*2 WEICK, Before CELEBREZZE and McCREE, Judges. Circuit CELEBREZZE, Judge. Circuit appeal We consider and two cross- a District appeals from Court’s judgment Unions Appellee did not breach their towards employee a former Appellant, Appel- Motors Corporation (GM). lee General Appellant asks conclusion official, willfully his had failed perform and that action reversed to file failing the required Unions and GM be reinstated. GM ar- before grounds statement. A trial gues that alternative exist for dismissing the case. resulted in a finding it from Committee Unions had grounds negligent assert alternative Panter been guilty also dis- argue Appeals of willful inaction. higher missal and their cross-claim *3 grievance levels failed. send to arbitra- granted. tion have should been The ar- Appellant also charges filed with the guments significant raise several issues National Board, Labor Relations concerning an individual employee’s investigated but dismissed them. right Union, to fair treatment Appellant instituted further intra-Un- relationship as well as the of arbitration against ion action Local 166 for wrong- procedures judicial recourse ag- for processing grievance, ful of his but this grieved persons. actiоn was unsuccessful at the Local lev- 31, 1970, On March Appellant William el. An appeal higher levels was discharged Ruzicka was for being intoxi- stayed pending resolution of a policy job using cated on the threatening grievance that Panter’s successor at language and abusive towards his superi- Local 166 had filed. The policy griev- ors at GM’s lanti, Run Willow Plant in Ypsi- ance, which requested GM’s considera- Appellant Michigan. had worked Appellant’s grievance tion of despite the years there for eleven nearly and had procedural problem, was by withdrawn actively been involved Union activities April Local 166 on time. for much of that appeal Rather than the adverse deci- Appellant initiated the proc- sion on Local processing 166’s Agreement ess under National between grievance to the UAW’s International GM and the United Auto Workers Board, Appellant Executive filed a com- filing timely grievance protesting his plaint in federal court on June discharge. dispute He did the essen- alleged personal He that Panter’s “hos- tial facts of intoxication and abusive lan- tility” had towards him caused Panter guage, argued that discharge was an not to file the statement of unadjusted “unduly penalty harsh” which was incon- grievance. He asserted that both the past sistent with decisions of umpires in- Local and International Unions had thus terpreting the National Agreement. given representation, him unfair and he completed Company the second step alleged discharge that GM’s was wrong- process by the filing an an- ful and that conspired GM had to dis- Paragraph swer under 77 of the National charge him because of his Union activi- Agreement. The Union began the third ties. step by filing a “notice of unadjustеd grievance.” arbitration, To invoke the The Unions filed a cross-claim required by Union was Paragraph 37 to GM, seeking dispute that the be ordered file of unadjusted a “statement griev- to arbitration. After denying various simultaneously ance” with GM. The motions, pretrial the District Court con- District Court found Local 166 nev- hearing ducted a limited to question statement, er such filed although it of representation. unfair It concluded sought had and received two time exten- that there was no unfair sions to do so. After the due date for merely because Panter “neglected” had passed, had GM statement disclaimed required to file the statement. obligation further under the National reasoned, hostility Court “Mere between Agreement. plaintiff union and the official is in- sufficient to show a breach Appellant immediately pursued his in- [of under of fair under 29 tra-Union remedies U.S.C. Article 31 (1970)]; plaintiff § the UAW Constitution. must show ar- Panter, hostility gued that tainted the Charles official’s Local 1§6 now to turn consider- tional Union. We showing “there was no Since conduct.” liability, any, if hostility ation of the Local 166. tainted Panter’s the case grievance,” processing above, the As discussed District Court dismissed, along with сomplaint that Local 166 had concluded not unfair- cross-claim. Unions’ represented Appellant ly Agent because merely “neglected” had Panter to file question first consider We will required Unadjusted Statement if representation, unfair and had not acted in Grievance bad correct, the action conclusion Court’s Appellee urges faith. the Unions and GM must both upheld, asserting conclusion that bad Sipes, Vaca fail. See an essential element faith is L.Ed.2d 842 If the of unfair erred, there remain for the Unions’ and ar- GM’s consideration We do not find the grounds alternativе exist *4 guments so limited. In representation Vaca v. Finally, we must address dismissal. 