45 V.I. 90 | Supreme Court of The Virgin Islands | 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(October 16, 2002)
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Plaintiffs action for declaratory judgment. Defendants moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment pursuant to Rules 7, 10, 12, and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 56.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure and supported by affidavits and various discovery documents. Plaintiff never responded to Defendants’ motion. The aforementioned motions and supporting documents have been reviewed, and this Court finds that the facts and evidence support declaratory judgment in Plaintiffs favor as a matter of law. Defendants’ motion, therefore, will be denied.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
At some point prior to September 1989, Plaintiff earned one hundred and eighty (180) credit hours from Alabama State University toward a Bachelor of Arts (“B.A.”) degree. On September 18, 1989, Plaintiff was
In June 1992, Plaintiff requested leave with pay in order to complete the requirements for a B.A. degree. However, he was granted leave without pay from December 1992 until May 29, 1993,
Plaintiff does not claim to have pursued any administrative remedies, and neither party indicates when or if Plaintiff submitted the required paperwork to be approved for the pay differential. Defendants claim that (1) Plaintiff is barred from this action by the applicable statute of limitations, (2) Plaintiffs failure to exhaust his contractual and administrative remedies defeats this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and (3) Plaintiff has no standing to pursue his claim in an individual capacity, without joining the Union
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 5 V.I. CODE ANN. § 1262, as further described in footnote 3, infra.
“The standard for granting summary judgment on a request for a declaratory judgment is the same as for any other type of relief.” Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Bd., 298 F.3d 201, 210 n.12 (3d Cir. Pa. 2002). When a party seeks adjudication in the form of summary judgment, the Court is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as applied to this court by Rule 1 of the Territorial Court Rules.
Summary judgment must be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Green v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 29 V.I. 27, 30 (Terr. Ct. St. C. 1994). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit. Ferris v. VI. Industrial Gases, Inc., 23 V.I. 183 (D.C.V.I. 1987). All reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the non-moving party. In re Tutu Water Wells Contamination Litig, 78 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.C.V.I. 1999). This applies even where a party does not respond to a summary judgment motion, so judgment must be denied unless the movant meets its initial burden of showing the absence of material facts in dispute. Carty v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419 n.2 (D.C.V.I. 1999) (citing Ascencio v. Ramirez, 20 V.I. 508, 512 (D.V.I. App. 1984)). However, a “mere scintilla of evidence in support of the [opponent’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably end for the [opponent] ... by a preponderance of the evidence.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
IV. Discussion
When deciding an action for declaratory judgment, a trial court must declare the parties’ respective rights and obligations: “Any .person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising
A. Plaintiff Is Entitled to an Educational Pay Differential.
The Virgin Islands Code established “a career incentive pay program offering pay differentials to corrections officers of the Bureau of Corrections ... as a reward for furthering their education in the field of corrections work beyond the minimum qualifications set forth in the job class specifications for positions held by such employees.” 3 V.I. CODE Ann. § 570(a). All corrections officers who qualify are eligible for some type of pay increase or differential at the time of hire. “An employee in a position subject to this subchapter shall be paid at the rate within the grade of his position determined in accordance with this chapter together with any pay differential applicable to him provided under this subchapter.” 3 V.I. CODE ANN. § 556. “New appointments shall normally be made at the minimum rate of the appropriate grade plus any applicable pay differential.” 3 V.I. CODE ANN. § 557. The only question that remains is whether Plaintiff qualified for a pay increase.
The statute makes certain formalistic requirements before an employee may be awarded this educational pay incentive. Pay differentials falling under this career incentive pay program must be added to the basic compensation of employees effective the first pay period following receipt and verification of official transcripts by the Director of Personnel. 3 V.I. CODE ANN. § 570(d). Transmittal of all transcripts to the Director of Personnel is the responsibility of the employee who wishes to be a beneficiary of the act. 3 V.I. CODE ANN. § 570(d).
No motion before this court addresses this requirement, and there is no evidence as to whether Plaintiff completed the formal transcript submission and verification process. Therefore, we will remand this matter to the BOC for further proceedings to determine, via the internal grievance procedure, the sole fact issue of whether and/or when Plaintiff submitted the paperwork required by 3 V.I. CODE ANN. § 570(d). If the BOC determines the date of Plaintiffs submission, Defendants shall be obligated to pay the amount of pay differential Plaintiff would have been paid beginning on the pay period immediately following the date of submission. If the BOC determines that Plaintiff did not make a submission at any time, Plaintiff will not be entitled to a pay differential
B. Plaintiff Initiated This Matter Within the Applicable Statute of Limitations.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, but do not specify to which statute of limitations they refer. The Virgin Islands Code establishes the time for commencement of various actions at 5 V.I. CODE Ann. §31: “Civil actions shall only be commenced within the periods prescribed below after the cause of action shall have accrued, except when, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute.” The statute at issue here, 3 V.I. CODE Ann. § 570, does not provide a specific statute of limitations; therefore, the general six-year limitations period for “[a]n action upon a. liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture” is applicable. 5 V.I. CODE ANN. § 31(3)(B). Plaintiff initiated this action in September of 1998 for payment of educational pay differential beginning in May 1993 — less than six (6) years after the date his claim accrued. Therefore, Plaintiff s claim was timely.
