Lead Opinion
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.
From 1990 to 1992, the State Department had in place a hiring plan aimed to increase racial diversity among the officer corps in the United States Foreign Service. William Shea, a white Foreign Service Officer, brings suit alleging that the hiring plan violated Title VII. Although Shea challenges a plan that ceased to exist over twenty years ago, he joined the Foreign Service during the two years the plan was in effect. He alleges that, because of the plan, he entered the Foreign Service at a lower level than would have been the case had he been a minority applicant.
The district court viewed Shea’s claim to be controlled by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California,
I.
A.
The United States Foreign Service, a branch of the United States Department of State, works through its Foreign Service Officers to “advocate American foreign policy, protect American citizens, and promote American interests throughout the world.” Taylor v. Rice,
B.
In the years preceding Shea’s application to the Foreign Service, the State Department faced significant scrutiny about the lack of diversity of the Foreign Service Officer corps. In 1985, Congress perceived an underrepresentation of minorities among Foreign Service Officers. Congress therefore enacted legislation directing the Department to “develop ... a plan designed to increase significantly the number of members of minority groups ... in the Foreign Service,” with a “particular emphasis on achieving significant increases in the numbers of minority group members ... in the mid-levels of the Foreign Service,” the FS-02 and -03 levels. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub.L. No. 99-93, § 152(a), (b), 99 Stat. 405, 428 (1985).
Two years later, Congress remained unsatisfied. Concluding that the State Department “ha[d] not been successful in [its] efforts ... to recruit and retain members of minority groups,” Congress instructed the Department to “substantially increase [its] efforts” to ensure that the “Foreign Service becomes truly representative of the American people throughout all levels of the Foreign Service.” Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub.L. No. 100-204, § 183(a), (a)(1), (b)(1), 101 Stat. 1331, 1364 (1987). Congress specifically directed the Department to “ensure that those [efforts] effectively address the need to promote increased numbers of qualified ... members of minority groups into the senior levels of the Foreign Service.” Id. § 183(b)(2).
Congress did not stand alone in raising concerns about the diversity of the Foreign Service Officer corps. In 1989, the General Accounting Office (now known as the Governmental Accountability Office) released a report entitled “State Department: Minorities and Women Are Underrepresented in the Foreign Service.” The 1989 GAO Report evaluated the Department’s existing efforts, finding that, while “[p]rogress ha[dj been mixed” in increasing diversity,
[m]inorities ... were still substantially underrepresented when compared with civilian labor force data that the EEOC ha[d] issued to measure federal agencies ....
In mid-level ranks of the officer corps, minority male representation ha[d] increased, but minority and white women ha[d] made less progress. In State’s Senior Foreign Service positions, under-representation of minorities and white women [wa]s still pervasive.
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, State Department: Minorities and Women Are Underrepresented in the Foreign Service 15 (1989) (1989 GAO Report).
The 1989 GAO Report compared the Department’s 1987 minority workforce with the racial breakdown of the American population possessing the skills required for Foreign Service employment. That comparison indicated that the Department generally fell short of “full representation”' — the level at which a minority group would make up the same proportion of the workforce as its proportion of the American population possessing the relevant
The Civil Service Subcommittee of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service convened hearings focusing on the 1989 GAO Report’s findings and on the results of two other studies — the Bremer Study Group Report (commissioned by the Secretary of State on his own initiative) and the Thomas Commission Report (mandated by Congress as part of the 1988-1989 Foreign Relations Authorization Act). Representative Gerry Sikorski, the Subcommittee’s Chairman, interpreted those two studies to “disclose[ ] major problems of discrimination against ... minorities in the Foreign Service.” Underrepresentation of Women and Minorities in the Foreign Service: Hearing Before the Sub-comm. on the Civil Serv. of the H. Comm, on Post Office & Civil Serv., 101st Cong. 3 (1989) (1989 Subcomm. Hearing). Those studies, he concluded, revealed that “management of the U.S. Foreign Service [was] seriously flawed.” The Department of State in the 21st Century: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Ops. of the H. Comm, on Foreign Affairs & the Sub-comm. on the Civil Serv. of the H. Comm, on Post Office & Civil Serv., 101st Cong. 6 (1989) (1989 Joint Hearing).
