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William L. Gray v. Joseph Klauser, Warden
282 F.3d 633
9th Cir.
2002
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 to a strays close dangerously conviction Such

finding guilt association.

сonviction, in the of a even context street First squared with the cannot

gang,

Amendment, thus stand. See cannot Hardware,

Claiborne 3409; F.3d Prunty, 107 Mitchell v. (9th

1337, 1342 Cir.1997), oth overruled on Horsley, 133 grounds by Santamaria v.

er (1998) (en banc); v. see also Hill

F.3d 1242 (5th Houston,

City F.2d Cir.1986) Constitu (explaining “[t]he decent, law- protect only

tion does

abiding people”). stringent requirements

Given the

AEDPA, grant we hesitate affirm a Arizona where three levels of the

habeas prop- system have held a conviction

Court however, conclude, reluctantly

er. We in which

that this is one of rare cases decision review" of state court’s our “a firm convic-

leaves us with ‘definite and an error committed.”

tion’ that has been (citation omitted).

Chmn, 263 F.3d at 969 is, grant

The district court’s of the writ

therefore,

AFFIRMED. GRAY, L.

William Petitioner-

Appellant, KLAUSER, Warden,

Joseph

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 00-35732. Appeals, Court

United States

Ninth Circuit. 7, May

Argued and Submitted

Filed Feb. *3 rights and constitutional

requisite error harmless standard was met, we reverse.

I. Facts 24,1989, July LeRoy On Leavitt went to Falls, the Idaho Idaho home of Reeda Roundy. There, Roundy he found Betty Gray, Roundy’s best friend and lover, gunshot Leavitt’s dead from wounds *4 to the head. more than years After two investigation suspects, govern- of four Gray’s ment indicted Betty husband of 29 years, Gray, William for the murders a and related burglary count. Theory A. The State’s Grant, Newcomb,

Maynard Grant D. & Seattle, WA, petitioner-appellant. for the state, According learning to the after Robins, that Deputy Betty having

Kenneth M. Attorney Gray was affair with General, Boise, ID, divorce, for the Leavitt and respondent- that she wanted a appellee. Gray hatched a Ml plan to his wife and steps

took to ensure he would get First, caught: Gray bought a 1971 Inter- registered national Travelall and a under Then, false name. in early morning July Gray hours of drove the Hole, Travelall in from his home Jackson TROTT, LAY,* BERZON, Before: and Wyoming, to Eastern Idaho Medical Judges. Circuit Falls, Center Gray Idaho Idaho. parked the at the Travelall Medical Cen- BERZON, Judge: Circuit ter, and then bicycle rode his 3.6 miles to Idaho prisoner Gray state William home, Betty Gray where had wife, convicted of killing Betty Gray, spent night. friend, Roundy. and her Gray Reeda un- successfully home, sought relief At Roundy’s Idaho government claimed, state system before filing Gray a habeas both Betty Gray shot and petition pursuant Roundy in federal court to 28 with a handgun. head 9mm § U.S.C. 2254. The district court The prosecution denied Gray theorized that ar- petition granted ranged but certificate of appear the scene to as the site of a appealability Gray’s for each killing, claims. ritualistic cult hoping to deflect Because we find that the Idaho suspicion Then, Gray from himself. rode (“trial court”) rulings court’s regarding the bike back 3.6 miles to the medical admission of evidence violated center and drove the Travelall back to * Lay, The P. Honorable Donald Senior nation. Circuit Circuit, Judge Eighth sitting by for the desig- bicycle ride a into medical aged man was also evidence Hole. There

Jackson into bicycle lot parking put the investi- center initially during lied Gray matters, plates. license including Wyoming a vehicle with as several gation police, Mackley a vehicle similar to the de- whether he owned Travelall, it. variously Jeep, as why, happened what scribed the vehicle vehicle, and as “Suburban-type” perhaps The B. Defense an International. of two related consisted defense approached the Suspicious, Mackley murderer and he was not the claims: that lot questioned parking man him. Regarding else that someone was. dark, Mackley jury, he told the murderer, Gray was not the claim he flashlight over the man’s scanned a beam was not in Idaho Falls that he asserted sixty approximately face. For seconds testified also question. He night Mackley spoke middle-aged with a Cauca- Betty Gray’s he know about did not rosy with cheeks who was sian man red until after the murders. affair Leavitt out of breath. sweating profusely and was no the State had emphasized man, a medical identifica- who wore crimes, linking him the fingerprints Mackley told glasses, tion bracelet and *5 physi- little other produced that State picking up that the vehicle for he was Moreover, Dr. Karen Servil- cal evidence. Hole, Wyoming. friends from Jackson la, opined that Gray’s treating physician, spread, news of thе murders After condition, poor medical because of police and told Mackley contacted the to ride his Gray physically unable was he had When asked to them what seen. in the round-trip mile time bicycle the 7.2 a composite create help police a artist Gray government. also theorized man, fairly mystery Mackley sketch of bought he had the Travelall explained that with Gray signifi- described one accurately part pawnshop of his for someone else as that man cant he claimed exception: business, was although that never person he had was clean-sha- spoken with whom found. mustache, beard, ven, no or stating “No Gray’s posit- defense part second Gray a full beard sporting was anything.” killer, else was the real somebody ed that night question. on the directions. Gray pointed and several later, police when the days Three the ritualistic emphasizing Aside from five-person photographic him a showed scene, Gray postu- crime overtones of the Mackley selected bearded line-up,1 people Leavitt, lated that one three — Gray, person remember stating “the lover), Riley (Roundy’s current Houston [Gray].” photograph a was in tee lover) Dyer (Roundy’s previous J.W. —was about the fa- he was “concerned” Because the murders. responsible for however, hair, Mackley po- asked the cial had been recently photograph lice how Line-up C. The Photo taken. case was key to the state’s Steve later, Then, days Mackley coinci- a few Mackley, security guard at the Eastern Gray hospital, at a and dentally ran into 3:00 a.m. Idaho Center. Around Medical Gray as the man immediately identified Mackley a middle- July saw person photograph 6. array knew Actually, photograph consisted of Mackley acknowledged photos. that he six parking medical center lot with hearsay by Betty from the statements made Gray that, Mackley put Gray motive, and Travelall. As bicycle supplying didn’t appear likely it: “The facial hair throw me off made it he more that was the Likewise, seen it in again, picture.” I’d killer. attempted because the defense hearsay introduce statements made by prevent state Gray sought to from Roundy, through testimony Roun- introducing Mackley’s statements identify- children, friend, dy’s two her best Gray mystery bicycle-rider. ing as the Riley, the man was her who lover at the Gray argued that the manner in which the time her death. These statements arranged was photographic array called appear likely made it more Gray unduly attention to thus lover, killer, Dyer, former was the as he array, suggestive. Gray’s picture In the is had Roundy. threatened and stalked tint; only also, a dark pink one with only Gray Gray’s objections, other man are Over one shown the trial court glasses. That other man is allowed the state to wearing wear- introduce some of Gray Betty ing sunglasses depicted while look- statements. Before so top ruling, the trial court ing reading glasses, pre-trial out over the held a suppression Mackley hearing to consider the regard- characteristic had admis- noted sibility of these person statements. Buceóla testi- ing he saw. contended fied at others, hearing about that for several conver- these reasons the ar- sations she had with her deceased sister.2 ray unduly suggestive, and that the Following hearing, the trial court ruled identifications fruits of unduly that the state could not Betty introduce suggestive reject- The trial line-up. Gray’s statement that she feared her hus- Gray’s argument, finding ed the array *6 band, because the statement not mate- unduly was not that suggestive, and even if did, however, rial. court The allow Buceó- was, it Mackley’s were suffi- identifications la testify to that Betty Gray trial said ciently reliable to be admitted. Idaho that she was having an affair and wanted a array Court Appeals found the to be divorce, Gray that had learned about the unduly suggestive, held Mackley’s that divorce, affair and desire for Gray that had “sufficiently identification was reliable to secret, keep asked her to it Gray that outweigh suggestiveness the low level of angry became when she divulged the se- the identification procedures.” State v. cret. trial court concluded that one of 784, Gray, 129 Idaho 932 P.2d (that these Betty Gray statements told 921 (Ct.App.1997). The federal district divorce) Gray she wanted a not hear- court in its decision on habeas review say, and that the rest were relevant state- reasoning appeals tracked of the state fact particularized ments of that bore court. guarantees of trustworthiness and thus Hearsay D. The Evidence were admissible under Idaho’s residual ex- ception hearsay rule, IDAHO R. trial, sought At both to present sides 803(24) (“Rule 803(24)”). EVID. hearsay in order to advance their respective not, theories Through however, case. The trial court did allow testimony Betty Gray’s sister, Gray Joann any hearsay introduce of the state- Buceóla, the sought state to introduce ments Roundy. attributable to Roundy’s prosecution 2. The gave pre- reason the ways for were different in some from those con- senting Buceóla a live government's witness before prehearing tained written judge was that the statements she testified to submissions. first, Gray filed a peti- P.2d 907. then indicated, she was that statements second, the Idaho and, Supreme the reasons tion for review with Dyer, afraid of and, denied, fear, Court, petition had including Dyer after it was her that for her, to kill had threatened for of Certiorari with the United that he Writ stalked Court, her, had her that police Supreme told also denied. and that States The trial court “mercenary.”3 awas timely petition filed a for habeas Gray could not statements first ruled these Gray respondent Joseph Klau- relief. mind hear- under Idaho’s state of come ser, the warden of the Idaho State Correc- 803(3) R. EYID. say exception, IDAHO Institution, summary filed tional cross (“Rule 803(3)”). It reasoned —as did judgment district court motions. The Betty regard to similar granted the warden’s motion denied relating Gray the statements —that Gray’s. Gray appeals ruling. now immaterial Roundy’s mind were state It held that inadmissible. then and thus II. ANALYSIS Roundy’s fear were state- the reasons for Gray appeal. raises four issues fact, qualify for ments of thus photo line-up proce- argues He under the state mind admission that it denied his suggestive dure was so exception. to due constitutionally-protected right pro- The trial considered ad- court next process He due is- cess. raises second missibility Roundy’s statements under sue, claiming the trial court failed to hearsay exception, Rule Idaho’s residual poll jurors regarding prejudicial mid- all 803(24). Here, once the trial court held claims, Gray thirdly, trial publicity. relating that because the statements again rights under violated state of mind were materi- Roundy’s Amend- Confrontation Clause Sixth al, they As were inadmissible. hearsay statements by admitting ment factual rea- statements that indicated the Finally, argues that Betty Gray. mind, sons for state of process his due the trial court violated they qual- court held that because failed rights suppressing hearsay statements Idaho’s state of ify admission under these con- by Roundy. We address made did not hearsay exception, they mind also *7 in turn. tentions qualify for admission under Idaho’s residu- rulings hearsay exception.4 al two oral Photographic Line-up A. The trial, during repeated the trial court this deciding— reasoning. Assuming—without arrаy five-person photo that the was some Proceedings E. suggestive, we are convinced what eyewit trial, circumstances jury under the Following the returned ver- Mackle/s sufficiently degree ness identification was reliable counts first guilty dict of two of jury. presented been Man degree of bur- to have murder and one count first Brathwaite, 114, 97 the of son v. Gray appealed to Idaho Court glary. (1977); L.Ed.2d 140 Neil v. 53 Gray, affirmed. 129 Idaho S.Ct. Appeals, which rulings question are 4. on this the court's 3. The does not elaborate on defini- record detail, infra, except say we "mercenary” to individual, where tion of more described military-involved who admissibility was "a issue on the discuss goods with sporting owns a store ... access merits. weapons.” to numerous 640 188, 198, 409

