Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ALETA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 24-2654 (BAH) v.
Judge Beryl A. Howell FAMILY HEALTH INTERNATIONAL
d/b/a FHI 360, et al. ,
Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Aleta Williams alleges claims of race, color, and gender discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and wage discrimination under several federal and state statutes against her former employer, Family Health International (“FHI”), known as FHI 360, Tessie San Martin, the CEO of FHI, and Deborah Kennedy, the COO and plaintiff’s supervisor at FHI. See generally , First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 14. Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state any claim. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16. For the reasons discussed below, defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual background and procedural history relevant to the pending motion are described below.
A. Factual Background
As set forth in the 199-paragraphs of the First Amended Complaint, plaintiff, an African American woman, was employed at FHI for eight years, from March 2015 through her departure in April 2023. FAC ¶¶ 15, 133. FHI is a domestic nonprofit human development organization that works in the areas of global health, education, and economic development. ¶ 12. After *2 her initial hiring as the Director of Strategic Partnerships, plaintiff was promoted a few months later, as part of a reorganization, to Director of Business Development and Diversification, overseeing both strategic partnerships and global business development with a team of 45 or more staff. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 18-19. She alleges that she was successful in this role and received positive feedback. See id. ¶¶ 21, 131. Beginning with a change in leadership in 2021, plaintiff experienced conflict with new leadership over diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) policies and several additional incidents, including a change in position, which, in plaintiff’s view, constituted discriminatory and retaliatory conduct and created a hostile work environment. The key factual allegations are summarized here.
1. Role as Acting Managing Director of the UK Entity In addition to plaintiffs’ primary job responsibilities as Director of Business Development and Diversification, she was made Acting Managing Director of a newly acquired entity in the United Kingdom in June 2020, tasked with working on acquisition integration. Id. ¶ 30. This new role gave her a seat on the Subsidiary Leadership Team, a group adjacent to the executive leadership team developed to “increase the exposure of people of color to the executive team” and seen as a pipeline to that group. Id. ¶¶ 22, 30.
Plaintiff alleges that with this new role, she was working two full-time jobs, yet she was still paid below market and less than her white peers for her job as Director of Business Development and Diversification. Id. ¶ 31. After engaging an external executive compensation consultant, plaintiff learned she was also paid below market rate by about 10% for her role as Acting Managing Director. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff asked her HR manager for a 10% raise, and after negotiation, the HR manager granted a 5% salary increase. Id. ¶¶ 32-35. As she was still tasked with two jobs, plaintiff then requested “an executive coach . . . to help her manage the incredibly overwhelming workload of two roles.” ¶ 35. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff learned that “a male *3 employee was offered an ‘acting director’ role, similar to Plaintiff’s Acting Managing Director role, with a 20% salary increase.” Id. ¶ 36.
2. FHI’s DEI Initiatives and New Leadership Plaintiff alleges that during the early part of her tenure, FHI took a proactive approach to DEI, such as by creating leadership team “subsidiaries” “to increase the exposure of people of color to the executive team,” including the Subsidiary Leadership Team in which plaintiff participated by virtue of her role as Acting Managing Director, by prioritizing having a diverse pool of candidates for hiring, and by instituting a DEI Initiative to address racial disparities. See id. ¶¶ 22-29.
Beginning in early 2021 with the departure of the prior CEO, plaintiff alleges FHI’s attitude toward DEI changed. COO Kennedy shifted toward a bottom-up rather than top-down approach and asserted that the DEI initiative was not “about race only,” which plaintiff perceived as “reject[ing] a focus on race,” despite racial disparities being its core purpose. Id. ¶¶ 38-43. When CEO San Martin, who is “Cuban-American and ‘white-passing’” joined FHI in September 2021, plaintiff alleges that this CEO only made an effort to get to know her white, or “white passing” colleagues. Id. ¶¶ 46-47.
Early in San Martin’s tenure, several incidents reinforced plaintiffs’ view that San Martin was not prioritizing DEI. See id. ¶ 48. For instance, San Martin outsourced oversight of the DEI initiative to an external consulting firm. Id. ¶ 54. She also cancelled her meeting with the African American Employee Resource Group (“ERG”), of which plaintiff was the executive sponsor, and “claimed it would be months before she would be free to meet with them,” despite promptly meeting with the other ERGs. Id. ¶¶ 63-64. She only reinstated the meeting when plaintiff pointed out this was a “bad look” for her. ¶ 65. San Martin also “dismantled” most of the leadership team “subsidiaries” intended as pipelines for people of color and “demoted *4 Asian and Black employees from their management positions in the subsidiaries to non- management or less prominent positions” within the organization, replacing them with white or “white-passing candidates.” Id. ¶¶ 75-77.
3. DEI Program Criticism and Attribution to Plaintiff When the outsourced DEI program was “suffering” because the organization failed to make it a priority, a white colleague mentioned that the “DEI initiative was a failure.” Id. ¶ 55. On October 13, 2021, San Martin attributed this comment to plaintiff during a team videoconference. Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiff believes the CEO did so because plaintiff “is Black,” and San Martin “stereotyped her as an ‘Angry Black Woman’ who complains about racial issues.” Id. Plaintiff corrected San Martin, and the white colleague acknowledged the statement had been hers, but San Martin became “argumentative” and did not apologize. Id. ¶¶ 57-58.
