Case Information
*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA January 2017 Term
FILED June 8, 2017 No. 16-0043 released at 3:00 p.m. RORY L. PERRY, II CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA WILLIAM F. CRAWFORD, Claimant Below, Petitioner V.
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS - WORK RELEASE, Respondent Below, Respondent Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review Claim No. 2014016722 Appeal No. 2050637
AFFIRMED Submitted: May 16, 2017 Filed: June 8, 2017
John Skaggs Jonathan J. Jacks
The Calwell Practice, LC Lisa Warner Hunter Charleston, West Virginia Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Attorney for the Petitioner Brown & Poe, PLLC
Charleston, West Virginia Steven K. Wellman Attorneys for the Respondent Jenkins Fenstermaker, PLLC
Huntington, West Virginia
Attorney for Amicus Curiae,
Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia
JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011) (Supp. 2016) prohibits a person confined in a state correctional facility or jail who is participating in a work-release program from receiving workers’ compensation benefits for any injury sustained while engaged in such work during the person’s period of confinement.
i
Davis, Justice:
In this appeal from an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (“the Board”), Mr. William F. Crawford (“Mr. Crawford”), petitioner herein and claimant below, challenges the Board’s finding that he is not eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits for an injury he sustained while he was an inmate participating in a work-release program. [1] Having considered the briefs, [2] the record submitted on appeal, the relevant law, and the oral argument presented by the parties, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This case involves a former inmate, Mr. Crawford, who seeks workers’ compensation benefits for an injury he sustained during his period of confinement at the Charleston Work Release Center. [3] In order to be placed at the Charleston Work Release Center, Mr. Crawford was required to sign a “Contract for Placement at a Work Release *5 Center.” The contract set out certain conditions for participation in a work-release program, and provided that Mr. Crawford could be returned to his parent institution at any time. After completing a thirty-day probationary period, Mr. Crawford was assigned to a road crew working for the West Virginia Division of Highways (“DOH”). Inmates at the Charleston Work Release Center, including Mr. Crawford, were able to provide work to DOH by virtue of a “Statewide Convict Workforce Agreement” made between DOH and the West Virginia Division of Corrections (“Corrections”), [4] the respondent herein and below. Under the particular agreement in effect at the time relevant to this appeal, which was dated April 26, 2012, Corrections would make available to DOH “a number of crews, which will vary both according to availability of inmates and the seasonal needs of [DOH].” In return, DOH agreed to “reimburse Corrections for inmate pay.” In addition, pursuant to the express terms of the agreement,
[DOH] and Corrections agree that the inmates performing services under this agreement will not be employees of the State entitling them to any benefits such employees might have including , but not limited to, insurance, worker [sic] compensation , benefits, pensions, sick, and annual leave.
*6 (Emphasis added). In order to be on a road crew, Mr. Crawford also was required to sign a Corrections document titled “Contract for Placement on Road Crew or Community Crew.” This document established various restrictions for inmate participation on a road crew. For example, pursuant to the contract, “[DOH] staff members have no authority to excuse an inmate Road Crew member from work.” Moreover, “[a]ll inmate Road Crew members must remain on their designated crew unless given written permission to leave that assigned employment placement. An inmate Road Crew member will not be permitted to leave the assigned crew until replaced by another person, except in cases of parole or discharge.” Likewise, under the contract, a Corrections “Employment Officer may terminate an inmate’s work assignment at any time or may reassign an inmate to a different work crew at his/her discretion.”
While working on a road crew serving DOH, Mr. Crawford’s hand was severely injured on March 28, 2013, when it was caught in a wood chipper. His injuries resulted in surgery and hospitalization, with medical bills in excess of $90,000 that were paid by Corrections. Mr. Crawford was paroled soon after his release from the hospital.
Mr. Crawford initiated a claim for workers’ compensation and, on November 15, 2013, the Claims Administrator rejected Mr. Crawford’s application for benefits based upon its determination that he did not suffer an injury in the course of and resulting from his *7 employment. The claims administrator found that Mr. Crawford was an inmate and not an employee as defined under West Virginia Code § 23-4-1(a) (2008) (Repl. Vol. 2010). The Office of Judges (“OOJ”) affirmed the decision of the claims administrator. The OOJ found that Mr. Crawford was still incarcerated and an inmate while housed at the Charleston Work Release Center. Moreover, the work agreement between Corrections and DOH made clear that the workers from work release centers were considered inmates and not employees. The OOJ concluded that, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011) (2016 Supp.), Mr. Crawford was ineligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits for an injury he received while in a work-release center performing work for DOH. The Board affirmed the Order of the OOJ. This appeal followed. By order entered on February 16, 2017, this Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs. The case subsequently was submitted on briefs and oral argument.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW Because the Board decision under review affirmed prior rulings by the claims administrator and the OOJ, the standards for this Court’s review of the Board’s rulings are set out in W. Va. Code §§ 23-5-15(b & c) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010):
(b) In reviewing a decision of the board of review, the supreme court of appeals shall consider the record provided by the board and give deference to the board’s findings, reasoning and conclusions, in accordance with subsections (c) and (d) of *8 this section.