Biggers, U.S. had a S.Ct. fendant “shoulder-length straight- (1972). In determining L.Ed.2d permanent style”). ened hair an eyewitness’ whether identification is Mackley fairly was the photo sure at sufficiently to outweigh rehable the sug- line-up that Gray was the man he had consider, of gestiveness photo array, we encountered the medical parking center (1) among things: opportunity other of lot. He stated Gray person “the was the witness to view criminal at the (2) crime; Mackley remember to a time tee.” was degree the witness’ con- attention; (3) cerned, accuracy prior however, hair, of his about facial (4) level description; certainty dem- photo and asked when the taken. (5) identification; at onstrated Finally, Mackley’s the time between en- length time between the crime and the counter with mystery bicycle-rider Brathwaite, identification. 432 U.S. at Gray his photo selection line-up 114, 97 days. was short: three Mackley fairly had a good opportunity to mystery bicycle view spoke rider. He circumstances, Under these there is not man range approxi- at close “a very substantial irrepara- likelihood of mately sixty Although seconds. it was [, ble misidentification and] [s]hort dark, Mackley flashlight scanned a beam point, such evidence is for jury across the man’s face several times. Brathwaite, decide.” U.S. Mackley’s degree attention was rela- (internal quotation S.Ct. 2243 and citation tively onduty An high. security guard at omitted). encounter, time his attention was piqued suspected because he that the B. Polling Juror illegally man siphoning gas or hot- wiring a car. Upon Gray’s request, the trial court Mackley’s pre-line-up description was polled members their expo- about accurate in ways. Mackley several de sure potentially adverse mid-trial pub- person scribed the parking in the lot as a licity. court, In his brief Caucasian, man, middle-aged with flushed argued, as he appeal had on in the state a ruddy cheeks and complexion, who wore courts the federal district court on glasses and a medical identification brace habeas, that the trial judge inadvertently let. Also, description Gray. Each matched bypassed juror one and that this failure Mackley accurately described the Interna denied him right to an impartial jury. tional Travelall vehicle with fair accuracy, appeals The state district including Wyoming its plates.5 license *8 accepted the factual representation However, the Mackley fact that remem but held that there was no of error consti- clean-shaven, bered the man as while Gray tutional Gray’s appellate dimensions. As beard, had a significant appreciably under counsel acknowledged during oral argu- cuts accuracy of his description. See ment, however, reading a careful Myers, Tomlin v. 30 F.3d 1241 — 42 (9th Cir.1994) transcript judge shows that the trial (questioning the accuracy of poll each of jurors identification where the twelve witness and two stated perpetrator had a “two-inch afro” and de- alternates. There was no error.

5. Mackley vehicle, brand, vacillated somewhat before and its and the manner during describing trial in precise tailgate operated. color of which the

641 sufficient under Hearsay respects, in some Betty Gray’s ed Statements C. to a violation of the Con- Wright preclude trial court’s challenges the frontation Clause. Gray’s out- Betty of allow some decision to Idaho’s residual under statements of-court Hearsay Roundy’s Statements D. 803(24), as viola exception, Rule hearsay did commit a different The trial court right Amendment Gray’s Sixth tive error, in connection though, constitutional a declarant is confront witnesses. When Betty Gray’s its to admit decision testify, Confrontation unavailable the court hearsay Although statements. if it hearsay only Clause countenances statements, which favored admitted her reliability indicia of adequate demonstrates position, it refused government’s (1) firmly rooted by falling within either by hearsay statements parallel admit (2) bearing hearsay exception; particu statements, in- Roundy Roundy. In these See of trustworthiness. guarantees larized had life threatened her dicated 805, 815, Wright, 497 U.S. Idaho applied her. Had the court and stalked (1990). Ida 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. reasoning used to exclude exception, under hearsay ho’s residual statements, Betty Gray’s statements ad challenged which the as excluded those statements would have mitted, ex firmly hearsay rooted not a is well. S.Ct. 3139. The Id. ception. Amend question raised Sixth asymmetrical application This is whether challenge, consequently, ment is unconstitutional. evidentiary standards under admitted Betty Gray’s statements arbitrarily a de prevent A state hearsay exception partic bore residual presenting from evidence fendant of trustworthiness. guarantees ulaiized material, trustworthy, important allowing prosecution, defense. presented the testimo- government 803(24) defense, to use Rule ny to the situational back- of Buceóla as import of similar hearsay admit evidence Betty Gray’s statements. As ground of character, court violated the the trial observed, tri- district court the federal arbitrary against prohibition constitutional precisely process engaged al court to de evidentiary standards application suggested is Supreme that the Court has fendants. trustworthi- to determine the necessary thereby statements and ness Ruling the Trial 1. The Basis for Court rights defendant’s under

protect on direct 818-20, Appeals The Idaho Court Id. at Confrontation Clause. review, P.2d Idaho at Moreover, Gray, 129 the trial court re- habeas and the district court on on the basis of some found trustworthiness facially asymmetrical affirmed the view Supreme that the Court has of the factors on an rulings on similar evidence ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‍abuse particularized guarantees approved standard, ruling that trustworthiness, including spontaneity, discretion mind, entitled to conclude court was repetition, state of consistent prosecution bore all offered (although not lack of motive to fabricate trustworthiness particularized indicia of admitted had all these of the statements *9 characteristics). by the defense did not. while that offered Id. conclude that the We record, however, indi- A close look the into the trustworthi- inquiry trial court's not the trial court’s decision was Betty cates that the introduction of preceding ness statements, the trustwor- any on concern about based hearsay while truncat- Instead, parts Roundy’s of the statements. the ries: the of thiness statements (1) (2) mind; court on a thrice-repeated regarding trial acted sub- her of state analysis that stantive could been used the factual reasons for her of state mind. Betty Gray to exclude to statements but The Roundy’s latter included statements “(1) was not. she had heard that was a (2) mercenary; Dyer had threatened to kill actually the court gave reasons trial (3) her; around; Dyer had followed her hearsay rejecting for evidence offered (4) Dyer kept calling always her and (1) by Gray were that the evidence was not seemed to know her address.” The court (2) material to the case and because the regarding declared statements Roun- qualify not for admission un- did dy’s state of mind immaterial and thus hearsay mind der Idaho’s state of excep- inadmissible. It then held that the state- 803(3), tion, qualify Rule it did not also for ments indicating Roundy’s reasons for hearsay admission under its catch-all ex- state of mind were statements of fact and 803(24). ception, Rule These reasons thus qualify did not for admission under of formed basis court’s hold- the state of hearsay exception. mind ings on each of the three occasions that the admissibility trial court considered the next section of trial court’s writ- the Roundy hearsay by evidence offered disposition ten analyzed hearsay evi- the defense. Not once did the court pass dence under hearsay Idaho’s residual ex- judgement Roundy on whether the state- 803(24).8 Here, ception, Rule the trial guarantees ments bore particularized held, again, once that because the or they trustworthiness indicate that relating Roundy’s state of not.6 material, mind were they were inad- initial, disposition, In its written missible. As to the parts the trial the state- analyzed admissibility court first ments that indicated the factual reasons mind, Roundy hearsay for evidence under Idaho’s state the trial court stated, hearsay exception, passing, state-of-mind they Rule that because failed 803(3).7 analysis, qualify To conduct this for admission under Idaho’s court divided the into two catego- hearsay exception, they state of mind also Indeed, later, as we discuss equivalent guarantees is clear from circumstantial Gray adequately trustworthiness, the record that met the trial if the court determines that only request proof court's for an offer of con- (A) the statement is as offered evidence of a cerning Roundy situational context of the fact; (B) material the statement is more statements. probative point which it is of- any fered than other evidence which the unavailable, 7. When the declarant is Rule procure proponent through can reasonable 803(3) allows for admission of: efforts; (C) general purposes statement of existing A the declarant’s then justice these rules and interests of will mind, emotion, sensation, physi- state of or best served admission of the state- (such intent, motive, plan, cal condition ment into evidence. A statement design, feeling, pain, bodily mental exception be admitted under this unless the health), including but not a statement of proponent of it makes known to the adverse memory prove or belief to the fact remem- party sufficiently in advance of the trial or bered or believed unless it relates to the hearing provide party execution, revocation, identification, adverse with a it, opportunity prepare fair to meet terms of declarant's will. proponent's intention to offer the statement unavailable, 8. When the declarant Rule it, particulars including and the 803(24) for the allows admission of: name and address of the declarant. specifically A any statement not covered exceptions of the foregoing having *10 spoke or the circumstances which the under Idaho’s for admission qualify did not uttered, remarks were and therefore did hearsay exception.9 residual any it wаy not indicate in that believed the later, trial court reaffirm- days Two regarding hearsay statements these facts a oral statement. in brief ruling ed its trust- particularized guarantees lacked request renewed denying the defense’s worthiness. hearsay evi- court that the trial admit later, again the trial court dence, the rea- Two weeks judge reaffirmed admissibility hearsay of the Just as its considered soning in its written order.10 803(24). order, Again, under Rule the trial court did evidence written earlier And, orally.11 Roundy ruling trial court issued its the facts of which not focus on I.R.E., 803(3), evidence under Rule it following is the trial court's written as 9.The admissibility analysis regarding the of Roun- are also inad- follows that such statements 803(24) (emphasis 803(24), dy's Rule statements under under I.R.E. missible Rule added): following analy- first 10. is the court's oral foregoing statements Gray also offers the admissibility Roundy's regarding the sis exception to the hear- under the "catch-all” 803(24), say I.R.E. In order rule under Rule statements: under Rule for a statement to be admissible my that I stated in [F]or reasons I.R.E., find, 803(24), among must opinion, state- written I don't think that the things, that "the statement is offered other presented to me for review ments that major- of a fact.” The as evidence material any exception hearsay fall within stated ity of have held that a victim's courts rule. person only mate- of a is evidence of a fear And, therefore, going I’m stand enumerat- rial fact under the circumstances So I will allow that limit- written decision. i.e., (1) where a defendant raises ed above: interrogation Rodriguez ed as Mr. con- self-defense, suicide or accidental a claim of cerning particular suspect, this but I’m not such death and the declarant-victim feared you get going into state- defendant; to allow (2) where the declarant- prior we in the hear- ments that addressed of a defendant is offered to victim's fear ing. that a claim the defendant rebut relationship victim with the defendant's following However, second oral 11. The is court’s good. at least one court has analysis regarding admissibility of Roun- person a stated fear of a held that victim’s 803(24) (emphasis probative identity dy’s of the Rule statements under is and, therefore, added): evidence of a material killer Gause, Ariz. fact. See State v. I at least right. All have ruled this (1971). P.2d opinion a written twice before. issued opinion is Because this court date, pointed time I an earlier person's mind is evidence of one state of majority courts have held out that the minimally only probative of the state of person fear of a is victim's stated another, the view mind of and because only a material fact under the evidence of would, effect, Gause, adopted supra, in Rule sub circumstances enumerated person’s one state of allow evidence of is, 24; part that where a defendant raises to be introduced as evidence mind suicide, defense, of self accidental claim (i.e. per- of another it would state mind death, such victim feared declarant particular person mit a victim’s fear of defendant, and where the declarant victim's probative evidence of such be introduced to rebut a fear of a defendant offered intent), person’s court is murderous by the defendant’s claim defendant majority view. inclined follow relationship good. with the victim Therefore, having concluded herein Roundy's statements that she feared Therefore, me that Reeda seems to not fall her such do reasons fear for Roundy's she feared Mr. statements that circumstances which within either of the such and her reasons [sic] admitted Dier would allow the statements fear *11 644

