205 Mass. 396 | Mass. | 1910
This is a suit in equity, by which the plaintiff seeks to enforce specific performance of a contract for the sale
The defendant strenuously contends that under the authority of Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, the decree was rightly entered. The principle there laid down was that the conveyance of land cannot be decreed in equity by reason merely of an oral agree
The removal of the home of the plaintiff to the farm in reliance upon the terms of the contract must also have been contemplated by the defendant. This was not a collateral undertaking, but a primary purpose of the purchase by the plaintiff. A necessary result of assuming a new home was the abandonment of the old. The reasonable consequences of such a change of domicil might so affect the condition of the plaintiff that it would be inequitable to deprive her of the advantages she would gain by having the contract specifically performed. It is not necessary in a case of this sort that the loss to the plaintiff shall be a corresponding gain to the defendant.
It is alleged that the plaintiff abandoned a profitable business in another town, in reliance upon the oral contract, for the purpose and at the time of the taking possession of the land contracted for. Although it is not alleged that this was known to the defendant, it was or may be found to be an act “ growing out of ” the “ contract with the defendant to which it could be ex-elusively referable ” and to have been induced by the act of the defendant. Graves v. Goldthwait, 153 Mass. 268, 270. While this circumstance standing alone would not constitute a part performance, yet where there is payment in full and a taking possession, both of which are technical part performance, then such attendant conditions may be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the parties can be restored to their original position, and whether money damages will be adequate compensation to the one injured.
It is probable that in the brief time elapsing between the taking possession and the discovery by the plaintiff of the defendant’s fraud no extensive improvements could have been made upon the farm, but her situation was peculiar after this discovery. She was rightfully in possession. We are not in-dined to hold her strictly to the management of the farm at her peril. If it was reasonable husbandry to go forward and make the improvements, her position may have been such as to justify her in doing so.
The result we reach is not in conflict with the principles laid down in Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, and is within the rule
Decree reversed.
After a hearing on the demurrer before Dana, J.