OPINION
Rhonda Barbour sued her former employer Williams-Pyro, Inc. (WPI) for age discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. A jury found in favor of Barbour and awarded her $40,000 in damages for back pay, $10,000 in lost employment benefits, $100,000 in past compensatory damages, and $100,000 in future compensatory damages. The trial court determined that the statutory caps required under Texas Labor Code Section 21.2585(d)(1) should be applied to the jury’s award of damages and rendered judgment for Barbour in the amount of $120,714, exclusive of attorney’s fees and costs. Based on a prior agreement between the parties, the trial court then addressed Barbour’s claim for attorney’s fees. In her claim for attorney’s fees, Barbour asked the court to apply a multiplier to enhance her fee award. After the hearing, the trial court determined that Barbour was entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of $154,335, but concluded that it did not possess the authority under Section 21.259 of the Texas Labor Code to apply a multiplier. The court specifically ruled that if did have such authority, a 1.5 multiplier was appropriate.
WPI then filed the instant appeal. It challenges the trial court’s judgment, complaining that: (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that age was a motivating factor in WPI’s decision to terminate Barbour, and (2) that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Barbour’s discrimination case because she failed to fully exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. Barbour also appeals, contending that the trial court erred by not applying a multiplier to her attorney’s fee award. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment in its entirety.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
WPI develops and manufactures products for various industries involved in oil and gas development, fire suppression, aeronautics, and national defense. In 1988, Bob Williams hired twenty-six year old Rhonda Barbour to work at WPI. Mr. Williams was the co-founder of WPI and, at the time he hired Barbour, he was also WPI’s president and CEO. When Mr. Williams hired Barbour he was looking to expand WPI’s business to include a new line of fire extinguishers or fire suppression devices. He personally trained Barb
About a year after Barbour was hired, WPI established a specific assembly line for the sole purpose of manufacturing the fire suppression devices. The line was referred to as the “pyro line.” Barbour was the supervisor of the pyro-line and she was responsible for training the new employees. 1
In 1996, Mr. Williams passed away and his wife, Delia Williams, took over as President and CEO of WPI. 2 According to Mrs. Williams, handling the lead styphnate was the most dangerous aspect of WPI’s operation. She also acknowledged that the very existence of the pyro line depended upon Barbour building the charge caps.
Barbour continued her work assembling charge caps for the fire suppression devices for her first seventeen years as a WPI employee. James Craig Walters supervised Barbour from 1998 to 2004. He testified that Barbour:
[CJcould use some improvement because she is quick to talk about people behind their back and stir up criticism pools with other employees. I addressed this problem with her and she said it was from being frustrated but in the end she agreed to stop.
According to Walters, on Barbour’s 2003 work performance review he specifically noted that there were improvements he wanted to see. Barbour was good at “repetitive tasks,” but that she was not good at tasks that involved change. Although Walters did not recall ever giving Barbour a written warning, he testified that he spoke with her on several occasions regarding her behavior. He considered these discussions oral reprimands or warnings.
In 2005, the company completed development on a safer alternative to the charge caps, which did not involve the use of explosives. This new design no longer required Barbour’s specialized skills, nor did it require the assembly to occur in an isolated environment. According to Mrs. Williams, as the new design was implemented, the old method of using lead styphnate was phased out. Likewise, Barbour’s position was effectively phased out.
Barbour was then re-assigned to the “connectivity and test systems” (CaTS) assembly line. 3 The CaTS assembly area included both mechanical and electrical assembly. Although Barbour had previously spent the majority of her time working on the pyro assembly line, she had worked on both the electrical and mechanical assembly lines from time to time as needed.
Tammy Renteria, a CaTS assembly leader, testified that an assembly leader also had a duty to go from station to station along the CaTS assembly line, double-check each assembler’s work, and see whether the assemblers had any questions or otherwise needed work orders or parts for assembly.