again, court Penry, mentioned the “rea- 121 (quoting S.Ct. 1918 Williams, 1495). is, 404, 529 sons” for fears —that the facts U.S. at 120 S.Ct. Because the concerning her former lover’s behavior— Idaho state courts did not apply pertinent in only only passing. Nev- constitutional rules es- general Court, by Supreme tablished discussed er did the trial indicate that below, they applied an requisite legal incorrect stan- guarantees of trustworthiness Thus, “contrary Instead, that, gov- dard. to” clause lacking. it is apparent case, only questions erns and the given rulings, any the trial court’s offer (1) remaining are whether there was con- put on a to witness show trustwor- error; (2) stitutional “whether the er- refused, thiness would have been on the a injurious ror had substantial or on effect ground repeated the evi- —thrice —that Packer, the verdict.” 277 F.3d at 1102 immaterial, simply dence was however Abrahamson, v. (citing Brecht 507 U.S. trustworthy. 619, 637, 1710, 113 S.Ct. 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). Applicable Principles 2. Constitutional principles Two of constitutional

a. Constitutional Protections law, clearly by Supreme both established 2254(d)(1), § 28 Under U.S.C. a precedent, figure prominently Court in de may grant federal court an application for termining whether there was constitutional a writ corpus of habeas for a adjudi claim First, in this error case. a state rule or cated in a only state court if—and if—that ruling may arbitrarily a deprive defen adjudication “resulted in a decision that dant of his right present defense to, contrary or involved an unreason right present on witnesses his be of, application clearly able established Second, half. a state rule or state judge law, Federal as determined the Su justification impose not without strict preme Court United States.” The evidentiary er standards on a defendant Supreme Court has held that the clauses desiring present testimony a witness’ “contrary to” applica and “unreasonable than on prosecution. it does independent tion of’ meaning. Pen These rules emanate from the Johnson, 782, ny v. 532 121 U.S. S.Ct. general principles system our 1910, 1918, (2001); 150 L.Ed.2d justice, a defendant has the fundamental 362, 404, v. Taylor, Williams rights present present defense and to 1495, (2000); 146 L.Ed.2d 389 see years, witnesses. For more fifty than Hill, (9th Packer 1092, F.3d Supreme clearly Court has and repeatedly Cir.2002). “contrary ap- to” clause articulated guar these core constitutional alia, plies, inter when a “applies state antees. rule governing that contradicts the law set forth” cases; in the Supreme Black, Court’s writing Justice for the “unreasonable application ap- of’ clause Court, Supreme declared that a defen- plies when a state identifies the correct “right dant’s day to his court” is “basic legal standard applies unreasonably. system in our jurisprudence” in- don’t fall within either my ruling circum- So I will prior affirm

stances which would allow the statements objection issue and sustain the state's to be admitted as evidence under Rule that evidence. part sub and it would also follow that such would not be admis- part sible under Rule sub *12 409,108 minimum, 484 at S.Ct. Taylor, fact.” U.S. right to examine a “as a eludes formally him, incorporated Washington testimo 646. against to witnesses the offer In Clause into Compulsory Process counsel.” represented and to be ny, 499, 273, the Fourteenth Oliver, 257, Due Clause of 68 Process 333 U.S. S.Ct. re added). 17-19, (1948) Amendment. 388 U.S. at 87 S.Ct. (emphasis L.Ed. 682 92 then, again has That stated: Supreme Court 1920. case Since or “es the “fundamental” again noted testimony of wit- right to offer the right of a defendant’s character sential” nesses, attendance, compel to them defense, Ken a Cram v. present to both in plain right terms the necessary, if 683, 690, 687, 106 S.Ct. 476 tucky, U.S. defense, right pres- a to present to (1986); v. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 facts version ent the defendant’s California Trombetta, 485, 479, S.Ct. 467 U.S. 104 prosecution’s as well as the (1984); v. Tex 2528, 413 Webb 81 L.Ed.2d the truth lies. may where so decide 351, as, 95, 98, 34 93 S.Ct. 409 U.S. to right as an accused has Just Texas, (1972); Washington v. 330 L.Ed.2d witnesses for prosecution’s cоnfront the 19, 1920, 14, 18 L.Ed.2d 87 S.Ct. 388 U.S. challenging their testimo- purpose (1967), as a present and to witnesses 1019 right present he to his own ny, has the Illinois, Taylor v. of that defense. part a This to establish defense. witnesses 646, 400, 408, 98 108 S.Ct. U.S. 484 due fundamental element of right is a Arkansas, (1988); 483 Rock v. L.Ed.2d 798 process of law. 2704, 44, 55, 37 107 S.Ct. 97 L.Ed.2d U.S. 19, Id. at 87 S.Ct. 1920. (1987); Mississippi v. 410 U.S. Chambers may a defendant’s A state violate 1038,