190, 171, Sipes, 903, 386 87 U.S. S.Ct. 17 contention their cross- the Unions’ (1967), the Supreme L.Ed.2d 842 Court Appellant’s grievance or- to have union actions held that which are “arbi wrongfully was dis- to arbitration dered trary, discriminatory, or in bad faith” missed. added) could (emphasis establish representation. breach representation unfair of Proof 515, we held in Clair v. Local 422 As St. showing on depends by a Union 128, (6th 1969), F.2d 130 Cir. a member of toward conduct “a union’s bargaining unit is arbi collective the phrase The representation” “fair discriminatory, or in bad faith.” trary, art, of a term something of and the 171, 190, 87 386 U.S. S.Ct. Sipes, v. Vaca by which we are bound have standards (1967). A re 916, L.Ed.2d 842 903, 17 explicitly down in a set code. not been complaint and the of view However, Supreme spo- Court has trial convince us that developed at facts enough guide us clearly here. ken of prove that officials did not 171, Sipes, 386 U.S. 87 Vaca See acted Union had International Appellee 903, 842 17 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. discriminatorily, or in bad arbitrarily, held that there fair 377, 506 F.2d v. Local In Hines faith. not require does a un- representation 1974), granted cert. (6th Cir. 1153, 1157 every theoretically to exhaust ion 421 ground, to othеr and limited simply procedure on the de- available 1654, L.Ed.2d 85 44 928, 95 U.S. S.Ct. member. 386 at of a union U.S. mand (1975), we stated: 903). However, . . (87 192 S.Ct. perfunctory proc- or the ignoring There was no claim that the local grievance may essing of a violate the acting for or at union was the di- representation. Vaca v. duty of fair International, appel- rection and 194, at 87 Sipes, 386 U.S. S.Ct. at 903. Hines, when asked on deposition lant with the Fourth anal- agree Circuit’s We steps the what International failed to three-pronged standard estab- ysis of investigating company’s take in determining in Vaca for whether lishеd charge “I don’t replied: any know of unfairly represented has one of a union they should or steps that should not its members: there gen- have taken.” Since was no A union must conform its behavior to a material fact uine issue as about separate each of these three stan- of the International the conduct Un- First, it must treat all dards. factions ion, grant summary judgment segments membership and with- proper. hostility Next, or discrimination. out here, and the broad discretion the union in reasoning applies The Hines asserting rights of its finding Court’s individual we affirm must be exercised in by the Interna- members com- unfair no 310 argue Unions honesty. Finally, and Dill v. faith píete good Corp., 231, 435 F.2d arbitrary Greyhound (6th con- avoid 238 must union 1970), denied, 952, cert. rep- Cir. 402 requirements these 91 Each duct. (1971), 29 L.Ed.2d obliga- 122 separate and S.Ct. stands a distinct resents tion, proposition that bad may consti- for the faith of which is an the breach element for civil essential claim of action. unfair the basis tute Dill held that bad faith United Union of v. International Griffin required to support claim of un Workers, 183 F.2d Automobile where the union in 1974). Arroyo v. See also De (4th Cir. had made a question decision that Packinghouse, De Trabaiadores Sindicato grievаnce was individual’s without merit. (1st Cir.) AFL-CIO, F.2d 281 cert. we held that the interpretation In Dill denied, 400 U.S. company by the and union of the collec (1970).1 L.Ed.2d bargaining agreement tive was reasona believe District Court ble, refusing so to invoke arbitra Vaca when it