(c) If the decision of the board represents an affirmation of a prior ruling by both the commission and the office of judges that was entered on the same issue in the same claim, the decision of the board may be reversed or modified by the supreme court of appeals only if the decision is in clear violation of constitutional or statutory provision, is clearly the result of erroneous conclusions of law, or is based upon the board’s material misstatement or mischaracterization of particular components of the evidentiary record . The court may not conduct a de novo re-weighing of the evidentiary record. If the court reverses or modifies a decision of the board pursuant to this subsection, it shall state with specificity the basis for the reversal or modification and the manner in which the decision of the board clearly violated constitutional or statutory provisions, resulted from erroneous conclusions of law, or was based upon the board’s material misstatement or mischaracterization of particular components of the evidentiary record.
(Emphasis added). We have previously recognized, however, that this Court “review[s]
de
novo
legal conclusions of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review.
Johnson v. W. Va.
Office of Ins. Comm’r
,
III.
DISCUSSION To resolve the instant matter, we must address two issues raised in this appeal: (1) Whether an inmate who is participating in a work-release program and is assigned to work for a state agency is prohibited from receiving workers’ compensation benefits by W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011) (Supp. 2016); and (2) Whether denying workers’ compensation benefits to an inmate who is participating in a work-release program violates equal protection. [5] We address these issues in turn.
A. W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b)
Mr. Crawford contends that W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b), which he characterizes
as excluding workers’ compensation coverage for work “imposed by the administration of
the state correctional facility or jail,” is unambiguous and does not exclude workers’
compensation coverage for work-release employment because such employment is
voluntary
*10
as opposed to being
imposed
by the administration of the state correctional facility or jail.
In support of his argument, he relies on Syllabus point 5 of
State ex rel. Gillespie v. Kendrick
,
Agreeing that W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) is unambiguous, Corrections argues
that its plain language precludes work release inmates from receiving workers’ compensation
benefits. Corrections disagrees with Mr. Crawford’s characterization of his work for DOH
as voluntary. Rather, Corrections contends that, while inmates may voluntarily request the
privilege of participating in the work-release program, once an inmate is accepted into the
program the requirement of work is
imposed
on inmates as a condition of their continued
participation in the work-release program.
[6]
If for any reason an inmate fails or refuses to
work, the inmate is returned to the correctional facility from whence he or she came to
resume serving his or her term of incarceration at that facility.
See, e.g.
, Syl.,
Craigo v.
Legursky
,
In our endeavor to settle the meaning of W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) in the
context of the facts herein presented, we observe the well-established principle that “[t]he
primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature.” Syl. pt. 1,
Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r
,
Pursuant to the relevant portion of W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e, (b) Notwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary, no person confined in a state correctional facility or jail who suffers injury or a disease in the course of and resulting from his or her work during the period of confinement which work is imposed by the administration of the state correctional facility or jail and is not suffered during the person’s usual employment with his or her usual employer when not confined shall receive benefits under the provisions of this chapter for the injury or disease [.]
(Emphasis added).
[7]
While we agree that the foregoing language is plain, we disagree with
*13
the interpretation of that language proposed by the parties to this appeal. Disagreement as
to the meaning of the statue does not, however, render the statute vague.
See T. Weston, Inc.
v. Mineral Cty
.,
The plain language of the foregoing statutory provision identifies two types of work: (1) work performed during the period of confinement which work is imposed by the administration of the state correctional facility or jail; and (2) the person’s usual employment with his or her usual employer when not confined. Under the statute, workers’ compensation *14 benefits are not provided to a person confined in a state correctional facility or jail for an injury sustained while the person is engaged in the first type of work, i.e., work performed during the inmate’s period of confinement, which, as the statute plainly recognizes, necessarily “is imposed by the administration of the state correctional facility or jail.” Workers’ compensation benefits are, however, available to a person confined in a state correctional facility or jail for an injury sustained while he or she is engaged in the second type of work, that is, the person’s usual employment with his or her usual employer when not confined.
