139 Minn. 32 | Minn. | 1917
The legislature of Minnesota in 1913 passed an act (Laws 1913, p. 789, c. 547 (G. S. 1913, § 3904), establishing a Minimum Wage Commission and providing for the determination and establishment of minimum wages for women 'and minors.
This act defines a living wage as a wage “sufficient to maintain the worker in health and supply him with the necessary comforts and conditions of reasonable life.” “Minimum wage” is given the same meaning. Section 20 (G. S. 1913, § 3923).
The act prohibits every employer in any occupation “from employing any worker at less than the living wage or minimum wage as defined in this act and determined in an order of the commission.” Section 12 (G. S. 1913, § 3915).
The act gives the commission the power “'at its discretion” or at the request of not less than 100 persons engaged in any occupation where women and minors are employed, to make an investigation. The commission must hold public hearings at which employers and employees may appear. If, after investigation, the commission is of opinion that the wages paid to one-sixth or more of the women or minors employed therein are less than living wages, the commission shall establish a legal minimum rate of wages in said occupation for women and minors of ordinary ability and for learners and apprentices. The commission shall then issue an order to be effective 30 days thereafter making the wages then determined the minimum wages in s'aid occupation throughout the state or within any area of the state, if differences in the cost of living warrant this restriction.
Defendants, members of a commission constituted as provided by the act, after a hearing and investigation, made two orders fixing minimum wages for women and minors of ordinary ability in certain occupations. These actions are brought to restrain the enforcement of the orders on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional and void. The trial court overruled a demurrer to the complaint 'and ordered a temporary injunction as prayed. Defendants appealed. The ground of the order was that the statute is unconstitutional 'and void. This is the question in the case.
There are some limitations in the state Constitution on legislative power. It may safely be said, however, that, so far as applicable to the facts in this case, there are none more restrictive than the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We may therefore direct our inquiry to the question whether this law is violative of any provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: “Nor shall any state deprive any person of * * * liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” This guarantees to the citizen liberty of contract and liberty to conduct his business affairs in his own way. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 277, 48 L. ed. 148; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 48, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Adair v. U. S. 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. ed. 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 764; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 545, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 53 L. ed. 315; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. ed. 441, L.R.A. 1915C, 960. This right it is claimed has been infringed by this statute. ‘
The liberty of contract guaranteed by this amendment is not absolute. It is subject to the power of the state to legislate for certain permissible purposes. For example, the state may, under certain conditions regulate hours of labor of women (Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. ed. 551, 13 Ann. Cas. 957; Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. 469, 58 L. ed. 788); or of minors in certain occupations (Sturges & Burn Mnfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 34 Sup. Ct. 60, 58 L. ed. 245, L.R.A. 1915C, 1196); or of men engaged in employments hazardous to health (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435, 61 L. ed. 830); or of men employed on public work (Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 48 L. ed. 148); or it may regulate conditions of labor, or the time of payment of employees (Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. ed.
The power of a state legislature to restrict liberty of contract is coincident with what is familiarly known as the police poWer. Ereund, Police Power, §§ 498-500. “The police powers of the state,” said Chief Justice Taney, in the License Cases (Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504, 583, 12 L. ed. 256), “are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions.” In Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 359, 28 L. ed. 923, Justice Field defines the police power as the “power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health; peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity.” In Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 188, 55 L. ed. 112, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487, that court broadened the definition as follows: “It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. * * * It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare,” citing Camfield v. U. S. 167 U. S. 518, 17 Sup. Ct. 864, 42 L. ed. 260.
Yet there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the state. It is not enough to merely 'assert that the subject relates to the health, peace, morals, education or good order or welfare of the people. “The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can. be held to be valid which interferes with-the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 57, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 543, 49 L. ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133. “The liberty of contract guaranteed by the Constitution is freedom from arbitrary restraint” not freedom from reasonable regulation., ifhe real test is whether the limitation is a “reasonable regulation to safeguard the public interest,”
There is a notion, quite general, that women in the trades are underpaid, that they are not paid so well as men are paid for the same service, and that in fact in many cases the pay they receive for working during 'all the working hours of the day is not enough to meet the cost of reasonable living. Public investigations by publicly appointed commissions have resulted in findings to the above effect. Starting with such facts, there is opinion, more or less widespread, that these conditions are dangerous to the morals of the workers and to the health of the workers and of future generations as well.
It is a strife for employer and employee to secure proper economic adjustment of their relations so that each shall receive a just share of the profits of their joint effort. In this economic strife, women as a class, are not on an equality with men. Investigating bodies, both of men and of women, taking all these facts into account, have urged legislation designed to assure to women an adequate working wage. The legislatures of 11 states have passed laws having the same purpose as the one here assailed. .
