals upheld the trial court’s suit, wrongful finding death that under Sept. § 154, O.S.Supp.1978, decedent’s Rehearing Denied Oct. separate children were widow and two each claimants, seeking to re- each was because damages particular for his or her

cover Roelofs, also, Faber See

losses.

Minn. N.W.2d Dowling,

Mathew City, ap- Oklahoma for pellant.

Foliart, Niemeyer by &Mills D. Glen Mills, Wayne Huff and W. City, Oklahoma appellees. for KAUGER, Justice. question presented

The novel is whether year the two statute of provided 95(3) 12 O.S. 1981 or the limitation prescribed of year one 12 O.S. § 95(4) governs bring the time to an action for intentional infliction of emotional dis- § 95(3) tress.1 We that controlling. find (appellant-employee), Jimmie L. Williams employed was as a dock worker Lee Way Freight, Motor (appellee-employ- Inc. er). 1, 1981, May Way’s On Lee assistant manager terminal accused Williams of stealing spray several bottles of mouth presence the his Subse- co-workers. quently, employee detained, the inter- was arrested, rogated, imprisoned, and fired job. Approximately his a la- month ter, larceny charges dropped, the were employee with was reinstated full back pay. He filed an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on June employer’s 1982. The peti- demurrer to the overruled, tion an was amended an- summary swer and a for motion asserting were filed statute of complete limitations was bar to em- 95(3), (4): enumerated; provided by 1. It is 12 O.S. hereinafter an action ground recovery for relief on the "Civil than of fraud —the cause actions other for the property real can of action in within the such case shall not be deemed to following periods, after the discovery cause action have accrued until the of the fraud. accrued, and shall have not afterwards: (1) ... year: Fourth. Within one libel, an action for (2) years: Third. Within trespass upon assault, two An action for slander, battery, pros- malicious property; real an action for ecution, imprisonment; or false an action taking, detaining injuring personal proper- or forfeiture, upon penalty except or statute ty, including recovery specific actions imposing prescribes where statute personal property; an action limitation_” different another, contract, rights arising describing genesis court In of this new ployee’s action. trial cause of years judg- noted, forty-five ago, that summary Prosser sustained the motion holding many cases find a techni- year the one statute courts strained to ment § 95(4) assault, battery, imprisonment, cal limitations contained O.S. right trespass, or even invasion of controlled. permit par- privacy, as tenuous to excuse appeal that employee The contends on recovery injury, mental when in astic for of action intentional because cause for reality suffering was the sub- mental specif- infliction of emotional distress is not damage Prosser stantial sustained. also § ically 95(4), enumerated courts cannot problem suggested that the inherent could exception into which read the statute torts were re- be solved if the technical expressed by Legislature; has not been action, and moved from the cause of express thing im- mention of one that separate independent of and tort intention- mentioned; plies the exclusion of others not suffering al infliction of extreme mental gene- though that even the tort had its and by outrageous recog- caused conduct were comprises of assault sis tort nized.2 liability. separate and distinct for basis following employer jurisdictions, counters that Oklahoma did Numerous Pros- logic, recognize in- infliction acknowledge the tort of intentional ser’s now that of not Dean suffering independent mental as an cause fliction of emotional distress until (Okla.1976), Generally, action.3 Chapman, of states which have P.2d 257 556 adopted infliction the tort of intentional of that because Dean adopted Restate- anguish (d) mental have the Restate- (Second) followed of ment Torts comment § (Second) (1965), § ment of Torts has adopt it should also the rationale damages right to Oklahoma. The recover (b) comment of that section which states dependent for emotional distress not on dis- infliction of emotional that intentional Chapman, After Dean v. physical injury. regarded as an extension of tress recognized did a new tort was which assault. require fiction of maintenance theo- THE IS THE LIMITATION PERIOD FOR physical impact injury retical or in order to INFLIC- TORT OF INTENTIONAL justify damages the award of for mental TION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS one, Dean anguish. acknowledged § 95(3) BY GOVERNED O.S.1981 outrageous who extreme and conduct or 12 95(4)? O.S.1981 wilfully wantonly or causes severe emo- A another, tional to lia- distress Allowing for and emotion- actions mental bility emotional distress and scope injury outside the of some tradi- al emanating harm from the distress.4 tionally recognized relatively tort new. The interest in mental and emotional secur- of emotion- The tort of intentional infliction regarded ity standing alone is as sufficient- intentional, outra- consists of al distress important protection ly through to warrant geous in infliction of conduct which results independent physical tort action —neither form, suffering in an extreme to, mental injury interests nor invasion other predecessor an ancient resembles the claimant need be to establish a shown —assault. Counce, Hutson, Ark. See Ford 2. M.B.M. Inc. v. S.C. S.E.2d Prosser, (1981) (1980); 777-778 collected cases. S.W.2d 686-87 “Intentional Tort,” Suffering: A New Infliction Mental League Corp., In Breeden v. Services Mich.L.Rev. 874 (Okla.1978) Chapman, and Dean v. protects general two-year cause of action.5 The law the more emo- statute set forth tranquility against 95(3) tional and mental seri- applies to “an action for However, ous and intentional another, invasions.6 rights arising contemporary civility standards of do not contract, and not hereinafter enumerat- recovery every justified allow case of ed.” originally Section 95 was written in indignation. requires The tort some extra- subsequently revised ordinary transgression of the bounds of 1961 and 1971. The statute was recodified socially tolerable conduct.7 change although without the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress litigants dispute 95(4) do not adopted judicially had been years some five libel, provides slander, that actions for as- Accordingly, earlier. until such time as the sault, battery, prosecution, malicious classify sees fit to this new imprisonment, penalty or an action for or we must assume that the intent of the brought forfeiture must year be within one parame- is that it fall within the imposing unless the statute prescribes § 95(3). ters of different employer argues limitation. The applies that this section here because this tort recog- is similar to assault. While we B. parasitic nize the nature of this tort’s ori- finding There is a second reason for gins, decline we to subordinate it to the § 95(3) controlling. Generally, if reason, compelling older torts. There is no question there is a substantial of which of otherwise, why historic or the newer two or more statutes of limitations should given independent its status should be tied applied, be the doubt should in be resolved

