2003 Ohio 7197 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2003
{¶ 3} Williams was charged with domestic violence. He pled to aggravated menacing and was ordered into the City's Time Out program. Following Williams' plea, Police Chief Irvine ordered The Internal Affairs Division ("IA") of the Akron Police Department to conduct its own investigation of the incident. Both Williams and Pamela lied to the IA investigators. They told investigators that Pamela had grabbed Williams' genitalia, and that he had struck her in self-defense. As he was being interviewed by the IA investigators, however, Williams admitted that he lied and told the investigators what really happened on the night the incident occurred.
{¶ 4} Matt Contessa, the Deputy Mayor for Labor Relations, recommended that Mayor Plusquellic discharge Williams. Mayor Plusquellic followed the Office of Labor Relations' recommendation and discharged Williams. Williams appealed his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission upheld Williams' dismissal.
{¶ 5} Williams then filed the underlying action in this appeal on November 23, 1999, claiming that he had been discharged because he is an African-American in violation of R.C.
{¶ 6} The City timely appealed to this Court, setting forth seven assignments of error for review. Williams filed a cross-appeal, asserting one assignment of error. This Court will first address appellant's appeal.
{¶ 7} In its first assignment of error, the City argues that the trial court erred by not granting its motion for a directed verdict at the close of Williams' case. This Court agrees.
{¶ 8} Whether a trial court properly granted or denied a motion for a directed verdict presents a question of law, which we review de novo.Schafer v. RMS Realty (2000),
"When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue."
{¶ 9} A motion for a directed verdict tests the sufficiency of the evidence, not the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Wagner v. Roche Laboratories (1996),
{¶ 10} R.C.
{¶ 11} To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for the position; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) replacement by a non-protected person. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973),
{¶ 12} In the present case, Williams did not offer evidence that he was replaced by a person outside of the protected classification. Therefore, in order to establish a prima face case of discrimination, he must show that he was treated differently than similarly situated employees from outside the class. Howell at ¶ 15.
{¶ 13} The Six Circuit discussed what it means to be "similarly situated" in Clayton v. Meijer, Inc. (C.A. 6, 2002),
"As this Court first explained in Mitchell, `it is fundamental that to make a comparison of a discrimination plaintiff's treatment to that of non-minority employees, the plaintiff must show that the "comparables" are similarly situated in all respects.'
"* * *
"It is well established that Clayton may obtain relief under Title VII, even if he engaged in serious misconduct, provided that white employees who engage in the same conduct were either not disciplined or not disciplined as severely. McDonnell Douglas,
"* * *
"In this case, the employer discharged an African-American employee who had engaged in a serious act of misconduct which resulted in injury to a coworker who was rendered totally disabled. While other white employees may have engaged in the same acts of negligence, the employer is not precluded from considering the harm resulting from the conduct of its employees. In this case, only Clayton's negligence caused serious injury to a coworker. This is precisely `such differentiating or mitigating circumstance' that distinguishes Clayton's conduct from those of the three white coworkers. Mitchell,
{¶ 14} In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
{¶ 15} Williams established the first three prongs of the analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas. Williams is a member of a protected class. He was discharged from his position as a police officer. He was qualified for the position of police officer. However, Williams failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis in that he did not establish that he was either replaced by a person from outside the protected class or was treated differently from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.
{¶ 16} Williams offered seven white officers employed by the Akron Police Department as "comparables" — Michael Beitko, Mark Hockman, Michael Lugenbeal, Anna Starvaggi, Rick Warren, David Ferrell, and Robert Bennett.1 This Court will discuss each officer separately and in no particular order.
{¶ 17} Officer Anna Starvaggi was charged with conduct unbecoming. She had secondary employment as a security guard at Central-Hower High School. Officer Starvaggi called off sick three separate times at Central Hower. Two of those three occasions, she attended training sessions at the police department. Officer Starvaggi also entered incorrect information on her police log sheet in relation to a call. She was disciplined informally by Captain Callahan and Major Livers of the Akron Police Department.
{¶ 18} Officer Starvaggi was clearly not a "comparable" to Williams. She was not similarly situated to Williams in any aspect. The conduct engaged in by Officer Starvaggi — calling off sick to a secondary job to work her primary job and entering incorrect information on a police log sheet — are in no way comparable to Williams' act of domestic violence.
