31 N.Y. 411 | NY | 1865
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *413 By the condition of the bond and mortgage the defendant undoubtedly had a right, after failure by the plaintiff to pay the taxes assessed on the mortgage premises, to pay and discharge the same, and thereupon to collect the amount so paid by suit upon the bond or by foreclosure of the mortgage. And the principal question in this case is, whether the purchase of the premises at the tax sales and the taking certificates of such purchase under the provisions of the charter of Buffalo, were a discharge of the assessments and taxes, within the true construction of the bond and mortgage.
By section 20 of title 5 of the charter of the city of Buffalo, as revised by the Laws of 1856, it is provided that the owner of any real estate sold for taxes may at any time before a declaration of sale is granted, as elsewhere provided by the charter, redeem the same by paying to the city treasurer, for the benefit of the holder of such certificate, the amount paid by him with the addition of fifteen per cent per annum on such amount.
The certificates are transferable; and it cannot always be easily ascertained who the holder is. Hence the statute has provided that the redemption may be made by payment to the city treasurer. In all cases of sales for taxes the owner of the land is clothed by law with this right of redemption; and the tax together with the expenses of the sale remain a lien on the premises *414 assessed, with an addition thereto of fifteen per cent, until the redemption or payment to the treasurer is made. The effect of the sale is therefore merely an assignment of the lien of the tax and the expenses then incurred, enhanced by the additional per centage; and this lien continues till the owner of the land makes the redemption, or the holder of the certificate takes title to the property in the prescribed form. It is therefore clear that the tax or assessment is not discharged by the sale and certificate. In this case the purchase at the tax sale was made by M.E. Viele, and the certificates of the comptroller were made to him, as he says, "for convenience of transfer." He was in fact the agent of defendant, but there was nothing in the manner of sale or form of the certificate to indicate that fact. The legal rights of the parties are perhaps the same as though the certificate had been made to the defendant; but it would certainly be very embarrassing to titles of real estate if the owner's right of redemption were dependent upon some undisclosed relation of agency between the apparent purchaser and the incumbrancer of the land. There would be no safety for him if he were not allowed to redeem; because the ostensible purchaser could transfer the certificate to a bona fide holder and subject him to great embarrassment and perhaps to the loss of his land. A mortgagee, who desires to pay off taxes or assessments and charge them on the mortgaged premises, has a very plain course to pursue. At any stage of the proceedings he can step forward in his character of mortgagee and pay the assessment or redeem from a sale before the purchaser's title has actually ripened by a conveyance under the law. It is no hardship to require him to do this in a plain and distinct manner, so as not to embarrass the title of the mortgagor or owner. When, however, he purchases at a tax sale and takes a certificate as purchaser, that is an election on his part to occupy the relation of purchaser, with all the rights and incidents which the law attaches to it. He becomes then the owner of an undischarged lien, which the owner of the land may discharge in the manner provided by law.
But it is insisted that the purchase and taking of the certificate *415 by a mortgagee, who has the right by the terms of his mortgage, or under the general statute, to pay off taxes and add the amount so paid to the lien of his mortgage, is by operation of law,ipso facto, an extinguishment and discharge of the tax. To support this proposition the familiar principle that a person who is placed in a situation of trust or confidence in reference to the subject of the sale, or has a duty to perform which is inconsistent with the character of a purchaser, cannot be a purchaser on his own account. (Torry v. The Bank of Orleans, 7 Paige, 649; Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 Paige, 257; Burhans v. Van Zandt, 3 Seld., 523.)
But this principle has never been carried so far as to prevent a junior mortgagee from purchasing the subject matter of the mortgage at a sale under a prior lien; nor has it been held that a title fairly purchased at such sale was held for the benefit of the mortgagor. A mortgage is a mere security for a debt; and there is no such relation of trust or confidence between the maker and holder of a mortgage as prevents the latter from acquiring title to its subject matter, either under his own or any other valid lien. The defendant had no duty to perform to the plaintiff or toward the mortgaged premises that precluded her from buying at the tax sale. She was under no obligation to pay the taxes. The plaintiff had covenanted that she might do so at her option, and thereby acquire certain rights; but she had not undertaken to do it nor subjected herself to any burthen or obligation whatever in respect to the assessments or taxes. She might pay them or not, as she chose, or she might stand upon her general rights and purchase at the tax sale, as others could do, for the purposes of investment or protection. But if this were not so, all that the principle sought to be invoked would require is that as purchaser she should take a redeemable interest only which never could ripen as against the mortgagor into a greater one, and not that the lien she purchased should be discharged or extinguished, leaving her to no remedy except the possibly inadequate one under the covenants of the bond and mortgage. It is my opinion, *416 therefore, that the purchase at the tax sale did not operate to discharge the assessment and deprive the plaintiff of his right of redemption under the statute.
But it is urged that the failure of plaintiff to pay the tax was a breach of the condition of the mortgage, and gave defendant a right to foreclose and collect the whole amount secured. There is no clause of the mortgage making the whole sum due on failure to pay the interest, or on breach of any condition. The clause which authorizes the retention by the mortgagee of the whole amount secured after a sale of the premises, does not have the effect claimed for it; nor do I think it would countervail the provision of the statute which requires a sale in parcels, when that is practicable, and prohibits a sale of more than sufficient to pay the amount actually due with the expenses of sale. (3 R.S., 5th ed., p. 860, § 6.) But no right to foreclose would accrue upon a simple failure of the mortgagor to pay the taxes; to give that right it is essential that the holder of the mortgage shall have paid off and discharged the assessment or tax, otherwise no money has become due which the mortgagee is entitled to retain on a sale. The language of the mortgage settles this, for it provides that "such assessments, taxes andcharges as shall have been paid by them" may be retained.
Besides, in my judgment, a mere naked breach of such a covenant in the condition of a mortgage, without the payment of any amount, would give no right to commence a foreclosure under the statute; but this it is not necessary to determine.
I think the judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. *417