As of 1989, minorities remained underrepresented in Foreign Service Officer roles. Id. And that was after years of concerns voiced by Congress and repeated warnings from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission “that the State Department ha[d] not had an effective ... plan or program for overcoming the underrepresentation [of minorities] in the Foreign Service.” U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Testimony: Underrepre-sentation of Minorities and Women in the Foreign Service, Statement of Joseph Kelley, Director of Security and International Relations Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Before the Subcommittee on Civil Service, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, United States House of Representatives 1 (1989). The Department undertook various measures in response, including creating a special hiring path for minorities into the Foreign Service’s mid- and upper-level ranks — the affirmative action plan in issue here.
C.
At the time of Shea’s entry into the Foreign Service, the State Department operated two distinct programs that enabled applicants to bypass the Department’s usual preference for internal promotions and allowed the direct hiring of outside applicants into mid- and upper-level (FS-01, - 02 and -03) positions. One program, the Career Candidate Program (CCP), was race-neutral. The other program, the 1990-92 Affirmative Action Plan (1990-92 Plan), targeted minority applicants.
Under the CCP, the Department accepted certain applications from outside candidates for FS-01, -02, and -03 positions. But the Department, in accordance with its general preference for filling vacancies through internal promotions, could hire an otherwise viable outside applicant through the CCP only if the Department issued a “certificate of need” attesting that no internal candidates could fill that vacancy. The Department would then consider the outside applicant consistent with its typical hiring procedures. In the absence of a certificate of need, no outside candidate could receive an offer of employment through the CCP.
D.
In 2001, Shea filed an administrative grievance with the State Department. Among other claims, he argued that he started at a lower pay grade by virtue of the 1990-92 Plan’s preferential treatment of minority applicants, infringing his rights under Title VII as well as the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Foreign Service Grievance Board dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and Shea then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Shea’s case initially traveled back and forth between the district court and this court on the question of whether his Title VII and equal protection claims had been timely filed. (As to the remaining claims, Shea did not appeal their dismissal.) See Shea v. Kerry,
Proceeding to the merits, the district court granted summary judgment to the State Department. Id. at 55. The court first determined that the Supreme Court’s Title VII affirmative action decisions in Weber,
At the first step, the district court concluded that Shea had established a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id. at 31-33. Turning to the second step, the court found that the Department had proffered evidence that, if accepted as true, permitted the conclusion that the Department had acted pursuant to a lawful affirmative action plan. Id. at 33-44: Finally, at the third step, the district court considered whether Shea had shown that the affirmative action plan was, in fact, unlawful. The court rejected Shea’s proffer of lay statistical evidence to that end, and thus concluded that he had failed to raise any genuine issue concerning the validity of the Department’s affirmative action plan. The court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. Id. at 55.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Shea’s Title VII claim. Holcomb v. Powell,
To demonstrate his standing, Shea must show, inter alia, that he suffered an injury in fact that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U..S. 555, 560,
Shea alleges that the 1990-92 Plan denied him the opportunity to compete on an equal basis by extending a preference to minority candidates that was unavailable to him: the ability to gain consideration for entry to a mid-level position without any certificate of need. Shea could have sought direct mid-level placement through the race-neutral CCP program, however. He did not do so, instead applying only for an entry-level FS-05 position. There is thus a question whether Shea suffered an actual or imminent injury as a result of the 1990-92 Plan, or whether his injury was merely hypothetical.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gratz v. Bollinger,
Gratz controls our inquiry. Like Ha-macher, Shea alleges that he possessed an intent to apply to the position in question, i.e., a mid-level position. Pl.’s Decl. in Supp. of Pl.’s Surreply at 3-4 (filed Dec. 14, 2012). If the mid-levels had been open to him for equal consideration on a race-neutral footing, he would have applied to the mid-levels instead of the entry-level. Thus, like Hamacher, Shea stood “able and ready to apply [to the mid-levels] should the [State Department] cease to use race” as a factor in mid-level hiring. Id. (quotation marks omitted). By choosing not to apply because the Department was considering race during the time of his application process, Shea did exactly what Ha-macher alleged he would do: refuse to apply through the race-conscious program unless and until that program’s use of race-conscious preferences ceased. As a
III.
