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William McCorkle and Andre Clinkscale v. United States
100 A.3d 116
D.C.
2014
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*1 armed, and remand for gree murder while vis-a-vis those counts proceedings

further In opinion. with this all accordance the judgments we affirm on respects,

other

appeal.61

So ordered.

William McCORKLE and Andre

Clinkscale, Appellants, STATES, Appellee.

UNITED 11-CF-1667, 11-CF-1668.

Nos. Appeals.

District Columbia Court

Argued Feb. 2014. Sept.

Decided survives, first-degree premeditated 61. Leon's merges murder der conviction it with the addition, felony merge, underlying felony. murder convictions In stated in as felony likely finding while the two supra, juiy’s statutory murder convictions note aof keeping pre- aggravating will be vacated favor of circumstance should be vacated. conviction, felony meditated murder if a mur- All this be addressed on remand.

H7 court, the statement unconstitutionally province invades and has implicitly Finding overruled. no re- versible error on this or grounds other raised, we affirm. *3 Background

I. Factual trial, At thе government’s case primarily Brand, Service, Jessica Public Defender focused on that place events took shortly Fam, with Klein whom James and Sarnia May after 4:00 a.m. on 2008. An alter- Service, brief, Public Defender were on the began cation that morning after McCorkle for appellant William McCorkle. Hough cut front of at the attendant’s Greenbelt, MD, Szekely, Andrew R. for window of a gas station. The conflict esca- appellant Andre Clinkscale. lated, eyewitnesses and six testified that Perez,

James M. Assistant United they saw the shooting. A firearms expert Attorney, States with whom Ronald C. determined that two different semi-auto- Jr., Machen States Attorney, and pistols murders, matic were used Trosman, Danello, Elizabeth Elizabeth H. and medical examiners testified that Kerkhoff, Jennifer Cooney, and J.P. Assis- Hough times, had been shot seventeen Jet- tant United States Attorneys, were on the times, er nine Mincey and eleven times. brief, appellee. witnesses, None of the including McCor- kle, said they saw the victims with WASHINGTON, Before Judge, Chief any weapons morning. guns No be- FISHER, RUIZ, Judge, Associate and longing to the victims were found at the Senior Judge. scene. FISHER, Harlenia Ray, teenage girl a Judge: Associate from the neighborhood, in support testified of one of May On Hough, Johnny Duane justice obstruction of charges. She Jeter, Anthony Mincey and were shot to said that shortly after she questioned was death after an early-morning altercation at by poliсe, she received a visit from McCor- gas station. Appellants William McCor- kle They and another man. called her into kle and Andre Clinkscale were later indict- pickup her, truck and McCorkle told variety ed on a charges stemming from “don’t say nothing” to the detectives. that triple homicide subsequent and their attempts to justice. obstruct After a McCorkle Hough admitted he shot trial, Jeter, McCorkle was convicted on fourteen and but claimed that he acted in charges and years sentenced to 144 self-defense. He took the stand and re- incarceration. that, found Clinkscale counted provoked after he Hough’s guilty charges, on seven line, and he was later by cutting ire he made evеry years sentenced to 105 in prison. ap-On effort to calm the other man down and peal, both contend that the eventually first gas tried to leave the station to prong of the Laumer test for admitting prevent trouble. McCorkle said that interest,1 statements Hough which followed him as he tried to walk requires a veracity trial court to assess away toward Holbrook Street and that of the witness repeat who has offered to Hough’s associates him cut off with their (D.C.1979) (en banc). 1. See Laumer v. United 409 A.2d 190 gas judge, from the station rules of evidence that allow a rather near the exit vehicle jury, Street closer to than the [Morse].” “on Holbrook assess the of a still outside the vehicle. When Hough was live witness as a basis for excluding his reaching made mo- Hough and the driver testimony are improper.” They fact claim tions, thought they were reach- that the “first Laumer unconstitu- firearms, pulled so he his semi- ing for tionally limits the criminal defendant’s began firing. McCor- pistol automatic right to call witnesses in his favor and street, kle was in the with his back to defense, complete further lot, firing station when he commenced gas impinges right on his trial by jury.” he heard Hough. Const, at McCorkle said that V, They See U.S. amends. VI. “thought other shots and dude argue therefore that the trial court erred that, shooting at me.” McCorkle testified Tywon Hager’s when it excluded testimony *4 fled, as he he looked back and saw a friend based on its own assessment of his credi- his, Trey Joyner, ‍​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍standing in front of of bility. Hough’s firing By black into it. SUV trial, Trey Joyner