to the limitation of its ancestors. application favor of the of the statute which longest contains the limitation.9 Nor do we find basis for ex legislative protect This serves intent of panding the statute to include unenumerat- ing claims, yet pro defendants from stale ed torts. The tort of intentional infliction approach liberality vides an which af of emotional distress is neither addressed plaintiff party-litigant fords a maximum parastically dependent statute nor system.10 free access to our court Al the existence of another cause action. though primarily statutes of limitation are statutory maxim of constriction that designed expression to assure fairness to defendants thing of one or more ex they prevent being cludes because claims from applicable.8 those mentioned is tort of intentional infliction of when the mental relevant evidence is so must, therefore, governed unreliable, distress policy old that it is repose (Okla. 1976) virtually plied legislative 556 P.2d 257 the court to defeat intent. In re Arbuckle adopted Dist., Co., the Restatement of Torts. Conservancy Murray Master Dist. Ct. 9660, 385, (Okla.1970). No. 474 P.2d 391-92 We Byrd, "Recovery Anguish for Mental in North helpful find that it is a aid in this instance in the Carolina", N.C.L.Rev., 435, (1980). 58 461 legislative absence of intent to the contra. Siliznoff, 6. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Reed, 435, (10th Hughes 46 F.2d 440 Cir. 330, 282, (1952), 38 Cal.2d 285 1931); Ostrus, 1039, Payne v. 50 F.2d 77 A.L.R. Judge Traynor which traces the evolution of the (1931); Sims, 155, O'Malley 531 51 Ariz. 75 tort. 50, (1938); P.2d 115 A.L.R. 634 Southern P.R. 131, May Dept. 7. Hall v. Stores 292 Ore. 637 Gonzalez, 260, 377, Co. v. 48 Ariz. P.2d 106 126, (1981). P.2d (1936); Loafers, Bay A.L.R. 1012 Shew Coon Inc., (1969). 76 Wash.2d 8. A similar result was reached in Stewart v. Thomas, (D.C.1982) F.Supp. and in Honolulu, City County 10. Salavea v. Puryear, Dickens v. 302 N.C. 276 S.E.2d (1973). Haw. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a rule of statutory ap- construction which should not be as enumeratio here, outweighed justice the interest of accurately where or more est exclusio alterius.4 Invoking unius requires For the reasons stat- otherwise.11 ed, rule the court reasons that because the applicable find that statute is not included eo nomine outrage intentional inflic- limitations for tort of is 12 O.S. 1981 tion of emotional distress among delicts enumerated § 95(8). § 95(4)5 governed by a which are —those necessarily falls into time bar —it REVERSED. § 95(3). provided in the unenumerated class governed by two-year limi- The latter are SIMMS, V.C.J., HODGES, DOOLIN, tation. I cannot accede this view. ALMA KAUGER, WILSON JJ., con- jurisprudence ex- Whenever this court’s cur. recognition tends to a delictual claim cognizable by BARNES, previously the common law C.J., and LAVENDER and ALA, JJ., state, applicable OP to it dissent. of this the time bar statutory provides that which our law