4. Plaintiff is Removed from Acting Managing Director Role On November 24, 2021, San Martin informed plaintiff that she would be replaced as the Acting Managing Director of the UK entity to focus on her Business Development and Diversification role, noting that this was a “big job” and she should be “set up for success.” Id. ¶ 70 (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that San Martin removed her from the UK role because plaintiff “challeng[ed] [her] snub of the African American ERG.” Id. ¶ 70.
Plaintiff was replaced by a white male colleague, John Doe, who had been previously working with plaintiff and whom plaintiff had given a more forward-facing role with San Martin because plaintiff believed she more readily accepted ideas coming from him than from her. Id. ¶¶ 68-69, 72. Plaintiff had recommended that San Martin select a more qualified British Indian woman to fill the role, but San Martin did not interview that qualified candidate. ¶ 72.
When plaintiff was removed from the Acting Managing Director role, her salary was reduced to the salary she had as only Director of Business Development and Diversification, *5 before she had negotiated a 5% raise for taking on the additional role. Id. ¶ 92. Plaintiff does not believe that FHI normally “decrease[s] employees’ salaries after they complete acting roles” and not to the extent they decreased hers. Id. The removal of plaintiff from the UK role also meant she was no longer a member of the Subsidiary Leadership Team, providing a pipeline to the executive team. Id. ¶ 79. Plaintiff felt her influence in the organization was greatly reduced, describing herself as a “lame duck.” Id.
5. Plaintiff Raises Concerns with HR Investigator Plaintiff went to the “human resources investigator responsible for handling internal complaints about discrimination,” Dawn Fisher, and discussed San Martin’s behavior, including the CEO’s snub of the African American ERG meeting, her accusation of plaintiff calling the DEI Initiative a “failure,” and her removal of plaintiff from the Acting Managing Director role in favor of a less experienced white man. Id. ¶ 73. These complaints were not investigated. Id. ¶ 74. FHI’s Continued Approach to DEI and Plaintiff’s Pushback
6. Plaintiff continued to take issue with FHI’s failure to address systemic problems with racial disparities in the organization and to push back against leadership. In November 2021, defendant FHI received a report “it had commissioned to ‘support’ the DEI Initiative.” Id. ¶ 81. The survey reflected “a culture of marginalization and bullying of Black employees,” leading to a high turnover rate, as well as “salary concerns, promotion bias, and frequent microaggressions” such that Black women were “experiencing trauma from the working conditions.” Id. ¶ 82. The organization instituted a 16-hour diversity training requirement on acknowledging impact with respect to offensive statements, even in the case of good intent, but did not change other policies or take other action. ¶¶ 83-84.
In April 2022, San Martin began the search for a Chief of Staff, and plaintiff suggested they outsource recruitment to get a diverse pool of candidates. Id. ¶ 85. Nonetheless, San Martin only interviewed white people and selected a white man for the position. Id. Contrary to the usual practice, HR did not vet the new hire. Id. ¶ 86. Rather, plaintiff and others found “alarming content” on the new hire’s social media, including “racist posts” and posts supporting “far right politicians.” Id. When these concerns were raised, San Martin simply cited the candidate’s “diversity of thought.” Id. Plaintiff made an “impassioned appeal” against the candidate at a leadership meeting and explained how “diversity of thought” was “weaponized against marginalized people.” Id. ¶ 87. She also expressed her frustration with the organization’s “indifference to racial diversity.” Id. ¶ 88. The candidate was asked to withdraw acceptance of the offer, and he was compensated to do so. Id. ¶ 89.
Plaintiff then complained again to colleague Fisher about San Martin’s “discriminatory practices” and inquire about efforts to improve the experiences of Black staff. Id. ¶ 90. Fisher stated no such efforts were underway. Id. ¶ 91.
That same spring, a new white employee was hired to fill an open role in a particular department and paid a “much higher salary” than what existing Black employees in that department working in the same role were making. Id. ¶ 125. Colleague Doe pointed out this pay inequity and requested that FHI pay the existing Black employees more. Id. ¶ 126. FHI accordingly reduced the offer to the new white employee and gave a “modest raise” to the existing Black employees. Id. Request for Additional Work and Characterization of Plaintiff as
7. “Angry”
In June 2022, Director Bragale asked plaintiff and her direct report, a white woman named Andy Turner, to take on a new significant project. ¶ 93. Both responded that they *7 could not take on the project because of their existing priorities. Id. ¶ 94. During a July leadership meeting, Bragale and another white colleague discussed plaintiff’s refusal to take on the project and described her as “angry” and “bitter” about the request. Turner was not so characterized. Id. ¶ 96. Plaintiff felt embarrassed and offended to be so characterized in such a public forum. Id. Plaintiff raised the incident with San Martin and HR, and San Martin acknowledged she had received other complaints about Bragale but took no action. Id. ¶ 97.
8. Meetings Raising Concerns about Treatment of Black Staff In a subsequent July 2022 leadership meeting, San Martin raised the subject of psychological safety in the workplace, encouraging leaders to “assume good intent and be kind” and to push back on others’ ideas. Id. ¶¶ 98, 100. Plaintiff took issue with this approach because of the implication that those complaining of disparate treatment are wrong to assume the conduct was because of their gender or race. Id. ¶ 99; see id. ¶¶ 102-03. Plaintiff also explained that Black employees may be labeled as disagreeable or angry when they push back. Id. ¶¶ 100-01. She recommended psychological safety training for leaders, but San Martin doubled down on the importance of intent and brushed off the suggestion. Id. ¶ 104.