the time of was dead. Prong A. First of Laumer “ was that he Clinkscale’s defense was ‘Hearsay* is out-of-court present and that “all acts attributed to him statement ‘offered in evidence prove the ” by the Government or the witnesses were truth of the matter asserted.’ Martin v. by Trey Joyner.” committed In addition States, (D.C. United relying testimony on McCorkle’s to this 2010). Although “generally not admissible effect, sought Clinkscale to introduce the trial[,]” Laumer, at 409 A.2d at hear testimony Tywon Hager, pre- who was say “will be admissible if it falls under an pared testify Trey Joyner that had ad- exception.” Dutch v. United homicide, participating mitted in the triple (D.C.2010). A.2d exceptions Such contrary penal During to his intеrest. an “provide for the admission of statements evidentiary hearing Hager at which Mr. they because exhibit certain indicia of reli gave proffered testimony, his ability that overcome outweigh or the nor requested Trey also that the statement of mal risks associated with the inherent dan Joyner hearing, be admitted. After the gers hearsay statements.” the trial court Hager found that was not at A.2d credible and that the defendants therefore Historically, our common law did not Joyner had failed to establish that Mr. hearsay contain a exception for statements reported “made the statement.” See, against penal e.g., interest. Admitting

II. The Laumer Test for Alexander, States v. 430 F.2d Against Statements Penаl (D.C.Cir.1970) (“declining] appellant’s in- Interest adopt exception vitation” to the for hear- interest). say against penal statements Both contend that the However, in Laumer v. United prong admitting first of our state test court, banc, interest, sitting en held that the “total against penal ments announced in rejection of against penal declarations in- Laumer v. United 409 A.2d 190 (D.C.1979) (en banc), terest ... keeps probative reliable and implicitly has been evidence from- They invalidated. assert that the trier of “[i]n fact[.]” Nevertheless, three-and-a-half since A.2d at 197. “not all decades Laumer confes- decided, admissible, sions are Supreme Court and this and we exclude those increasingly recognized inherently court have confessions that are untrust- Therefore, adopting “corroborating ant be unavailable and that worthy.” Id. against for declarations hearsay exception clearly circumstances indicate the trust- interest, approach penal preferred we worthiness statement.” Fed. 804(b)(3). “it not of the federal rule because Although R.Evid. first totally bars abolishes the doctrine explicitly of Laumer is not set forth penal interest against declarations hearsay exception, in the federal federal evidence, proffered but also assures appellate historically split courts have interest contain declarations over whether a trial court should assess reliability that are consis- those indicia of of the in-court witness as other hear- tent with the rationale behind part of its say exceptions.” Id. at 199. analysis.2 however, assessing Recently, conjunction whether state with