284, 294, 302, S.Ct. 35 L.Ed.2d 93 present a defense witnesses right Webb, 98, (1973); 409 at 93 S.Ct. 297 U.S. in an evidentiary by applying standards 19, 351; at Washington, 388 U.S. 87 S.Ct. arbitrary Washington, uneven way. variously has stated 1920. Court Supreme Court held example, right to a right defense and an accused’s prevented accomplice a Texas rule that emanate from the Sixth present witnesses ar- a defendant’s behalf testifying from on 409, Amendment, 108 Taylor, 484 U.S. at right bitrarily denied defendant 646; v. States Valenzuela- S.Ct. United a witness. U.S. testimony 388 offer 3440, 858, Bernal, 867, 102 458 U.S. S.Ct. Rock, 23, Similarly, in 87 1920. at S.Ct. (1982), Process 1193 the Due 73 L.Ed.2d that Arkansas’ Court held Supreme Amendment, of the Fourteenth Clause re- hypnotically all per excluding se rule 2704; 51, Rock, 483 at 107 S.Ct. U.S. in- testimony arbitrary was an freshed 2528; Trombetta, 485, 467 104 S.Ct. U.S. at right fringement of the defendant’s 1038; Chambers, 294, 93 410 U.S. at S.Ct. a testimony. stated that The Court present Oliver, Webb, 97, 351; 409 at 93 S.Ct. U.S. testimony not may state’s restrictions Crane, or both. U.S. 68 S.Ct. at 55-56, at 107 S.Ct. arbitrary, 2142; S.Ct. Strickland at 2704; apply not an arbi- “may that a state 668, 684-85, 104 Washington, 466 U.S. a ma- competence to exclude trary rule of (1984); Wash 80 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. taking from terial defense witness 17-18, 1920. 87 S.Ct. ington, 388 U.S. stand;” “may apply that a state a witness permits rule of evidence Amendment source The Sixth stand, arbitrarily excludes Process take rights Compulsory is the these Id. portions testimony.” of his Clause, right to have material which embraces “the 55,107 2704. trier S.Ct. testimony heard the witness’ ruling unequal that a state In addition standards to defendants and the arbitrarily apply evidentiary rule, stan- state. Under the Texas an accom- dards, Supreme Court has also focused plice testify could for the state but not for particular variety its criticism on arbi- the defendant. The Cоurt ruled that this unjustified ap- trariness: and uneven distinction was not rational. 388 U.S. at way plication evidentiary standards Harlan, Justice con- *13 prosecution that the over favors defen- currence, emphasized the arbitrariness 95, Georgia, In dants. Green U.S. and unevenness of this distinction. He (1979) 2150, 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 738 the applicable stated that different rules to curiam), (per the Supreme Court reversed the state the defendants violated the a penalty death sentence because the trial Clause, Due Process because a state by court had excluded testimony offered recognize not and competent as relevant Georgia’s the under hearsay defense rules. testimony the of a certain category wit- Georgia’s hearsay While did al- rules not arbitrarily ness but bar of testimony use low the admission of evidence that would by by that same kind witness the defen- exculpatory have been in Green’s sentenc- 24-25, 1920; dant. Id. at 87 S.Ct. also see hearing, ing the state’s rules did the allow Chambers, 295-98, at U.S. 93 S.Ct. government evi- introduce the same (unconstitutional bar defendant dence his co-defendant’s trial. Su- The from impeaching although own witness preme Court held the exclusion of the government the impeach was free to sentencing evidence at to be reversible witness); States, Cool v. United error, listing several why reasons the trial n. 93 S.Ct. 84 L.Ed.2d 335 hearsay court should have admitted the (1972) (jury instruction telling the testimony. The Court concluded: “Per- it could convict solely the basis of most haps important the State considered accomplice testimony but that it could sufficiently the testimony reliable use acquit grounds on this basis constituted for against co-defendant], [Green’s and to base reversal). a sentence of death it.” Id. upon apply Other cases confirm and Here, the trial court indubitably a principle that ruling state rule or applied hеarsay Idaho’s exception residual imposes greater evidentiary burden on a arbitrarily unevenly. With expla no justification defendant without due violates all, nation at the trial court used two com Webb, process. for example, the trial pletely analytical different frameworks judge admonished the defendant’s witness considering prosecution when and de length testify truthfully, hearsay fense’s evidence under Rule give similar warnings the state’s wit 803(24). The analysis trial court’s di nesses. As a result of judge’s the trial verged in significant ways, least three lecture, the defendant’s witness refused to below, explained depending on whether the testify. Supreme Court ruled by prosecution evidence was offered or judge “trial gratuitously out singled surprisingly, defense. Not the differ witness,” one and held that the witness’ 803(24) analysis ent Rule by used subsequent refusal testify deprived diametrically court resulted in opposite defendant process. of due 409 U.S. at 97- rulings: rejected While the trial court 98, 93 S.Ct. 351. evidence, hearsay defense’s it admitted Similarly, Washington, Supreme substantially parallel hearsay evidence objected Court to a that applied by Texas rule prosecution. submitted materiality, lack with no manly per- first, important, difference and most 803(24) analysis explanation. tinent ana- trial Rule court’s between trial court frameworks was lytical way in which the trial court’s The second hearsay whether considered 803(24) analysis depending Rule differed were mate- prosecution offered gave was that trial court party on the fact case, mate- but did not consider rial to the findings its under Rule preclusive effect to hearsay riality offered when defense 803(3) when it considered the defense’s in- In three different statements of fact. not when it considered the evidence but stances, hearsay admitted a Although the trial court prosecution’s. prosecu- offered statement аnalytical framework used different of fact of its anal- devoting paragraph after tion the two considering parties’ when the state- ysis 803(24), to consideration of whether under Rule at least one *14 In material to the case. these ment was In analysis the consistent: aspect of was instances, 803(24) trial noted that two of case, analysis the court each the Rule imme- prove Gray comments “tend to the consideration of the same diately followed 803(3). killer,” the and a third comment “es- the under Rule When evidence 803(24) killing.” motive for the Based Rule tablished a trial court moved onto the court analyses, the trial behalf of it analysis prosecution, on these careful the hearsay all material to an of the evi- began held three statements its consideration case, anew, but, ac- inexplicably, admissible did not issue the and therefore dence 803(24). advantage cord this defense. under Rule example, the trial court admitted For contrast, the court de- In when trial 803(3) by offered Rule a statement under hearsay clared the statements inadmissible indicating the Bet- the reasons prosecution defense, the by the trial of fact offered ty Gray feared that had discovered Gray consider the court did not once whether decision, the her with Leavitt. In its affair to material the case-even statements were of statement was one court noted that the though explicitly trial court acknowl- the fact, making inappropriate it for admission hearsay of the statements edged that some hearsay exception. mind under the state of were of by offered the defense statements Then, to trial court moved on consider the considering of whether the fact.12 Instead 803(24) statement under same hearsay fact were material statements of exception, ruling that “state- hearsay admissibility un- determining their when 803(24), Rule may be offered under ment 803(24), trial court conducted der Rule facts therein.” prove I.R.E. to asserted to why as hear- a detailed examination say relating statements state not admit as the court would Just trial This failure to mind were material. evidence described above prosecution’s of materiality ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‍hearsay exception of defense’s consider the state of mind under the fact, fact, hearsay lump- of external of the trial statements because it a statement of admit in instead with the state mind also defense’s ing them court facts, under of of fact evidence hearsay was critical: As result statement hearsay statements, exception. This of mind the exter- state merging diverse time, though, the court moved on rejected when nal sum- fact statements fact, also such are statements prior considering the de- Immediately 803(24), proffer the district of mind’ ex- fense's under Rule under the ‘state not admissible added): (emphasis 803(3), "Because court wrote ception in Rule I.R.E.” Dyer Roundy's are stated reasons her fear admissibility prove consider the tend to was the killer? court, exception, under the residual conclude that trial We careful 803(3) prior analysis matters, Rule though viewed its under it was as to other this as dispositive. applied entirely instance divergent analy- and came to ses irreconcilable results re- that the trial ana- way The third court’s garding admissibility the substantive 803(24) lytical under Rule dif- structure the out-of-court statements the two vic- identity on the depending fered tims. party was that the court included pro-admissibility analysis only factor in its b. The Limits of the Constitutional considering admissibility when Protections prosecution. evidence submitted analysis above demon admitting the prosecution’s hearsay testi- arbitrarily strates that the trial court de mony, consistently gave nied right present defense weight to the that “the factor interests and witnesses. But so conclude does justice are best when the served not settle the constitutional issue before presented with as much information right present us. The relevant testimo possible Despite about case.” fac- cases, ny “may, appropriate bow to ac significance tor’s constitutional with re- *15 other legitimate commodate in interests gard defense, to offered statements Chambers, process.” the criminal 410 U.S. 19, Washington, see 388 U.S. at 87 S.Ct. 295, 1038; Rock, 93 S.Ct. see also 483 (right testimony to is “in plain offer U.S. 2704. A S.Ct. state’s re present terms ... to right the defen- striction right present on a defendant’s to dant’s version of the facts as well may evidence not to rise constitutional er prosecution’s jury it may to the so decide immaterial, if ror the evidence unimpor is lies”), where although the truth de- tant, or untrustworthy. fense argued jury counsel that the should picture, allowed to see whole (i) Materiality Importance court did not consider when deter- Defense admissibility mining hearsay by Gray. statements offered The trial To establish violation of the court gave explanation no for why the right witness, constitutional to present a prosecution was accorded the benefit defendant must “plausible make a showing pro-admissibility this factor but the de- of how testimony [the] would have been any fense was not. Nor can think we both material and favorable to his defense.” explanation zuela-Bernal, for such treatment. Valen 458 U.S. at 3440; Rock, 102 S.Ct. see also Trott, dissent, Judge suggests that 2704; U.S. at 107 S.Ct. United States Roundy factual statements excluded 303, 315, Scheffer, 118 S.Ct. analytically were parallel not their con- (1998). addition, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 Gray tent Betty to some of the statements judges may repeti exclude evidence that is admitted, that the court he ex- never tive, relevant, only marginally poses or plains why perceive not. We any cannot harassment, prejudice, undue risk of pertinent Why, example, difference. do Crane, 689-90, confusion. 476 U.S. at Betty Gray’s statements that Gray was angry with Betty Gray to that prove “tend Gray killer,” Much, was the Roundy’s all, while although state- not ments that Dyer Gray her not threatened life do regarding Dyer submitted it had explained has that Chambers While the state- to case. was material exculpatory demanded admission of Roundy’s state of mind regarding ments (and “did not evidence because the state dem- not material we quite probably were hearsay testimony that error to their onstrate constitutional do ascribe case, which assurances of trust- exclusion), regarding bore statements threats, including corroboration and behavior worthiness Dyer’s occupation, evidence, would provides some other be unreliable.” latter evidence were. This (in- Rock, 55, 107 483 U.S. at S.Ct. 2704 believing might basis for omitted). ternal quotations facts were also vital Roundy. killed These defense, on the Gray’s which rested to Here, Gray’s counsel maintained that other than premise that someone testimony trustworthy, stressing attorney committed murders. judge to the trial point to the trial emphasized latter had the same situational attributes as fervently and often that the judge, stating Betty admitted as Gray statements trust- to our defense” testimony is “fundamental mind, no worthy fearful state other —a our key and that “the defense statements, way adequate introduce the point, At one suspect.” discuss the other detail, repetition of similar statements just “I how we can pleaded, he don’t know There no people. sugges- several .... keep possible suspect from the any tion had motive to fabri- Roundy telling story.” like them the entire It’s they at the cate the statements time made, any suggest nor does such motive suggestions The dissent’s prosecutor did not contend at itself. The contrary notwithstanding, this court has any provide point that the defense failed recognized that repeatedly “[e]vidence background a situational for demonstrat- the defendant someone other than *16 Roundy ing trustworthiness of the the committed crime is critical excul the statements. is enti patory that the defendant evidence Hubbard, v.