Later that month, plaintiff became aware of an HR document regarding attrition and that the report had only been revealed after months of HR delaying doing so. Id. ¶¶ 108-09. [1] The document rejected discrimination as the reason for attrition among Black women, explaining the data did not differentiate between microaggressions and oversensitivity. Id. ¶ 110. At the late- July leadership meeting where the report was presented, plaintiff asked how Black employees are supposed to thrive if this is how the organization viewed racism and depicted those experiencing *8 mistreatment as overly sensitive. Id. ¶ 112. Plaintiff explained that the organization’s emphasis on intent rather than impact absolved white employees from accountability for discriminatory behavior. See id. ¶ 112-15.
9. Plaintiff Obtains Representation and is Isolated by Leadership In between the two July leadership meetings, on July 15, 2022, plaintiff’s counsel sent a Letter of Representation to FHI to indicate that they were representing plaintiff regarding discrimination at the company. Id. ¶ 106. Plaintiff alleges that the HR director “decreed that . . . FHI 360 should avoid firing Black women, for fear they would all hire lawyers.” Id. ¶ 107.
Thereafter, plaintiff noticed a significant difference in how San Martin and Kennedy interacted with her. San Martin “frequently cancelled their bi-monthly check-ins to avoid[] speaking with plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 119. She also “overhaul[ed] aspects of plaintiff’s work, despite not having previously reviewed or participated in the work.” Id. COO Kennedy also “walled-off plaintiff from significant decisions relating to her team, severely diminishing [her] influence.” Id. ¶ 120. She excluded her from key business development meetings and “started shifting business development employees away from plaintiff’s reporting line.” Id. ¶¶ 120-21. She also approved hiring of employees in business development “without involving Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 120.
In September 2022, FHI hired consultants from Accenture to make operational recommendations, and plaintiff was placed on the steering committee to work with them. Id. ¶ 122. At some point shortly after, plaintiff was removed from the steering committee team and replaced by white colleagues. Id. ¶ 123.
10. Plaintiff’s Departure Plaintiff received feedback during her 2022 performance evaluation that while her team respected plaintiff, they did not always feel they could approach her because she “had become reserved and less approachable.” ¶ 131. She felt that COO Kennedy was reflecting that *9 plaintiff did not assume good intent and instead recognized microaggressions, against FHI’s new practice. Id.
Plaintiff experienced “significant health issues” and “severe emotional distress” as a result of her treatment at FHI, which led her to resign in February 2023. Id. ¶ 133. She left the organization in April 2023. Id. She was not recognized for her service, nor was her departure formally announced. Id. ¶ 134. Plaintiff continues to work in the international development industry and feels that her reputation has been diminished by defendants. Id. ¶ 135.
Upon plaintiff’s departure, her role was upgraded from a director level to a vice-president level; plaintiff had often complained her role had been under-leveled. Id. ¶ 136. A white man filled plaintiff’s position and was “paid substantially more” than plaintiff for the same job. Id. ¶ 137. That man only lasted three weeks and then was replaced by a white woman “who was less qualified than plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 138.
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights on May 23, 2023. ¶ 10. The EEOC issued a dismissal and Notice of Rights letter on June 26, 2024. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in September 2024, see Compl., ECF No. 1, with an amended complaint filed in January 2025, see FAC.
Plaintiff asserts claims of race, color, and gender discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code §§ 2- 1401.11 et seq. and 2-1402.61 et seq. FAC ¶¶ 139-86. Plaintiff has also alleged pay discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d) et seq. , and the DCHRA. FAC *10 ¶¶ 187-98. These claims are separated into seven counts in her Amended Complaint: (1) race, color, and gender discrimination and hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII (Count I); (2) retaliation, in violation of Title VII (Count II); (3) race and color discrimination and hostile work environment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III); (4) retaliation, in violation of § 1981 (Count IV); (5) race, color, and gender discrimination and hostile work environment, in violation of the DCHRA (Count V); (6) retaliation, in violation of the DCHRA (Count VI); (7) violation of the Equal Pay Act (Count VII); and (8) wage discrimination, in violation of the DCHRA (Count VIII).
Defendants seek dismissal of all counts, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff failed to plead facts establishing that defendants took any adverse employment action against her, that she was treated less favorably based on her protected class, that she was subject to severe or pervasive conduct creating an objectively hostile or abusive workplace due to her protected characteristics, that she engaged in any protected activity, that defendants took any retaliatory action against her because of that activity, or that she was paid less than employees outside her protected classes for similar work in effort, skill, and responsibility. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of MTD (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 1-2, ECF No. 16-1. Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MTD (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 23.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “the complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Wood v.
Moss
,
Courts accept all factual allegations as true when evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, “even if
doubtful in fact,”
Twombly
,
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to infer that she suffered any actionable adverse employment actions by defendants, thus failing to state a claim on her claims of racial and gender discrimination, Counts I, III, and V, under all three statutes she invokes as being violated. Nor has plaintiff sufficiently pled facts indicating working conditions so severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile working environment under that alternative theory for the same three counts. Further, plaintiff has not alleged any materially adverse employment action taken in response to protected activity to state a claim for retaliation, in Counts II, IV, and VI, under any of the three statutes she invokes as violated. Plaintiff has, however, stated a claim of pay discrimination, in Counts VII and VIII, under the EPA and DCHRA, respectively. Defendants’ motion to dismiss *12 is therefore granted in part, with respect to Counts I through VI, and denied in part, with respect to Counts VII and VIII, for the reasons set out in more detail below.
A. Plaintiff’s Claims of Discrimination on the Basis of Race, Color, or Gender
under Title VII, § 1981, and DCHRA (Counts I, III, and V)
Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, § 1981
“prohibits private employers from intentionally discriminating on the basis of race with respect
to the ‘benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions’ of employment.”
Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae
,
Discrimination is evaluated using the same standard under all three of these statutes.
See
Ayissi-Etoh
,
At the outset, defendants focus on the statutes of limitation on plaintiff’s claims, given
that plaintiff’s allegations “span almost a decade.” Defs.’ Mem. at 5. The longest statute of
limitations period that applies to plaintiff’s claims is four years, under § 1981.
See Graves v.
District of Columbia
,
“To bring a . . . discrimination claim under” the three statutes at issue, the plaintiff must
allege that . . . ‘she suffered an adverse employment action.’”
Jones v. District of Columbia
, No.
23-cv-1488 (BAH),
Here, defendants argue that plaintiff has not alleged any cognizable adverse employment action suffered. See Defs.’ Mem. at 9-12. In her briefing, plaintiff identifies four potential adverse employment actions from her complaint: (1) the “demotion” from her position as Acting Managing Director, which also resulted in a decrease in salary, (2) “remov[al] from a steering committee that offered leadership opportunities and career advancement,” (3) a critical evaluation, and (4) constructive discharge. Pl.’s Opp’n at 11; see also id. at 10. Considering each in turn and in context, none constitutes an actionable adverse employment action.
To start, plaintiff alleges that San Martin removed her from the position of Acting Managing Director in November 2021 because of her race and gender. See FAC ¶ 142. The additional pay that she had negotiated from taking on that role in addition to her normal responsibilities as Director of Business Development and Diversification was, as a result, removed from her salary. See id. ¶ 92. She also lost her seat as a member of the Subsidiary Leadership Team, which she viewed as a pipeline to executive positions in the company. Id. ¶ 79.
Removal from a temporary post, however, generally does not constitute an adverse
employment action, as defendants point out.
See
Defs.’ Mem. at 31 n.16. “[T]he D.C. Circuit
has held that . . . [a] temporary designation is not one of the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment contemplated by Title VII.”
Stewart v. Evans
,
Moreover, plaintiff’s other allegations undermine any suggestion that her removal from the Acting Managing Director position should be considered “adverse.” While that position did give her greater responsibility, more pay (that she specifically negotiated), and a seat on the Subsidiary Leadership Team, plaintiff at the outset expressed concern about taking on the new *16 role. She described the workload of the Acting role, on top of her regular responsibilities, as “incredibly overwhelming” and requested an “executive coach . . . to help her manage.” ¶ 35. Indeed, plaintiff seemed to remain busy in her Business Development role, having to turn down new projects several months later in spring of 2022. See id. ¶¶ 93-94. Relieving plaintiff from the double workload therefore appears to have been at least a neutral development.
Plaintiff does not argue that temporary positions are part of the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of one’s employment such that her removal should be considered an adverse employment action. Rather, plaintiff argues that defendants have “introduce[d] facts extraneous to the Complaint” because plaintiff did not allege that the position was temporary. Pl.’s Opp’n at 20. The term “Acting,” however, makes clear that plaintiff’s position was not intended to be permanent, and plaintiff also indicated that acting roles are generally time-limited by alleging that they are “complete[d]” while employees remain at the organization in other roles. See FAC ¶ 92 (“FHI 360 does not normally decrease employees’ salaries after they complete acting roles.”). Plaintiff points to no allegations to the contrary.
Plaintiff also tries to rebut the principle stated in
Stewart
,
Plaintiff’s second listed potential adverse action is removal from the Accenture
consulting group steering committee.
See
Pl.’s Opp’n at 11; FAC ¶¶ 122-23. The steering
committee position, like the Acting Managing Director role, was intended to be temporary in
nature—the committee was created to obtain certain recommendations from the consultants,
FAC ¶ 122—so her removal from the committee also does not constitute an actionable adverse
employment action. In any event, plaintiff’s complaint does not describe any clear harm
resulting from no longer being on the Accenture committee. Although she asserts that this meant
she “no longer played a role in setting priorities for business development,”
id.
¶ 123, she does
not provide any facts explaining why or how this affects the privileges and conditions of her
regular job. Her briefing describes the committee as providing “leadership opportunities and
career advancement,” but she does not cite to any facts in the complaint establishing those
opportunities, in contrast to those described for other committees like the Subsidiary Leadership
*18
Team.
See
Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. Given that changes in duties or work-related assignments
generally do not constitute adverse employment actions,
see Jones
,
Plaintiff also refers to a “critical evaluation.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. Plaintiff’s complaint,
however, does not actually allege any obvious critical evaluation. Her 2022 performance review
included only a sole comment plaintiff perceived as negative, alongside a positive one: “[W]hile
her team commented they respected and felt safe with plaintiff, her peers felt they could not
always approach [p]laintiff because [p]laintiff had become reserved and less approachable. . . .
Kennedy remarked favorably upon plaintiff’s creation of a psychologically safe space for her
team, and recognizing and championing her team and their achievements.” FAC ¶ 131. Even if
that could be construed as a “critical evaluation,” negative evaluations are not adverse
employment decisions except in the rare circumstance where such an evaluation impacts
position, grade, level, salary, or promotion opportunities.
See Douglas
,
Lastly, plaintiff alleges that she suffered “constructive discharge” due to her treatment at
FHI: “Continuing to work for Defendant FHI 360 caused significant health issues . . . and severe
emotional distress” such that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. FAC ¶ 133. Although plaintiff correctly states the threshold for constructive discharge—that plaintiff
was “discriminated against by h[er] employer to the point where a reasonable person in [her]
position would have felt compelled to resign,”
Green v. Brennan
,
In considering a claim about constructive discharge, courts evaluate the circumstances
objectively and ask whether “the conditions made remaining in the job unbearable.”