It is not a question of what we may ourselves think of the policy or the justification of such legislation. The question is, is there any reasonable basis for legislative belief that the conditions mentioned exist, that legislation is necessary to remedy them, and that laws looking to that end promote the health, peace, morals, education or good order of the people and are “greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare?” If there is reasonable basis for such legislative belief, then the determination of the propriety of such legislation is a, legislative problem to be solved by the exercise of legislative judgment and discretion. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 398, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780.
We think sufficient basis exists. It is not necessary that we should hold that statutes of this kind applicable to men would be valid. We think it clear there is such an inequality or difference between men and women in the matter of ability to secure a just wage and in the conse
We sustain the principle of minimum wage legislation as applied to women. By like reasoning the principle may be sustained as applied to minors.
Let us address ourselves to this question. As above stated, section 20 defines a living wage. Section 12, in effect, enjoins every employer to pay a living wage “as defined in this act and determined in an order of the commission.”
We think this must be construed as establishing a living wage as defined in the act as the lawful minimum wage, and as fixing a living wage as so defined as the standard by which the commission must be guided in determining a minimum wage for any occupation. The determination of a minimum wage by the commission is accordingly a determination of a fact “upon which the law makes * * * its own action depend.”
We do not overlook the fact'that the statute cannot be effectively executed nor its penalties enforced until the commission establishes a mini
One court has gone so far as to say: “Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing them. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.” Moers v. City of Beading, 21 Pa. St. 188, 202, quoted in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. ed. 294.
The acts of Congress, establishing forest reservations, provide that their use for grazing purposes is subject to rules and regulations established by the secretary of agriculture, and make violation of such rules and regulations a penal offense. In U. S. v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 522, the defendant was convicted .of violation of some rule or regulation of the department. The court sustained the law as against objection that this was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and said: “A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress. The statute, not the Secretary fixes the penalty.”
In Red “C” Oil Mnfg. Co. v. Board of A. of North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380, 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 152, 56 L. ed. 240, an act of the legislature of North Carolina provided that “all kerosene, or other illuminating oils, sold or offered for sale in this state, shall be subject to inspection and test to determine the safety and value for illuminating purposes.” Power is conferred on the bo'ard of agriculture to make all necessary rules and regulations for the inspection of such oil and to adopt standards of safety, purity and luminosity, “which they may deem necessary to provide the people of the state with satisfactory illuminating oil.” Penalties are provided for disobedience of the orders of the board. There could be no penalty until the board made an order. Objection was raised that this was a delegation of legislative power. The court
In Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 496, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. ed. 525, the court had before it an act of Congress which made it unlawful to import tea inferior in purity, quality and fitness for consumption, provided for a board of experts, gave the secretary of the treasury power, upon recommendation of the board, to fix uniform standards of purity, quality and fitness for consumption, and provided that tea inferior to such standards should be within the prohibition of the act. Inferior tea was liable to destruction under certain conditions. Objection was made that this vested legislative power in the secretary of the treasury. This was overruled. The court held that “Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute.” See also Monongahela Bridge Co. v. U. S. 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. 356, 54 L. ed. 435; Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Ind. Comm. 236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387, 59 L. ed. 552, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 296.
In all such cases, the punishment is not fixed by the board, the making of rules is administrative, the substantial legislation is in the statute which provides the law 'and the penalty. Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 66 N. E. 607; U. S. v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 520, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L. ed 563.
Decisions similar to the foregoing might be multiplied, but we think it unnecessary. The principles stated are now well recognized. The act' contains no delegation of legislative power.
The limitations of the Constitution are flexible enough to permit of practical application. Eecent decisions have more and more “recognized the difficulty of exact separation of the powers of government” (Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Ind. Comm. 236 U. S. 230, 246, 35 Sup. Ct. 387, 59 L. ed. 552), and the necessity of giving weight to practical considerations. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 496; Jeffrey Mnfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 578, 35 Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. ed. 364.
Objection is raised tq sections 7 to 9 (G. S. 1913, §§ 3910-3912), which provide for “an advisory board,” define its powers and the power of the commission to act upon its estimates, and section 10 (G. S. 1913, § 3913), which gives power to the commission in certain event to order new rates of minimum wages “if it sees fit.” The validity of these provisions are not involved in this case, unless it can be said the whole act depends upon their validity. We do not think it does. We do not pass upon these provisions.
Order reversed.
On March 1, 1918, the following opinion was filed:
Per Curiam.
The point is made in an application for a rehearing in this cause that the court failed to determine the question whether the ordei of the commission is void for uncertainty, in that the period is not therein prescribed during which employees may be treated as “learners” and “apprentices.” We did not regard this as fatal to the order. These terms have a modern meaning reasonably well understood. City of St. Louis v. Bender, 248 Mo. 113, 117, 154 S. W. 88, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1072. Practical experience under the order may suggest and render necessary something more specific in the respect stated. If so, a modification may be made to meet the conditions thus disclosed. But the absence of specific provisions in this particular is not fatal, and the order in the present form is valid. Until some action is taken by the commission, or by statute, the matter will be subject to regulation by contract between the employer and employee.
Petition for rehearing denied.