tled to Thomas adduce.” arguments In face of the that were the (9th Cir.2001) (emphasis F.3d it, very the trial court was presented added). if the “[e]ven This is true defense proof nature the it specific about the of theory “it is the purely speculative,” is as admissibility to determine needed —“in of to consider the evidence role the fairness, I have a name identified need to presents and determine ... whether it time, statement, place, so each theories for how the legitimate alternative ... I can at each statement so look Vallejo, crime States occurred.” United you’ll ... If summarize make a decision (9th Cir.2001). 237 F.3d We in oral offer of me a written or for the factual statements ex conclude I’ll a look at each proof, then take state- surely cluded material to the defense. were it as can and analyze ment and best ruling.” Gray request, this make a met (ii) Trustworthiness reports on each of the submitting written present. trial he wanted The A state sometimes show witnesses decision that court indicated in its written that it not a defendant’s con did violate satisfactory, and did affirmatively the rights by demon submissions stitutional not live witnesses before exculpatory it the ask assess strating that excluded Instead, unreliable, the trial making its decision. it was ac evidence because situation, court, closest to the consistently stan who was applied cordance regarding no whatever expressed the Court conсern example, Supreme dards. For (1) the trustworthiness of testimony state- consisted of three factors: ments, (2) fabricate; the of ques- and reached merits the lack spontaneity of motive to the of (3) tion whether contents the state- repetition; and consistent mental ments were evidence of a material fact. state of In admitting prose- declarant. was, By so, trial court it doing appears, statements, hearsay however, cution’s assuming that statements otherwise did strictly trial court not adhere to this requisites admissibility met the for under Although framework. the trial court sub- hearsay exception. the catchall jected hearsay by most submitted test, the state to this case it one admit- Moreover, prosecution conceded that ted hearsay evidence submitted Roundy these statements to made which prosecution without evaluating its trust- prepared the witnesses were to testify, cases, at all. worthiness other when clear, stating: “I to make I’m want 803(24), admitting under Rule suggesting making witnesses] are [the trial court not consistently require rep- did up.... people. I’ve talked to these And etition; it did not consistently refer to the yeah, So, these made.” statements were of mental state Betty Gray; declarant the dissent’s reliance on the failure to and, referring to the motive to fabricate present testimony justification live factor, just it sometimes referred to testimony exclusion notwith- motive, declarant’s and sometimes referred been standing, there would have no point to both the declarant witness’ mo- calling testify witnesses live be- Further, tives. analysis state’s judge. fore the testimony Live whether declarant possessed credibility essential for motive making determina- to fabricate consisted regarding simply tions the conclu- whether the witness is tell- sory statement that it ing Here, appeared Bеtty truth. no dispute there was Gray had no motive to about fabricate the state- that. ments. Appeals Court of Idaho nonethe- that, less testimony by Gray concluded because offered provide adequate proof offer fared well according to dem- standards requisite guarantees actually onstrate the trustworthiness used trust- worthiness, Roundy court. appeared not support “[t]he record does to have no more the assertion that the motive to fabricate district abused her statements than *17 Gray, its did excluding Betty Roundy, Betty discretion in and such evidence.” like 795, Gray, 129 repeated Idaho at 932 P.2d at 918. In the so statements to several ruling, court, the different appellate people. Betty Idaho far Gray’s, from Like rescuing arbitrary Roundy’s the factual ruling from consti- statements were coupled invalidity, fear, tutional only expressions exacerbated of it appears the so Roundy, due process Betty Gray, violation of like right frightened was present when a defense: The she made state Court of these statements of fact. Appeals deferred to a decision about trust- short, simply it is true not that there worthiness that decidedly was inadequate contextual basis apply did not make and that have would been trustworthiness analysis to Roundy’s inconsistent with the trustworthiness stan- statement degree with the same of scruti- dards the trial court applied Betty ny and consistency applied as was to Bet- Gray’s statements. Rather, ty Gray’s. the lack-of-trustwor-

The trial court’s for judging framework for thiness basis relied upon exclusion the reliability prosecution’s the court, appellate state the dis-

651 from whole” that error of a tion sent, explanation is an after-the-fact the habeas grant harmless —we must justified that could decision O’Neal, 437, at 513 115 explana- petition. The U.S. it was made. on which basis Kotteakos, 328 at (quoting rec- 992 U.S. comport with either the S.Ct. does not tion Fisher, 1239); 765, 263 at 66 S.Ct. F.3d standards or the trustworthiness ord such, actually applied. As 917-18. trial court approving decision Appeal’s the Court some fur precedent provides Our is Roundy’s statements the exclusion guidance applying imprecise ther example application simply another A doubt” standard: 55% likelihood “grave and therefore arbitrary, asymmetrical, “hardly was harmless is error rulings in this evidentiary unconstitutional ... and a ‘fair assurance’ harmlessness case. have chance that defendant would 45% com- that the state courts We conclude certainly error acquitted but been ” arbi- they error when mitted constitutional ‘grave like a doubt.’ United seems to admit state- trarily refused (9th 422, Hitt, v. F.2d 425 n. 2 States 981 implicating Dyer. ments Cir.1992) Kotteakos, 328 (quoting U.S. 1239). words, 765, 66 In other S.Ct. Injurious Effect and 3. Substantial harmless, the trial error we must find Influence more considerably that there was conclude we re last issue that must a 55% likelihood that error The than is the trial court’s error solve whether jury’s not affect the verdict. the standard articulated

harmless under standards, we Applying these McAninch, v. 513 U.S. Brecht O’Neal concluding that the trial difficulty no have 432, 436, 437, 130 L.Ed.2d 115 S.Ct. to disallow evidence court’s decision (1995).13 The standard 947 Brecht/O’Neal was not regarding Dyer harmless. first whether the trial requires that we ask Gray was en against affirmative injurious effect had error “substantial far from over tirely circumstantial and determining jury’s ver or influence in against Dyer whelming, while the evidence Brecht, 113 S.Ct. dict.” 507 U.S. possi with a provided would States, v. United (quoting Kotteakos question that answer to the critical ble 750, 776, 66 L.Ed. the defendant’s defense arises whenever Roe, (1946)); see also Fisher Then commit the crime: he did not Cir.2001). (9th If we are F.3d who did? answer “grave doubt” point, the nature and is, “fair to the first if we do not have a As question—that assurance, against Gray: case hap strеngth all pondering after comments, made on three dif- judge’s ac- stripping the erroneous pened without *18 Cir.1990) (7th (Ea F.2d does address the Brecht 13. The warden not ster-b brief, rook, J.) focusing ("Procedural apply gov ex question anywhere in his rules argument clusively defendants.”). the that no constitu on we As well as ernment as has not tional error occurred. This circuit this government that convinced the are government’s the failure decided whether had could meet the Brecht standard case not consti address in a habeas case harmlessness addressed, day the we leave to another it been issue, although a there is tutes waiver of on question a waiver rule whether enforce law the Seventh Circuit so indicat case from government argue if the does habeas McGinnis, ing. 963 F.2d See Holland was harmless. asserted constitutional error (7th 1992); O’Leary, 1057-58 Cir. Wilson v. occasions, best guide ently are the than the jury ferent and afforded evaluating strength of the case. weight the state’s to the evidence than did different judge ques- The trial first addressed the the jury may in this case and have tion on defendant’s initial motion for ac- drawn the evi- different inferences from quittal: dence ... very Frankly, I’ve been troubled added). doubts, (emphasis Despite his the strength the throughout the case as to judge determined that was suf- there the state’s case. It’s obvious some- support jury’s ficient evidence to the ver- crimes, these terrible one committed dict, “I opining hope while and trust linking the state’s evidence the crimes the matter will be so can have appealed we been minimal. defendant has another as to view whether there was suf- question The I have to decide is ficient evidence.” any jury whether or not reasonable Later, deciding impose beyond find a could reasonable doubt penalty, judge death the trial specificаlly that the defendant committed crime. summarized evidence that led him to Admittedly, evidence is on equivocal have a “lingering or residual doubt as to that issue. guilt the defendant’s of the crimes for judge nonetheless decided to “reserve which he has been convicted.” Those ruling that motion and see what the facts, stated, judge were: jury When the a decides.” returned (1) steadfastly The defendant has main- guilty for acquittal verdict and the motion tained his innocence. renewed, again judge was summa- (2) The state was unable produce concerning rized views strength weapon. murder the state’s case: (3) The identify any state was unable to I throughout must admit that the tri- finger prints of the defendant to link al, waiting I kept pres- for the State to him to the crimes. evidence, ent finger- conclusive such as (4) The produce state unable to prints, eyewitnesses, that would tie the convincing footprints evidence

Defendant to crime scene ... and found at the scene the crime were frankly, in. it did not come evi- those of the defendant. was, part, dence the most if not (5) The state was unable to entirely, conclusively circumstantial evidence. establish that the hairs question is: found was and Was there [TJhe scene of the were from crimes the defen- submitted evidence so that sufficient dant. jury could that this find Defendant

the individual who did (6) commit Although witness testified that he crimes ... green saw defendant in a Interna-

I given good this case deal tional Travelall vehicle at a hospital thought, and it has been a case troubling parking approximately lot 3.5 miles from to me.... Had this Court been on the the crime in the early morning scene jury, crimes, I perhaps have day would evaluated the witness also differently than mem- other testified that the man he saw had no jury. when, fact, bers have deter- facial hair at that time the *19 mined the credibility witnesses defendant had a full beard.14 of differ- 14. tending To these observations could be evi- added: dence to show the that defendant did

653 Cir.1996) 1347(9th context, 1343, In that physical the in the and paucity Given “support[ing] evidence alternative theo- one can infer that testimony, eyewitness ry might of the crime have been com- to- how concerning anger the evidence likely mitted” to be “crucial to the de- murdering is his wife motive and ward a fense.”16 Id. seeking she divorce—was was her —that jury’s in the delibera- great importance alter- likely importance Nor is the of an Indeed, the prose- the substance

tions. Dyer suspect native diminished because argument began by focusing closing cutor’s In consid- only suspect. was not the such had the and question of who motive on the ering thing wrong the impact “the done women, two murder the temperament own, men, on the minds of other not one’s the that and endeavoring show Kotteakos, setting,” in the total suspects aside from possible other two 764, 66 we are to make a asked Dyer did not.15 likely reasoning pat- the judgment about at the Looking closely terns of others. ledger the decid- On the other side of jury to make record before order whether the standard ing Brecht/O’Neal there that we note that while judgment, met is nature of the evidence has been possible oft was that the two other recog- As has evidence excluded. this court and a motive nized, suspects, Riley, the de- Leavitt had against where evidence murder, that there was no evidence purely is circumstantial and fendant do identity, either threatened to so “jurors expressly had issue is therefore pivotal themselves, had with do- naturally ‘If the and taken actions consistent ask would crime], (stalking, keeping with ing up so didn’t who [commit defendant whereabouts). Crosby, F.3d States v. did?’” United crime, Roundy including his to introduce the statements doctor’s not commit impor- representing, repeatedly, great physically capable its testimony he was not plan its alleged; Mackley’s tance did the defense abandon riding bicycle as Dyer, reasoning that to do suspicion cast precise testimony concerning the make and evidentiary support so no would had seen was not color of vehicle he ironclad; counterproductive. there the consideration regarding credibility of the issues some noteworthy when we repeatedly, is It 16. testi- relatives who victim’s defendant’s likely impact consti considered against the fied defendant. error, particular note tutional we have taken case, prosecution's strength of the jury Dyer presented was not as a strong, recognizing that where that case is not suspect. present possible Unable might oth evidentiary other matters that him, concerning Roundy the de- statements consequence poten take on erwise be of little investiga- not from the fense elected to elicit See, significance. e.g., tially dispositive Sas suspect. Dyer was also As tors the fact Roe, (9th 230 F.3d sounian v. Gray's passage quot- in the explained counsel Cir.2000) ("It cannot be that the other said 660-61), (post, the dissent without ed in at trial so overwhelm evidence amassed was Roundy indicating Dyer had ing the same that the would have reached to kill one the vic- stalked and threatened [material even if had not considered the result so, bringing up do and had means to tims White, it].”); v. properly not before Eslaminia investigated fact that he had been (9th (error Cir.1998) was F.3d help suspect of no would have been part "prosecution because the harmless defense. overwhelming”); Hanna case was far from Cir.1996) Rivetand, (9th sug- 87 F.3d incorrect The dissent therefore J., (error (Wright, concurring) not harm gesting the defense conсeded useless- prosecution's contrary, To the less because evidence. ness overwhelming). unsuccessfully trying three times only after *20 it,