Robinson-
Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ.
,
“The kinds of situations where courts have upheld constructive-discharge findings tend to
involve extreme mistreatment or thinly veiled (or even overt) threats of termination.”
Kalinoski
,
Plaintiff has not pled any facts suggesting FHI or defendants San Martin or Kennedy wanted to get her to leave, even accepting reasonable inferences that they began devaluing plaintiff’s work and decreasing her sphere of influence. In sum, plaintiff alleges that she was removed from an acting position, which resulted in a reversion to her salary to that for her main role as Director of Business Development and Diversification; she raised with leadership her disagreements over workplace culture, including treatment of Black employees and approaches to DEI and hiring; she was labeled as “angry” in response to not taking on additional work; she *21 was isolated from leadership and some meetings; she received an evaluation with one comment she perceived as negative; and she was paid less than white, male employees. See supra Part I.A. Such workplace strife may be distressing, but these circumstances do not rise to the level of objectively intolerable, nor indicate “aggravating factors” beyond ordinary discrimination that would transform her resignation into a constructive discharge.
Plaintiff argues that the issue of constructive discharge is “ultimately a matter of fact for
the jury”—whether the conditions were “sufficient to make a reasonable person quit.” Pl.’s
Opp’n at 31. “[B]ut simply invoking the words ‘constructive discharge,’ without more, will not
carry an otherwise insufficient complaint over the line of plausibility” to withstand a motion to
dismiss.
Valentine v. Towers Condominium Ass’n
, 22-cv-3216 (JMC),
Plaintiff cannot state a claim under Title VII, § 1981, or DCHRA for racial and gender
discrimination without alleging she suffered an adverse employment action.
See Black v.
Guzman
, No. 22-cv-1873 (BAH),
B. Plaintiff’s Claims of Hostile Work Environment under Title VII, § 1981, and DCHRA (Counts I, III, and V)
Plaintiff alleges, as an alternative theory for Counts I, III, and V, that she was subject to a
hostile work environment, violating Title VII, § 1981, and the DHCRA. To establish a
prima
facie
case, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) the
employee was subjected to unwelcome[] harassment . . .; (3) the harassment complained of was
based upon [the plaintiff’s protected status]; (4) the charged [] harassment had the effect of
unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff’s work performance and creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment . . .; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior
liability.”
Slate v. Pub. Def. Serv. for D.C.
,
A hostile work environment is one “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment.’”
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.
,
Defendants argue that plaintiff has not alleged behavior sufficiently pervasive, severe, and objectively offensive to constitute a hostile work environment. See Defs.’ Mem. at 16-21. As summarized in the previous section, see supra Part III.A, plaintiff alleges that she was removed from her Acting Managing Director position, paid less than her white, male peers, described as “angry” on one occasion and falsely accused of making a negative comment on another occasion, ignored and cut off from certain meetings and decisions by defendants San Martin and Kennedy, and subject to a perceived critical comment in a performance evaluation. See FAC ¶¶ 30-36, 56-60, 70, 79, 92, 95-96, 118-121, 123, 131, 136-37; supra Part I.A. Plaintiff also identifies discontent expressed by Black employees—Black women, in particular—at the organization, resulting in their higher attrition rates and disagreements with leadership over the *24 approach to DEI and hiring. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 29; FAC ¶¶ 108-10, 128-30. [3] These incidents do not together rise to state a hostile work environment claim.
While plaintiff perceived discrimination and mistreatment, she has not alleged “the sort
of ‘deeply offensive’ discriminatory comments or conduct that, combined with other allegations
of interference and denied privileges, might state a hostile work environment claim.”
Gomez
,
Moreover, the other alleged abusive behavior—her removal from the Acting Managing
Director position, being shut out from certain meetings and ignored, and her performance
evaluation—are not objectively offensive actions but rather “ordinary,” albeit unpleasant,
“actions taken by supervisors at the workplace,” and “such ‘work-related actions by supervisors’
are typically not found sufficient to state a hostile work environment claim.”
Gomez
, 2022 WL
1471375, at *12 (quoting
Wade v. District of Columbia
,
Plaintiff also cites to her allegations about the general dissatisfaction of black employees
at the organization—resulting in high attrition and frequent complaints about microaggressions
and hostility—as supporting her hostile work environment claim. Pl.’s Opp’n at 29. While those
effects could certainly be caused by a hostile work environment, they do not alone demonstrate
the existence of one. Plaintiff has not pled specific facts depicting how she personally was
subject to an objectively severe, pervasive, and abusive work environment that “alter[ed] the
conditions of [her] employment.”
Stewart
,
Finally, even if some of plaintiff’s allegations suggest discrete acts of discrimination—
such as her allegations of unequal pay,
see supra
Part III.D—they do not demonstrate that the
workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult.”
Harris
, 510
U.S. at 21. Just as “a hostile work environment claim is not rendered invalid merely because it
contains discrete acts that the plaintiff claims . . . are actionable on their own,” a discrete
discriminatory act does not alone constitute a hostile work environment claim without showing
that it was “part of a severe and pervasive pattern of harassment.”
Outlaw
,
Plaintiff thus has not stated a claim for hostile work environment, and Counts I, III, and V of her amended complaint are dismissed.
