Luther Jerome WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard ALLEN, Commissioner for Alabama Department of Corrections, in his official and individual capacity, Grantt Culliver, Warden, Holman Correctional Facility, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 07-13638.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 21, 2007.
496 F.3d 1210
Id. at 1352.
Olech and Executive 100 are “fairly distinguishable” from the present case. In Olech, the challenged governmental decision involved zoning. As we have already observed, the nature of the decision allowed the Court to conduct the “similarly situated” analysis at a high level of abstraction. The same is true of Executive 100, another zoning case. Executive 100 involved a governmental decision we would characterize as one-dimensional—plaintiffs were denied a zoning variance, while other individuals had been granted the same variance. Executive 100, 922 F.2d at 1538. Here, in sharp contrast, the defendants were engaged in a complex, multi-year process of environmental regulation. This difference, standing alone, makes this case “fairly distinguishable” from Olech and Executive 100.
In sum, even if Griffin had stated a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the district court erred in holding that the defendants’ alleged conduct constituted a violation of clearly established law. Neither the state officials nor the local officials had “fair warning” that their actions might subject them to legal liability. Consequently, to hold them liable “would destroy the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties, by making it impossible for officials reasonably to anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
III. CONCLUSION
After thorough review, we reverse the district court‘s denial of qualified immunity for the defendants. Griffin‘s “class of one” claim fails to properly allege that the individual defendants intentionally treated a “similarly situated” entity in a disparate manner. Moreover, the facts in Griffin‘s own complaint plainly contradict the conclusory allegation that the defendants had no rational basis for taking regulatory action. In short, Griffin has failed to allege that the defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it has failed to meet its burden of showing that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.10
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Joel L. Sogol, Tuscaloosa, AL, Scott K. Pomeroy, Little, Medeiros, Kinder, Bulman & Whitney, Inc., Providence, RI, for Williams.
J. Clayton Crenshaw, Montgomery, AL, for Allen and Culliver.
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Luther Jerome Williams (“Williams“) is an Alabama death row inmate scheduled for execution by lethal injection on August 23, 2007. On April 4, 2007, the State of Alabama (the “State“) filed its motion with the Alabama Supreme Court to set an execution date. On April 20, Williams filed a
I. BACKGROUND
The details of Williams‘s crime are set forth in our opinion affirming the district court‘s judgment denying Williams federal habeas relief. See Williams v. Allen, 458 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1874, 167 L.Ed.2d 365 (2007). Briefly, in January 1988, Williams, along with two other individuals, noticed the victim‘s vehicle beside the road, stopped and confronted the victim. Williams led the victim to a nearby wooded area and shot him once in the left side of the head, “execution style,” with a .22 caliber pistol which had been in the trunk of the stolen car in which Williams was riding. Williams and his companions left the victim‘s body at the scene and took his money and vehicle. Id. at 1235-36.
After a jury found Williams guilty on the charge of capital murder, the jury recommended, by a 10-2 vote, that the trial court impose the death penalty. The trial court agreed with the jury‘s recommendation and sentenced Williams to death. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Williams‘s conviction and death sentence. See Williams v. State, 601 So.2d 1062 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. See Ex parte Williams, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala. 1992). The United States Supreme Court denied Williams‘s petition for a writ of certiorari. See Williams v. Alabama, 506 U.S. 957, 113 S.Ct. 417, 121 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). Approximately 16 months later, Williams sought post-conviction relief in the state circuit court by filing a Rule 32 petition. See
Williams then sought relief in federal court by filing a federal habeas petition on March 29, 2001. In July 2002, while Williams‘s federal habeas petition was pending, the Alabama Legislature changed the State‘s method of execution from electrocution to lethal injection. The new statute gave death-row inmates 30 days to elect electrocution instead. After that period of time, the State‘s sole method of execution would be lethal injection. See
II. DISCUSSION
Williams‘s
“Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy that is not available as a matter of right.” Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir.2007). “Additionally, the
equitable principles at issue when inmates facing imminent execution delay in raising their § 1983 method-of-execution challenges are equally applicable to requests for both stays and injunctive relief.” Grayson, at 1322; Rutherford v. McDonough (Rutherford II), 466 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 465, 166 L.Ed.2d 331 (2006); see also Rutherford v. Crosby (Rutherford I), 438 F.3d 1087, 1092 (11th Cir.) (commenting that “where petitioner‘s scheduled execution is imminent, there is no practical difference between denying a stay on equitable grounds and denying injunctive relief on equitable grounds in a§ 1983 lawsuit“), vacated on other grounds, Rutherford v. McDonough, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2915, 165 L.Ed.2d 914 (2006).
