143 Iowa 328 | Iowa | 1909
Lead Opinion
On the question of the measure of the plaintiff’s recovery, the trial court instructed as follows:
In ascertaining the amount of plaintiff’s damages, you should give him such an amount as would fairly and reasonably compensate him for the injury received. In so doing you have a right to take into consideration the personal-injury suffered, the wounds and hurts received, the physical pain, mental anguish, and humiliation already suffered, and any which you may find he may suffer in the future in consequence of such injury, and his expense incurred for medical attendance and nursing. If the jury find from the evidence that the injury of the plaintiff is permanent, that prior to the injury he was capable of earning and did earn his living by farming, and that said injury has in whole or in part incapacitated him from performing the manual labor incident to such occupation, then you may take into consideration such facts in determining plaintiff’s damages. And in this connection the plaintiff’s admitted expectancy of life may be considered by you; but regard should be had as to the probable time during- such expectancy of life that plaintiff might reasonably be expected to be capable of performing manual labor on account of his age. In determining plaintiff’s earning capacity as a farmer, the profits of such farming operation should not be considered. Only that should be taken into consideration of which plaintiff has been deprived by reason of the injury received.
We need not go into the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff. It is argued at'great length in the briefs of both counsel; but it is sufficient for us to say, in view of a new trial ‘of the case, that the evidence is amply sufficient to support a finding for the plaintiff on all fact issues presented. Whether the present verdict is excessive we do not determine.
For the error pointed out, the judgment must be, and it is, reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
specially concurring. — I think the error upon which the majority opinion is based is so slight that it ought to be deemed as nonprejudicial. I think also that it was fully cured by the subsequent instruction. At most the error was formal, rather than substantial. Our previous decisions have gone as far as we ought to go on this form of error. The present opinion goes farther than any previous holding, and to my mind is extremely technical. However, the verdict was so clearly excessive that in my judgment it ought to have been set aside and a new trial granted on that ground. I therefore concur in the result, although I dissent from the ground upon which the majority opinion is based.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice that there was no prejudicial error in the instructions given by the trial court.