When Rules, ment fits within the declaration an amendment to the Federal exception, require we a “tri Advisory on Evidence Committee Rules judge three-step inquiry al to undertake a commentary: adopted following “[T]he (1) declarant, to ascertain whether credibility of the witness who relates the (2) fact, statement; made whether the proper statement is not a factor for the (3) unavailable; whether declarant assessing court to consider in corroborat- *5 clearly indi ing circumstances. To admission or base the trustworthiness of the statement.” cate of hearsay exclusion statement on the applying prong Id. at 199. the first When credibility usurp jury’s witness’s would of the test determine “whether the de- determining credibility role of of testi- proffered clarant in fact made the state fying Advisory witnesses.” Committee ment, the trial court’s focus is not on the Note on the 2010 Amendments to Fed. declaration, truth of the but on the veraci 804(b)(3), U.S.C.A., p. R.Evid. 28 338 ty of the repeats witness who the declara 2012). (West far, only Thus the Seventh tion.” Id. “If the trial judge concludes explicitly acknowledged Circuit has this made, that no statement was then no basis commentary changed revised its exists for inquiry, further and the Henderson, stance. See United Statеs v. proffered testimony should be excluded.” (7th (“The 1128, Cir.2013) 736 F.3d 1131 Id. question of whether the declarant made adopted largely implicates testifying The test we the statement wit- based hearsay exception on the federal credibility; making credibility state- ness’s de- which, interest, against penal ments at the terminations is a role reserved to the Laumer, required time of jury.”).3 appears that the declar- It now Hendrieth, Compare, e.g., 2. ordinarily United States v. of an in-court witness 748, (11th Cir.1991) (the 922 F.2d 750 jury”), trial a matter for the United States v. Kat 769, (2d Cir.1983) court consider in-court witness’s sougrakis, motive 715 F.2d 777 matter), misrepresent (“preliminary and United States assessment of the in-court wit Rasmussen, 55, (8th Cir.1986) v. 790 F.2d usurpation ness’ would ... be a of ("The function”), of trustworthiness a statement and United States v. At by kins, (3d Cir.1977) ("Rule declarant's interest is determined 558 F.2d analysis probable 804(b)(3) of two ‘the elements: verac- directs the court to the trustworthi witness, ity reliability declarant, witness.”). of the in-court and the ness of the of declarant.'") (quoting of the out-of-court Alvarez, authority Advisory United States v. 584 F.2d 3. The of an Committee's (5th Cir.1978)), with, e.g., Compare, e.g., United States v. Notes has been debated. Tome (1st Cir.1989) ("the States, Seeley, 892 F.2d v. United 115 S.Ct. U.S. basis has ing philosophical the trial whose requires which prong of in- credibility of the substantially by subsequent court to assess the undermined decisions,’ of the test for admit- part by witness as or our own Supreme court Court interest, rep- ting statements en banc.” supervening rulings Lee v. minority (D.C. resents a view.4 822, 828 United 668 A.2d 1995) (citation omitted) Frendak, (quoting Revisiting Decision B. a Prior 27); 408 A.2d at 379 n. see Thomas v. “The rule is fundamental our (D.C. 415, 421 United 731 A.2d that ‘no division of this court jurisprudence 1999) (“[T]he ‘philosophical basis’ of Proc- decision of this prior will overrule substantially ter and Brewster has been ” Servs., Inc., v. Washington court.’ Guest by progeny.”). undermined Muniz and its (D.C.1998) (quoting A.2d Nevertheless, lightly court will not “[t]his (D.C. 310, 312 Ryan, M.A.P. v. 285 A.2d deem one of its decisions to have been 1971)). result can be ac “[S]uch [a] overruled and thus implicitly stripped court en banc.” complished this Lee, precedential authority.” its M.A.P., In this case 285 A.2d at at 828. go step by asking one further to declare that one of division of court Analysis C. long en banc decisions is no our landmark law. good er Appellants subsequent contend that opinions Supreme this court and the course, blind ‘panel

Of “a cannot Court have invalidated the first ly prior ruling follow in the face of [a] They Laumer. are mistaken. A division enunciat clearly controlling doctrine later ” of this court addressed this same Supreme ed Court.’ Teoume-Les States, concluding v. Gilchrist United sane (alteration appellant had cited “no decision *6 in original) (quoting 364, Supreme from the Court or this court v. Frendak (D.C.1979)). Moreover, declaring that a trial court panel explicitly which 379 ‍​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍n. 27 “ follow, witness, obliged inflexibly, credibility ‘to a rul- determines the of a is not J., ron, 892, (N.D.2010) ("the 696, (1995) (Kennedy, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 N.W.2d ("We opinion) plurality have relied on those analyze court ... district should credibili- guide with, as a in witness"), well-considered Notes useful ty e.g., Carpen- of the in-court Rules."), ascertaining meaning of the State, 1182, (Fla.2001) v. 785 So.2d ter with, 167-68, (Scalia, e.g., id. at 115 S.Ct. 696 ("[T]he credibility of an in-court witness who J., concurring concurring judg- part in in testifying regard an is with to out-of-court in, ment) ("I previously acquiesced have declaration is not a in, ' myself engaged indeed similar use of the matter that the trial court consider in should Advisory mature Committee Notes. More determining testimony whether admit persuaded consideration has me that is statement.”), concerning the out-of-court wrong.... promulgated says Rule what [T]he State, 529, 697, Gray v. 368 Md. says, regardless its drafters.” it of the intent of (2002) ("There nothing any is ... in of our (citations omitted)). specifically per- ... cases trial mits a trial court to make a factual assess- supremе are divided this 4. State courts on ment of the trustworthiness of the in-court State, Compare, e.g., well. Woods v. issue as relator of the out-of-court declaration that 128, 464, (1985) ("In P.2d 101 Nev. defendant.”), exculpates a and Common- determining in fact whether the declarant Drew, 65, statement, wealth v. 391 Mass. 489 N.E.2d proffered the trial court made the (1986) ("[T]he credibility 1241 n. 11 of the [in-court] consider witness.") ), question jury.”). the witness is a for the (citing Laumer and State v. Stridi- repeat a declarant’s offered to statement Leibovitz assessed the interest, violates the Fifth Hager part Mr. as of her admissibility and Sixth Amendments to the Constitu- determination, as Laumer instructs her to (D.C.2008). tion.” 954 A.2d do, and made a well-supported finding that Furthermore, explained, we “not one of proffered hearsay statement was never overrules the cited cases Laumer made.6 Because the statement did not test.” Id. meet one of Laumer’s foundational re- quirements, appellants had right no with