HARGRAVE, J„ disqualified. litigation into the class of new my opinion that tort falls.6 It is hence ALA, Justice, OP dissenting. one-year period of found § 95(4) applied newly-for- should be to the pronounces today The court that a two- outrage. mulated tort of Subdivision limitations, year prescribed statute of clearly embraces all the invasions of § 95(3),1 applicable O.S. 1981 to the so- wilful interest, both in free- person’s protected outrage.2 Today’s holding called tort of restraint, bodily upon dom from harm and from rested a canon of construction known expressio unius est exclusio alterius,3 enactment, were, at the time of its which conduct; or where 11. Burnett v. N.Y. Central R.R. 380 U.S. tain to result from his he 1050, 1054, recklessly disregard high 85 S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 941 acts in deliberate of a degree probability that the emotional distress 95(3) are: 1. The terms of 12 O.S. 1981 § follow; applies only and will that the section recovery other than the of real "Civil actions where the emotional distress has in fact result- only brought property can be within the follow- ed, and where it is severe. ing periods ... pendent theory of threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or other defined in the ly the text of that section the delictual emotional other results from tor's conduct has been extreme and to another is applies only where the actor desires to inflict trivialities. It does not extend to mere of Restatement severe emotional such distress is certain or is on * * * * * * Third. Within two or emotional extreme contract, and recklessly ’’ ” tort of ^[******] [emphasis supplied]. Liability attaches to the distress, and According (Second) distress, outrage, following causes severe emotional distress outrageous distress; rights intentional, and if it, hereinafter of Torts (2) years; to the has been formulated to the words: where he knows another, bodily conduct intentional- such insults, indignities, reckless infliction rests on an inde- liability substantially cer- comments, enumerated where the ac- "(1) ... an action harm to the outrageous. not [1964]. One who for such claim is arising harm. 46§ that ... by In 6. Our 5. The terms of 12 O.S. 3. See footnote 17 infra. League pronounced property exclusion of a different tionary false "Civil actions other than for the ing periods ... [1978]. terius means the plied]. ... The maxim enumeratio unius Fourth. Within one assault, battery, imprisonment; recognition ^[******] Service [5th Ed.1979] can and in Dean v. only Corp., specification later reaffirmed in be of this new tort was first brought ... malicious page 479. Chapman, thing. (1) year: * * * of one within the follow- 95(4) Black's Law Dic- recovery prosecution, [emphasis est An action for exclusio thing are: Breeden of real is the sup- al- or any evidentiary of Okla- court with sup- common law by the material cognizable plea port of their that there was an homa.7 absence facts. controverted The court’s decision I implicitly, if grounded was not explicitly, judge’s the alleged trial view THE DISPUTE imprisonment tort-of-outrage false and According allegations, both plaintiff's to the claims were barred § 95(4). statute limitations in the harm be vindicated came to be in- wrongly detained flicted when he was and plaintiff clearly sought to rest his falsely accused stealing company prop- recovery; claim on two distinct theories of arrest, erty. These acts resulted in his imprisonment one for false and another imprisonment job. and dismissal from the outrage. Regardless tort of of what do charges respect dropped After were and his em- here with to the timeliness tort-of-outrage claim, judgment reinstated, under ployment was he must review insofar as it bars against employer suit his and the assistant affirmed plaintiff's imprisonment false suit. manager, alleging terminal acts clearly oné-year The latter is barred “extreme, complained outrageous of were period provided 95(4). We decency” beyond bounds of human speculate here that on remand of “intentionally maliciously and were plaintiff this case the will be able to show perpetrated” purpose causing for the more than imprisonment.10 extreme him suffer emotional The trial court’s should hence be physical distress. The trial court sus- in part. affirmed at least tained the defendants’ “motion summa- ry judgment”. Ill TORTS BY INTRODUCED RECENT JU-