misread held that “bad Dill’s was a legitimate tion of read separate faith” must be into the way proper for the union reject independent standards of “arbi- of the union’s his view contract with the “discriminatory” trary” or treatment. We do not company. deviate from our which is arbitrary Union action or dis- in Dill to holding conclude that when a criminatory need motivated makes no decision as union to the merit amount to represen- bad faith to unfair of an individual’s but merely *5 tation. expire by it to negligently allows failing required to a basic and take step to it, resolving wards union has acted In the instant case Local offi arbitrarily and is liable for a breach of Appellant’s cials discussed grievance representation. its As the among and person themselves with GM stated, Vaca Court nel, inexplicably neglected but to take may union not arbitrarily ignore a [A] Appellant’s grievance to stage the third grievance рrocess meritorious or it in of processing filing not a Statement perfunctory fashion Unadjusted of appro Grievance with the priate sought GM official. Having and grievance In administering the and granted been two extensions time to machinery arbitration as statutory file the and at Statement no having time employees, of the a agent union must, Appellant’s decided that claim was with faith a good in manner, and in nonarbitrary merit, Local out allowed the final make as decisions to the mer- pass without deadline to filing the State particular grievances.2 its of requеsting ment or further extension. made no Union decision as to the At point Local did not inform grievance, merits or Appellant either GM that it had de allowed it to merely expire out negli- cided either to continue stop proc or to perfunctory gent handling. Thus, and grievance. essing Appellant’s neg Such we reverse District must Court’s con- ligent handling grievance, unrelat that Local clusion 166 did not unfairly ed as it was to merits of Appellant. represent case, amounts to unfair representation. example arbitrary It a clear through cross-ap- and argues Loсal handling perfunctory grievance. of a been dismissed have it should peal parallel Arroyo unacceptable to the instant case. belief 1. De faith mistaken was an ex- discharged There, employees pursuing grievances were al- not cuse for seven and arbitrary perfunctory legedly proc- of automation but in violation to because amounted and explicitly seniority essing, provisions. Their failed to which Vaca union stated was one honestly finding ground press out of an mis- for a their of unfair certain NLRB relief extended taken belief 194, U.S. at 2. 386 S.Ct. at gоod- First Circuit found them. The to “neglected” for four that Panter the case alternative rea- conclusion to from required sons. file the Statement. Local 166’s must, therefore, argument respect in this First, that Appellant it contends fail.3 collaterally estopped pur- from should be his action because an suing intra-Union Second, argues Local 166 Appel- had decided his case adversely forum to to lant failed exhaust his intra-Union him. and, under Bsharah Eltra remedies A Trial Committee of Local (6th 1968), F.2d 502 Corp., 394 Cir. Appellant against which took his case from taking should be barred his case to Article 31 of the Panter under UAW Specifically, court. Local contends Constitution, decided that Panter was appealed should have “consciously guilty purposely rejection adverse decision Local’s intending allow a to ex- of his intra-Union claim that it had The International pire.” Ap- Union’s wrongfully processed grievance. agreed Committee with this conclu- peals
sion, stating, period months, For of 27 through March 1970 June Appel is no evidence of kind to [T]here sought lant intra-Union relief beyond
indicate reasonable doubt agree Local 166. with the failure to secure man- [Panter’s] that this was sufficient exhaustion agement’s Statements motivated of intra-Union remedies to permit it to by personal political differences hear his case. In Bsharah we affirmed years [Ap- over the between him and grant summary judgment pellant]. employee who had “failed to allege or Board, The UAW’s Review Public any attempt show initiate her intra the International sustained Executive prescribed union remedies by the consti Appeals affirmance of its Board’s Com- by-laws tution and of the International mittee, only noted that issue bеfore 394 F.2d at Union.” 