The procedural history of this case is lengthy. On October 28, 1998, Margaret Williams filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Devell R. Young and his professional corporation, alleging that Dr. Young had failed to diagnose dislocated bones in her left foot. The Dougherty County Superior Court grantéd summary judgment to the defendants, and Williams appealed.
In
Williams v. Devell R. Young, M.D., P.C.,
Thé Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petitiоn for a writ of certiorari to examine this Court’s adoption of the continuous treatment doctrine for malpractice actions. In
Young v. Williams,
We now turn to Williams’ sole enumeration of error in which she argues that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis that the suit was barred by the statute of limitation.
To repeat the factual context out of which this case arose:
[Williams,] who suffers from diabetes, first sought, treatment from Dr. Young for swelling and pain in her left ankle and foot in September 1995. In June 1996, Dr. Young prescribed a lymph edemа foot pump. In response to appellee’s repeated complaints about her foot, Dr. Young told her on September 30, 1996, that her conditiоn was a permanent one with which she had to live. Five weeks later, in early November 1996, appellee saw another physician about her foot. The second physician took an x-ray of appellee’s foot and diagnosed a dislocation of her talonavicular joint with subluxation of the calcaneal cuboid joint of the ankle. Thereafter, appellee telephonically informed Dr. Young of the second physician’s diagnosis. The sеcond physician performed surgery in December 1996 to repair the three dislocated bones, and Dr. Young saw appellee with regard to her diabetes during her hospital stay following the surgery. Appellee filed her complaint alleging medical malpractice/failure to diagnose on the part of Dr. Young. . . .
Young v. Williams,
*823 In contending that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment, Williams claims that the trial court failed to recognize that her telephone сonsultations with Dr. Young about her injuries and her course of treatment constituted medical care and established the correct date from which the statute of limitation began running. In this regard, she argues that until November 6, 1996, she consulted with Dr. Young about her foot and leg and that on that date he was still providing care and medical opinions to her. Under this argument, Williams contends, the statute of limitation had not expired when she filed her complaint on October 28, 1998. Alternatively, she cоntends that the November 6, 1996 telephonic consultation with Dr. Young was the date of her injury.
As reiterated by the Supreme Court in
Young v. Williams,
in general, in mоst misdiagnosis cases, the injury begins, immediately upon the misdiagnosis due to the pain, suffering, or economic loss sustained by the patient from the time of the misdiagnosis until the medical problem is properly diagnosed and treated. The misdiagnosis itself is the injury and not the subsequent discovery of the proper diagnosis; thus, the fact that the patient did not know the medical cause of his suffering does not affect the applicability of OCGA § 9-3-71 (a). (Citations and punctuation omitted.) [Cits.]
Hughley v. Frazier,
Nevertheless, in
Whitaker v. Zirkle,
*824
Unlike the situation in
Whitaker
and
Walker,
the evidence in this case established only that Williams had bеen continuously experiencing discomfort, pain and swelling in her foot and ankle throughout Dr. Young’s treatment of her. In fact in the medical affidavit which she filed with hеr complaint, the expert notes that Williams sought treatment from Dr. Young on September 29, 1995, complaining of swelling of her feet and ankles. Williams testified that the pain had intensified dramatically by January 1996 and that the pain was continuous throughout 1996. The swelling continued until it reached up into her groin area; the swelling in her groin area was present when Williams last saw Dr. Young on September 30, 1996. In fact, there was even evidence that in response to her repeated comрlaints about her foot, Dr. Young told Williams on September 30, 1996, that her condition was a permanent one that she would have to live with. Accordingly, in this case, any injury Williаms may have sustained occurred at the time of the misdiagnosis, certainly before October 28, 1996. See
Hughley v. Frazier,
Similarly, we reject Williams’ argument that the date of her injury wаs November 6, 1996 — the date of her telephonic consultation with Dr. Young. As discussed above, the evidence before the trial court established that Williams’ foot and leg pain was continuous throughout Dr. Young’s treatment of her, and that the injury was present more than two years before she filed suit. See
Hughley v. Frazier,
We reach this conclusion, as stated above, because of the Supreme Court’s reversal in
Young v. Williams,
In light of the inequities inherent in cases like this one, in which a patient remains under the care of one physician and the stаtute of *825 limitation expires on her claim, we encourage the General Assembly to look into and remedy this situation by enacting a statute allowing the incоrporation of the continuous treatment doctrine into the existing statute of limitation provided for in OCGA § 9-3-71. A legislative enactment to this effect would creаte a more just statutory scheme for this type of medical malpractice case.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
We decline to overrule the misdiagnosis law, as the amicus curiae brief urges us to do.