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of’ inter alia, “such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The statute protects both minorities and non-minorities — the latter against “reverse discrimination.” See Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
A.
At the outset, we consider the governing framework for resolving Shea’s reverse-discrimination claim. For nearly thirty years, we have examined Title VII challenges to affirmative action programs under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber,
In Weber, the Supreme Court for the first time considered a Title VII challenge to an employei*’s affirmative action plan. As of 1974, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. had an “almost exclusively white craftwork force[],” with black employees making up only 1.83% of the company’s skilled craftworkers at its Gramercy, Louisiana, plant, even though the workforce in the area surrounding that plant was roughly 39% black. Weber,
The Supreme Court disagreed and upheld Kaiser’s affirmative action plan. The Court declined to “define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans,’.’ but concluded that Kaiser’s plan fell “on the permissible side of the line.” Id. at 208,
[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees. The plan does not require the*52 discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees. Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees; half of those trained in the program will be white. Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Preferential selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the Gram-ercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. Id. at 208-09,99 S.Ct. 2721 (citation omitted). For those reasons, the plan fell “within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.” Id. at 209,99 S.Ct. 2721 .
2.
Nine years later, in Johnson, the Court again rejected a Title VII challenge to an employer’s affirmative action program. The case arose from the efforts of Santa Clara County, California, to increase diversity in portions of its workforce. The County sought to address a striking gender imbalance in certain positions: Women constituted 36.4% of the labor market in the area, but “none of [the County’s] 238 Skilled Craft Worker positions was held by a woman.” Johnson,
In upholding the County’s plan, the Court determined that the analysis should follow the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into account in an employer’s employment decision [step one], the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision [step two]. The existence of an affirmative action plan provides such a rationale. If such a plan is articulated as the basis for the employer’s decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s justification is pretextual and the plan is invalid [step three].
Johnson,
The Johnson Court explained that it would “be guided by [its] decision in Weber.” Id. In Weber, the Court noted, it had blessed an affirmative action plan that (i) sought to “eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories”; and (ii) did not “unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees.” Id. at 628-30,
For nearly three decades, Johnson has guided courts — including ours — in the analysis of Title VII claims alleging unlawful reverse discrimination. See, e.g., Hammon v. Barry (Hammon II),
3.
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Ricci v. DeStefano,
The Supreme Court ruled in the firefighters’ favor. The Court understood that the City’s “objective” in discarding the tests was to “avoid[ ] disparate-impact liability” under Title VII. Id. at 579,
Shea argues that Ricci upends Johnson and Weber such that those earlier decisions no longer guide our analysis here. Under Johnson and Weber, we would first assess the sufficiency of Shea’s prima facie case, then turn to the State Department’s proffer of a valid affirmative action plan, and finally examine Shea’s efforts to demonstrate the invalidity of that plan. See Johnson,
The Department initially argues that Shea forfeited any argument based on Ricci by failing to present that argument to the district court. We disagree. Although forfeiture principles apply to new arguments raised for the first time on appeal, see Potter v. District of Columbia,
Shea’s argument based on Ricci fails on the merits, however. Johnson and Weber are directly applicable to this case. They set out the framework for “evaluating the compliance of an affirmative action plan with Title VIPs prohibition on discrimination,” Johnson,
Here, Johnson and Weber have “direct application,” and we have no occasion or cause to conclude that Ricci, “by implication,” overruled those decisions. Id. Indeed, Ricci does not mention or even cite — much less discuss- — Johnson and Weber. That is understandable, as Ricci, by its own description, addressed a particular situation not in issue here. Cf. Ricci,
The specific question addressed in Ricci was whether, even though the City’s action in discarding the test results was assumed to violate Title VII’s disparate-treatment prohibition, that action could be justified based on a particular objective asserted by the City: avoiding liability in a Title VII disparate-impaci lawsuit. The Court expressly framed its holding by reference to actions taken for that particular purpose:
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.
Id.; see id. at 580,
The employers in Johnson and Weber did not modify the outcomes of personnel-processes for the asserted purpose of avoiding disparate-impact liability under Title VII. Nor did the State Department here. The Department, like the employers in Johnson and Weber, instead acted to “expand[ ] job opportunities for minorities and women,” Johnson,
IV.