When Barbour began working on the CaTS assembly line, her supervisor was Stacy Chapa. Chapa supervised Barbour from June 2005 to December 2005, during which Barbour received two positive performance evaluations. The first performance evaluation was signed by Paul Shiller, WPI’s Operations Manager, and gave Barbour a “good” rating. The second performance evaluation, signed by Vice President Brent Williams, included the following comments regarding Barbour’s performance: (1) “tracks and completes assigned work independently after initial instructions and feedback;” (2) “positive and supportive of the company’s mission;” (3) “knows the status of tasks the standards for accuracy and quantity;” (4) “exhibits patience with customers/coworkers;” (5) “maintains courteous and cooperative relationships with supervisor and co-workers;” and (6) “accepts supervision, change and feedback.” Based on this evaluation, Barbour received a pay raise. Chapa testified that as of December 2005, she had worked with Barbour for seventeen years and never had any problems with her.
Jose “Joe” Montalvo began working at WPI in 2004 as a Quality Inspector. He was later promoted to supervisor of the Quality Inspection area (or Quality Assurance Department). At the time Barbour was reassigned to the CaTS assembly line in 2005, Montalvo was the supervisor in charge of the quality inspection area. In April or May 2006, Montalvo became the production manager for the CaTS assembly area. 4 As production manager, Mon-talvo also became Barbour’s direct supervisor.
According to Barbour, in 2005 Montalvo began making age-related comments to her. He made comments about her gray hair and told her that she was getting old and looking old. He also suggested that she color her hair, stating that if she were his wife, she would not look like she did. On occasions when she was in the inventory room and would have to bend over, Montalvo would tell her that her butt was getting big and that she was looking old. Montalvo eventually mentioned replacing Barbour with “young Mexican girls.” Barbour said these comments were made three or four times a week. She also testified that Montalvo’s tone was serious and that his comments made her scared and sick.
Once Montalvo became her direct supervisor on the CaTS assembly line, he continued to make comments about her age. At that point, Barbour decided to report the comments to Paul Shiller, the Operations Manager. According to Barbour, in May or June 2006, she reported Montal-vo’s behavior to Shiller. She told Shiller, in detail, about all of Montalvo’s age-related comments. Montalvo admitted making some comments related to the color of Barbour’s hair but said he was only joking.
Mr. Walters, Barbour’s supervisor from 1998 to 2004, testified that he observed Barbour interacting with Montalvo but he never heard Montalvo make derogatory comments toward Barbour.
Mrs. Williams, owner of WPI, testified that she was never informed about Barbour’s complaints regarding Montalvo. She found the comments offensive and they should have been reported to the Human Resources Department. According to her, even jokes about age should be reported to Human Resources. On November 15, 2006, WPI terminated Barbour’s employment. The only people in the room were Montalvo, Shiller, and Candace Woodard from Human Resources. Montalvo did all the talking. Barbour was not given a reason for her termination. Barbour asked to speak to Mrs. Williams or her son, Brent Williams, but was told by Montalvo that they “had already been informed.” Mon-talvo admitted that he never gave Barbour a written reprimand prior to terminating her. He also admitted that he generally gives an employee an oral warning and a written reprimand before terminating that employee, and that he had given other employees written warnings if they had done something “really wrong.” According to Montalvo, he had orally reprimanded Barbour at some point, but Barbour testified that she never received a verbal warning while for WPI. No written reprimands appear in Barbour’s file.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 13, 2006, Barbour filed an administrative complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) alleging age discrimination as the reason for her termination. TWC forwarded Barbour’s complaint to WPI on December 22, 2006. After investigating Barbour’s discrimination claims, the TWC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Right to File a Civil Action.
After her termination, Barbour also applied for unemployment benefits with the TWC. In January 2007, a telephone hearing was conducted. Montalvo and Human Resources representative Candace Woodard participated in the telephone hearing on behalf of WPI. Montalvo stated that Barbour was terminated because of errors on a contact socket order and a knob order and her scheduling of time on the knob order. This was the first time Barbour had heard a reason for her termination. According to Barbour, she was never made aware of any errors with the contact sockets order prior to her termination, or at any time prior to the TWC hearing. Barbour also testified that she did not make the errors on either the contact socket order or the chalk knobs work order.