II RISPRUDENCE MUST BE GOV- BY ERNED LIMITATIONS PROVID- THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE THE ED IN LEGISLATIVE CLASSI- FICATION SYSTEM judgment The here under review is not a disposition8 § plead- Rule 13 but the one on By the of 12 2 terms O.S. 1981 the ings.9 provide The defendants legislature gave failed to the this court power the to amendments, Although 782, intervening [1980]; Wedgewood Village, there were 7. Weeks 784 v. language 780, present-day Okl., the of subdiv. 4 12 [now 785 554 P.2d [1976]. 95(4)] exactly § is the as that in O.S.1981 its same enactment. St. 1893 § initial 3890. legal 10.Several hurdles have to be overcome enacted, plain subdiv. 4 was the At the time first tort-of-outrage may before a claim sub- warrant legislature of the was that all intention jury. wilful mission to the The trial initial- court must person’s protected of a interest in invasions ly determine whether the conduct defendant’s gov- from harm or be freedom restraint reasonably regarded be so extreme and by Violence is erned limitation. permit outrageous recovery. It is also statutory the time-bar when an done to scheme determine, instance, the court to in the first gov- delict is to be after-formulated declared whether, upon presented, based the evidence by a limitations from erned that different supporta- claim for emotional severe distress is litigation very for the into intended class of Where, court, under ble. the facts before the falls. it differ, could reasonable men it is then for the A under Rule 13 is one where the jury to whether the in find defendant’s conduct appear facts material to be uncontroverted from any given significantly has case been extreme evidentiary the tion. homa, material tendered with mo- outrageous imposition to warrant liabili- 13, Rules for of Okla- Rule District Courts ty. League Corp., supra Breeden Service note 1981, 2, App. 12 O.S. Ch. 1377; 46, (Second) 6 at Restatement of Torts h; Puryear, see 302 comment also Dickens v. 876, College,Okl.App., 9. Beck Bacone P.2d 604 437, N.C. 276 S.E.2d 325 [1981]. [1980]; Harris, 877 Wabaunsee v. 1300 law,11 grant, “procedure” is by a constitutional