Further, it critically, prosecution whether seems that the believed and that counsel, us, dissent, trial or was if Roundy or to defense aware that that was a better or worse alterna- Dyer Dyer introduced, statements about it than the two is not tive other suspect likely was that there would alibi evi- Rather, we been question. have admon- dence as well. judge “one must others’ reac- ished that affairs, From amorphous state of own, not his allowance tions Dyer dissent concludes that had a might for how react and not be others alibi,” post “valid and unchallenged regarded acting generally without rea- and that court’s exclusion of the son.” 1239. Viewing Id. Roundy concerning Dyer statements that, light, the record that we conclude therefore harmless. The truth is that we given overall weakness the state’s have no idea—and more importantly, case, the Dyer had evidence been before record, jury, present on the had no idea— them, ... jurors general- one or more “not Dyer’s whether or not alibi would have ly could have acting without reason” been “unchallenged” been or whether it was swayed. juror might reasonably A decide know, all Dyer “valid.” For we might that Dyer signif- evidence lessened the presented have only his alibi to be deci- stronger parts icance of one of the of the sively ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‍impeached, Perry Mason-style, on anger against Gray, case his at his wife cross examination. possibility That is not her; having and motive to murder so de- particularly Dyer only far-fetched: de- juror thereby termined such could be nied being Oregon but also “denied pushed harboring a over into reasonable knowing Roundy, much about Reeda least, doubt we guilt. At harbor time, seeing long her in a certainly not juror a “grave “not ... doubt” no her, her, harassing threatening following generally acting without reason” could her, anything or of that sort.” Had four have so reacted. To our conviction that witnesses testified to applying the standard we Brecht/O’Neal contrary, possible is the jury must grant petition, habeas the dis- regarded would not have as a Dyer truth- objection sent’s principal are oth- —there ful person representations regard- whose ers, have but we believe we answered ing his night whereabouts on the them explaining in the course of our own murder were be believed. alibi, reasoning had an so —is is, course, This last scenario an exer- the jury swayed would not have been cise in speculation. recognize But so to is threatening evidence of his behavior. only to highlight embarking upon testified, Dyer never whether before the speculation concerning how the trial would

jury offer proof, and except for have unwound had the evidence excluded an attorney’s statement that he claimed to been admitted inconsistent with our role Oregon been in small town in at the in determining whether there was Brecht/ murders, time of the no details the alibi (or any O’Neal error other version of appear in the record. do not We know rule, matter). harmless error for that precisely was, where he said what he he Kotteakos, with, forebear, said its doing, he was he Brecht and who make alibi, whether clear that there is corroboration of the a trial error is harm- considered or whether there is less any only evidence that if the actual in the case alibi is not true. All we know would have reached do is that he the same verdict ab- provided some sort of sent he was the error. “The test under Kotteakos out of murders, Idaho at the time of the is whether the error ‘had substantial and

655 that we diсtates precedent likewise Our influence in determin or effect injurious ” trial, Brecht, but hypothetical 507 U.S. not construct must verdict’ ing jury’s added) of the trial er- (emphasis the effect 637, 1710 instead consider 113 S.Ct. at 776, Kotteakos, 66 U.S. at In 328 verdict. jury’s actual actual (quoting ror on the 629, 1239); at 113 S.Ct. id. 1039, see also Hanna, stated that: S.Ct. F.3d we 87 1710(trial to harmless- “is amenable error in ha- inquiry error proper harmless “the ... ‘may analysis because error ask, judge is for the proceedings beas in the context assessed quantitatively he or facts, record’s whether based on the in to deter order presented other evidence substantially ‘that the error she believes ” ”) the trial].’ it had on effect mine [the (emphasis jury’s decision?’ influenced (alterations Arizona v. original) (quoting in added). any case to are not aware We 279, 307-08, Fulminante, 111 499 U.S. is, in a case which ex- contrary —that (1991)); Kot L.Ed.2d have adjudged cluded evidence teakos, 66 S.Ct. 1239 328 U.S. addi- possible harmless because been must of error impact (judicial analysis not before the that was tional evidence to all else that “in relation place take (or matter, judge, before jury for added). The em (emphasis happened”) outline), and the dissent except in broad words, be on what must in other phasis, any. not cite does before in the courtroom actually occurred jury. sum, upon dissent’s reliance been admitted but might alibi the record before beyond go To not, almost which we know and as to of ex- likely impact deciding cannot affect the nothing, indeed, Brecht/O’Neal would, jury evidence on cluded dissuaded therefore are not analysis. We Amend- the defendant’s Sixth implicate that on the decisive conclusion from our guise in the by jury a trial right ment any accept- say cannot we question, As Justice determining harmlessness. Louisiana, that the evidence of confidence explained in Sullivan able level Scalia 275, 279, admitted, excluded, have had 113 S.Ct. if could not 508 U.S. (1993): deliber- jury’s L.Ed.2d 182 on the influence substantial jury-trial guarantee, ations. Consistent with effect the ... is not what question might generally be error

constitutional III. Conclusion jury, upon a reasonable expected to have Idaho’s applied the trial court Because upon it had rather what effect very in two different rules of evidence at hand. in the case guilty verdict prosecu- whether the ways depending on looks, we have review Harmless-error evidence, presented defense tion or the said, on which the to the basis rights. Gray’s constitutional it violated inquiry, verdict. The actually rested its Therefore, whether, harmless. words, in a trial This error was is not in other error, grant guilty the trial court’s REVERSE occurred without we ren- surely have been the warden judgment would summary verdict dered, verdict guilty with in- but whether district court to the REMAND surely trial was actually writ, rendered requiring grant structions error. unattributable Gray to trial bring of Idaho to the state of time amount a reasonable (internal again within (alterations quotations original) custody. omitted). him from release citations Green, TROTT, 155-56, Judge (Concurring Circuit nia v. *22 (1970). 1930, dissenting part): S.Ct. 26 L.Ed.2d part, 489 case, my order a colleagues In new this hearsay exception, Idaho’s residual un- murdering trial for a man convicted of der which challenged statements were my and a In judg- former wife friend. admitted, firmly rooted hearsay ment, ground for errant order is their this 817, exception. Wright, at 497 U.S. 110 than that was not nothing more he allowed However, Betty’s S.Ct. 3139. statements stale, pointless, his defense introduce particularized guarantees bore of trustwor- untrustworthy hearsay evidence ex- presented The government thiness. by the trial court and Idaho’s Court cluded testimony live of Joanne Buceóla as to the irrelevant, inadmissable, of Appeals background Betty’s situationаl state- Thus, agree I although immaterial. with subjected ments. Buceóla intense colleagues’ my much of otherwise excellent by Gray’s cross-examination counsel. She respectfully on opinion, I dissent the dis- Betty spontaneously testified that uttered positive issue. statements, them repeated several

times, and inwas an excited state when I she made them. As the federal district observed, correctly court the trial court Hearsay engaged precisely type of careful My colleagues conclude that process that the Supreme suggested Court judge Idaho’s courts appellate necessary protect the Defendant’s guilty asymmetrical application rights under the Confrontation Clause. with evidentiary state law standards re- 814-16, Wnght, 497 U.S. 110 S.Ct. 3139. I spect respectfully evidence.” “parallel Moreover, analyzed the trial court the fac- disagree. tors which tend to show that a statement particularized guarantees bears of trust- 1. worthiness, including spontaneity, consis- Betty Gray’s Statements mind, repetition, tent state of and lack of Furthermore, motive to fabricate. Id. The trial court’s to allow decision some Court of Appeals Idaho reviewed this Betty Gray’s victim out-of-court state- issue as a matter of the State’s rules re- ments under Idaho’s residual ex- garding hearsay, and it concluded that the ception Gray’s did not violate William decision basis in court’s had a State right Sixth Amendment confront wit- Const, law and was not an abuse discretion. VI; nesses. See U.S. amend. Ida- 784, State Gray, v. 129 Idaho 932 P.2d 907 803(24). ho R. this respect, Evid. In (Ct.App.1997). agree my with When a colleagues. declar- ant testify, is unavailable to the Confronta-

tion hearsay only Clause countenances if it adequate demonstrates of reliability indicia Reeda Statements (1)