Valerie Dorsette was Barbour’s co-worker in the CaTS assembly area. Barbour testified that Dorsette was the assembler
On April 23, 2007, Barbour filed the instant suit alleging age discrimination. The case was tried to a jury. The charge instructed the jury to answer three questions. Question 1 asked:
Was age a motivating factor in Williams-Pyro, Inc.’s decision to discharge Rhonda Barbour?
A ‘motivating factor’ in an employment decision is a reason for making the decision at the time it was made. There may be more than one motivating factor for an employment decision.
Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’
The jury answered “yes.” Because the jury answered yes to Question 1, the jury was then instructed to answer Question 2:
Would Williams-Pyro, Inc. have taken the same action inquired about in Question 1 when it did, in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, if any?
Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’
The jury answered “No.” Finally, the jury was asked to award damages based on their liability determination. In response to Question 3, the jury awarded Barbour $40,000 in damages for back pay, $10,000 in lost employment benefits, $100,000 in past compensatory damages, and $100,000 in future compensatory damages. After the jury rendered its verdict, WPI filed a post-trial plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss. Barbour also filed a post-trial motion for attorney’s fees. On July 19, 2011, the trial court held a hearing. The next day, it signed an order denying WPI’s plea to the jurisdiction. That same day it also signed its final judgment. The judgment stated in relevant part:
[A] jury, having been empaneled and sworn to try this cause, and after hearing the pleadings, evidence, and argument of counsel, and after the trial court read the Charge of the Court to the jury, the jury did return into open court its verdict, duly signed by ten jurors, and in response to special issues, definitions and explanatory instructions submitted to them by the Court in its Charge, which findings as verdict of the jury were received by the Court and entered into the record and minutes of the docket of said Court, and the Court heard arguments and evidence regarding attorneys fees. The Court does hereby enter its Judgment as follows:
1. Plaintiff Barbour is hereby entitled to recover damages from the Defendant Williams-Pyro, Inc., in the sum of One Hundred and Twenty Thousand and Seven Hundred Fourteen Dollars and Forty Cents ($120,714.40), which includes, prejudgment interest that accrued on the award of past compensatory damages of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00), and past lost wages awarded by the Court in the amount of Forty Thousand Dollars, ($40,000.00) and past employment benefits in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) at the rate of Five percent (5%) per an-num, simple interest. Such interest accrued from April 23, 2007, the date on which suit was filed in this cause through June 13, 2011.
2. The Court finds that counsel for the Plaintiff, Jason C.N. Smith and Zoe Courtney, have reputations for providing highly competent, ethical, and qualified legal representation of individuals in employment matters such as this case and that Plaintiff is entitled to recover herreasonable and necessary attorney fees. The Court awards reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and orders Defendant to pay Plaintiff the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars ($154,-335.00) in attorneys fees through trial, Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) for any appeal to the Court of Appeals in which she prevails, Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) for any Petition filed with the Texas Supreme Court in which she prevails and Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) if the Texas Supreme Court requests full briefing in which she prevails.
On August 29, 2011, the trial court filed two separate sets of findings of fact and conclusions of law. One related to its decision denying WPI’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss and the other related to Barbour’s motion for attorney’s fees. WPI then filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Alternative Motion for New Trial. On September 26, 2011, the trial court held a hearing to address both motions and on October 19, 2011, the trial court issued an order denying them in their entirety.
WPI’s APPEAL
WPI challenges both the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding that Barbour’s age was a motivating factor in WTPI’s decision to terminate her employment. It also contends that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case because Barbour failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit in district court. We will begin by addressing WUTs jurisdictional argument.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Issue Three, WTPI argues that Barbour failed to properly exhaust her administrative remedies before filing the instant suit, thereby depriving the trial court and by extension this court of subject matter jurisdiction. Under Texas law, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to filing an action under TCHRA, and the failure to exhaust TCHRA’s administrative remedies deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger,
Courts construe complaints filed under TCHRA liberally and “look slightly beyond [the] four corners, to [the] substance rather than [the] label.”