Appellants present us no cases this evidence to the jury. See addressing either court Illinois, Taylor 484 U.S. They since decided. Gilchrist was assert (1988) (“The 5.Ct. 98 L.Ed.2d 798 opinion instead that the is not Gilchrist accused does not have an unfettered right binding panel on this because the issue testimony offer incompetent, plain was considered under error review privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under analysis and the court’s evidence.”). standard rules of of Laumer is dictum event. But regardless of whether that discussiоn is III. Aggressor The Initial Instruction

dictum or an alternative holding, it demon- judges strates that three other of this In supplemental brief, pro se persuaded court were not that the ratio- appellant argues the trial nale of Laumer has been undermined. court erred when it provide declined to The advisory comment in the committee what he terms the “Initial Aggressor” in note to the amended federal rule has been struction. really What he asked for was decided, issued since Gilchrist was but we an explaining instruction when an initial do not consider that development sufficient aggressor may regain his right to self- to undermine the analytical framework of defense withdrawing from a conflict. one holdings. of our en banc Just as the explained, Gilchrist court without a you Su- was told that “[i]f find that preme Court decision or a supervening en the aggressor, defendant was the he can- ruling banc from this court that rely upon under- the right of self-defense to it, mines good Laumer remains justify law.5 his use of force.” See Criminal Appellants cite several cases where we have opinion dictates of an en banc of this court. danger Brisbon, commented on the of a contrast, trial court In the trial court added *7 "usurp [ing] jury’s prerogative the of deter its own assessment to the test for States, mining credibility.” Boyd v. United admitting an excited utterance. (D.C.1984). See, e.g., A.2d Bris bon v. United Hager significant 6. Mr. had a record of im- (D.C.2006) (trial finding court erred in peachаble convictions and failed to mention "appellant's longtime friend” was "not a reli exculpatory the previous declaration in a testify able witness” to about an excited utter lengthy investigators. statement to He also requirements ance that met the foundational relationship had a close with the accused and admission); for Newman United Joyner knew that Mr. Although was dead. it A.2d (highlighting the Hager’s testimony ruled that Mr. was incredi- evaluating distinction reliability between ble, the trial court found that the other two proffer evaluating of a and reliability of prongs Joyner, of Laumer were met. the de- witness because the of the wit clarant, unavailable, was dead and therefore decide). jury ness’s was fоr the to and there were though appellants Even making are similar support a claim that he was the second objections constitutional of shooter. different, very the situation here is where the trial court was bound to follow the facts, withdrawal instruction on those tak- for the District Co- Jury Instructions rev.2013). 9.504(A) (5th in ing light them the most favorable Mr. lumbia, ed. No. McCorkle.” clarified that Judge “[m]ere Leibovitz ... more the defendant words without Judge only Leibovitz added that “the See id. aggression.” constitute do not arguably other moment where withdrawal because appropriate instruction was This when, according could even be discussed is evidence, including ample there was McCorkle, to Mr. he has shot and killed testimony, bеgan that he own McCorkle’s self-defense, people they two are both shooting. dead, and he ... visibly certainly and fleeing.” agree now that there was no We to the standard “initial supplement A factual basis for a withdrawal instruction instruction, “Deadly entitled aggressor” in this case. See Jones v. United Withdraws,” ex- Defendant Force Where (D.C.2010)(“A trial court aggressor] “if who plains that one [is ‘may properly give decline to [a defen- faith, good ... ... later withdraws requested] dant’s instruction where there words or communicates withdrawal ” (altera- legal is no or factual basis it.’ actions, deadly use force to save s/he original)). tion in danger imminent himselfiherself bodily death or serious harm.” Criminal any event, In give the failure to Jury Instructions for the District of Co- withdrawal instruction would matter rev.2013) 9.504(C) (5th lumbia, No. ed. instruction, aggressor if the initial as giv- (brackets request- in original). McCorkle en, caused the to believe that McCor- instruction, but Leibovitz ed this kle right forfeited his to act self-defense it, give explaining that “no declined to by sparking the verbal conflict at the gas ... supports theory