Mario Williams appeals from the trial court’s order finding that his claims for conversion and invasion of privacy against the Georgia Department of Corrections (the “DOC”) are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds and owe no deference to the trial court’s rulings on questions of law. See Laskar v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga.,
In August 2014, Williams filed suit against the DOC and several of the Prison’s individual employees in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, asserting claims for conversion and invasion of privacy.
1. In his sole enumeration of error, Williams asserts that the trial court erred in granting the DOC’s motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity. Because sovereign
Sovereign immunity has constitutional status, and that immunity may be waived only by a constitutional provision or an Act of the General Assembly. See Ga. Dept. of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc.,
However, the GTCA contains exceptions to this limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and to the extent the GTCA sets forth those exceptions, the State and its departments remain immune from suit. See OCGA § 50-21-24 (setting forth 13 limitations to the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity). One such exception relates to the State’s inspection powers. OCGA § 50-21-24 (8) provides:
The state shall have no liability for losses resulting from... [ijnspection powers or functions, including failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property other than property owned by the state to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law, regulation, code, or ordinance or contains a hazard to health or safety[.]
On appeal, Williams claims that the inspection exception does not apply because the cause of action stated in his complaint arose not from the inspection of the mail but rather from the unlawful reading and confiscation of that mail.
2. Remand for further development of the record is not necessary in this case, however, because the DOC raised an alternative argument below as to why Williams’ claims must fail. In its motion to dismiss, the DOC argued that Williams does not have a property interest in his unnamed clients’ letters. And although the trial court did not ultimately base its dismissal on this ground, it did consider the issue, noting in its final order:
The Court also has serious reservations regarding whether Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth claims for which relief could be granted in any event, particularly because the complaint contains no allegation thatthe letters at issue were ever mailed to Plaintiff.
We, thus, are permitted to consider this alternative ground for upholding the trial court’s dismissal under the “right for any reason” rule. See Ratliff v. McDonald,
OCGA § 51-10-1, which embodies the common law action of trover and conversion,
Here, as noted by the trial court, there is no allegation in the complaint that Williams’ unnamed clients had taken any affirmative steps to relinquish control or possession of the letters to Williams at the time the letters were confiscated. And in .Williams’ parallel litigation against the individual officers, the Eleventh Circuit held that the letters in his unnamed clients’ possession had not been placed in the mail and that Williams, as an addressee, does not have a protectable Fourth Amendment possessory interest in the envelopes and their contents. Williams v. Russo,
3. Lastly, to the extent that Williams raises a claim for invasion of privacy,
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.
(Citation omitted.) McConnell v. Dept. of Labor,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Williams’ clients are neither parties to nor named in the complaint.
We also note that because a motion to dismiss asserting the protection of sovereign immunity challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, the trial court is entitled to hear evidence and make relevant factual findings in deciding the issue of immunity. Rivera v. Washington,
Before filing that suit, Williams first appealed the superior court’s dismissal of his warrant application for a probable cause hearing to consider criminal offenses he alleged were committed by the correctional officer. See Williams v. Russo,
Williams, however, elected to proceed with his claims against the individual employees in federal court. See Williams v. Russo,
The DOC falls within the scope of the GTCA as one of the State of Georgia’s “departments.” See OCGA § 50-21-22 (5).
Correctional officers generally have a duty to inspect incoming and outgoing mail to ensure it does not contain “escape plots, plans to commit illegal acts, plans to violate institution rules, or other security concerns.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 125-3-3-.01 (1). Even privileged mail may be inspected by fluoroscope, .metal detecting devices, or manual manipulation. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 125-3-3-.03 (2). And any privileged correspondence reasonably suspected of containing contraband or of being inauthentic may be opened and inspected in the inmate’s presence. Id.
See Grant v. Newsome,
On appeal, the DOC explains that it did not read Williams’ complaint as including an invasion of privacy claim, so the DOC did not raise any arguments regarding such claim in its motion to dismiss. Based on our review of the complaint, as renewed, we find the DOC’s construction of the complaint to be reasonable. However, since the trial court sua sponte determined that such claim had been raised and ruled upon it, in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, we will also consider it on appeal.