change the common but it did not regulation by subject to exclusive court- the court to fashion limitation authorize rules.14 fashioned newly-created torts. periods for Since bringing a fixed time for the notion of legislature bring by fails to in When the law, unknown to the common actions was new, judicially-created name some regard- power to limit the time must be analogous stat- adopt must for it the most exclusively legislative.12 Because the ed as existing ute of limitations in the cata- reposed in the power psychic to alter limitations logue.15 plaintiffs The claim for by statutory legislature, intentionally by we are bound inflicted the defend- harm outrageous Statutory allegedly limitations bind the ant’s conduct should scheme.13 which, governed by very jurisdictions in be declared to be courts even those by provide outrage fashioning 2 the tort of for it a distinct of 12 O.S. 1981 terms limitations, Supreme part: period of so is the Court by doing law, restrained the same rule from as modified constitution- "The common law, expressly prohibits the statutory judicial and the which the constitution decisions al and Moose, people, doing. Loyal shall condition and wants of the remain from Order of Cavaness, Okl., 143, general Lodge in aid of the Statutes of Okla- in force P.2d 1785 v. * * * [1977], homa A.L.R.3d 1234. Publishing McCormack v. Okl. 737, analysis [1980], 14. In a conflict-of-law limitations of P.2d integral part actions are considered to 12. Limitations are created statute and derive law, relating adjective ment, i.e. rules to commence legislative They hence their force from it. are prosecution maintenance and of suits. Lietch, Okl., judicial and not acts. Lake v. (Second) 122, Conflicts of Law § Restatement 935, P.2d [1976]. [1969]; v. Public Comment Barnhill Service Colorado, strong policy against 13. In Oklahoma there is a Co. 718-719 [Colo. statutory App.1982], governed by alteration of limitations: the law of the (A) But even in those states—i.e. New Jer constitutionally prohibited forum. Parties are sey "procedure" reducing legisla- to exclusive limitations contract because —where rules, regulation by statutory tively-prescribed beyond are court-fashioned Const.; parties. Winberry reach of the Art. 23 Okl. limitations bind courts. See Co., Okl., [1949], Uptegraft Salisbury, N.J.Super. v. Home Insurance A.2d (B) Limitations are also be- 686 [1983]. affd. 5 N.J. 74 A.2d 406 cert.den. yond they the reach of the courts because are of 340 U.S. 71 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed. 638 [1950]. parliamentary origin. and not common-law Jersey Supreme Court has a While the New developed by limitation the common procedure, "monopoly" constitutional prescrip- was the so-called "immemorial law procedure a line of demarcation between draws Century tion”. It was not until the 17th power regulate by policy rules and within its decision-making legislation passed providing Parliament fixed legisla- that still remains ’ action must be time limits within which an Winberry,supra, ture. In the court followed the brought. Opala, Praescriptio Temporis See antecedents of the common law and historical Prescriptive its Relation to Easements merely held that limitations of actions are not Law, 106, Anglo-American 111- 7 Tulsa L.Rev. procedural rules for the courts to fashion. 46, 113, (C) [1971], By § the terms of Art. 5 Const., legislature prohibited from Okl. is courts, 15. Federal follow a similar by fashioning special tampering with limitations Congress scheme when creates new causes of making unreasonable classifica- limitations and provide action but fails to for a statute of limita 220, McIntosh, City v. 141 Okl. tions. Tulsa tions, adopt analogous peri the most limitations special vice of a law is 284 P. 875 The by Equal Employ od enacted state law. See not embrace the whole class natural- that does ly falling Gaddis, Opportunity ment Commission et al v. scope. within its Limitations must 1373, Cir.1984]; 733 F.2d 1376-1377 Board [10th be uniform for each class and based therefore Tomanio, 478, 483-484, Regents v. 446 U.S. legisla- classifications. When the on reasonable 1790, 1795, [1980]; L.Ed.2d 100 S.Ct. 95(4), one-year ture enacted it classified for a § Railway Express Agency, v. 421 U.S. Johnson treatment all the then-known torts limitation 454, 462, 1716, 1721, 95 S.Ct. 44 L.Ed.2d 295 that deal with invasion of one’s freedom from Wilson, [1975]; Garcia 731 F.2d 642-643 bodily category harm or restraint —a intentional Cremins, See also Smith v. [10th Cir.1984]. encompass clearly that would rage. the tort of out- Annot., Cir.1962] F.2d 187 98 A.L.R.2d [9th legislature Just as the itself would not 1160. special category create a have been able to all applies of the enumerated class same which were un- person’s protect- other invasions of a wilful known to the common law of this state. It ed interest in freedom from harm say legislature would be absurd to that the and from restraint. Those invasions are original intended to exclude from its statu- separate set out as a tort class 76 O.S. tory classification scheme wilful torts governed 616. The entire class yet in may not existence. The court thus by one-year time bar O.S. 1981 existing not infer from the enumeration of § 95(4). yet given torts the exclusion of those to be