version of the facts station attendant’s booth. But there is no of withdrawal] here[.]” reason to believe that the instruction would have had this effect. The was argues that he was entitled to McCorkle more ... told that “mere words without do instruction because he the withdrawal Moreover, aggression.” not constitute every attempt Hough “made to calm down pаrties argued none that the vio- disengage from the verbal altercation. lence before started walk- began this, Failing physically disengaged [he] ing away. aggressor Because the initial apologized from the altercation when he properly given instruction and there and, attempting Hough’s to shake after was no factual basis for a withdrawal in- hand, gas left the BP Station and set off struction, reject appellant’s argument. we on foot in the direction of his home.” However, acknowledges he mat- “[i]t IV. Other Claims was at aggressor ters little who initial A. The New Year’s Eve Assault shooting BP Station because the Gas During testimony, his direct place did not take there.” McCorkle’s *8 analy- Ray Leibovitz’s McCorkle said that Harlenia was “like statement echoes they little him and that were provide She declined to the withdraw- cousin” to sis. because, family.” like “[g]ood al instruction while McCorkle was on terms. We were cross-examination, discussed his away, yet, there “as no con- On he walking was time possession to or of various firearms over physical flict from which withdraw the semi to the self-defense and said that he had traded confrontation as which in homicide pistol therefore “con- automatic he used the issue has arisen.” She then denied that that there is no basis for the revolver. McCorkle clude[d] what the prior legitimate point prosecutor had a revolver the stand he had ever attemрting by identifying was to make asked whether government murders. The referring age. Harlenia to her More- and “New a revolver on Year’s possessed he over, questioning the about whether 31st, 2007, Eve, January into December had a revolver six months be- McCorkle and, 1st, he not said did 2008?” McCorkle the shootings tangential probative fore had was over- objection after his counsel’s value, best, light at of other evidence. ruled,7 engaged in the fol- prosecutor the But, assuming questions even that the and lowing questioning: effect, prejudicial answers had some the You not have a revolver? Q: did testimony heard four weeks of that A: No. randomly included evidence that McCorkle Q: point did not that revolver at You ocсasion, parked shot at a car on another anybody? assaulted and threatened witnesses the A: No. case, acknowledged multi- possessing Q: Ray, Harlenia cor- circumstances, You did know ple firearms. In these rect? limited reference to the New Year’s Eve 2007 assault did not constitute reversible A: Yes. Precious. error. Eve, she was 14 Q: And on New Year’s

years old. Joyner B. The Death of Mr. A: Thirteen or 14. additionally argues Clinkscale moved for a subsequently mis- the trial court abused its discretion when it trial, arguing government ‍​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍“asking that the prevented him eliciting testimony from Ray about Harlenia in the same line of Trey Joyner was killed law en questioning impression leaves the that he that, forcement *9 during night triple its cross-exаmination of McCor- of [the homicide.]” however, my perspective, is no evi- the case. From limiting “[T]here instruction: ei- dence, suggestion that any determining admissibility information or test for the in this case had the defendants ther of of evidence under the statement Trey the death of to do with anything exception explicitly that re- repeated Joyner.” This admonition quires “general the court to assess the jury.8 to the during the final instructions credibility” goes beyond of the witness gatekeeping function of the court and Trey Joyner’s The circumstances province jury. too far into the of the strays crimes unrelated to of the death were of Laumer in the Applying prong Any possibility remote that charged here. сase, considered Judge Leibovitz for jury would have blamed concluding number of factors before that by the trial killing dispelled him was credible, including was not the witness merit in We see no court’s instruction. of impeacha- witness’s considerable record instruction, to claim that this Clinkscale’s convictions, ble his failure to mention the than agreed, did more harm which he fact, exculpatory previous declaration in a to think that In it is fanciful good. jurors spec- lengthy investigators, to statement to and his the instruction would cause designed exact manner it was relationship ulate in the close with the defendant. prevent. to appropriate Those facts are all consider- assessing general crеdibility ations for