Pacheco v. Mineta,
Barbour filed an EEOC claim in December 2006. On her sworn charge of discrimination, Barbour marked the box for “age” as the type of discrimination alleged. EEOC Form 5 requested the following information: (1) personal harm; (2) reason for adverse action; and (3) discrimination statement. Barbour completed the “personal harm” section with the following statement: “I was terminated from my job on 11/15/06.” She also stated on the form that she was told by WPI that they did not need a reason to terminate her. Finally, as her “discrimination statement,” Barbour stated that she “believed [she] was terminated because of her age, 44 years old, in violation of Texas Labor Code, Chapter 21.”
After denying WPI’s plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law which stated in relevant part:
21. On February 26, 2007, Rhonda Barbour provided additional information to the Texas Workforce Commission regarding her years of service at Williams-Pyro, Inc. and her excellent work record.
22. Plaintiff did not allege a hostile work environment claim based on age in her sworn charge of discrimination.
23. Rhonda Barbour received a Notice of Right to File a Civil Action on February 27,2007.
On appeal, we must determine whether the allegations in Barbour’s original charge and/or her subsequent amendment could reasonably give rise to an investigation of her claims of discrimination based on age.
See Pacheco,
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In Issue One, WPI complains that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that age was a motivating factor in WPI’s decision to terminate Barbour because there is no evidence that: (1) WPI treated Barbour less favorably than similarly situated WPI employees of the opposing class; and (2) WPI’s proffered reasons for terminating Barbour were pretext for discrimination. Appellant also contends that, “Montalvo’s alleged workplace remarks are not evidence of pretext or that WPI terminated Barbour because of her age.” Alternatively, in Issue Two, WPI argues
In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we view all evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the judgment.
Bradford v. Vento,
48 S.W.Bd 749, 754 (Tex.2001). However, if the evidence allows for only one inference, neither the jurors nor a reviewing court may disregard it.
City of Keller v. Wilson,
In a factual sufficiency review, we examine all the evidence in the record, both for and against the lower court’s findings.
Ortiz v. Jones,
Barbour sued WPI under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA)
See
Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 21.051. An employer is prohibited from discharging, or in any other way discriminating against, an employee because of the employee’s age.
5
See
Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 21.051;
Canchola,
Texas courts follow the approach set forth by the United States Supreme Court and recognize two alternative methods of proof in discriminatory treatment cases.
Mission Consol.,
1089,
A significant portion of WPI’s argument is dedicated to the assertion that Barbour presented no evidence regarding the treatment of similarly situated employees. It thus contends that Barbour failed to establish the fourth element of a
prima facie
case of discrimination. In support of this argument, WPI relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s opinion in
AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes,
In
AutoZone,
Salvador Reyes sued his employer, alleging he was fired because of his age in violation of TCHRA.
AutoZone,
The court’s analysis in
AutoZone
began by discussing whether remarks made by a store manager constituted evidence of discrimination.
Id.
at 593-94. The employer argued that statements made to a parts service manager by a store manager that the employer intended to get rid of “the old people” were “stray remarks” made by an individual who was not part of and had no input into the decision to fire Reyes.
Id.
at 592. The Supreme Court specifically acknowledged that “remarks and statements
may serve as evidence of discrimination,”
if they are: (1) related to the employee’s protected class, (2) close in time to the employment decision, (3) made by an individual with authority over the employment decision, and (4) related to the employment decision at issue. [Emphasis added].
Id.
at 593. The court concluded that the evidence showed the store manager played no part in, had no leverage over, and exerted no influence concerning the employer’s investigation or decision to fire the plaintiff.
7
Id.