{¶ 19} In 1999, Officer Rick Warren was charged with conduct unbecoming for discharging a firearm at the FOP Lodge and failing to report the incident. Officer Warren was disciplined in-house by Chief Matulavich. In 2001, Officer Warren was disciplined for submitting overtime time sheets for work he did not perform. Officer Warren entered into an agreement with Chief Matulavich and Deputy Mayor Holland in which he was permanently demoted from Sergeant, received a 60-day suspension, and was barred from all off-duty extra jobs for one year.
{¶ 20} Again, Officer Warren was clearly not a "comparable" to Williams. Discharging a firearm and domestic violence are not similar conduct. Neither is submitting an incorrect time sheet and domestic violence.
{¶ 21} In 1995, Officer David Ferrell attempted to receive pay twice for the same hours. Officer Ferrell was disciplined informally by Captain Mullins. In 1997, he signed two different checks in two different names to avoid reporting the income to the Internal Revenue Service. The Internal Revenue Service refused to take the case, so the matter was handled internally. Officer Ferrell was charged with conduct unbecoming.
{¶ 22} Once again, this Court must find that Officer Ferrell is not a "comparable" to Williams. Although serious behavior, neither turning in incorrect time sheets nor forgery is similar conduct to domestic violence.
{¶ 23} In 1995, then Sergeant Robert Bennett was disciplined for conducting an improper search. Sergeant Bennett was disciplined informally. He was demoted for the rest of his career and suspended for 90 calendar days.
{¶ 24} Although conducting an illegal search of someone's property is a serious matter, it is not by definition similar conduct to domestic violence. Therefore, Officer Bennett is not a "comparable" to Williams.
{¶ 25} Officer Michael Lugenbeal was arrested when he and his wife began arguing at their home and he threw a hand-held can opener at her. He also threw a set of keys at her, but did not hit her then either. Mrs. Lugenbeal sustained no injuries as a result of the incident. Officer Lugenbeal pled to disorderly conduct. He was disciplined informally and received a five-day suspension.
{¶ 26} Although, Officer Lugenbeal did engage in domestic violence as did Williams, the victim, Mrs. Lugenbeal, sustained no injuries. Mrs. Williams, however, was rendered unconscious, spent three days in the hospital, and had to have her jaws wired shut for several weeks. Given the severity of Mrs. Williams' injuries and Mrs. Lugenbeal's lack of injuries, this Court finds that Williams failed to demonstrate that he was similarly situated in all relevant aspects to Officer Lugenbeal.Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co., (C.A. 6, 1998),
{¶ 27} Officer Mark Hockman was charged with domestic violence as a result of an incident that occurred between him and his wife at their home. Before the trial began, Officer Hockman entered the domestic court's diversion program. Officer Hockman was formally disciplined. Mayor Plusquellic suspended Officer Hockman indefinitely. The victim, Mrs. Hockman, scraped the back of her legs, had a slight redness on her arm, and what appeared to be a bite mark on her nose. Mrs. Hockman drove herself to the hospital where she was treated and released.
{¶ 28} While Officer Hockman did engage in domestic violence, this Court finds that Mrs. Hockman's and Mrs. Williams' injuries are not similar enough to conclude that Officer Hockman and Williams were similarly situated in all relevant aspects. Therefore, Officer Hockman is not a "comparable" to Williams.
{¶ 29} Officer Michael Beitko was also disciplined as a result of an incident that occurred between him and his wife at their home. Lieutenant Sylvia Trundle of the Akron Police Department testified that neither she nor Lori Floren, Executive Director of Victim's Assistance observed any marks or bruising on Mrs. Beitko. Lieutenant Trundle also testified that Mrs. Beitko said that she was not injured. However, one officer did testify that she saw a slight red mark on Mrs. Beitko's neck. Given the severity of Mrs. Williams' injuries and Mrs. Beitko's lack of injuries, this Court finds that Williams failed to demonstrate that he was similarly situated in all relevant aspects to Officer Beitko.
{¶ 30} While the officers that Williams offered as "comparables" may not be exemplary officers, this Court finds that Williams did not satisfy the fourth prong of the analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas and, therefore, has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
{¶ 31} Consequently, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Williams, this Court finds that reasonable minds could come but to one conclusion, and that conclusion is that Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Civ.R. 50(A)(4). The City's first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 32} This Court's disposition of the City's first assignment of error renders its remaining assignments of error moot; therefore, this Court declines to address them. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
{¶ 33} Williams' cross-assignment of error is also rendered moot by this Court's disposition of the City's first assignment of error. Therefore, this Court will not address it. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
Judgment reversed.
Slaby, P.J., Whitmore, J. concur.