Under the framework established by Johnson and Weber, we ask first if Shea establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, we examine whether the State Department can articulate a nondiscriminatory reason — in this case, a valid affirmative action plan — for its actions. Finally, we assess whether Shea carries his burden to prove that the Department’s plan is invalid. The district court found that Shea and the Department made the requisite showings at the first and second steps, respectively. The court then found Shea to falter at the third step and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. We agree at each step.
A.
We first address whether Shea has made out a prima facie case of reverse discrimination in violation of Title VII. At the outset, we note that neither party has addressed the potential implications of our decision in Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms,
We have not, however, specifically applied Brady in the context of a reverse-discrimination suit challenging the validity of an employer’s affirmative action plan under Title VII. In that domain, Johnson has long set forth the governing approach. Because no party on appeal argues that Brady should alter that framework, and because the existence of a prima facie case • is readily resolved in this case in Shea’s favor, we leave for another day the resolution of the interaction between Brady and Johnson. We therefore proceed on the assumption that Johnson’s framework — including its call for examining the establishment of a prima facie case — is controlling for our purposes.
Here, the State Department contests Shea’s establishment of a prima facie case in only one respect. As part of the showing necessary to make out a pri-ma facie case of discrimination (or reverse discrimination) in violation of Title-VII, a plaintiff must establish that he has been subjected to an adverse employment action. George v. Leavitt,
Although “we may affirm a judgment on any ground that the record supports and that the opposing party had a fair opportunity to address,” Jones v. Bernanke,
B.
At the second step of Johnson’s framework, the Department must “articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision.” Johnson,
Rather, the Johnson framework maps onto McDonnell Douglas’s three steps. Johnson,
We have explained that, under Johnson and Weber, a valid affirmative action plan should satisfy two general conditions. First, a valid plan rests on an adequate factual predicate justifying its adoption, such as a “manifest imbalance” in a “traditionally segregated job category].” Johnson,
1.
The district court concluded that the Department adequately grounded its 1990-92 Plan in evidence of a manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category. See Shea,
a.
Ascertaining the existence of a “manifest imbalance” is a “fact-specific task” in a “sensitive and delicate area.” Hammon II,
When the Department adopted the 1990-92 Plan, the agency had before it two analyses comparing its own workforce with the labor pool possessing the relevant qualifications: (i) the 1989 GAO Report, and (ii) a formal analysis conducted by the Department itself when promulgating the 1990-92 Plan. The Department points to those two statistical studies as its principal evidence of a manifest imbalance between minority representation in the Foreign Service and the comparator population.
We assume arguendo the correctness of Shea’s premise that the Department cannot justify its race-conscious actions by reference to post hoc data collection. Even so, Shea errs in contending that the Department cannot rely on the 1989 GAO Report or the findings contained in the 1990-92 Plan to justify the Plan. The district court concluded that the Department’s 1987-89 affirmative action efforts and the 1990-92 Plan in fact were two different plans. See Shea,
The version of the 1990-92 Plan in our record contains the Department’s employment data from 1989 and 1990. As the 1989 data represent the data in the State Department’s possession both at the time it promulgated the 1990-92 Plan and at the time Shea applied to the Foreign Service, we use that data (though we note that the minor differences between the 1989 and 1990 data would have no impact on our conclusions today). The 1990-92 Plan’s findings showed improvement in the Foreign Service’s diversity from the time of the 1989 GAO Report. The combined FS-02 and -03 levels, for instance, showed underrepresentation only for Native Americans and Alaskans. See 1990-92 Plan Document at 46a; 47a. For other minority populations at the combined FS-02 and -03 positions, there were no imbalances, manifest or otherwise. As a result, Shea contends, the Department cannot justify the 1990-92 Plan by claiming that it addressed manifest imbalances for all minority groups at those levels.