V. Conclusion of a witness and have led the Superior determine, here, judgments of the Court as the trial court did hereby are lying the witness was about fact that ever made. But to the statement was Affirmed. prevent hearing testimony potentially exculpatory about a statement WASHINGTON, Judge, Chief reliability that otherwise meets the test for concurring: of Laumer prong deprives under the third affirming I concur in the decision While opportunity the defendant an have decision, Laumer the trial court’s because jury perform its traditional role of controlling panel is still law to which this making credibility determinations bound, separately to respectfully I write weighing the evidence. my about the continued express concerns of the first of Laumer to application into the prov- To avoid such an intrusion regarding admissibility decisions jury, but remain faithful to the ince of in- out-of-court statements ensure that obligation trial court’s terest. by the rehable evidence is considered court, prong, I believe Laumer’s third Fisher, concurring opinion, his requires which the defendant to demon- a trial great distinguish makes efforts to strate pur- court’s determinations of the clearly indicate the trustworthiness admissibility jury’s from a deter-

poses of declaration, fact-finders in out-of-court is sufficient to sat- minations of as Perhaps "[y]ou Joyner’s it would have role Mr. death.” 8. The trial court instructed Trey person that a named say: heard evidenсe have been clearer to "Neither defendant Joyner longer evi- is no alive. There is no anyone any- with them had nor associated anyone defendant or associ- dence that either Joyner.” thing to do with the death of Mr. played any either defendant ever ated with *10 isfy gatekeeping purpose.1 admissible.”); the trial court’s ... whether evidence is Ad- preferred approach among visory This is the Committee Note to 1972 Proposed 104(a) (“To majority of federal and state courts. It Rule the extent these comports also with the revised commen- factual, inquiries judge are acts as a tary by Advisory fact.”). Committee on Evi- trier of Appellants’ singular focus majority,2 dence Rules citеd and a propriety judge on the of a making credi- holding series of decisions this court bility determinations misunderstands this credibility that trial court assessments are (in- basic distinction. The Laumer test improper excluding as a basis for testimo- course, cluding, of its prong) first is used ny being from admitted into evidence.3 particular to determine whether evidence is competent' and admissible.

Accordingly, urge I the court to consid- er, banc, en whether the first prong of the We have “broad latitude under the Con- Laumer test should continue to be a factor stitution to establish rules excluding evi- trial courts to consider when determin- dence from criminal trials.” Holmes v. ing admissibility of against statements Carolina, South 547 U.S.

penal interest. (2006); S.Ct. 164 L.Ed.2d 503 see Laumer, (“[T]his 409 A.2d at n. 195 7 court

FISHER, Judge, concurring: Associate is the authority final for establishing the my colleagues Because evidentiary have called for Superior rules for the Court of Columbia.”). reconsidering the first of I the District Despite of latitude, append these brief explain remarks to the Constitution forbids the cre- “ appellants’ upon attack Laumer is flawed. ation of evidentiary rules that ‘infring[e] long It has been the rule “that preliminary upon weighty interest of the accused’ evidentiary questions ... such as the ad- and are ‘arbitrary or disproportionate to ” missibility of evidence are within the con- the purposes they are designed to serve.’ Holmes, trol judge. However, of the trial 324-25,126 these 547 U.S. at S.Ct. 1727 (alteration questions (some must distinguished be original) cred- quo- internal ibility weight omitted). assigned to be to compe- context, tation marks In this tent and admissible testimony.” arbitrary Fowel v. rules are rules that “excluded Wood, (D.C.1948); 62 A.2d important see defense evidence but ... [do] 104(a) (“The Fed.R.Evid. court must de- not any legitimate serve interests.” Id. at any preliminary 325,126 cide questions about S.Ct. 1727. 1. See Laumer v. United 409 A.2d credibility statement on the witness's would (D.C.1979) (stating proponent that the of usurp determining role of the credi- proffered declaration witnesses.”). bility testifying of “significant must overcome a burden” to clearly demonstrate the trustworthiness of the 3.See, e.g., Brisbon v. United declaration under the require- corroboration (D.C.2006) (holding ques- that the ment). credibility tion of of a witness was for the consider, court, not the trial in the context Advisory Committee Note on the 2010 proffered testimony under the excited utter- 804(b)(3), Amendment U.S.C.A., to Fed.R.Evid. rule); exception ance hearsay to the Newman (West 2012) ("In p. assessing v. exist, whether (stressing evaluating reliability that in prof- some courts have focused on the testimony, fered a trial court must the witness not seek to who relates the statement is not a proper reliability factor evaluate of the for the court to consider witness because the assessing corroborating of the excluded circumstances. To witness’ base hearsay admission or exclusion of a jury, judge). was for the not for the *11 RUIZ, undoubtedly legitimate Judge, interest of Senior concurring:

One evidentiary rulеs is to exclude unreliable join I in Washington Chief ex- Scheffer, States v. 528 evidence.- United pressing the view that the issue of the 803, 309, 1261, 140 118 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. wisdom, constitutionality, indeed the of the (1998) (“[T]he exclusion of unreliable prong first in the Laumer ripe test is for objective many principal evidence is a review the court en banc. Laumer ‍​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍v. rules.”). the im- evidentiary Recognizing (D.C. 190, United 409 A.2d objective, exception of this our portance 1979) (en banc). As the authorities cited hearsay against rule for statements in Judge opinion Fisher’s for court requires showing that “the clear, make the tide decisively turning is declarant, fact, in made a statement.” against evidentiary an permits rule that Laumer, adopted 409 A.2d at 199. We (to judge jury) the exclusion of the in a prerequisite, among this foundational oth- criminal case to make credibility determi- ers, in proffer order to ensure that regarding nations the testimony of an in- guarantee contains “a sufficient of trust- and, court witness based on that 203;1 worthiness.” Id. at see In re determination, preclude the defense (“[I]t M.L.H., from introducing evidence of an out-of- responsibility is the trial court’s to exam- court declaration that otherwise meets the [hearsay] testimony ine the and determine requirements admissibility for as a state- proper whether the foundation has been against penal ment interest. See ante laid for the exercise of discretion as to its courts) (citing notes 2 appellate federal аdmission”). courts); 4 (citing supreme state Advi- sory Committee Note on the 2010 Amend- case, In this the statement 804(b)(3), ments to Fed.R.Evid. sought to admit was not admissible unless (West U.S.C.A., 2012). p. 338 it qualified exception as an to the rule against hearsay. See v. Chambers Missis- This court’s opinion adopting Laumer sippi 410 U.S. S.Ct. the statements penal interest ex- (1973) (“The rule, L.Ed.2d hearsay ception to the hearsay rule did not consid- long recognized which has and re- er whether of the test for State, spected by virtually every admissibility is based jury’s pre- trenched on the experience grounded on rogative the notion and the defendant’s Fifth and untrustworthy evidence should not rights be Sixth Amendment a de- fact.”). presented to the triers of As dis- fense and to a jury Interestingly, trial. abоve, however, cussed the Laumer test strikes a recognize Laumer did that once admitting probative balance between (i.e., evi- a statement is deemed admissible af- excluding dence and evidence that is unre- ter the passed trial court has on the credi- liable. There nothing arbitrary bility witness), about of the in-court “the truth of evidentiary an rule that on attempts, the statement as well as basis, case-by-case legiti- to reconcile these the witness repeats who the statement [in mate, yet conflicting, sometimes concerns. weighed by court] must be the trier-of- purposes 1. Our formulation of the originally test Laumer was other and ... the Rule as Judiciary go enough preventing informed the House Cоmmittee’s drafted would not far 804(b)(3)’s (cit- explanation that Fed.R.Evid. cor- fabrication[.]” 409 A.2d at 198 requirement ing H.R.Rep. Cong., roboration arose from a concern No. 93d 1st Sess. 16 (1974), Cong. "that declarations interest were U.S.Code & Admin. News 7051, 7089). 'suspect' pp. more than declarations offered for function.”); Apparently usurping jury’s fact.” 409 A.2d at 196. Newman (D.C. of whether the should have a 1997) similarly role when the trial court decisive (noting evaluating that in a proffer in-court not credible was finds the witness admissibility, judge the trial must be thirty-five raised to the court. In the evaluating careful to refrain from the cred has been years since Laumer issue "witness). ibility of the have also *12 We by a number of Su- brought into focus against judicial warned rules based on “ex jealously guаrd cases that preme Court juries.” cessive mistrust Allen v. Unit jury’s the ultimate fact-finder role as States, (D.C.1992) 1219, 1224 ed 603 A.2d concerning guilt on and maximum matters (en banc) (quoting Kempiners, Riordan v. See, e.g., exposure punishment. Holmes (7th 690, Cir.1987)); 831 F.2d 698 Winfield Carolina, 319, 329-31, v. South 547 U.S. 1, v. United 676 A.2d (2006) 1727, L.Ed.2d 126 S.Ct. (en banc). (striking “arbitrary” down a rule as long recognized It has that courts permitted the trial court to exclude may adopt to regulate rules the admissibil- third-party perpetrator evi- defendant’s ity relevant, of evidence to that which is dence, probative, even if if the court evalu- reliable, unduly prejudicial. and not See guilt ated evidence of the defendant’s as Holmes, 326-27,126 547 U.S. at S.Ct. strong); Blakely Washington, 542 U.S. cases). (citing authority But that must be 296, 313, 124 S.Ct. 159 L.Ed.2d 403 necessary used when a legitimate (2004) (hоlding sentencing a scheme un- purpose and line with the constitutional permitted judges constitutional because it rights 330-31, of the parties. See id. at to increase sentences based on their own 1727 (holding S.Ct. that state’s eviden- fact); findings Apprendi Jersey, v. New tiary rule “violates a criminal defendant’s 466, 490, 530 U.S. 120 S.Ct. right to have ‘a meaningful opportunity to (2000)(“Other L.Ed.2d 435 than the fact of ”) complete a (quoting defense’ conviction, prior fact that increases Kentucky, Crane v. 476 U.S. penalty beyond for a pre- crime (1986)). S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 636 scribed statutory maximum [sentence] time now has come for the en banc court to must be to a jury, proved submitted revisit the first fully of Laumer and doubt.”). beyond a reasonable In cases challenge by apрellants consider the raised dealing admissibility with the of defense necessity to its excluding as means to generally, evidence we have made clear unreliable evidence from tainting a trial fact-finder, that it is the not the trial court and, more fundamentally, its constitution- credibility that must assess the of a prof- ality light of supervening jurisprudence See, e.g., fered witness. Brisbon v. United giving preeminence (D.C.2006) (re- jury’s to the role in making ultimate determinations. versing conviction where defense witness judge’s was excluded based on determina- biased,