either by falling firmly within a rooted (2) hearsay exception; bearing рarticu- preclude The trial court’s decision larized guarantees of introducing trustworthiness. See from certain out-of-court e.g., 805, Wright, Idaho v. 497 U.S. made Roundy statements Reeda about (1990); S.Ct. suspect L.Ed.2d 638 alternative violate Roberts, 56, 62-63, Ohio v. constitutional and it rights, was ful- (1980); ly evidentiary 65 L.Ed.2d 597 consonant with Idaho’s rules Califor- district I dis- the assertion that hearsay. respect, regarding with, colleagues. begin excluding its discretion in such agree my To abused Appeals of Idaho concluded Court evidence. analysis review after full direct Gray, 129 Idaho at 932 P.2d State lato, “Roundy’s that under State issue added). (emphasis about regarding her concern My colleagues’ lengthy protestations because ex-boyfriend her are inadmissible loud, clear, notwithstanding, we have a they relevancy.” to meet test fail for added). *23 from unambiguous statement Idaho’s (emphasis In the 932 P.2d at 918 disputed piece Appeals of that this Court main, victim’s fear of an individual a of trust- guarantees evidence lacked the of only in circum- Idaho is relevant certain certainly This differentiates it worthiness. stances, present and none of them was mistakenly by the evidence used from case; “Roundy’s a third of fear as a Judge comparison. Berzon disprove person does not establish or The Appeals Id. Court of Gray’s guilt.” the a federal habe- province “It is not of threatening analyzed Dyer’s allegedly then determi- as court to reexamine state-court hearsay excep- its behavior under residual Estelle v. questions.” nations on state-law 803(24) tion, here also Rule concluded McGuire, 62, 67-68, 112 502 U.S. S.Ct. excluded. properly that this evidence (1991). Therefore, 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 guarantees it bore of Why? Because “no agree Gray I to that even if were trustworthiness:” erred a matter of Idaho judge trial also I.R.E. The district court considered Roundy’s admitting law evidentiary not 803(24) theory of ad- as an alternative would do not—we statements —which eаrlier, missibility. As I.R.E. discussed granting Gray’s from federal ha- forbidden 803(24) requires the trustworthiness resulting “convic- petition, beas unless his must hown the statement be s of from laws, Constitution, tion violated sur- totality the circumstances that Id. treaties of United States.” making statement. round the limitations, Recognizing our habeas 819, 497 110 Wright, U.S. S.Ct. attempts to a constitutional force of the evidence seeking admission evidentiary claim slipper onto his state trial, Gray’s counsel presented decision not arguing that trial court’s the state- district court content of Roundy’s allow him to introduce irrele- to provide ments. counsel did not Defense statements violated his vant out-of-court proof which indicated offer a right present defense. process due Roundy’s surrounding circumstances far refrain we hear too This is strained alleg- The who declarations. witnesses Gray claims that often. not Roudy’s heard statements were edly residual arbitrarily applied the state’s back- upon provide called a situational 803(24), R. Evid. hearsay exception, Idaho Hence, ground for the statements. to introduce it allowed the state because record there is no the circumstances why she feared Betty’s statements about cannot surrounding the statements. We husband, Gray from in- precluded her re- say factual statements why Reeda’s statements about troducing ex-boyfriend’s garding her behavior suspect. particular alternative she feared guar- occupation bore circumstantial says deprived him Gray, application, This which would antees of trustworthiness a defense. opportunity put I.R.E. justified under admission 44, Arkansas, 54, 803(24). v. 483 U.S. support e.g., record Rock does See 658 (1987); Instead, Gray’s 97 background. L.Ed.2d 37 counsel

107 S.Ct. relied Mississippi, wholly proffer Chambers v. on his own oral as to what (1973); L.Ed.2d 297 if say S.Ct. the witnesses would allowed Texas, 14, 22, Washington testify. U.S. point, Gray’s At one trial counsel (1967). 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d request- stаted the record he was “the ing opportunity to call these wit- trial court to differ- Although the came During argument, Gray’s nesses.” oral regarding the women’s ent conclusions two appellate forthrightly counsel admitted statements, I am somewhat similar satis- that trial request counsel’s referred to call- fied distinction between substantial ing testify these witnesses to proof as articulated front of parties’ offers jury, calling them front of the clearly by Appeals Idaho Court judge to provide situational back- that the trial court did not demonstrates ground of the statements. The record act arbitrarily. majority is mistaken appellate supports counsel’s characteriza- in its claim the two victims’ *24 tion of the events. “parallel,” Judge statements were as Wood’s and the of Appeals’ Court decisions Simply trial precluded because the court Thus, asymmetrical demonstrate. no Betty’s Reeda’s statements and admitted amounting treatment to a constitutional statements does not demonstrate that violation occurred. Gray’s court trial violated constitutional part proof,

As of its offer of the state rights, Gray’s far opportunity from it. to witness, Buceóla, presented a Joanne who lay proper a foundation was in the trial in person presence testified out of the of court. He did not avail himself of that jury background about the situational opportunity, and it is not for the federal Betty’s statements. Buceóla described to remedy courts his failure. The notable Betty’s for the judge harried state-of- qualitative govern- difference between mind, repetition her consistent of the Gray’s ment’s offer of and proof offer statements, sponta- the fact Betty and proof well as the legal manifest differ- statements, neously uttered re- between satisfy ences the two submissions sponse lеading questions. to any The trial me that the trial did not act arbi- judge specifically relied on Buccola’s de- so trarily deprive Gray as to of his due meanor and testimony detailed in conclud- right process present As defense. ing Betty’s out-of-court statements Wood Judge correctly response noted bore particularized guarantees sufficient of Gray’s attempt evidence, to use trustworthiness to admitted under the right defend does not right include the exception. residual hearsay I underscore so to do with inadmissible evidence. This judge

here that observed this short Gray’s is the answer to meritless stand, witness on the listened to her testi- claim he allowed to defend mony, and made determination rele- himself.

vancy admissibility and that is entitled to

deference. about More relevance later. II contrast, Gray’s proof, in offer of includ- Injurious Substantial ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‍and provide ed no witness a situational Effect or Influence background Roundy’s In- statements.

deed, Gray never asked trial court if Even were I to start from the flawed he could call such a proposition witness out that Judge Berzon’s constitu- presence jury provide analysis regarding such tional exclusion flimsy how the excluded To demonstrate is cor- alleged statements Reeda was, not, only to look I con- one need rect, I do respectfully which description deci- counsel’s Judge Wood’s own nevertheless clude disputed for which it was purpose and the irrelevant preclude sion to not have a “substantial absolutely did to the trial court: being offered jury’s on the or influence” injurious effect you. Judge, Thank our MR. RADIN: Abrahamson, 507 U.S. verdict. Brecht defense, key to our defense is to 123 L.Ed.2d 113 S.Ct. haven’t suspects. the other We discuss (1993). Here, whatsoever I have no doubt Judge. They were sus- up, made this When one examines about this conclusion. Dier, Leavitt, LeRoy pects—J.W. im- asks what evidencе and the excluded suspects all in the Hugh Riley' —were jury, have had on it would pact police officers. minds much.” is at best “not my view answer The alibis of They’re investigated. all needs to con- problems, one Among other impor- checked. it’s all three were So would package what the whole sider here understand, us, you I hope tant for admitted had the evidence been have been in this express any thing if I can one promised then countered as hearing, key is that the to our morning’s enough to examine It is not prosecution. at least discuss with defense is to from its evidence divorced disputed suspects. the other the rest of the record. context and *25 as They can their own conclusion draw Dyer and police investigated had at least one. But we have to This to each had a valid alibi. concluded that he to them. picture make the whole known Dyer’s alibi would neutralizing evidence admissible, recognized as have been you But can’t do it THE COURT: 419, 115 Whitley, 514 U.S. Kyles v. evidence. through inadmissible (1995), to demon 131 L.Ed.2d get MR. RADIN: Let me to that. by investigation conducted strate that very is testimony regarding J.W. Dier and not police comprehensive the court to let asking We’re important. admitted at trial shoddy. Gray’s counsel- 80324(sic). That’s the it in under Rule allegedly inculpa- that if he introduced the catchall. evidence, would call tory prosecution alibi. testify Dyer’s about the officers Counsel did not attack p. E.R. story. part RADIN: It’s MR. a fraud. suggest alibi or that was Dyer’s individuals. His Dier is one of those fact, referred to Gray’s In counsel Rodriguez’s brought to Mr. name was

just a and even admitted “suspect” Roberts, Riley, Hugh by attention Vada sus Dyer was not the best “alternative Roundy. Roundy, Clayton Ann Ruth Indeed, that other sus argued he pect.” Dier’s full name? THE What’s COURT: and that likely Dyer, more than pects were jurors have a “com just he wanted MR. RADIN: J.W. Dier. According of the situation. plete picture” MR. James. MULLIGAN: counsel, just the third on the Dyer was right. THE All COURT: Betty # 1 Suspect “possibles.” list of these As a result of what MR. RADIN: lover, Leavitt, discov

Gray’s current who said, in his Rodriguez Mr. four witness police. called the Sus ered the bodies and They Mr. Dier. lover, looked into department current # 2 was pect They spoke to him his alibi checked Hugh Riley. directly. fact, said, they tape-recorded And like I he prosecutor] [the can that conversation. bring out length on cross the of time. He can bring out that Mr. Dier was we Mr. Rodriguez, So intend to ask investigated. He did have an alibi. your permission, whether there were Now, They can all bring of this out. possible suspects. other he We’re saying that he’s the best say, suspect We eliminated him. why? And that we can show that he very And that would Mr. committed the proper crime. prosecutor] bring Kane out. [the But is entitled to know that

But we to Mr. Rodriguez would like ask that there were suspects, other that they if possible there were other suspects and were investigated by the office, they investigate what did or didn’t do to sheriffs why they investigated. suspects. those other added.) (Emphasis [May 12 & 14 hear- Dier was one of them. We have not ings] made up. his name It came forward police these other individuals. fill To out this picture, here part prosecutor’s response offer McCandless,

Mr. while he’s on the of proof. stand, he was the one who actually

checked the alibi. He’s the one who MR. Finally, KANE: if I could make actually Riley. interviewed Mr. proof, offer of prepared we are prove prove and would that Mr. Dier was in a ISo part would like to ask him: As different state at the time the killings your investigation you check into went I down. don’t think [the evidence] any possible suspects other including is relevant for that reason. Mr. Dier? 2,1993] [June Yes. Judge note here that pre-trial Wood’s you What did do? *26 hearsay relevancy ruling left the door open

