175 S.W.2d 380 | Ark. | 1943
Appellants, Williams Manufacturing Company and Lumbermen's Reciprocal Insurance Exchange, its insurance carrier, seek by this appeal to reverse the judgment of the circuit court setting aside award of the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Commission against appellee, Charley M. Walker, and ordering that appellee recover compensation for disability arising from a hernia, which appellee claimed he suffered as a result of an injury sustained by him while in the employ of appellant, Williams Manufacturing Company. *394
It is undisputed that on June 3, 1942, appellee, working as a laborer for this company, caught with a cant hook a rolling log, which it was his duty to catch, in order to straighten it out so that it would run into a pond properly; that on account of the speed at which this log was moving it gave appellee a severe jerk; that on the morning of the accident appellee reported his injury to his foreman; that at noon following the accident appellee went to see Dr. O. R. Kelley, the employer's physician, and told him of his injury; that Dr. Kelly gave him some medicine and appellee went home, returning next day for another visit to Dr. Kelley; that appellee had not been able to work since receiving the injury, although he had tried to do so.
There is some contradiction in the testimony as to whether or not appellee had a hernia. Four physicians, Dr. John W. Cole, Dr. F. Walter Carruthers, Dr. W. H. Simmons and Dr. O. R. Kelley, the employer's physician, testified that appellee had suffered an umbilical hernia. Dr. W. T. Lowe stated that appellee had no umbilical hernia. Dr. Joe F. Shuffield said that he had examined appellee, and that he had no record of finding an umbilical hernia, but said: "It is quite possible he had an umbilical hernia and I did not observe it."
The opinion of the Commission apparently recognized the existence of a hernia in the appellee's abdomen at some time following the accident on June 3, and we think the evidence abundantly justifies a finding that following and resulting from the accident appellee suffered such a hernia.
Appellee testified that on the morning of the accident he notified his foreman of his injury; that he noticed a burning sensation in the region of his naval — this seems from the testimony to be a subjective symptom of hernia — and told Dr. Kelley about it on the day of the accident, and that the next day he called Dr. Kelley's attention to the protuberance or swelling around the navel, which he says was about the size of his finger; that he experienced severe pain immediately after this injury in his abdomen and still had it; that he was a manual laborer by occupation, *395 and was not qualified to do anything but manual labor; that he had tried to work since the injury and was not able to do so; that prior to the injury he had not had any symptoms of pain in the hernia region.
The Commission found that the parties were bound by the provisions of the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Act, Act No. 319 of 1939; that appellee suffered an accidental injury on June 3, 1942, which arose out of his employment; that this injury resulted in disability which continued until September 1, 1942, and that the hernia sustained by appellee "does not meet the requirements laid down by the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Act governing the compensability of hernia." The Commission, in its conclusions of law, declared that the "medical testimony . . . from Dr. O. R. Kelley, who treated this claimant on the day of the accidental injury and immediately thereafter, is that this claimant made no mention to him of having suffered any hernia until at some time between the fourth and eighth week of his treatment."
The finding of the Commission to the effect that appellee did not give sufficient notice of the hernia within forty-eight hours after it occurred, as required by the statute, is in our opinion not supported by substantial testimony. Appellee testified under oath that he advised Dr. Kelley almost immediately after the occurrence of the injury that he had a burning sensation in the neighborhood of his navel and that the next day he called Dr. Kelley's attention to the protrusion in the region of the navel. Dr. Kelley did not testify, but a letter from him to the insurance carrier was made a part of the record without objection, and apparently the Commission based its denial of the claim on what it found to be the effect of this letter. In this letter, however, Dr. Kelley did not specifically deny that appellee had given him this information almost immediately after the injury and also on the following day, but only said: "I do not think he did until from the fourth to eighth week after injury." Such a statement could not be said to amount to a contradiction of the testimony of appellee. *396
But, even if it was not established that appellee specifically advised Dr. Kelley of the existence of the hernia within the forty-eight hour period, this would not be sufficient to justify a denial of appellee's claim. It is not disputed that soon after appellee was injured he reported his injury to his employer and to his employer's physician, and that he was examined by his employer's physician on the day of the accident and also on the following day.
In 71 Corpus Juris, p. 980, it is said: "With respect to the nature and extent of the injury, a notice which gives the employer such knowledge as will enable him to provide the necessary medical or other attention that the nature or extent of the injury demands is sufficient. . . . Since the requirement of notice necessarily implies knowledge on the part of the employee of the injury for which claim is made, where an employee reports his injury as he knows it without designating its nature because not aware thereof, compensation cannot therefore be refused."
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in the case of Bates Rogers Const. Co. v. Emmons,
In the case of Page v. State Insurance Fund,
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Hay v. Swiss Oil Co.,
Here the evidence is undisputed that appellee, in the discharge of his duties, suffered an accidental injury, that *400 he promptly reported it to his employer and almost immediately after its occurrence submitted himself to the examination of his employer's physician, who admitted finding the hernia from four to eight weeks later.
The Commission, in its findings, recognized the existence of the hernia, and there is nothing in the proof that would justify a finding that this hernia was caused by anything other than the original injury suffered by appellee. The act here involved is a highly remedial statute enacted for the purpose of placing a part of the burden of loss from industrial accidents upon the public at large, thereby ameliorating, to some extent, the condition of the worker who suffers disability as a result of his effort to earn his daily bread by the sweat of his brow.
As was said by Justice CARTER, in the case of Birchett v. Tuf-Nut Garment Mfg. Co.,
These compensation acts are entitled to and have universally received a liberal construction from the courts. The humanitarian objects of such laws should not, in the administration thereof, be defeated by overemphasis on technicalities — by putting form above substance.
In the case at bar there is no intimation in the record of any malingering, lack of good faith, or misrepresentation or concealment of facts, on the part of appellee. Since he suffered an accidental injury in the course of his employment and it clearly appears that he did all that could be reason expected of a workman in the way of reporting his injury promptly and submitting himself to *401 examination by his employer's physician, we conclude that the judgment of the lower court was correct and must be affirmed. It is so ordered.