The Department initially asserts that the 1990-92 Plan established “goals” only for groups specifically shown in the data to be underrepresented.. We take this to mean, for example, that, at the combined FS-02 and -03 levels, “goals” would have been set only for Native Americans and Alaskans, and not for other minority populations. If the “goals” operated such that only members of the underrepresented minority groups received favorable treatment in the application process relative to Shea, the Department’s argument would have
The Department’s defense of the 1990-92 Plan stands on stronger footing, however, with regard to more senior-level positions. Looking up the ranks from the FS-02 and -08 levels, the Department identified a more across-the-board manifest imbalance. The Department first points to the FS-01 level. According to the 1990-92 Plan data, all minority groups were underrepresented at the FS-01 level at the time of the plan’s promulgation. To achieve full representation, the number of black Officers at that level would have needed to increase by 62%, Hispanics by 14%, Native Americans and Alaskans by 256%, and Asians and Pacific Islanders by 47%. See 1990-92 Plan Document at 46a; 47a.
The Department also points to the ranks of the SFS. The on diversity in the SFS. Accordingly, we look to the SFS findings from the 1989 GAO Report. Those findings show underrepresentation of all minority groups at the SFS level. And the imbalances are manifest: To achieve full representation, the number of black Officers in the SFS would have needed to increase by 154%, Hispanics by 163%, Asians and Pacific Islanders by 700%, and, for Native Americans and Alaskans, by an undefined percentage (because the Foreign Service had no SFS Officer of Native American or Alaskan origin). See 1989 GAO Report at 17.
b.
Johnson speaks in terms not just of any manifest imbalance, but of a manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category.
First, the substantial imbalances at the SFS level themselves indicate that discriminatory practices may well have been afoot. While a significant disparity is not itself dispositive, “ranks [that are] overwhelmingly] white” are “a powerful present-day demonstration of a prior regime of discrimination.” Hammon v. Barry (Hammon I),
Second, testimony before Congress concerning the 1989 GAO Report, the Bremer Study Group Report, and the Thomas Commission Report provided Congress with evidence of pervasive historical discrimination in the Foreign Service tracing as far back as the 1960s. For example,
To the House Subcommittee on the Civil Service, such testimony likely came as no surprise. While the record before us does not contain the underlying materials, Representative Sikorski, the Subcommittee Chairman, stated his belief that those reports confirmed a State Department inadequately concerned with diversity. Previous investigations and hearings by his subcommittee, he stated, “documented serious instances of discriminatory treatment by the Foreign Service of women, minorities, and people with handicaps.” 1989 Joint Hearing at 10. His testimony included the revelation that “more than 240 Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) cases” had been filed and indications that previous efforts to diversify the Foreign Service championed by the Secretary of State were “largely ignored by the Department.” Id. Moreover, he noted, the Department had “been repeatedly cited by the [EEOC] for submitting deficient [diversity] reports.” Id. The 1989 GAO Report noted that, despite repeated criticism including suggestions of bias, the State Department never “conducted analy-ses of possible impediments to equal employment opportunity.” 1989 GAO Report at 4.
This case is therefore a far cry from our decisions in Hammon I and II, in which we determined that the District of Columbia had failed to demonstrate the predicate of discrimination necessary to justify an affirmative action program for its hiring of firefighters. The challenged plan purportedly addressed the District’s history of discriminatory hiring against black applicants. But during the relevant historical period, blacks made up an average of 41.8% of the firefighters hired each year, Hammon I,
Here, by contrast, evidence identified by the Department would permit the conclusion that there had been a past practice of discrimination with continuing effects through the early 1990s. We therefore agree with the district court that the Department made an adequate evidentiary proffer that the 1990-92 Plan “served to remedy the lingering effects of State’s past discrimination.” Shea,
Having shown the necessary factual predicate for the 1990-92 Plan in the form of a manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category, the Department faces one additional requirement: The plan must not have unnecessarily trammeled the rights of white applicants. Johnson,
a.
There is “no precise formula for determining whether an affirmative action plan unnecessarily trammels the rights of non-beneficiaries.” In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Emp’t Litig.,
First, the type of affirmative action plan matters. Affirmative action in hiring generally poses less of a concern than affirmative action in layoffs. See Johnson,
Second, the degree of benefit, or “plus,” bestowed by the affirmative action plan can make a difference. Affirmative action resulting in the hiring only of qualified candidates more easily survives scrutiny than affirmative action resulting in the hiring of unqualified beneficiaries. See Johnson,
Third, the goals of the affirmative action plan affect the inquiry. A plan that seeks to achieve full representation for the particular purpose of remedying past discrimination will generally be shorter in duration than one that pursues proportional diversity for its own sake. When a plan pursues only the former goal, it presumably would cease to operate once full representation is achieved. And the shorter the time period for which a plan is in operation, the less it could be said adversely to affect non-beneficiaries. In Weber, for instance, the Court approvingly observed that the plan it upheld was “not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.”
