William G. Barter, Wanda B. Barter, Ralph D. Blair and Pauline D. Blair v. United StatesWilliam G. Barter, Wanda B. Barter, Ralph D. Blair and Pauline D. Blair v. United States
This appeal involves taxpayer refund suits, consolidatеd in the district court and
The district court determined that this so-called “marriage penalty” does not offend the Constitution.
Johnson v. United States,
Wе agree with the district court that the inequities asserted to inhere in the “marriage penalty,” whatever may be their persuasiveness as arguments for legislative change, 2 do not risе to the level of constitutional violations of apрellants’ rights. The district court’s thoughtful and workmanlike opinion cоgently expounds the reasons for this conclusion, and there is little to be added to its analysis except to observe that it has not been demonstrated to us that perfect еquality or absolute logical consistency between persons subject to the Internal Revenue Code has beеn, at least since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendmеnt, a constitutional sine qua non. Accordingly, the opinion of the district court is, with certain exceptions, 3 adopted as the opinion of this court, and the judgments appealed from are affirmed.
AFFIRMED
Notes
. Significant income in this context means a contribution to the married couple’s income of, generally, at least 20% of the couple’s total income.
. Although it dоes not, of course, affect the result in this case, we tаke notice of the fact that such arguments have reсently been made to and acted upon by the Congress. The pertinent tax bill has very recently been signed into law by the President, and is said to contain provisions embodying “an effort tо reduce the ‘marriage penalty.’ ” Chicago Daily News, Mаy 17, 1977, at 4, col. 3.
. As noted, a third consolidated case was dealt with in the district court’s opinion; that case is not before us. Thus those portions of the district court’s opinion addressing thаt case are not adopted, nor are any views with reference thereto implied. Also, appellants advanced in the district court the theory that the “marriage penalty” constituted unconstitutional sex discrimination, which theоry has been abandoned on appeal. Accordingly, part VI of the district court’s opinion, which considers and rejects that theory, is not adopted nor are any views of this court pertinent thereto to be inferred.