William G. Barter, Wanda B. Barter, Ralph D. Blair and Pauline D. Blair v. United StatesWilliam G. Barter, Wanda B. Barter, Ralph D. Blair and Pauline D. Blair v. United States
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Cummings
This appeal involves taxpayer refund suits, consolidated in the district court and
The district court determined that this so-called “marriage penalty” does not offend the Constitution.
Johnson v. United States,
422 F.Supp. 958 (N.D.Ind.1976). The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was therefore denied, and the summary judgment motion of the United States was granted. Final judgments in favor of the United States were entered pursuant to
We agree with the district court that the inequities asserted to inhere in the “marriage penalty,” whatever may be their persuasiveness as arguments for legislative change, 2 do not rise to the level of constitutional violations of appellants’ rights. The district court’s thoughtful and workmanlike opinion cogently expounds the reasons for this conclusion, and there is little to be added to its analysis except to observe that it has not been demonstrated to us that perfect equality or absolute logical consistency between persons subject to the Internal Revenue Code has been, at least since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, a constitutional sine qua non. Accordingly, the opinion of the district court is, with certain exceptions, 3 adopted as the opinion of this court, and the judgments appealed from are affirmed.
AFFIRMED
Notes
. Significant income in this context means a contribution to the married couple’s income of, generally, at least 20% of the couple’s total income.
. Although it does not, of course, affect the result in this case, we take notice of the fact that such arguments have recently been made to and acted upon by the Congress. The pertinent tax bill has very recently been signed into law by the President, and is said to contain provisions embodying “an effort to reduce the ‘marriage penalty.’ ” Chicago Daily News, May 17, 1977, at 4, col. 3.
. As noted, a third consolidated case was dealt with in the district court’s opinion; that case is not before us. Thus those portions of the district court’s opinion addressing that case are not adopted, nor are any views with reference thereto implied. Also, appellants advanced in the district court the theory that the “marriage penalty” constituted unconstitutional sex discrimination, which theory has been abandoned on appeal. Accordingly, part VI of the district court’s opinion, which considers and rejects that theory, is not adopted nor are any views of this court pertinent thereto to be inferred.