48 So. 485 | Ala. | 1908
This is an original action, by the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Jack Williams, deceased, to recover damages of the defendant for negli
For the purposes of this discussion it may be, as Ave understand it is in fact, conceded that, while the plaintiff’s intestate might, under the facts alleged in the complaint, have maintained his action under section 1749 of the Code of 1896, on account of the injury suffered, yet unless his action had been commenced within one year from the day on which he received the injury, the action would have been barred by the limitations of one year, as prescribed by section 2801 of the Code of 1896 (section 4840 of the present Code). Therefore, before the intes
The object of the statute (section 1751, Code 1896), as we understand it, Avas to continue the cause of action which the person injured had — and Avliich he had not enforced, but might have enforced had not death intervened — for the benefit of the legal distributees of his estate ; and to enable the distributees to obtain their damages, resulting from the same primary cause, and not to create an entirely new and additional right of action, although the mode of estimating the damages might be entirely different from that employed had the action been brought by the employe. “Tn the view Ave take of
“But the measure of the administrator’s risrht to have the employer declared responsible toward him is to be ascertained by the rights the deceased himself had
Another statute of Canada (section 2262 [2] of the Code) provided that actions “for bodily injuries” were prescribed by one year, saving the special provisions contained in section 1056, and cases regulated by special laAvs. It was held by the House of Lords: That the conditions affecting the right of action competent to the deceased, being prescribed or specified in the statute1, were so delineated “for the purpose of making it clear that no conditions affecting the personal claim of the deceased, other than those specified, are to stand in the way of the statutory right conferred upon his widoAv and relatives;” that notwithstanding the deceased2* right of action Avas barred at the time of his death, yet the statute provided one year- from the death as. the time within which the Avidow might bring suit; and that therefore to hold that, because the deceased’s right of action Avas barred at his death, the. AvidoAv’s right of action was cut off, Avould be to add to the language .of the statute Avords not to be found there, such as “and without his claim having been otherwise extinguished,” or, in other Avords, Avould involve the insertion of a neAV condition Avhich the Legislature had. excluded. So the decision of the House of Lords is based (as must be all decisions construing statutes) upon the particular statute then submitted for construction.
In Fowlkes v. N. & D. Ry. Co., 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 683, we have a case almost on all fours with the one in judgment. A statute of Tennessee provided that: “The right of action Avhich a person Avho dies from injuries received from another, or Avhere death is caused by the Avrongful act or omission of another, would have had against, a. wrougdoer, in (use death had not ensued, Avould not
From the foregoing considerations, it remains to us only to' announce our conclusion: That the statute of limitations of one year commenced to run from the time the intestate received the injury; and, therefore, on the undisputed evidence, the affirmative charge was properly given for the defendant.
Affirmed.