Williams v. Department of Human ResourcesWilliams v. Department of Human Resources
Lead Opinion
Paul and Sheila Williams sent an ante litem notice to the state claiming that she suffered pain, disfigurement, and reduced life expectancy and he suffered loss of consortium due to a public health nurse’s failure to diagnose Mrs. Williams’ breast cancer. After his wife died, Mr. Williams filed a wrongful death action against the Georgia Department of Human Resources, which the trial court dismissed for insufficient notice. The Court of Appeals for the State of Georgia affirmed, holding that Williams failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of
Sheila Williams complained about a lump in her breast on five visits to the Lumpkin County Health Department from March to August 1994, but the health department’s nurse did not examine Williams or refer her to a doctor for further evaluation. In November, Williams was diagnosed with breast cancer. On November 7, 1995, the couple gave written notice of their claims under
Unlike the Federal Tort Claims Act or the notice required before
(A) The name of the state government entity [that committed] the acts or omissions . . . ;
(B) The time of the transaction or occurrence out of which the loss arose;
(C) The place of the transaction or occurrence;
(D) The nature of the loss suffered;
(E) The amount of the loss claimed; and
(F) The acts or omissions which caused the loss.7
The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that the state receives adequate notice of the claim to facilitate settlement before the filing of a lawsuit.
In construing this statutory provision, both this Court and the court of appeals have looked to the plain meaning of the statutory language. In Norris v. Georgia Department of Transportation,
Construing these terms in the context of the statutory purpose and requirements for ante litem notice, we conclude that Mr. Williams never gave the state notice of his claim for the wrongful death of his wife prior to bringing his action against the state. The November 7,1995, letter described the nature of Mrs. Williams’ loss as pain, disfigurement, and a reduced life expectancy; it described Mr. Williams’ loss as a loss of consortium. The notice did not, and could not, have asserted the death of Mrs. Williams as part of his loss since the letter was written 11 weeks before she died. Because a claim for wrongful death does not accrue until the death occurs, it is impossible to determine the nature of the loss or the person having the claim until the death.
Applying the dissent’s interpretation, individuals could sue the state based on the notice of other persons about other claims, so long as the claims derived from the same negligent act. If, for example, Paul Williams had died before his wife, their children would be entitled to bring the action for Mrs. Williams’ wrongful death and, under the dissent’s view, would have been able to sue based solely on their mother’s notice of her pain and suffering and their father’s notice of loss of consortium. That liberal construction would undermine substantially the requirement of notice to the state.
Following Mrs. Williams’ death, Mr. Williams should have given the state notice of his claim for the wrongful death of his wife before suing the state. Because the notice that he and his wife gave prior to her death did not adequately describe the nature of his loss after her death, we agree with the court of appeals that the trial court properly dismissed the wrongful death claim.
Notes
Williams v. Department of Human Resources,
See, e.g., Howard v. State of Georgia,
Compare
See Maleski,
See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Frost,
See McGee v. State of Georgia,
See Kim v. Department of Transp.,
See
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion because it confuses a “claim,” which is explicitly defined by the statute as simply a demand for money on account of a loss by a state actor, with a “cause of action.” In essence, the majority is holding that a person does not experience a loss, as defined under the statute, until his or her cause of action has accrued on that loss.
The Georgia Tort Claims Act provides that “[n]o action against the state under this article shall be commenced and the courts shall have no jurisdiction thereof unless and until a written notice of claim has been timely presented to the state as provided in this subsection.”
I believe the Court of Appeals and the majority erred in construing the statute in an overly technical manner that disregarded the literal language of the statute in favor of terms that appeared nowhere in the statute. ALLTELL Ga. Communications Corp. v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm.,
Thus it is clear that an unduly technical interpretation of the notice provision is not warranted in this case because not only is the language of the statute clear, the legislature has expressly stated that the statute was written to alleviate the harsh effects of sovereign immunity. I do not believe that limiting liability by dismissing potentially meritorious claims based on a highly technical interpretation of a very permissively worded notice provision furthers the legislature’s goal of achieving fair and equitable results by a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. While the statute emphasizes that the state’s liability must be limited because of the broad range of services the state must perform, the statute is explicit in listing means by which the state’s liability is limited.
This interpretation of the notice provision is in accord with how the analogous Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) has been interpreted. While the FTCA is not identical to the GTCA, comparison with this statute is warranted because each statute has as its purpose assisting the government in facilitating settlement. See Maleski, 9 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 431, 437; Adams v. United States, 615 F2d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 1980). To achieve this purpose, federal courts have determined that ante litem notice need only contain enough facts to,, allow the government to make a thorough investigation and to assist in settlement negotiations. Rise v. United States, 630 F2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1980).
Despite the permissive language of the Georgia statute, the stated intent of the legislature in favor of achieving fair and equitable results, and the manner in which federal courts have interpreted the FTCA, the majority determines that since Mrs. Williams had not
Neither does the statute’s definition of the word “loss” suggest that claimants must provide the cause of action or theory of recovery they will pursue before they file suit. “Loss” is broadly defined in this statute as “personal injury; disease; death; damage to tangible property, including lost wages and economic loss to the person who suffered the injury, disease, or death; pain and suffering; mental anguish; and any other element of actual damages recoverable in actions for negligence.”
It is particularly clear that the notice given in this case was not so general and indefinite that the State was prejudiced by having no basis for investigation. From the record, it is apparent that the State was well aware that Mrs. Williams was about to die, given that the State’s attorney attended Mrs. Williams’ deposition that was taken early in order to preserve her testimony before her imminent death. Under these circumstances, I see no benefit that the State would have gained from another notice after Mrs. Williams’ death that would justify dismissing a potentially meritorious action. See Brown, supra (“Requiring the appellee to exhaust the administrative claim procedure again would serve no useful purpose. It is unlikely that the agency would conduct a second investigation or otherwise act any differently.”).
Since the majority holding employs a highly technical construction of the statute that contravenes the stated remedial purpose of the statute as well as the plain language of the statute, I respectfully dissent.
For example, the statute provides that liability is limited to $1 million per person, provides for no state liability for discretionary acts, provides for no more than one recovery for each “occurrence,” and lists several situations for which the state will not be hable for losses.
Respondent DHR argues that Mrs. Williams’ loss had not “accrued,” the proper party was not named, and that the description of the loss did not contain the elements of a wrongful death claim. These are all technical elements that are associated with a cause of action when a complaint is filed, but are not necessary when a party has made a demand and settlement is being discussed. Respondent’s use of the words “claim” and “loss” in this manner are not consistent with the definition of these words in the statute. In the statute, it is clear that a “claim” is different from a “cause of action” and a “loss” is simply the injury suffered from the State’s action or omission.
The State also claims that if Mrs. Williams is entitled to prevail, the State “would be put in the position of settling claims that might never accrue with persons who are not the proper claimants, subjecting the public funds to multiple recoveries for the same incident.” This situation could never occur because the statute specifically limits each claimant to one recovery of up to $1 million for each “occurrence” and the State’s aggregate liability for each “occurrence” to $3 million.
Brown involved a situation similar to the instant case. In Brown, the plaintiff filed a claim pursuant to the FTCA and gave notice to the VA with respect to the failure of the doctors to diagnose tongue and throat cancer from which he had been suffering. The plaintiff