C. Plaintiff Need Not Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
Defendants also claim that Plaintiff was required to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him before bringing this action. The exhaustion of remedies doctrine, a more focused version of the ripeness doctrine, concentrates on whether the complainant has availed himself of all administrative remedies. General Offshore Corp. v. Farrelly,. 743 F. Supp. 1177, 1190 (D.V.I. 1990). “Generally, courts do not assume jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceedings until administrative remedies have been exhausted; and where an appeal from a action of an administrative body is provided, declaratory judgment will be denied.” Flavo-Rich v. Quinn, 18 V.I. 530, 533 (D.V.I. 1981) (internal citations omitted).
However, exhaustion is not required when the challenged agency action presents a clear and unambiguous violation of statutory rights. Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619
Even where a statute is made a part of and cited in the agreement, a dispute under it is not a labor dispute. In the case at bar, a copy of the entire collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) is not provided, but Defendants have conceded that the CBA names the educational pay differential statute at issue (3 V.I. CODE ANN. § 570). Pay is certainly a term of employment, and, as such, could be interpreted as involving a labor dispute which is first subject to resolution by administrative remedies or arbitration. However, the pay differential at issue is mandated by statute, transforming a condition of employment into a statutory right. Plaintiff coot be prevented from determining his rights under the statute in a court of law.
In the case of Rivera v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 635 F. Supp. 795 (D.V.I. 1986), a firefighter injured his back and attempted to receive disability benefits. Despite his certification from a licensed physician that he was unable to work, the Government continued to deny Rivera his disability benefits. He sought assistance from the Union, but the Union did not respond.
Rivera then filed suit in Territorial Court to recover benefits pursuant to 3 V.I. CODE Ann. § 584a. The collective bargaining agreement for the firefighters included language similar to the CBA grievance procedures in the case at hand. Even though the firefighters’ collective bargaining agreement included grievance procedures, the court nevertheless denied the government’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the dispute was not
Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, whether to command that remedies be exhausted is ultimately a matter for “sound judicial discretion.” Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Flavo-Rich, 18 V.I. at 532. Certain quasi-policy reasons for refusing to require an employee to exhaust administrative remedies apply here. For instance, the court in St. Thomas & St. John Police held that “[t]he Commissioner of the Virgin Islands Police Department and the V.I. Government cannot frustrate a clear mandate of law by using the grievance provision of the CBA to forestall the granting of disability benefits.” St. Thomas & St. John Police, 27 V.I. at 145-146. Again, when the dispute is over governmental compliance with a clear statutory mandate, the employee need not exhaust administrative remedies, especially since the original purpose of requiring administrative review (streamlining of procedures) would be frustrated. As discussed in subsection A supra, the meaning of the pay differential statute is clear and must be applied irrespective of whether Plaintiff attempted administrative remedies.
C. Plaintiff Has Standing to Bring This Matter.
Defendants insist that Plaintiff has no standing to pursue a claim individually against the government because he is not a party to the contract. It is true that individual employees who are union members have no standing to challenge, in a suit against an employer, an arbitration proceeding to which the union and employer were the sole parties, except on the grounds of fraud, deceit, or breach of union’s duty of fair representation. Shores v. Peabody Coal Co., 831 F.2d 1382, 1383 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis supplied) (citing Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185). However, this rule applies very sensibly to a case in which the dispute has been arbitrated to award, not, as here, to a situation in which the employee is requesting judicial clarification of his statutory rights. Clearly, this rule does not apply to the case at hand.
Plaintiffs claim concerns payment pursuant to 3 V.I. CODE ANN. § 570, a statute which was cited in the CBA. He would clearly have had standing to sue for the pay differential after submitting his claim to the grievance procedure set up in the CBA, if, in fact, he were required to
IV. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, this Court will grant a declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiff and remand the matter for further proceedings on the issue of whether and/or when Plaintiff made his foal submission to the BOC Director of Personnel for a pay differential. An appropriate declaratory judgment follows.
Defendants dispute these dates, asserting that Plaintiff’s leave of absence was from January 13, 1993 until July 13, 1993. However, they do admit albeit contradictorily that Plaintiff returned to the BOC on or about May 30, 1993.
United Industrial, Service, Transportation, Professional & Government Workers of North America Seafarers International Union of North America.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs failure to exhaust remedies defeats this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. However, there is no consensus regarding this idea. Some courts have found that failure to exhaust is in the nature of statutes of limitations and does not affect a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 1999); Hornsby v. U.S. Postal Service, 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1986); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392-98 (1982). The latter interpretation applies to the present case and disposes of Defendants’ argument.