503. The reason 166’s Trial Committee requirement for this is that intra-Union was whether Mr. Panter intentionally *6 part are parcel remedies of the in grievance let the fail and in doing so procedure in-house dustrial for settling by political was motivated considera- disputes. labor The primary benefit of tions; negligence the issue of his or requiring initial submission of employee lack thereof was irrelevant. complaints against a union that refuses pre The District Court held in a help process a against a trial order that the Trial Committee’s is company internal machinery can collaterally estop decision did not Appel settle difficulties short of court action. arguing in lant from federal court that Thus, policy federal requires “staying acted out personal Panter had of hostili ‘judicial the hand of interference with filing not ty Unadjust in Statement of the internal affairs of a organiza labor Grievance, in view of “beyond ed the until it had at tion has least oppor some doubt” pre reasonable standard which tunity disputes to resolve concerning its ” forum. agree vailed before own internal affairs.’ Imel v. Zohn the District Court. with Co., Mfg. 181, (10th 481 F.2d 183 Cir. Furthermore, in view holding, 1973), of our it c e clear that the issue of negli- is Panter’s r . t gence adversely was not resolved to Ap- dy Airlines, 87, v. Trans-World 401 F.2d by Committee, the Trial pellant (3rd 1968), denied, 104 Cir. cert. 393 U.S. supports 1048, its decision the 684, District Court’s 89 S.Ct. 21 (1969). L.Ed.2d 691 alleges problem in court that the Union not address the of when acted in breach 3. We need estoppel applies representation. to intra-Union deci- of its of fair collateral adversely affected member when the sions 312 a breach When diligent processing of Appellant’s shown, however, is the 27 months of in through complaint
his portion Apрel- for that of is liable Union far more than proceedings tra-Union representing injury “increases if lant’s Local opportunity” for “at least some damages [chargeable those any in dispute with him. its 166 to resolve caused the union’s employer] refusal of intra-Un of exhaustion requirement Vaca, grievance.” 386 process hope on the is bottomed remedies ion 197-98, Thus, 87 at 921. at S.Ct. U.S. quickly will resolve procedures such finding representation, of unfair upon in delay inherent without disputes must fashion an appropriate court “the and with the aid of process judicial 187, 915, 386 аt 87 S.Ct. at remedy,” resolving at mem experienced persons from Un- compensating short of a full-blown conflicts ber-union expenses for those he in- pocket ion’s hope When that has judicial proceeding. Union’s failure to curred because however, failed, the member properly. his process to federal court proceeding barred unfair a claim with grounds urged none of the in Since a un would allow otherwise conclude To cross-appeal requires Local 166’s dismiss- against claim it from prevent ion to it, Appellant’s complaint against we al of litigation by forc stage reaching the judgment Court’s reverse through members endless ing aggrieved for a finding and remand its favor stages of review. relief. appropriate that Pan- 166 maintains Third, Local holding that Our Local failing to file the re- inaction ter’s duty of breached beyond his author- quired Statement reversal District Court’s requires rules, it so is not under Union ity claim dismissal negligence. liable has When Union failed in its GM. Shop Panter was Chairman of the fairly represent employee, duty to 166, Local and it was his Committee may not invoke the Union’s employer to file Statements responsibility sеt procedures to follow forth in failure Unadjusted Grievance with GM officials. bargaining agreement as a the collective job action or inaction in that His action of the employee. to the defense principal, to his clearly attributable at Sipes, 386 U.S. Vaca Union, Barefoot v. Teamsters (10th Cir.), 1004-05 cert. 424 F.2d has filed a cross-appeal GM which as- denied, 400 U.S. 91 S.Ct. that dismissal of serts L.Ed.2d it should nonetheless affirmed argues Finally, Local because First, grounds. alternativve it on two *7 damages could be established even if no complaint that raises no fac- argues clаim were an unfair that it is and entitled to sum- tual issues proper. is It argues dismissal proven, Second, the merits. mary judgment on “GM, any party, would be solely if that that dismissal should have contends GM plaintiff.” liable to Appellant’s granted because fail- been his intra-Union