Well, I did check on his alibi. Gray’s pursue counsel to attempt I don’t want to into get hearsay, but I at show Dyer was one of the other sus- least want to out bring that he awas pects. However, reasons, for tactical possible suspect and the why. reasons defense did advantage not take of this If you want to reconsider your other opportunity. In explaining why during a decision [regarding Betty Gray’s state- trial, motion for a new the lack of proba- ments], that’s, course, always up to tive value of this evidence again becomes you. point just But the I being that apparent. I note also that counsel don’t know how we can keep from the had the opportunity Dyer to call himself to jury a possible suspect that was investi- the stand but decided not to do so. This is gated by the sheriffs office itself. It’s yet another reason that my undercuts col- like not telling them the story. entire leagues claim that Gray was somehow not allowed to defend himself. Roberts, you If look at Vada if I could encourage you, you’ll I’m Now, sure read all of MR. RADIN: I am fully aware them, but Vada Roberts very specific. and the court did tell the defense It just occurred nine short prior months through counsel that we could mention to her very death. It’s detailed as to the name Dyer. of Mr. We could have Reeda Roundy’s concerns and the rea- asked Rodriguez Detective if such a sus- sons for her concerns. existed, pect expecting and that he another, honest, Dyer’s, from the statements he have would have been would was correct. On Roundy. Judge Wood “Yes, said, suspect. have a We we did hand, was other the record loaded Dyer. Mr. His name were ware Betty Gray, Reeda out, it and even- up. We checked come target killing. of this Roundy was the suspect.” him as a tually we discounted we were strategy, Judge, But as defense put way. me it this Let to convince obviously trying at the trial is the fact what relevance Of were Gray from Mr. there that aside suspect, X until it was discover- that was a Riley, Hugh Mr. suspects. There’s other dead at the investigation that he was ed and Roundy, the lover Mrs. who was com- time of the crime and could Leavitt, who was LeRoy Mr. there was what relevance at the trial mitted it? Of we had Gray. Mrs. And the lover of it suspect, that X was a until is the fact testimony. gentlemen Those some jail he was in at the discovered that was testify. here to Similarly, of what of the murder? time him simply have bring and To at this trial that X was a relevance is it come it, Rodriguez simply deny or have it discovered that he suspect, until existed. We say, guy “Yeah this time of the murder? was out of state at the out, come to him didn’t checked X is that the fact that The obvious answer in effect to have been anything,” would because it is not relevant suspect was a jury of a vacuum for the have created He nothing for the defense. proves facts, just like it would have been but he was cleared. suspect, have been little to throw out another trying kind of night day having It follows as tidbit, taken I think it would have murderer, nothing as the been eliminated defense, aspect of our away the effective earlier could be used said nine months he look at well, take a hard you’d better might have committed suggest that he Leavitt, take a LeRoy you’d better under these of what value the crime. So Riley alternate Hugh hard look fact that he was either the circumstances suspects. earlier, that nine months suspect was a name, feel, just Dyer’s But to mention nasty about one of the anything he said no It would good. have done us would elimi- All this evidence does victims? in a vacuum. presented have been suspects is increase nating one of the guilty. probability 10,1993] [Aug. circumstances, because *27 a Given these my opinion was in Dyer evidence alibi which Dyer had a confirmed flimsy evidence attempt based grasping dispute, and did not acknowledged nothing. The counsel something out of to make from the excluded state- any inference specula- did it” rank “Dyer idea that was killed the wom- Dyer tion, ments clearly probative. excludable as misleading. absolutely en would have been or circumstantial no other direct There is any is not admissible Misleading evidence or corrob- adequately supporting evidence true, then If this is system. in our view, contrary. Cer- where orating this counsel, by Gray’s attor- pushed fact as simple meant to trial tainly disrespect no suspect, a Dyer at one time ney flak evidence. Shoot it was it prove? What does lucky clearly irrelevant. maybe get into the air and we’ll suspect fact that another How does the correct- something Judge will hit it. Wood help he was cleared but that deciphering existed difficulty out the ly pointed the defense. behavior, If it hurts anything, defense. intentions person’s one (some-other-dude- If convincing defense counsel had succeeded in The SODDIT variant, did-it), judge a to admit this evidence and then of which this is weak prosecution Dyer watched the demolish years of 23 in the criminal my experience suspect, a I’m sure it would have been now only works when the evidence courts called blatant Strickland error on the Here, it pointing plausible. to that dude is ground that it hurt his client’s defense. fact, Gray’s In simply wasn’t. counsel was Opening police this allows the door aware that the was use- obviously evidence did, thorough job show they what was the less to show that killer. This they eliminated suspects. other This explains why only it was offered to show hardly helps the defense. This concern is suspects.” against “other Measured might Ap- not as far-fetched as it seem. eyewitness testimony and the inculpаtory pellate during appeal counsel the direct Gray’s guilt, other evidence believe the Idaho courts accused trial counsel of resoundingly harmless. exclusion was constitutionally numerous counts of defec- going was not to believe that representation. tive Mr. Radin has al- killer, Dyer was the the evidence that at Moreover, ready put been on trial. “suspect,” one time he was a but out-of- (9th Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966 ir- happened, state when the murder Cir.2001), recently we concluded that a relevant; and the excluded evidence attorney provided defense had ineffective in the light viewed rest the case by introducing assistance of counsel evi- was not sufficient to raise a reasonable client, dence of an alibi for his pointless doubt based on the claim that client, suggested and vouched for suspects.” were “other these Given the under attorney circumstances where the verdict, jury obviously credited Mack- known-given should have the rest of the ley’s testimony putting Gray, Dyer, evidence—-that alibi defense was position to kill his former wife and her “hopeless.” Because the attorney harmed friend. the defendant with a claim defective alibi, granted we the defendant a new trial. fact, attorney seriously a defense can great It is not a stretch to move from damage suggests his case when he or in- Phillips to this case where it appears that prove sinuates offers to without sub- attorney the defense was attempting to stantial evidence that someone other than use SODDIT defense that was certain to the defendant committed the crime. fail because of a unchallenged valid and prosecution proves then that the When lawyers alibi. Defense this circuit ap- innocent, surrogate suspect is which it is pear now to be Strickland damnеd if they do, certainly backfiring entitled to the loud don’t, they but also damned if do. that occurs tears a hole in the defense’s credibility strengthens prosecu- case. Ill

tion’s This is what we have here-a desperate albeit understandable attempt *28 Conclusion by muddy defense the waters. This close, case have been but the excluded doggedly repeat Our circuit tends its evidence, including “the whole picture” mistakes in though habeas cases even we it necessarily part, which was would not many have been corrected times fact, any have made it In very closer. it Indeed, Supreme beyond Court. well could have made it better for the pale say that we mildly have been Gray. State and worse for castigated abusing our habeas authori-

663 case, ty. Here is what the told us 1991 that “the court of Appeals Court based its in Estelle v. McGuire: grant solely ground of habeas relief on a state law that prejudged defendant.

We first consider whether the admis clear, As our discussion prior injury justified sion of the above makes such ruling relief. In habeas McGuire’s provide state-law violations no basis for rights process due were violated federal habeas relief.” 881 F.2d at 603- evidence, admission of the Court of 604.

Appeals relied in on its part conclusion We attempt to avoid this clear constitu- “incorrectly evidence was ad restriction, however, by tional claiming pursuant mitted ... to California law.” that the state-law violation we falsely per- Id., Estelle, v. 902 F.2d [McGuire 749] ceive is so serious that it violates due [(9th Cir.1990)]. 754 Such an inquiry, process, here, and we do so even as when however, part is no of a federal court’s the state courts definitively examined habeas review of a state conviction. We the issue under state law and declared many have stated times that “federal no state law violation lapse has oc- corpus habеas relief does not lie for curred. With all Jeffers, respect my errors of state law.” Lewis v. colleagues, 764, 780, 3092, 497 legal U.S. 110 S.Ct. 111 not even can legerdemain accomplish 606, (1990); L.Ed.2d Pulley see also v. such a result. To pull a rabbit out of a Harris, 41, 104 37, 871, 465 U.S. S.Ct. 79 hat, the hat must contain a rabbit before (1984). Today, reempha L.Ed.2d 29 we Here, the trick starts. hat has no province size it is not the of a rabbit, but we pull one out of it at the federal habeas court to reexamine state- expense State’s unwarranted nevertheless. ques court determinations on state-law Dyer was not in respect there. With all review, tions. In conducting habeas a my colleagues I believe we have far ex- federal court is limited to deciding authority ceeded our in ordering a new whether conviction violated the Consti trial in this case based on the exclusion of tution, laws, or treaties of the United my irrelevant hearsay. respectful judg- 2241; § States. 28 U.S.C. Rose v. ment, only have we mistreated Idaho 19, Hodges, 175, 423 21 U.S. 96 S.Ct. refusing apply the relevant habeas 177, (1975) curiam). 46 L.Ed.2d 162 (per taking handling test and liberties with its [N.2] rules, evidentiary of its but we have ac- (footnote 112 Id. S.Ct. at 479-480 in origi- complished exactly what the Supreme nal). against Court warned in Brecht when it hardly

One can implications miss the that unnecessarily noted old retrying cases the Court’s references to Lewis v. that, Jeffers “imposes significant ‘social costs’ Pulley cases, and to v. Harris. In those among things, other society’s frustrate in- we authority exceeded our and were re prompt jus- terest administration of versed. Footnote 2 passage from this Id., 637, tice.” 113 U.S. S.Ct. 1710. Estelle is also instructive about another simply Our order here orders a new trial our It unsuccessful cases. references at which it will proved could Cir.1989), (9th McCarthy, F.2d Blair murder, not have committed the thus 807, granted, rt. 111 S.Ct. ce tightening Gray. the noose.around 112 L.Ed.2d vacated as moot and remanded, Thus, although concur in the excellent U.S. 112- (1990) *29 says L.Ed.2d 391 about that Judge opinion, remainder Berzon’s ‍‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‍part that re- respectfully dissent from petition. granting

sults America, STATES of

UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee, SANCHEZ-CERVANTES, aka

Juan Quiroz, Quiroz

Hugo Quirox, Quiroc, Quiroz

Trejo, Tapia, Defendant-

Appellant.

No. 98-35897. Appeals,

United States Court

Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov.

Filed March 2002.

As Amended March

Case Details

Case Name: William L. Gray v. Joseph Klauser, Warden
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 27, 2002
Citation: 282 F.3d 633
Docket Number: 00-35732
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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