C. Plaintiff’s Claims of Retaliation under Title VII, § 1981, and DCHRA (Counts II, IV, and VI)
Plaintiff has pled additional claims under Title VII, § 1981, and the DCHRA for
retaliation in Counts II, IV, and VI. Those statutes prohibit retaliation “against employees for
opposing an unlawful employment practice.”
Black
,
The first requirement, a showing of “protected activity,” refers to an act by plaintiff constituting “oppos[ition] to an unlawful employment practice.” Touvian , 330 F. Supp. 3d at voice” and questioned her “psychological stability.” No such persistent, objectively offensive conduct has been alleged here.
251 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (citing
Broderick v. Donaldson
,
Regarding the second element, “a materially adverse employment action,” the standard
for an adverse action in the retaliation context is somewhat broader than in the discrimination
context: “Retaliation claims are ‘not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and
conditions of employment’ and may extend to harms that are not workplace-related or
employment-related so long as ‘a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse.’”
Baloch
,
As to causation, “Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was
the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”
Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar
,
Plaintiff identifies for her retaliation claims the same alleged adverse actions as for her discrimination claim, see supra Part III.A: (1) her removal from the Acting Managing Director position, including the salary reduction; (2) her removal from the steering committee; (3) her negative evaluation; and (4) her constructive discharge. Pl.’s Opp’n at 20-21. “For each adverse employment action alleged,” plaintiff insists, “including the demotion, [p]laintiff suffered identifiable harm, including lost income, lost opportunities for future career advancement and worsened job prospects.” at 21. As defendants argue, none of these incidents constitute a materially adverse employment action that is causally linked to any protected activity to sustain her retaliation claims. See Defs.’ Mem. at 29-32.
First, regarding her removal from the Acting Managing Director position, even assuming
this action is materially adverse under the standard for a retaliation claim—which does not
require an impact on the “terms, conditions, and privileges” of her employment, so the limitation
established in
Stewart
,
see supra
Part III.A, for temporary positions would seemingly not
apply—she has not demonstrated a causal link to any protected activity. Her complaint alleges
that San Martin removed plaintiff from the role “in retaliation for challenging defendant CEO
San Martin’s snub of the African American ERG.” FAC ¶ 70. Yet, plaintiff’s comment that not
attending the African American ERG “after attending the other ERGs, was a ‘bad look’” does
not constitute a complaint of “unlawful discrimination” to qualify as protected activity. FAC
¶ 65. Plaintiff does not attempt to explain how this comment constituted opposition to a practice
that would be unlawful under Title VII.
See Broderick
,
Second, with respect to the steering committee, plaintiff has not identified any objectively tangible harm for the removal to constitute a materially adverse employment action. She alleged only that the team had “significant implications for business development,” so she “no longer played a role in setting priorities” once removed. FAC ¶¶ 122-23. She did not explain how that impacted her work in business development or affected her opportunities for advancement. Even if this removal were a materially adverse employment action, plaintiff cannot draw any causal connection to protected activity. Plaintiff alleges that she was appointed to the committee in September 2022 and “soon thereafter” she was removed “in retaliation for [her] complaints about discrimination at defendant FHI 360, vocal opposition to defendant FHI 360’s policies concerning DEI, and advocacy for herself and other Black employees.” All of those alleged protected activities, however, occurred before she was even appointed to the committee in September 2022, which precludes any inference that the removal was motivated by those events. See, e.g. , FAC ¶¶ 87-88, 90, 97, 100-06, 112; cf. Sisay v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. , 34 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining that a benefit to the employee shortly after the protected activity, such as a promotion, undermines “the theory that the defendants’ attitude toward [plaintiff] negatively changed as a result of” the protected activity).
Plaintiff’s alleged negative evaluation also does not constitute an actionable materially
adverse employment action. “[I]n order for a performance evaluation to be materially adverse, it
must affect the employee’s position, grade level, salary, or promotion opportunities.”
King v.
Holder
,
Finally, plaintiff cannot sustain her retaliation claim based on constructive discharge. As
previously explained, plaintiff has not adequately alleged that she was constructively discharged
nor that she was subject to a hostile work environment,
see supra
Parts III.A-.B. Although such
circumstances could be the basis for a retaliation claim,
see Burrell v. Shepard
, 321 F. Supp. 3d
1, 14 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[A] hostile work environment can give rise to a retaliation claim.”), if
adequately pled, plaintiff has not described circumstances creating the kind of objectively hostile
and intolerable environment required to meet the threshold for either a hostile work environment
or constructive discharge. As a result, plaintiff’s departure cannot be “an adverse employment
action attributable to” defendants.
Joyce v. Off. of Architect of Capitol
,
Plaintiff does not isolate additional discrete acts that led to her departure as materially
adverse employment actions, and indeed, none seems apparent. Defendants’ cancellation of
check-ins with plaintiff, reducing their interactions, and walling her off from certain decisions,
and changing the reporting line for her subordinates,
see supra
Part I.A.9-.10, are certainly
inconvenient and unpleasant, but plaintiff has not tied them to any allegations of objective harm.
“Such minor ‘inconveniences and alteration of job responsibilities [do] not rise to the level of
adverse action’ necessary to support a claim.”
Taylor v. Solis
,
Plaintiff has not alleged facts giving rise to a claim of retaliation under any of the three statutes, and Counts II, IV, and VI shall be dismissed.