remedies. to exhaust ure complaint asserts Appellant’s rejected argu- Court both District The jointly are and and the Unions that GM pre-trial orders. ments injury. liable for his This is severally ground The second quickly rejected. is a union When breaches not true. above, Appellant As we stated suffi- representation, employer his ciently exhausted intra-Union reme- any damages “attrib liable for remains give jurisdic- dies to Court employer’s solely to the breach of utable tion also See Scott Anchor Motor contract,” e., wrongful discharge. i. Inc., Freight, 496 F.2d at Vaca, at at 920. not, however, fore- materials do These Appellant is ground first whether dis- question a factual as close concern- factual genuine issue no raised harsh, arbitrary, and dis- was a charge ex- discharge was so claim ing his criminatory penalty in view of all the his offense as to for penalty cessive Appellant’s situation. circumstаnces the collective bar- a breach to amount Appel- we cannot find that Accordingly, GM and between agreement gaining allegation concerning the dis- dispute no lant’s to be appears There UAW. dispute, we beyond factual and charge on the was intoxicated Appellant re- the District Court’s cannot overturn was that he abusive question day in summary judgment on the grant to claim fusal Appellant’s foreman. his towards in merits. was unwarranted discharge similar of- treatment past view remand, will be the District Court On tem- allegedly consisted of fenses, which Appellant’s consider motion to free to discharge. rather than suspension porary complaint, and GM will be his amend original in the com- stated as claim His summary for its motion to renew able “unduly was discharge plaint harsh, If a renewed motion is ac- judgment. discriminatory and con- arbitrary, companied by materials indicate interpretations” of the past trary to discharge ordinary penalty is an for Agreement. Appel- National UAW-GM Appellant’s position, con- someone to amend his com- a motion lant filed surrounding the sidering the facts dis- allega- clarify the basis this to plaint tion, seniority, past charge, Appellant’s appeal on con- filed the record record, and other matters relevant work amended proposed copy no tains issue, Appellant required will be to District Court took no complaint that there remains a fac- to demonstrate motion to amend. Appellant’s on action alleging specific by facts to tual issue showing. 56(e), GM’s Rule counteract a motion for GM filed trial Before F.R.Civ.P.; Cruise, Brugge E. Inc. v. R. asserting that under summary judgment, man, (6th 1975). At 508 F.2d Cir. F.R.Civ.P., it was entitled to Rule however, may we not fore- point, sup- law. Its matter of as a judgment opportunity prove close argued that because dis- brief porting against GM. his case under the Nation- permitted charge penalty as a of- Agreement al the District Court’s Having reversed committed, allegedly Appellant fense dismissal establish that dis- could having and GM and found no Local 166 a breach of contract. amounted charge entitling the Local or basis alternative motion, denied this dismissal, we are left with a final toGM stating: is raised the Unions’ This question. cross-appeal, which seeks to overturn imposition of is whether question [T]he summary judg- denial of Court’s concerning in Ruzicka’s District discharge sanction their cross-claim ment a breach of contract constituted case eventual and the dismissal against GM and this must be Motors by General thereof. facts of this particular on the decided case.4 sought to force GM to The cross-claim further or to send
process arbitration, despite the Un- directly it support have reviewed GM’s *8 procedures follow man- failure to ions’ accompanied its ing documents Agreement. by the National On judgment. The dated summary motion 15, 1973, District ordered the Court May sup and other materials two аffidavits Umpire. to an grievance submitted the discharge permis is a its claim port require- the in this Order was Included employed which was once penalty sible consider the issues Umpire the arbitrator) ment that in a (and upheld by before arbitrability representa- and unfair Appellant’s. to similar case somewhat 25, 1973). Order, (E.D.Mich., Apr. filed No. 36598 Civil 314
