(after stating the facts as above).
Much of the argument contained in the rather voluminous briefs filed, though ostensibly made "on the question of sufficiency of proof, is directed to what has already been decided by the Supreme Court in Ramsay v. Bill Posters, supra. It should be needless to point out that it is idle to ask us now to discuss the sufficiency of these complaints, for the defendants are bound to regard that as established, and so are we. United States Trust Co. v. New Mexico,
As above stated, no violation of the deeree of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered in 1916 was
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proved. Error is claimed in the refusal of thе court to charge that “the evidence shows that there was no refusal by defendants to accept and post advertising posters for anybody subsequent to July, 1916, and the period subsequent to thаt date has no bearing on any of the issues in this ease and should be dismissed from the minds of the jury.” The part of this request relating to the tendency of the evidence as to nonviolation of the 1916 decree was in accordance with the fact, but this was simply part of a request which embodied unsound legal conclusions, and the court could disregard such a request entirely. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humble,
It is also claimed that, even if the defendants are guilty, plaintiff Rankin cannot recover beсause it is in pari delicto. This question was submitted to the jury under instructions to which no objection was made and which followed correctly the law of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Material Co.,
During the trial, the judgе made certain remarks now said to constitute reversible error, but no exception to them was taken. No attempt has been made to point out wherein they were prejudicial and no plain error is disclosed which should be noticed of our own motion. Central Supply Co., Inc., v. Carter Clothing Corporation (C. C. A.)
In its proof of damages, Rankin was permitted, under objection and exception, to show by the testimony of its treasurer and by a compilation he had made, based on the net profits of the business in 1911 and from his knowledge of business conditions when free of the defendants’ unlawful interference, what he considered would have been the normal increase of this plaintiff’s business from year to year. He was permitted to estimate on this basis its probable yearly earnings from'July, 1913, to June 30, 1918, and to explain how his figures were arrived at. The fact that this amount of the plaintiff’s damages could not be expressed in exact figures did not make them speculative. There was no speculation as to the fact of actual damage. Its business had been seriously curtailed. The defendants had caused the damage, and cannot be permitted to escаpe liability because it is difficult for the plaintiff to express in terms of dollars the damages it has suffered. This evidence, while purely an estimate and introduced as such, was proof of a kind as dеfinite and certain as the subject-matter admitted. It had to do with what was never actually earned because of the defendants’ wrongdoing. The witness testified from his knowledge of the business history, made his сalculations upon what appears to be a reasonable basis, and the defendants had ample opportunity by cross-examination or the offer of their own evidence оn the subject to discredit him and show any fallacy in his reasoning or testimony. Whatever may be said of its weight, and that was entirely for the jury, we have no difficulty with its admissibility. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Material Co., supra, at page 379 of
Because Ramsay did not introduce any estimate of probable future earnings, being
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content to leave the matter on proof of earnings, expenses, and net profits before the defendants’ unlawful acts, it is said that no damages warranting a recovery have been proved by that plaintiff. Thus we have in this same ease, as it happens that two sеparate actions were tried and are now considered together, defendants taking the position in respeet to one plaintiff that it was error to introduce evidence of estimated future earnings because it is too speculative, and the position in respeet to the other plaintiff that it was fatal to a recovery not to do so. Had there been no evidence from which damages could be fixed by the jury, of course this plaintiff could not recover. But there was evidence. The financial history of the Ramsay business was in the ease. Perhaps thе jury was not as competent to analyze that evidence as some financial and business expert might have been, but it could draw its own reasonable conclusions from it. That is what a jury is to do аnyway in arriving at the amount of damages in any ease. The jury had the data before it, and was' left to determine the damages from that in what may be called its raw state. Perhaps the testimony of sоme one competent to have estimated the business loss resulting from the defendants’ acts would have helped, but it. was not indispensable. See Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (C. C. A.)
Rankin recovеred as trebled damages $277,329.58, and Ramsay recovered as trebled damages $25,637.09. In the Rankin Case, an attorney’s fee of $42,500 was allowed and in the Ramsay Case a fee of $7,-500. Both these allowances are attacked as excessive. Testimony was introduced tending to show that $50,000 was a fair and reasonable valuation for the services rendered and the appellants introduced no evidence to the contrary, although counsel for them stated that “between $25,000 and $30,000 was the amount they should be awarded.”
It is not easy to decide what is just and reasonable in a mattеr of this kind, and the judgment of the trial judge who considered the matter with full knowledge of the facts is not lightly.to be set aside. No doubt the suggestion that the task of counsel was made easier by the government’s рrosecution which started in 1912 is correct. Yet a large amount of work and skill was necessary in conducting this litigation in its various phases up to the time the award of fees was made. Substantial judgments were obtained. The record before us contains 1,453 pages and shows to some extent what work was done and how it was performed before the eases came to this court. In view of all this, we-can reach no other conclusion than that the-trial judge acted within the bounds of sound discretion in making the allowances as he-did. See Montague & Co. v. Lowry,
The judgment in each case is affirmed-