Accordingly, we now expressly hold that W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011) (Supp. 2016) prohibits a person confined in a state correctional facility or jail who is participating in a work-release program from receiving workers’ compensation benefits for any injury sustained while engaged in such work during the person’s period of confinement. [8]
Applying the foregoing holding to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that
Mr. Crawford is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for the injury he sustained.
Mr. Crawford was injured during his period of confinement while participating in a work-
release program through the Charleston Work Release Center, which is a state correctional
*15
facility.
See
W. Va. Code § 25-1-3(d) (2013) (Repl. Vol. 2013) (providing “[t]he
Commissioner of Corrections may establish work and study release units
as extensions and
subsidiaries of those state institutions under his or her control and authority
” (emphasis
added)); Syl., in part,
Craigo v. Legursky
,
B. Equal Protection Mr. Crawford additionally argues that his equal protection rights have been violated insofar as he is a member of a class in which all persons are not treated equally. He *16 contends that some incarcerated prisoners who work while serving their period of confinement, i.e ., those who work for private employers, are mandated to receive workers’ compensation, while those, such as himself, who work for a state agency, are not. Mr. Crawford avers that, had he been doing the same work for a private employer, he would have received workers’ compensation benefits. He argues that the denial of workers’ compensation benefits to work-release inmates serving a state agency advances no reasonable government interest, nor is there a rational basis for such a denial. [10]
Corrections contends that Mr. Crawford’s argument fails because he cannot establish that he was discriminated against as compared to other incarcerated individuals. In this regard, Corrections avers that Mr. Crawford had the opportunity to seek private employment. Corrections further asserts that it has not been established in the record that work-release inmates working in the private sector actually receive workers’ compensation benefits. [11] Nevertheless, Corrections contends that, even if discrimination is found, any such *17 discrimination bears a rational basis to a proper governmental purpose in that there is a substantial governmental interest in maintaining fair business practices and a fiscally sound state budget. Corrections explains that, if the private sector was permitted to employ inmates without providing the benefits afforded to other employees, the businesses would receive an unfair advantage in competition versus other private businesses not utilizing inmates. Corrections finally argues that imposing a duty on state agencies to provide workers’ compensation for inmate workers would have a substantial negative impact on the State’s budget.
The right to equal protection is expressly provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which declares in relevant part that “[n]o state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Likewise, this Court has recognized that “West Virginia’s constitutional equal protection
principle is a part of the Due Process Clause found in Article III, Section 10 of the West
Virginia Constitution.” Syl. pt. 4,
Israel by Israel v. West Virginia Secondary Sch. Activities
*18
Comm’n
,
Under the facts herein presented, we need not address the existence of a
rational basis or whether the denial of workers’ compensation benefits to inmates bears a
reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose,
[12]
because we find there has been
*19
no violation of Mr. Crawford’s equal protection rights. Assuming,
arguendo
, that inmates
who work for private businesses through the work-release program do, in fact, receive
workers’ compensation benefits, the receipt of such benefits does not demonstrate
disadvantageous treatment of inmates who instead work for a state agency. Clearly both
classes of inmates receive treatment for work-related injuries. With respect to privately
employed inmates who presumptively receive workers’ compensation benefits, we note that
the Legislature has declared its intention that the Workers’ Compensation Code operate, in
part, “to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured
workers.” W. Va. Code § 23-1-1 (2007) (Repl. Vol. 2010). Likewise, inmates working for
a state agency, such as DOH, receive treatment for their injuries provided by Corrections:
“[t]here is no question that a governmental unit, such as [a] Correctional Center, has an
‘obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.’
Estelle
v. Gamble
,
IV.
CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing discussion, we affirm the December 21, 2015, decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review finding that Mr. Crawford is not *21 eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits for an injury he sustained while he was an inmate participating in a work-release program.
Affirmed.
Notes
[1] The case was before the Board on appeal from a ruling of the Worker’s Compensation Office of Judges (“OOJ”). The Board’s order affirmed the ruling of the OOJ that, in turn, had affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Claims Administrator.
[2] We recognize the participation of Amicus Curiae, the Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia, who filed a brief in support of the respondent, the Department of Corrections. We value the contribution of the amicus and will consider its brief in conjunction with the parties’ arguments.
[3] The Charleston Work Release Center has been replaced by the Charleston Correctional Center, which was opened on May 1, 2015.
[4] The respondent to this appeal has been incorrectly identified in the style of the case as “Department of Corrections.” We note that the Legislature reorganized the executive branch of state government in 1989. That reorganization, in relevant part, incorporated the Department of Corrections into the Department of Public Safety and designated it as the Division of Corrections. See W. Va. Code §§ 5F-2-1(e)(8) & (j) (1989) (Repl. Vol. 1990). Thereafter, the Department of Public Safety was redesignated as the Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety. See W. Va. Code §§ 5F-2-1(e)(7) & (j) (1992) (Repl. Vol. 1993). The relevant provisions are now found at W. Va. Code §§ 5F-2-1(i)(8) & (o) (2011) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
[5] Mr. Crawford additionally attempts to argue that denying him workers’
compensation benefits amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. We reject this issue as
inadequately briefed.