Fourth, the extent to which the challenged plan limits opportunities for advancement by non-beneficiaries is a rele
b.
Our court has understood the need to avoid “unnecessarily ” trammeling the rights of non-minority candidates to indicate that a challenged affirmative action plan generally must be “tailored to fit the violation” sought to be addressed. Hammon II,
The Department submits that there is a sound explanation for targeting the FS-02 and -03 levels to address an imbalance at more senior levels. The 1990-92 Plan satisfies the tailoring requirement, the Department explains, because the FS-02 and -03 levels serve as the training grounds for learning the skills necessary to perform at the SFS and FS-01 levels. We agree.
The plan upheld in Weber is instructive. The employer in Weber aimed to remedy the manifest imbalance in its ranks of skilled workers: a mere 1.83% of its skilled workers were black, while the labor force in the surrounding area was 39% black.
Weber thus provides an example of an affirmative action plan going beyond strictly proportional representation in a training program: 50% of the spots would go to the company’s black workers, even though black persons made up only 39% of the area labor force. Employees who had completed Weber’s training program could then proceed to the rank of skilled worker, where the' manifest imbalance existed. The need to create an adequate pipeline of trained workers meant that the program was sufficiently tailored to target the “manifest imbalance” among skilled workers.
The State Department’s 1990-92 Plan worked similarly. In order to attain full representation at the SFS and FS-01 levels, the Department maintains, it had to go beyond strictly proportional minority representation at the FS-02 and -03 levels. It could then choose from qualified minority candidates at those levels to staff its SFS and FS-01 ranks.
With regard to the SFS, the Department’s hiring regulations in place at the
The conclusion from the then-existing regulations is straightforward: The Department believed that the best training for the role of a SFS Officer was experience as an FS-01, -02, or -03 Foreign Service Officer. The Department similarly valued skills gleaned from experience at the FS-02 and -03 ranks for the position of an FS-01, with outside hires into the FS-01 ranks serving as the small exception to the Department’s general internal promotion ladder. See J.A. 343, 516-17. Shea has introduced no evidence contradicting that understanding.
In view of the Department’s assessment that the most qualified candidates for the SFS and FS-01 ranks would come from its own mid-levels, the Department understandably saw a need to go further than strictly proportional representation in its mid-levels. That was necessary, the Department reasonably concluded, in order to have a sufficient reservoir of talented minority candidates from which to hire in order to achieve diversity in its SFS and FS-01 ranks. Otherwise, assuming that promotion rates were the same across races from the mid-levels to the SFS and FS-01 levels, the Department would need to await a great deal of turnover in the overwhelmingly white SFS and FS-01 ranks before the substantial imbalances at those levels would be rectified.
Congressional testimony on the 1989 GAO Report reveals that very concern. Joseph Kelley of the General Accounting Office, in response to questioning about when “the State Department [would] become representative of the American people,” told Congress that “[i]t is going to take a long time,” and noted that the EEOC had been pushing the Department “to have a program to move people around and to have upper-level promotions, but it ha[d]n’t worked out that well.” 1989 Sub-comm. Hearing at 29-30. The Department required a method by which to augment the flow of minority candidates to the SFS and FS-01 levels. As Representative Sikorski observed, “if the numbers [only] get[ ] better in ... entry level and hiring,” then “there is no upward progress. There is no flow in the right direction. We are talking centuries.” Id. at 29-30.
It is no answer to claim that the Department could simply promote minorities to the SFS and FS-01 levels at higher rates than their non-minority peers. That itself would have been a race-conscious action requiring justification. That option, at any rate, appears to have been non-viable. Testimony before Congress indicated that
At its root, finally, the unnecessary trammeling inquiry amounts to an exercise in balancing a plan’s attempts to remedy past discrimination against the plan’s adverse impact on the rights of non-minorities. In this ease, the latter impact was unquestionably limited. The 1989 GAO Report indicates that the State Department had 655 SFS Officers, 836 FS-01 Officers, and 2,032 FS-02 or -03 Officers. 1989 GAO Report at 17. Against that backdrop, the Department informs us that only sixteen minority candidates were hired into the mid-levels through the 1990-92 Plan over the three calendar years of its operation. With such a modest effect on the hiring process, the 1990-92 Plan was necessarily limited in the extent to which it could “trammel” Shea’s rights, “unnecessarily” or otherwise.
c.
