Williams v. GriffithWilliams v. Griffith
Alan Williams, pro se.
Reminger Co., L.P.A., and Lisa R. House, for appellees Villa Angela et al.
Lane Alton & Horst, LLC, and Gregory D. Rankin, for appellees Mohammed Shareef, M.D., and Mayyar Shareef, M.D.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
SADLER, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Alan Williams (“appellant“), appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas which granted the defendants’ motions to
First Assignment of Error
Did the Trial Court Err in granting dismissal for defendant James Griffith and all other defendants on the bases that they should enjoy relief from all of the Plaintiffs non-medical claims because the plaintiff did not file an acceptable affidavit of merit to support his wrongful death and medical negligence claim. The plaintiffs Wrongful death claim was not based on medical negligence but assault and battery which claims cannot be consumed under the medical negligence claim.
Second Assignment of Error
The Trial Court did commit intentional abuse of discretion claiming that the Wrongful Death of the child was to be subsumed under these claims, thus making it appear as if the plaintiff[‘s] entire case was subjected to the statue of limitation. None of the claims against the Appellee was subjected to the Statute of Limitation.
Third Assignment of Error
Did the Trial Court err in granting defendants defense of the claims when the court claims that the plaintiff did not file within one year of the statue of limitation.
Fourth Assignment of Error
The court did grossly erred [sic] when it ruled that the administrator of the estate cannot pursue the wrongful death action in for his sole benefit.
Fifth Assignment of Error
Did the Trial Court Err in its [sic] decision that the Plaintiff had committed the Unauthorized Practice of Law?
Sixth Assignment of Error
Did the court err by denying the administrator of the estate to pursue his own claims.
Seventh Assignment of Error The doctors James Griffith and the other defendants obtained no jurisdiction from the Probate Court to remove life sustaining or life prolonging treatment.
{¶2} The procedural history of the case is as follows: Plaintiffs Shamar Williams and Lakisha Williams (now deceased),1 filed a pro se complaint on February 24, 2006, against James Griffith, Villa Angela Care Center, Lisa Mathis, RN, Lorrie Pratt, RPT, Larry Conr, RRT, Melissa Bishop, SRT, J. Newton, LPN, Larry Howard, RN, Korinne Knuebel, two maintenance personnel, all unnamed others of service team, Brian Colleran, Dianne Bozek, and co-administrator and owner unknown (collectively known as the “Villa Angela defendants“); Mohammed Shareef, M.D., and Nayyar Shareef, M.D., alleging that defendants failed to provide plaintiff Lakisha Williams with adequate medical care and this failure resulted in her death on August 26, 2004.
{¶3} On April 13, 2006, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaint pursuant to
{¶4} The trial court in this case, granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss finding that the wrongful death claim should be dismissed because it included allegations of medical negligence, and thus required the filing of an affidavit of merit pursuant to
{¶5} Although the trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, the plaintiffs had already dismissed the complaint once, pursuant to
{¶6} In order for a trial court to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery.” O‘Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, syllabus. In construing the complaint upon a
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting dismissal of the non-medical claims because the plaintiffs did not file an acceptable affidavit of merit to support the wrongful death and medical negligence claims. Appellant argues that the wrongful death claim was based on assault and battery rather than medical negligence, and therefore should not have been treated as a medical negligence claim. While appellant raised non-medical claims other than assault and battery in his complaint, on appeal he only raises the assault and battery claims as the basis for his wrongful death claim.
{¶8} Even if we accepted appellant‘s assertion that the trial court erred in finding that the assault and battery constituted part of the medical negligence claim, and thus required an affidavit of merit, appellant‘s claim for assault and battery would not entitle him to recovery. Appellant‘s assertions of assault and battery are based on
{¶9} Appellant also seems to argue that the trial court was biased against appellant in favor of the government and argues that he was given no notice of the intention to dismiss his complaint. There is nothing in
{¶10} Therefore, appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶11} Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had committed the unauthorized practice of law by pursuing the claims of others in connection with his wrongful death claim. The trial court found that appellant could represent himself or could present himself as the administrator of Lakisha‘s estate, but he could not represent others because to do so would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Appellant argues that he is the administrator of Lakisha‘s estate, and that he has standing to represent his own and his son‘s interests.4
{¶12} A civil action must be asserted by the real party in interest because a party who is not the real party in interest lacks standing to prosecute the action. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 1998-Ohio-275. Only a personal
{¶13} “Thus, while a surviving spouse, child, or parent may be the real party in interest in the case, a suit brought by anyone other than the personal representative, admittedly a nominal party, will not meet the statutory requirements for the action.” Schaffer v. Gateway Harvestore, Inc. (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 448, 455, citing Burwell v. Maynard (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 108, 110. “[A] personal representative of a decedent‘s estate stands in the shoes of the decedent to assert claims on behalf of the estate.” Hosfelt v. Miller, 7th Dist. No. 97-JE-50, 2000-Ohio-2619. Thus, the personal representative represents the interests of the statutory next of kin.
{¶14}
{¶15} Appellant was appointed as the administrator of the estate of Lakisha Williams. However, he is not an attorney. Thus, while he may represent himself, pro se, he may not represent others that the statute designates as next of kin, because to represent others would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. As the trial court found, appellant could not proceed pro se by representing only himself, because the action has to be maintained by the personal representative on behalf of the statutory next of kin in one action.
{¶16} Appellant contends that the trial court refused to address the case law that he had cited, and argues that if the trial court had read In re Guardianship of Stein, 105 Ohio St.3d 30, 2004-Ohio-7114, it would have not dismissed the complaint. However, the Stein case does not address the standing issue. In Stein, the Supreme Court of
{¶17} Appellant‘s fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error are not well-taken, and are therefore overruled.
{¶18} In his brief, appellant cites Weaver v. Edwin Shaw Hosp., 104 Ohio St.3d 390, 2004-Ohio-6549. In the syllabus of Weaver, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the term “disability” as used in
{¶19} Appellant also cites Halbert v. Emch (Sept. 20, 1985), 6th Dist. No. L-84-310, in which the Sixth District Court of Appeals found that despite
{¶20} Appellant appears to be raising Weaver and Halbert for the proposition that the statute of limitations for the medical malpractice action was tolled in this case, which apparently relate to his second and third assignments of error. However, appellant did not provide any argument, just the case citations. App.R. 16(A)(7) states,
{¶21} Although appellate courts often afford some leniency to pro se appeals, they do not “conjure up questions never squarely asked or construct full-blown claims from convoluted reasoning.” State ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 199, 206. Ohio courts generally hold pro se litigants to the same rules and procedures as those litigants who retain counsel. Pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights, and they must accept the results of their own mistakes. Whitehall at ¶21. However, “[i]f a court cannot understand the arguments advanced by a party, relief cannot be granted.” State v. Dunlap, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-260, 2005-Ohio-6754, ¶10.
{¶22} Therefore, appellant‘s second and third assignments of error are overruled.
{¶23} In his seventh assignment of error, appellant contends that the defendants obtained no jurisdiction from the probate court to remove life-sustaining or life-prolonging treatment but does not allege an error by the trial court. However, appellant provided no separate legal argument for this assignment of error as required by App.R.
{¶24} Therefore, appellant‘s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
{¶25} Having overruled each of appellant‘s seven assignments of error, the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
FRENCH, P.J., and McGRATH, J., concur.
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