The Su
The instant case is distinguishable. There was testimony that Montalvo made comments to Barbour that she was getting “old,” about her having “gray hair,” and about her “sagging breasts,” and such comments were clearly related to Barbour’s age, and because Barbour was over forty, they were related to her “protected class.” Barbour also testified that Montalvo made these comments “nonstop,” “three or four times a week” and “all the time,” up until her termination. Since Barbour’s alleged adverse employment action was her termination, these comments were certainly made in “proximate time to the adverse employment decision.” In addition, Barbour testified that Montalvo made comments that the company “need[ed] to hire young Mexican girls.” Montalvo’s comments regarding Barbour’s age and the need for “young Mexican girls” is “related to the employment decision at issue.” Therefore, the only remaining question is whether Montalvo was an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue-i.e. Barbour’s termination.
AutoZone,
“In determining whether the individual making the remark had authority over the employment decision, consideration is not limited to statements by the person who officially made the decision.”
AutoZone,
It is undisputed that Montalvo was WPI’s production manager and that as such, he was responsible for personnel issues. Montalvo, Paul Shiller, and Candace Woodard were the only people present when Barbour was terminated. Montalvo was the only one who spoke and the one
There is also sufficient evidence showing that even if Montalvo was not directly responsible for the decision to terminate Barbour, he influenced the decision. WPI points to testimony that Delia Williams was the one who made the decision to terminate Barbour, and that since Mrs. Williams was unaware of any comments made by Montalvo, there is no evidence of discriminatory intent. But Montalvo himself testified that Mrs. Williams was not involved in the decision to terminate Barbour. The jury was free to disbelieve the testimony that Mrs. Williams alone made the termination decision.
Therefore, while a lack of evidence regarding the treatment of similarly situated employees could prevent Barbour from enjoying the benefit of the prima fade presumption, it does not preclude the possibility that Barbour presented sufficient direct evidence to show that age was a motivating factor in WPI’s decision to terminate her. We find that Barbour presented such direct evidence of discriminatory intent via Montalvo’s comments. 9
Here, WPI asserted it Barbour was terminated for multiple reasons. First, WPI points to evidence that it fired Barbour based on two complaints from Barbour’s “Line Lead,” Tammy Renteria, that Barbour failed to follow written work orders. In addition, WPI points to the testimony of Delia Williams wherein Ms. Williams stated that Barbour (1) had “missed a lot of work”; and (2) “had had a lot of conflict with a lot of different employees in the organization.” However, all of the testimony supporting these contentions was directly contested by Barbour. As the judges of witness credibility and demean- or, the jury was free to believe or disbelieve the testimony.
We conclude that the evidence presented would allow a reasonable and fair-minded jury to find that Barbour’s age was a motivating factor in WPI’s decision to terminate her. Likewise, the jury’s finding cannot be said to be so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Issues One and Two are overruled.
BARBOUR’S CROSS APPEAL
We now turn to Barbour’s cross-appeal. In a single issue, Barbour argues that the trial court erred by concluding that it lacked authority to enhance the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Barbour.
The parties agreed (pretrial) that, whatever the outcome, the trial court would determine the attorney’s fee award. After the jury returned its verdict in favor of Barbour, Barbour filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees. In her motion, Barbour requested that the trial court award attorneys’ fees through trial and post-verdict proceedings, as well as appellate attorney fees. Barbour also requested an enhancement of the base fee for both trial fees and any appellate fees. Specifically, Barbour requested that the trial court apply a multiplier of two (2) in determining reasonable attorneys’ fees. WPI filed a response and objections to Barbour’s motion.
The Court finds that Rhonda Barbour’s reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees through the trial of this case and for post verdict hearings and briefing are One Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars ($154,335.00). 10
In its conclusions of law, the trial court specifically stated that Barbour should recover attorneys’ fees in the amount of $154,335. On appeal, Barbour challenges only the trial court’s final conclusion of law stating:
The Court concludes that it is not authorized to utilize a multiplier in awarding attorneys’ fees under Chapter 21.259, but finds that a 1.5 multiplier would be appropriate if an appellate court concludes otherwise.