Williams proffers numerous excuses to justify his delay in filing his challenge to the State‘s lethal injection method of execution. We are not persuaded by any of his excuses. First, we note that it is common practice for the State to ask the Alabama Supreme Court to set an execution date for a death row inmate shortly after the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari review of the petitioner‘s federal habeas petition. See Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635, 639 n. 2 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2160, 167 L.Ed.2d 887 (2007). Hence, when Williams filed his petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on December 11, 2006, it should have been clear to him that a denial of the petition would remove the final obstacle to lifting the state-court automatic stay of execution. Moreover, it should have been clear to Williams that once the Alabama Supreme Court lifted the stay, he might have as few as 30 days before the date of execution. See
Second, we reject Williams‘s assertion that he could not have filed a challenge to the lethal injection protocol until the Supreme Court‘s decision in Hill v. McDonough, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006) (clarifying that a death row inmate could bring a
Third, Williams‘s unjustifiable delay cannot be blamed on any alleged change to Alabama‘s execution protocol. In Jones, we rejected a similar argument to the one proffered by Williams—that he delayed the filing of his lethal injection challenge because Alabama‘s execution procedures are secretive and thus could have changed over time. Jones, 485 F.3d at 640 n. 3. The crux of Williams‘s complaint, just like Jones‘s complaint, centers on the three-drug protocol utilized by virtually every other state that executes its death row inmates by lethal injection. Thus, his reliance on the alleged changes to Alabama‘s execution protocol to excuse his unjustifiable delay is belied by his complaint which lists Thiopental, Pavulon, and Potassium Chloride as the three-drug protocol utilized by the State. [Petitioner‘s Compl. ¶ 9-14.] See Jones, 485 F.3d at 640 n. 3; Grayson, at 1323–24.
Lastly, we reject Williams‘s contention that he delayed filing his lethal injection challenge because of the evolving standards of decency applicable to Eighth Amendment challenges. In essence, Williams claims that our maturing society is changing its belief that the death penalty is constitutional. There has been no change to Alabama‘s lethal injection method since its inception in 2002. Indeed, Williams makes no claim that Alabama‘s lethal injection protocol has been modified since its inception. Accordingly, Williams‘s view that the standards of decency are evolving does not excuse his unjustifiable delay in filing his lethal injection challenge.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Williams‘s delay in raising his
Both the State and the victim‘s family have a strong interest in the timely enforcement of Williams‘s death sentence. See Hill, 126 S.Ct. at 2104 (citing Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649-50, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2126, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004)); Rutherford II, 466 F.3d at 974; Jones, 485 F.3d at 641; Grayson, at 1326. As such, if Williams were allowed to proceed on his
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Williams‘s
AFFIRMED.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I dissent. Williams filed his execution-method challenge promptly—within 25 days of the conclusion of his federal habeas review and just 16 days after the State‘s motion to set an execution date. The majority states that it should have been apparent to Williams that he had a constitutional claim at the time the legislature changed the law in favor of execution by lethal injection. However, his claim did not become ripe until it was clear that he had exhausted the claims pertaining to his conviction and sentence. I cannot subscribe to the majority‘s view that Williams should have anticipated the denial of all relief and filed this case prior to the determination of his pending case.
Thus, I believe the district court‘s opinion should be reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Williams’ claims. This is especially so given the serious nature of his merits claim that Alabama‘s execution procedure is unconstitutional. Alabama‘s method of execution calls for the injection of three drugs which in sequence are intended first to anesthetize, then paralyze, and then kill the defendant. Williams asserts that the evidence he has marshaled will show that the first drug in Alabama‘s three-drug lethal injection protocol will be insufficient to induce surgical anaesthesia for the duration of the execution, leaving him conscious throughout this ordeal and subjecting him to excruciating, searing pain.1 Moreover, because the second drug in the cocktail will have rendered him unable to move, he will not be able to signal his pain.
A civilized and just society would surely want to assure itself that it does not administer executions in a manner that is needlessly painful and unconstitutionally torturous, especially when the solution—to provide sufficient anesthetic to safeguard against painful death—would appear so simple and easy to accommodate.
Therefore, I dissent.