judicial birth.18 IV wilfulness/negligenee traditional di- chotomy wrongs recog-

THE actionable was EXPRESSIO-UNIUS-EST-EXCLU- by nized Scott Bradford.19 court SIO-ALTERIUS RULE OF CON- There, adopted STRUCTION IS INAPPLICABLE IN this court a variant of medi- THE responsibility DETERMINING PERIOD OF cal tort known as lack of LIMITATIONS THAT A While, GOVERNS informed malprac- consent. TORT INTRODUCED INTO THE context, lack consent constitutes a tice BY LAW RECENT JURISPRU- assault and battery, common-law the mod- DENCE delict, rested on lack ern con- of informed sent, rightly negli- viewed as rooted in general express rule that men- gence. jurisdiction, In at one least a medi- tion of one matter excludes other similar malpractice cal claim founded on lack of matters that are not mentioned17 has no fall, informed consent is deemed to because, application to this case. This is so one-year within the limitations for wilful while the maxim be effective to ex- longer period but rather within the 95(4) any clude from wilful tort known to provided jurisdiction in that negligence when statute was the common law enacted, principles products cases.20 On similar lia- operate judi- it cannot to exclude bility governed actions are held cially-created later-promulgated by to be —or —torts 16. The terms of 76 O.S. 17. This governed by vided his It bodily sult, out one’s limitation three. The third class is construction to be and is not conclusive as to the exclusio "Besides the ognized ral association of ideas the contrast between a one which is not mentioned leads to specific statute. ence that included within the statute. personal §in clear that the first personal restraint or to the outrage in the Political maxim, alterius, 6 were intended It law, period. For a breakdown of torts to the latter was defamation, relations." personal rights applicable only qualifications ^[1] relations, matter which is falls within the first of these is an known as harm, applied auxiliary right two Code, ^[3] governed limitation and that [emphasis see 76 ^[2] and restrictions classes of delicts set and from expressio with where in mentioned or rec- from every person Accordingly, the rule of protection 6 are: intended to meaning O.S. 1981 expressed great personal mine]. unius est the natu- statutory two-year caution of the infer- to be from pro- has, 8.§ in- 20. Nelson v. statute to istence since the expressly sio unius est exclusio rule Spiers reject the rationale of Dickens for the reasons N.E.2d at discussed herein. result as this court’s who between common-law Corp Webster 92 N.J. negligence 1036 [1976]. Cf. operates will . Dickens v. Magnolia mentioned which have come into ex- things of a Patrick, 457 A.2d 431 [1983]. For an 856-857 without preclude which follows the maxim physician, Division, passage Puryear, supra of the same class as those Petroleum example alterius, pronouncement [1952]; Hardesty N.C.App. battery by of the statute. patient’s [1980]. see Perna v. application reaches the same of the difference 206 Okl. note consent and 293 S.E.2d physician today. v. Andro Pirozzi, expres- of the I applicable to ex delicto actions BARNES, C.J., and LAVENDER, J., join negligence.21 dissenting opinion. I would affirm the trial court’s tort-of-outrage which the claim —a wil- judge-generated

ful tort —was held barred

by the same limitation as that which is

applicable battery to both assault and imprisonment. Black & Decker Opala, tion, Okl., Thiry J.); Kirkland v. General Motors Armstrong 519 [1983] Manufacturing Company, World (concurring opinion by [1974]; Industries, Okl., O'Neal v. Corpora- & 501 F.2d ^[1974] 393 [10th Cir.1974]. Nichols v. Eli Lilly

Case Details

Case Name: Williams v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Date Published: Sep 25, 1984

Citation: 688 P.2d 1294

Docket Number: 61175

Court Abbreviation: Okla.