tion that noting witness was that is

“essentially determination

that should jury”); have been left to the

Brown v. United

(D.C.1999) (“Conditioning bias cross-exam-

ination on ability the court’s to assess the

credibility of the source of alleged [an]

motive [to runs too close to fabricate] officers. He notes on New pointed revolver at Year’s [her] trial, “[t]hroughout perva there was a Eve.” and, sive air of of witnesses” intim[id]ation context, mysterious “[i]n reference agree We with the trial court that “it’s Joyner many the death of Mr. raised not in the gun being record that the was questions.” He therefore contends that pointed Ray.” at Harlenia The had there prejudice was a “real risk of raised discussion of the motion heard jury being speculate wh[y] left to limine, supra note see without this such a figure central to the case was de information, background meaning ceased explanation with no as to the cause this exchange might entirely not have been of his death.” context, clear. the jury Without this could varying impressions, have been left with government responds it was including Ray died, that Harlenia ‍​‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‍was a witness Joyner particularly irrelevant how to an assault. are at a agreed following We loss under- because Clinkscale to the kle, preclude objected immediately McCorkle moved in limine to his counsel to the government asking Ray, question’s subsequently Harlenia as it relevance. The court that, grand jury, did in the about an assault on ruled "to the extent that Counsel is not allegedly planning questions New Eve Year's 2007 in which he to ask more ... about Eve,” pointed pistol pulled happened an unloaded at her and what on New Year’s the testi- trigger. agreed, ruling mony The trial court relevant because McCorkle's extremely inflammatory explanation that it was "an inci- “whole about how he came to very probative closely dent with low value." When have a revolver associated with [w]as government gun explanation mentioned New Year’s Eve he had the [which] his

Case Details

Case Name: William McCorkle and Andre Clinkscale v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Sep 25, 2014
Citation: 100 A.3d 116
Docket Number: 11-CF-1667 & 11-CF-1668
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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