See State v. White
,
[6] Corrections explains that, during his first month housed at the Charleston Work Release Center, Mr. Crawford, like other work-release inmates, was required to work within the facility. Thereafter, he was given the option of finding work in the private sector that might extend beyond his incarceration or performing work for DOH.
[7] The full text of this code section provides: (b) Notwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary, no person confined in a state correctional facility or jail who suffers injury or a disease in the course of and resulting from his or her work during the period of confinement which work is imposed by the administration of the state correctional facility or jail and is not suffered during the person’s usual employment with his or her usual employer when not confined shall receive benefits under the provisions of this chapter for the injury or disease: Provided, That individuals otherwise confined in a state correctional facility or jail, or at a juvenile services facility, and working in a program authorized by sections fourteen [W. Va. Code § 25-7-14] or sixteen [W. Va. Code § 25 7-16] of article seven, chapter twenty-five of this code, shall be eligible to receive benefits under the provisions of this chapter while working in an authorized program. The coverage for benefits may be obtained either by the private entity or by agreement with the state agency as specified in subsection (5), subsection (a) of sections fourteen [W. Va. Code § 25-7-14] and (continued...)
[7] (...continued)
sixteen [W. Va. Code § 25-7-16] of article seven, chapter
twenty-five of this code.
W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011) (Supp. 2016). The parties agree that the exceptions
contained in W. Va. Code § 25-7-14 & § 25-7-16, which pertain to the Prisoners’ Industries
Enhancement (“PIE”) program that apparently has never been implemented, do not apply to
Mr. Crawford. Corrections asserts that the different treatment afforded the PIE program,
which was crafted to comply with federal law, was to ensure that participating private
industries received no unfair advantage from using inmate workers. The purpose was not to
protect inmate workers.
See McMaster v. State of Minn
.,
[8] We reach this holding based upon Mr. Crawford’s employment by a state agency, and we render no decision regarding an incarcerated inmate’s employment by a private employer, as those are not the facts presently before us.
[9] Also raised in this appeal is the question of whether Mr. Crawford qualified
as an “employee” pursuant to W. Va. Code § 23-2-1a (1999) (Repl. Vol. 2010). However,
this question is rendered moot by our determination that Mr. Crawford is barred from
receiving workers’ compensation benefits by operation of W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b), which,
by its own terms, prevails over other provisions of the Code.
See
W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b)
(beginning with “[n]otwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary . . . .”).
See
also State ex rel. Canterbury v. Paul
,
[10] Mr. Crawford additionally asserts that he was released from custody upon his release from the hospital. He claims that his lack of treatment has put him at a significant disadvantage in re-entering society. Mr. Crawford fails to identify any specific treatment that was denied to him. Instead, according to the appellate record, Mr. Crawford received treatment for his injury at a cost in excess of $90,000, which amount was paid by Corrections.
[11] The only evidence in the record pertaining to whether work release inmates working in the private sector receive workers’ compensation was the following deposition testimony by Mr. Jeff Stinnett, Administrator of the Charleston Work Release Center: (continued...)
[11] (...continued) Q. And would those wages [earned by inmates working for private employers] be reported[,] if you know, by the employers as towards their Workers’ Compensation premiums? . . . . A. As far as I know, yes.
[12] This Court has held that,
“‘“‘“[w]here economic rights are concerned, we look to
see whether the classification is a rational one based on social,
economic, historic or geographic factors, whether it bears a
reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose, and
whether all persons within the class are treated equally. Where
such classification is rational and bears the requisite reasonable
relationship, the statute does not violate Section 10 of Article III
of the West Virginia Constitution, which is our equal protection
clause.” Syllabus Point 7, [as modified,]
Atchinson v. Erwin
,
[172] W. Va. [8],
[12] (...continued)
Syl. pt. 1,
State ex rel. Boan v. Richardson
,
[13] We recognize that there are disability benefits provided under workers’ compensation in addition to medical treatment benefits; however, the parties have not raised (continued...)
[13] (...continued) those specific benefits in their equal protection arguments. Instead, the parties have referred to workers’ compensation in a general sense. Because the parties have not briefed specific workers’ compensation disability benefits, we will not address the same.
[14] Mr. Crawford relies on
State ex rel. Boan v. Richardson
,