11 Pa. 499 | Pa. | 1849
The opinion of this court was delivered by
In Pennsylvania, where the question is of the execution of a deed, we have steadily adhered to the English rule, which requires the oath of the subscribing witness to prove an attested instrument, notwithstanding the inconveniences that have attended its operation in practice, and the doubt of its propriety, to which frequent complaints have given birth: Truby v. Byers. In other instances, a disposition has been manifested to extend it to documents not under seal: Heckart v. Haines, 6 Binn. 116; M’Mahon v. M’Grady, 5 S. & R. 314; and, in most of our sister states, the rule has been enforced as a general one applicable to all cases of attestation, though it must be confessed it might frequently be dispensed with, without hazard of injustice. So long ago as 1787, the question was mooted in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia county, whether an attested promissory note could be proved by
In Pennsylvania, being unshackled by binding precedents on this subject, we are at liberty to listen to the reasoning productive of the conclusion adopted by our sister state. After reflection, we are satisfied those reasons are well founded, and that the conclusion drawn from them is not only unattended with danger, but must be conducive to the convenience, and therefore promotive of the interest, of those whom it is principally to affect. It is, too, in accordance with the present wise inclination of courts to open rather than close the door for the admission of evidence. As it is not in violation of any cardinal principle of the law of evidence, nor likely, in any instance, to break in upon the understanding of the parties to negotiable instruments, we see no objection of sufficient magnitude to deter us from the adoption of the reasonable rule which has prevailed for some past years, in the neighbouring tribunals, without complaint. None such has been pointed out by the
If it be thought the decision of this point is introductory of a new practice, it is gratifying to know it cannot operate as a surprise on the defendants below. It is admitted their plea of non assumpsit was unfounded; their defence rested on other grounds.
Judgment affirmed.