tion, cross-appeal is that if processing well as the further propriety as of Appel- Thus, of the within the discharge. lant’s the GM-UAW District ordered, structure originally granted the has been Court Unions’ mo- deprived ju- to summary opportunity of the attain judgment tion for on their cross-claim, though dicial resolution his on terms claim. different requested by the those Unions. Thus, compelled we are to comment on proper the course of action for the Dis- 31, 1973, the District Court August On to take trict Court on remand. Its May the by revoked Order impliedly basically ordering choice is between the Appellant’s charges of ordering that un- to arbitration submitted or de- be submitted to the representation ciding itself merits of Only trial. if the found Court for GM. the griev- would unfair to a GM-UAW ance be submitted Um-
pire. choice This two embodies sets of hand, interests. one On there is the no finding rep- Based on unfair strong interest settling industrial dis resentation, the District Court ordered through putes arbitration. As discussed action, of the entire including dismissal Trilogy, in the Steelworkers 363 U.S. cross-claim. Unions’ 1347, 4 574, 80 L.Ed.2d (1960), S.Ct. “is the arbitration substitute for indus cross.-appeal purports The Unions’ to . . . trial strife. [Arbitration attack on the be an District Court’s deni- disputes labor under bargain- collective pre-trial al of all its motions. The relief ing agreements part parcel is that requested this Court bargaining process collective itself.” Co., v. Warrior Steelworkers & Gulf Judge’s dismissal reverse the Unions’ cross-claim de- L.Ed.2d 1409 An individual em- and . General Motors fendant may submitting ployee prefer griev- plaintiff’s processing of order further ance to an arbitrator rather judge than a grievance pursuant to the contract because the arbitrator is not bound to or, in the Agreement alter- GM-UAW only apply those expressed considerations Judge’s only, modify the final native agreement. in the collective bargaining provide that dismissal of said order to parties to such an agreement prejudice. was without cross-claim expect that judgment [the arbitrator’s] In of our reversal of the рarticular grievance view unfair of a will reflect conclusion, we need only not what says contract but, decide whether Unions’ cross-claim insofar as collective bargaining well taken had there been agreement permits, no unfair such factors as the Nor need we upon decide effect productivity particu- of a whether, event, result, process- further lar its consequence to the mo- ing grievance should be shop, ordered rale of the his judgment whether merely providing heightened instead dismiss- tensions will or dimin- preju- parties’ al of the cross-claim was without ished. For the objective in us- ing the process dice. arbitration is primarily
to further
their
goal
common
of unin-
Were we to decide
terrupted production under the agree-
granted
ment,
Court should have
the Unions’
the agreement
to make
serve
summary judgment
motion for
on
specialized
their
their
needs. The ablest
cross-claim, we would
judge
affect
be expected
cannot
bring
ability
bring his
case to
experience
conclusion.
same
competence
difficulty
raised
the Unions’
bear
upon
determination
of a
*9
claim. To ensure
he cannot
because
be simi-
grievance,
proceedings,
to these
conclusion
prompt
larly informed.5
furthermore,
the District Court should
Thus,
Supreme
Court held in Steel-
particular
time
specifying
consider
workers that
arbitration should be com-
within
particular
order to arbitrate the
[a]n
See,
Airlines,
g.,
e.
Northwest
pleted.
grievance should not be denied unless
Workers,
244,
442 F.2d
Machinists
Inc.
positive
with
may be said
assurance
it
1970).
(8th Cir.
the arbitration clause is not
that
sus-
we reverse the District
Accordingly,
interpretation
of an
ceptible
that cov-
of the Unions’ cross-
dismissal
dispute.
asserted
ers
Doubts Court’s
specified.
the relief
grant
in
and
be resolved
favor of
should
cover- claim
age.6
Judgment of
Court is
Furthermore, because of its more infor-
reversed,
the cause is
and
remanded for
nature,
arbitration proceeding
is
mal
consistent with this Opinion.
proceedings
efficient,
inexpensive, and expedi-
“an
appeal
of the main
The costs
will be
dispute
means for
resolution.” Al
tious
GM,
hand,
on
between
the one
divided
Co.,
ver
v. Gardner-Den
exander
166,
other,
on the
equal
Local
1011,
58,
1024,
39 L.Ed.2d
94 S.Ct.
costs of the cross-appeal
amounts.