Barbour argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that it did not have the authority under Texas Labor Code Section 21.259 to apply a multiplier to enhance the amount of attorney’s fees in an age • discrimination case. Accordingly, Barbour asks us to render judgment applying a 1.5 multiplier to the attorneys’ fee award.
Standard of Review
We review challenges to a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo.
Hitzelberger v. Samedan Oil Corp.,
Applicable Law
Under Section 21.259(a) of the Texas Labor Code, a prevailing party is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees as “part of the costs.”
See
Tex.Lab. Code Ann. § 21.259(a). In a suit brought under Texas law, the method of assessing and awarding attorney fees is governed by Texas procedural rules.
State v. Anderson Courier Service,
In
El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas,
In setting forth this process, the court acknowledged and accepted the presumption that the lodestar produces a reasonable fee.
El Apple I, Ltd.,
The relevant factors the court may consider in determining whether an adjustment is necessary are found in the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Such factors include: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.
El Apple I, Ltd.,
These factors mirror those set out by the Fifth Circuit in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
In calculating attorney’s fees under lodestar, the party applying for the award bears “the burden of documenting the hours expended on the litigation and the value of those hours.”
See El Apple I.,
Analysis
Barbour does not specifically challenge the trial court’s judgment awarding “reasonable and necessary” attorney’s fees in the amount of $154,335, nor does she challenge the trial court’s findings of fact that such amount is “reasonable and necessary.” She does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the amount of the award, or otherwise assert a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s award. Instead, she contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that it was not authorized to utilize a multiplier in awarding attorney’s fees under Section 21.259. Barbour relies on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in El Apple I and argues that it confirms that the trial court below erred in concluding that it was not authorized to utilize a multiplier.
While
El Apple
acknowledges that a multiplier may be applied to the lodestar amount in cases filed under the Texas Labor Code, it specified that only “exceptional circumstances may justify enhancements to the base lodestar.”
El Apple I, Ltd.,
The trial court specifically and repeatedly referred to the fees awarded as “reasonable and necessary.” Under Texas law, that is all the trial court is authorized to award. Finding no error, we overrule
ANTCLIFF, J., not participating.
Notes
.Sally Espinoza was also a supervisor on the pyro line. Espinosa testified that Barbour was a good employee and a hard worker. She also testified that Barbour was easy to get along with and that she never observed any combative behavior by Barbour.
. At the time Mrs. Williams took over control and ownership of the company WPI had nine employees. By the time of trial (May 2011), WPI employed ninety-nine employees.
. At the time she was re-assigned in 2005, Barbour was 42 years old.
. This was the first time Montalvo had been Barbour’s supervisor.
. In its entirety, Section 21.051, titled, "Discrimination by Employer” states:
An employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer:
(1) fails or refuses to hire an individual, discharges an individual, or discriminates in any other manner against an individual in connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; or
(2) limits, segregates, or classifies an employee or applicant for employment in a manner that would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of any employment opportunity or adversely affect in any other manner the status of an employee.
Tex.Lab.Code Ann. § 21.051.
. At trial, Barbour bore the burden of establishing discriminatory intent.
Canchola,
. The termination decision was made by a regional manager on the basis of a recom
. The court also noted that at trial the store manager (who no longer worked for the employer) testified that he was only communicating his personal opinion that the employer was attempting to remove long-time managers who were not following the employer’s policies.
AutoZone,
. We acknowledge that the fact Barbour presented direct evidence of discriminatory intent did not automatically require a verdict in her favor. "[T]he existence of direct evidence only shifted the burdens of production and persuasion to [WPI] to show that it would have made the same employment decision regardless of [Barbour’s] age.”
See Brown,
. In its final three findings of fact (numbers 33-35), the trial court found: (1) should Barbour prevail on appeal, reasonable and necessary attorney's fees would be $30,000; (2) if the matter is further appealed by petition of review to the Supreme Court, reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees would be $12,000; and (3) if the Supreme Court grants Barbour's petition for review, reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees would be an additional $30,000, "in the event she should prevail.”
. The remedies provided under TCHRA mirror those available under those available in federal employment discrimination law.