The tailoring inquiry, according to our decisions, also takes into account whether the employer considered race-neutral alternatives. See Hammon II,
The record documents a number of previous attempts to correct the identified imbalances without resort to explicit racial preferences, particularly through recruiting and outreach. From 1964 on, the Department targeted historically black institutions as part of its “diplomat in residence” program, through which it assigned a senior-level Foreign Service Officer to research, writing, and teaching duties at a university in an effort to generate interest in the Foreign Service among students. 1989 GAO Report at 24. From 1980 on, the Department made a concentrated recruiting push to stimulate an increase in minority applicants, including by “provid[ing] information packages to colleges ... and askfing] college coordinators to encourage minorities ... to take the annual written [Foreign Service] examination.” Id. at 22-23. The Department’s recruiters made special efforts to visit colleges and universities with large minority enrollments'. Id. at 23. Ultimately, however, the Department concluded that its “recruiting efforts [did] not increase[] the number of minorities taking the FS examination for officer positions.” Id. And in 1986, the Secretary of State implemented a recommendation from black Foreign Service Officers aimed at elevating minority written exam pass rates by increasing minority enrollment in university courses relevant to the exam. That initiative, too, apparently proved unsatisfactory. See id. at 25.
The Department also instituted “sensitivity training” between “senior management” and “senior minorities” to address the gap, with little success. J.A. 369-70. Moreover, it considered implementing an entirely race-neutral mid-level entry program, but rejected that option as unlikely to be effective-an understandable conclu
The Department, in short, has introduced evidence that the 1990-92 Plan worked to target manifest imbalances in senior-level positions in the Foreign Service Officer corps, and that those imbalances resulted from past discrimination. It has also introduced evidence that the Plan refrained from unnecessarily trammeling the rights of non-minority candidates. We therefore conclude that the Department satisfies its burden to introduce evidence that, if taken as true, demonstrates the 1990-92 Plan’s validity under Johnson and Weber.
V.
Having concluded that the Department met its burden of Douglas framework, we ask at the final step whether Shea has proven that the Department’s “justification is pretextual and the plan is invalid.” Johnson,
‡ sfc H* Hí # ‡
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
So ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I join the court’s opinion painstakingly applying the key Supreme Court cases, Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara, Cnty.,
Nearly three decades ago Judge Silber-man observed that he was “uncertain as to the meaning of ‘manifest imbalance.’ ” Hammon v. Barry,
The effect is especially striking here: Shea neither challenged the district court’s ruling that his analysis of the State Department’s calculations was inadmissible, Court Op. 65, nor its ruling that the affirmative action plan’s repeated declarations of “manifest imbalance” were sufficient without expert provision of statistical support. See Shea v. Kerry,
Further impairing the value of the analysis is that many of the subsets are so small as to indicate a complete lack of intelligible criteria for State’s assertions of “manifest imbalance,” a term the report often uses but never explains. The report contains charts that split the workforce three ways (by occupational subgroup, ethnicity, and gender), and in one case it announces that it “reveals” a “manifest imbalance” of American Indian females (who represent 0.2% of the labor force comparison data) in the Finance Officer division, which employs only 125 people. J.A. 224-25. It seems improbable that any statistical test or standard of significance could yield evidence of a non-random “imbalance” for so small a subgroup. To the extent the report is suggesting that some purported “imbalances” could be amended by the hiring of a single employee of the right ethnicity and gender in the occupational unit in question, that response would, in turn, presumably create “imbalance” in another direction — thus appearing to undermine whatever criteria may have been used to define “manifest imbalance.” See, e.g., J.A. 218-19; 224-25. I recognize that Johnson is quite specific in stating that the proof of imbalance needed as a prerequisite for race- and gender-based affirmative action preferences is less than what is needed to establish a prima facie case of a Title VII violation,
The State Department in this respect sounds rather like the defendant university in Hill v. Ross,