D. Plaintiff’s Claims of Pay Discrimination under the Equal Pay Act and the DCHRA (Counts VII and VIII)
Plaintiff asserts in her final two claims that defendant FHI violated the “Equal Pay Act” (“EPA”) by “paying female employees less than male employees for work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, performed under similar working conditions,” FAC ¶ 190 (Count VII), and committed wage discrimination in violation of the DC Human Rights Act by “paying Plaintiff, a Black female, substantially less than it paid white and/or male employees performing work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility because of her race, color, and/or gender,” id. ¶ 196 (Count VIII).
The EPA provides that “[n]o employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To state a
prima facie
case under the Equal Pay Act, a
plaintiff “must allege that (1) she was doing substantially equal work on the job, the performance
of which required substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility as the jobs held by members
of the opposite sex; (2) the job was performed under similar working conditions; and (3) she was
paid at a lower wage than those members of the opposite sex.”
Watkins v. DOJ
, No. 23-cv-766
(RDM),
As to the first element, the plaintiff’s job and that of the comparator “need not be
identical in every respect” but “they must be ‘substantially equal.’”
Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.
,
Plaintiff raises the issue of unfair pay four times in her Amended Complaint; only one states a claim under the EPA and DCHRA. [7] First, she alleges that she was “paid below market for her job as Director of Business Development and Diversification, and less than her white peers at Defendant FHI 360. On information and belief, male and white directors were paid more than Plaintiff for equal work.” FAC ¶ 31. That recitation of the elements of the cause of action is “conclusory” and “do[es] not suffice” to state a claim. Iqbal , 556 US. at 678. Plaintiff does not identify any specific comparators or allege any facts indicating that her “peers’” jobs were comparable in any way to hers. The same holds true even if her oblique reference to “peers” is meant to refer to the jobs of other directors.
Second, plaintiff alleges that she requested a 10% salary increase for her role as Acting Managing Director and was given only a 5% salary increase, which “left [p]laintiff earning *36 below market rate and, on information and belief, earning less than her male and white counterparts.” FAC ¶ 35. “Plaintiff learned that a male employee was offered an ‘acting director’ role, similar to Plaintiff’s Acting Managing Director role, with a 20% salary increase.” Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff’s allegations here are, again, insufficient. She does not allege any information about the jobs of “her male and white counterparts,” id. ¶ 35, and she provides no facts about the new “acting director role” and the extent to which it was similar to hers, id. ¶ 36. She thus cannot state a claim under the EPA. Moreover, with respect to the other male “acting director,” plaintiff does not even allege that she is paid less than the comparator, given that she only provided relative percentages of salary raises as opposed to absolute figures. Plaintiff could earn substantially more than the other “acting director” in absolute terms, even though she was only given a 5% raise for that role while he was given a 20% raise.
Third, plaintiff alleges that when she was removed from her Acting Managing Director role, her “salary was decreased to what she previously earned while only Director of Business Development and Diversification” and “FHI 360 does not normally decrease employees’ salaries after they complete acting roles.” FAC ¶ 92. Plaintiff does not allege, however, that she made less than any male comparator, and thus plainly fails to state a claim under EPA for that salary decrease.
Plaintiff does state a claim, however, with respect to her allegation that the white man
who replaced her upon her resignation—albeit only for three weeks before a different woman
took over—was “paid substantially more . . . for the same job.”
Id.
¶ 137. She alleges that
although the job was upgraded to a higher title, the job description was not changed. Though
sparse, these allegations allow for an inference that the male comparator—her successor—
*37
worked a substantially similar job under similar working conditions and was paid more than
plaintiff, which states a claim under the EPA.
See Watkins
,
As an initial matter, defendants do not argue that a successor is an improper comparator.
Cf. Thomas v. Vilsack
, 718 F. Supp 2d 106, 118 (D.D.C. 2010) (assuming that a successor can be
a proper comparator although “[t]his Circuit has not explicitly held whether or not a plaintiff can
use a successor as a comparator for a pay discrimination claim”). Rather, defendants assert that
“[p]laintiff’s claims must be dismissed because she provides absolutely nothing to support her
allegation that she performed the ‘same job,’ or that the term ‘the same job’ is even intended to
insinuate that Plaintiff and her successor perform substantially equal work as opposed to merely
having the same general position.” Defs.’ Mem. at 42;
see also
Defs.’ Reply at 25. To the
contrary, the allegation that the successor was hired pursuant to a job description the same as
plaintiff’s indicates that he performed “the same job,” and at this stage, plaintiff need not
separately allege that he performed substantially equal work when she has already alleged that
they were in substantially equal jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility.
See
Savignac v. Day
(“
Savignac II
”),
Indeed, in several other cases cited by plaintiff, something as simple as a similar job
description or a grouping of jobs in a work study has sufficed to allege that the plaintiff and
comparators had similar jobs. For instance, in
Clay v. Howard University
,
Defendants further argue that “plaintiff d[id] not plead the amount she was underpaid,” so
her allegation about unequal pay lacks factual support, Defs.’ Reply at 25, but provide no
authority for such a requirement to withstand a motion to dismiss. Although they cite
Baker-
Notter
and
Clay
as cases where plaintiffs pled the amount of underpayment, the court in
Clay
appeared to accept a bare allegation that a comparator “was paid significantly more,” and in
neither case did the court establish a requirement on plaintiffs to give dollar amounts or
percentage figures.