GM,
will
be borne
of the Unions
the cоsts of
along with
GM’s cross-ap-
hand,
is the
there
the other
On
peal.
aggrieved
em
affording
interest
of his claim.
resolution
a final
ployee
discharged on March
Appellant
McCREE, Circuit Judge (concurring).
long for an
is far too
years
Five
1970.
I concur in the holding of the majority
a final decision on
to await
employee
that the
opinion
local union breached the
with back
reinstatement
demand
it owed
would seem uncon
relay
Further
pay.
However,
appellant.
I write separately
Having
heavy
met the
burden
scionable.
because I do not believe that
the local
rep
unfairly
his Union
showing
handling
union’s
grievance
him,
is entitled to a
resented
“arbitrary”
“perfunctory”
or
as the ma-
against
on his claim
decision
judicial
jority opinion determines. The district
Vaca,
at
486 U.S.
employer.
union,
court determined
through
Panter, neglected to file a timely state-
unadjusted
grievance,
ment
and the
these interests
believe
majority opinion does not overturn this
if the District Court
be served
can both
Instead,
finding.
it characterizes
jurisdiction
but retains
arbitration
orders
negligent handling of the grievance as
the claims
until
case
arbitrary and perfunctоry.
the Na
settled.
If
are
and GM
Local
interpreted
Arbitrary
perfunctory
adjec-
to mean
are
Agreement
tional
characterizing
its contractual
intentional
tives
conduct
is relieved
that GM
capricious
superficial.
failure to
or
Here
the Union’s
because
duties
was an unintentional failure to act
procedures,
there
follow
appropri
appellant’s
award
proceed
prevented
should
the un-
being
Local 166 on
submitted
arbitration.
relief7
ate
Co.,
questions
proper
7. The
allocation
363 U.S.
v. Warrior & Gulf
5. Steelworkers
damages
between
166 and GM and
at 1352.
80 S.Ct.
at
liability
the measure of the Local’s
in the event
grievance is found
that the
to be without merit
582-83,
Id. at
gaining Plaintiff-Appellee, prerequisite for sub- is a statement v. employee’s claim to arbi- of an mission union has made tration, not because MAESTAS, Richard J. judgment for a lawful rea- faith good a Defendant-Appellant. document, not file the it should son 74-1799. No. negligent of its omis- merely because United Appeals, States Court of its of fair sion, it hаs breached then Tenth Circuit. Argued July however, a un- suggest, do not I negli- liable for all be held should ion Aug. Decided employee’s griev- processing in gence the courts put rule would a ance. Such second-guessing union position decisions. In accordance
representatives’ congressional policy “general
with centralized administra-
favoring expert, employee action” of
tion, remedial Employees Motor Coach
grievances, 274, 301, 91
Lockridge, 403 U.S. (1970), I believe 29 L.Ed.2d try to determine should not
courts
whether, fulfilling rep-
resentation, adopted has the tac- a union ag- to the needs of an suited
tic best employee.
grieved
Nevertheless, I believe that a total act, negligent whether or in-
failure to reason,
tentional, except proper for a that, egregious so as in the case
behavior discrimination, faith, hostile arbi-
of bad
trariness, perfunctoriness, or the union responsible.
should be held We have that an action will lie
stated gross . . mistake
union for “. such imply as to bad faith.” Ba
or inaction Union, 372 v. International F.2d
lo wski It requires only slight principle require of this
extension pre to answer to member if it
local employ consideration of the
cludes neglect its sheer
ee’s
timely paper employee file a filing by law for for himself.
prevented inju- that the incidence of an
I believe magnitude should be shifted
ry of employee innocent to the union negligence responsi- flagrant
whose it.
ble for