Clay
Finally, defendants briefly contest plaintiff’s DCHRA wage discrimination claim in Count VIII with respect to the unequal pay of her successor, arguing that plaintiff has not provided “nearly enough details to show how she was similarly situated to this comparator.” Defs.’ Mem. at 14-15. As support, defendants cite two cases for the principle that plaintiff did not show “there is a comparator nearly identical to Plaintiff in all relevant aspects,” id. at 15, but neither case is apposite. In the first, Franks v. Edison Electric Institute , No. 20-cv-3393, 2022 WL 971157 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2022), the court required a showing that “all of the relevant aspects of [plaintiff’s] employment situation were nearly identical to those of the other employee” at the summary judgment stage ; that opinion said nothing about what is required to meet plaintiff’s pleading obligation. at *5 (quoting Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp. , 801 F.3d 290, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
The other,
Savignac II
, directly cuts against defendants’ argument.
Savignac II
makes
clear that plaintiff “need not establish that” her comparators “perform[] identical duties” at the
pleading stage, but merely that “where the equivalence is not obvious on the face of the job, the
complaint must say something about the” similarity of “‘skill, effort, . . . responsibility’ and
‘working conditions’ that define the ‘job’ at issue.”
To prevail, plaintiff will eventually have to propound facts regarding “how the employee
performed,” but her allegations that she and her successor were in the same role with the same
responsibilities suffice to state a claim.
Savignac II
,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, defendants’ motion is granted with respect to Counts I through VI and denied with respect to Counts VII and VIII. Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Equal Pay Act and the DCHRA for wage discrimination but not for race, color , or gender discrimination, hostile work environment, or retaliation under Title VII, § 1981, or the DCHRA.
An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously. Date: September 2, 2025
__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL United States District Judge
Notes
[1] A similar report was released in October 2022 on turnover rates, revealing high turnover for Black employees and that these employees perceived pervasive microaggressions and were labeled as “over-sensitive” if they pushed back. FAC ¶ 128. These employees also complained frequently in exit interviews about pay inequality, biased promotions, microaggressions, and a hostile work environment. ¶ 129.
[2] Plaintiff also has not pled facts allowing for an inference of discrimination with respect to her removal from
the Acting Director position, as is required to state a claim of discrimination.
See Joyner v. Morrison & Foerster
LLP
,
[3] Plaintiff also argues that part of the abusive conduct was “[d]efendants[’] refus[al] to investigate any of [p]laintiff’s complaints of discrimination,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 29, but plaintiff has not alleged that she made specific complaints necessitating investigation, nor does she allege that she requested investigation and such investigation was refused, see FAC ¶ 74. The first time plaintiff complained to Fisher, she raised the issue of the CEO’s snub of the African American ERG, see id. ¶ 73, but the CEO had in fact attended the ERG meeting at that point, id. ¶¶ 65- 66, suggesting the issue had been resolved. Plaintiff also raised the accusation that plaintiff had called the DEI initiative a failure, plaintiff’s removal from her Acting Managing Director role, id. ¶ 73, and plaintiff being labeled as “angry” by Director Bragale, id. ¶ 92. Yet, even assuming these workplace actions were misfortunes, they do not indicate discrimination necessitating formal investigation. Similarly, plaintiff’s complaints to Fisher the second time about the CEO’s “discriminatory practices” and how the CEO “presented herself with Black employees,” id. ¶ 90, are too general to infer that defendants should have investigated. As a result, plaintiff has not alleged any refusal to investigate constituting abusive behavior that could contribute to a hostile work environment.
[4] The single case discussed by plaintiff,
Na’im v. Clinton
,
[5] Moreover, plaintiff also does not allege facts to create the causal link between the opposition to San Martin’s initial snubbing of the ERG and San Martin’s removal of plaintiff from the acting position. Plaintiff’s complaint does not establish temporal proximity between the two events: Although she alleges that she was removed from her acting position in November 2021, and though San Martin started as CEO in September 2021, plaintiff does not give any date for the snubbing of the ERG or how quickly San Martin resolved that issue by meeting with the ERG. She merely put the two incidents back-to-back in her complaint. See FAC ¶¶ 63-72. The order of paragraphs in her complaint cannot make up for her lack of concrete allegations, and an indication only in briefing that the snub of the ERG occurred around October 2021, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 22, is simply not a fact alleged in her complaint. See Defs.’ Reply at 21 (pointing out the lack of dates in the complaint).
[6] While the D.C. Circuit has not outlined the
prima facie
elements for an EPA claim using the precise
tripartite structure as the district court in
Watkins
and
Cornish
, other circuits have done so.
See, e.g., Rongere v. City
of Rockford,
[7] Defendants argue that the first three instances are untimely allegations, given that the EPA has a two-year statute of limitations period, see Defs.’ Mem. at 36-39, while plaintiff insists that a three-year period applies because defendants willfully violated the EPA, and willful violations are subject to a three-year period, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 7- 8. The timeliness of plaintiffs’ first three allegations of pay inequality need not be decided, however, because those allegations fail to state a claim regardless, as explained in the text. Only plaintiff’s fourth instance regarding a pay differential with her successor states a claim, and defendants concede that allegation is timely under both the EPA and the DCHRA. See Defs.’ Mem. at 14-15, 42.
[8] Although plaintiff mentions “unequal wage[s]” as part of her allegations of discrimination under Title VII, § 1981, and the DCHRA in Counts I, III, and V of her complaint, see FAC ¶¶ 142, 158, 174, the incident of unequal pay compared to her successor is considered here only for her EPA and DCHRA claims in Counts VII and VIII and not evaluated as part of the other claims. Plaintiff does not specifically reference this incident under Counts I, III, and V in her complaint, nor in her briefing on Counts I, III, and V, in discussing adverse employment actions. The allegation is therefore only clearly presented with respect to the EPA and DCHRA claims.