William Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc. Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union 100 Budco Group, Inc., Seaboard System Railroad

KRUPANSKY, Bеfore ENGEL Drivers, PARSEC, INC.; Truck GILMORE,* Chauf Judges, and Circuit #100; Helpers, Local Union feurs & Judge. District Inc., System Group, Budco ENGEL, Judge. Circuit Railroad, Defendants-Appellees. appeals a Dougherty William Plaintiff No. 86-3482. him summary judgment entered Appeals, Court United States System in favor of defendant Seaboard Circuit. Sixth Rule Railroad, as final under and certified April 1987. Argued Proce- of Civil 54(b) Federal Rules July Decided Unit- certifying appeal, Senior dure. Porter Judge David S. District ed States support of thorough statement made a reason just “no finding that there was Aetna, 782 delay.” Solomon See Cir.1986); v. Met- COMPACT F.2d * designation. Gilmore, Michigan, sitting by United W. Horace The Honorable Judge District of for the Eastern District States ropolitan Government Nashville Occupational Act, Safety and and Health (6th County,

Davidson 786 F.2d 227 660(c). section, Cir. U.S.C. prohib This which 1986). its retaliatory against actions individuals who complaints OSHA, make to does not Prior underlying litigation, to the Mr. private right create a Taylor action. v. Dougherty employed had been as a crane Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 Cir. operator Parsec, by the defendant Inc. 1980). backup position, As a Seaboard also Parsec and the Local 100 of defendant contended that under Allis-Chalmers parties Teamsters Union were to a collec- Corp. 202, v. bargaining agreement tive appli- which was 1904, (1985), 85 L.Ed.2d 206 the tortious Dougherty’s employment cable to pro- and interference claim preempted by was sec vided that could be terminated tion 301 of the Management Labor Rela only “just agreement for cause.” The con- tions Judge Act. accepted Porter Sea provisions tained the usual for processing board’s second argument, and we fully grievances, including steps usual agree. copyA Judge Porter’s requisite memoran proceeding hearing to to a before dum and May order of 1986 is joint committee of the attached Teamsters and hereto Appendix as A. trucking industry. members of the While complaint, In his Dougherty acknowledging that the issue asserted was doubt, 27, 1985, that on or not free Judge about June Porter Parsec conclud- discharged him employment from his that a fair reading at the of Allis-Chalmers request of alleged He was Seaboard. that Sea- that a tort under claim state law is board discharge about his preempted by because 301 if section that claim is he complained had concerning to OSHA “inextricably intertwined with considera- certain unsafe work conditions which Sea- tion of the terms of the labor contract.” board allowed to premises. exist on its Id. at 105 S.Ct. at Judge Porter Plaintiff at the had required time been observed public that some of policies ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍carry part of his duties on Seaboard’s served preemption would not necessar- premises. Parsec denied that it any was in ily endangered be by permitting plaintiff to way by any complaint motivated of Sea- proceed pendent claim, on the Judge board, denied that discharge was moti- Porter also acknowledged that such a vated “ringing retaliation for his cause of action can exist under Ohio Seaboard, bell” on and instead asserted see Heheman Co., Scripps E.W. that he had properly discharged been for (6th Cir.1981); F.2d 1115 Cincinnati Ben just cause. gals, Inc. Bergey, (S.D. 453 F.Supp. grievance 1974). A protesting plaintiff’s However, Ohio Judge dis- Porter also charge hearing was taken “Regardless before stated: of how the tortious joint committee, upheld committee interference with a contract claim is de discharge. alleges fined, Plaintiff the terms of the labor committee was biased him and that will have to be scrutinized determine if negligent the union was presenting his Seaboard induced its agree breach.” We grievance. cоmplaint requests relief Judge Porter that his conclusion is under section 301 Manage- of the Labor reinforced by Seaboard, cited cases ment Relations 29 U.S.C. such as v. Western Electric Satterfield breach of bargaining agree- the collective (8th Cir.1985). 758 F.2d 1252 He con- part ment on employer, and also cluded that even if plaintiff sepa- had filed for breach duty union of its of fair rate courts, actions state and federal representation. appended Plaintiff also procedure such a improper would have an Seaboard for tortious inter- impact upon national and the ference with his relationship contractual Congress interest of in the speedy and uni- with Parsec. form administration оf national labor law In its motion for dismissal under the Seaboard ar- National Labor Relations Act. gued first Again, agree. the tortious interference we contract with 11(c) preempted by section of the which charged interference could be (OSHA) Safety and Administration agreement. An Health the collective working in the allegedly could not exist hazardous condi- about in turn agreement, such at June Parsec absence of tions Seaboard. interpreted feder- exclusively to be fired him. al law. Dougherty alleges that re- reasons, judgment foregoing For the filing quested he fired in retaliation “for AFFIRMED. court is of district OSHA, exercising complaint a and for with right right speech his of free and his to (dissenting): GILMORE, Judge District concerning complain Seaboard’s unwarrant- majority respectfully I dissent (Parser-Un- Company ed with case, Dougherty William opinion. In this Complaint, Ap- 11 Joint ion relations.” K summary judgment entered a appeals pendix p. Dougherty 5.1 claims was he defend- one of the against in favor of him “just in by fired Parsec violation of ants, Railroad. dis- System Seaboard contract, in the and that Sea- cause” clause judgment as final certified the judge trict request that he fired alleged board’s be 54(b). issue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. major a factor in Parsec’s was decision. an ac- Dougherty can maintain is whether pursuant dismiss to Seaboard moved to System in Railroad against Seaboard tion 12(b)(6) on Fed.R.Civ.P. the alternative provisions of Sec- preemption light of the (1) grounds private parties cannot en- that Management Rela- the Labor tion 301 of prohibition retaliatory on dis- force OSHA’s Act, 29 U.S.C. tions charges against complain individuals who (2) that the tortious interfer- to OSHA and I preempted by ence with claim is contract dispute arising out This is a judge The trial federal labor law. ruled employ- Dougherty by his firing of William issue, preemption on the Seaboard’s favor er, charged He has Parsec Parsec. Dougherty’s whether and did not address bargaining agree- of the collective violation against by Seaboard were barred Driver, union, ment; Truck Chauf- preemption Dougherty appeals the OSHA. No. 100 Helpers Local Union and feurs argues appeal that decision. Seaboаrd duty of (Teamsters), with violation preempt- tort claim is not even if the state third-party a cus- representation, and fair by it is barred OSHA. labor law Parsec, System Railroad Seaboard tomer in- (Seaboard), appellee, with tortious The dis- with a labor

terference II granted Seaboard’s motion trict court properly Court ruled The District dismiss, Dougherty’s ruling that tort inter- bring not a tortious Dougherty could law, and by federal labor preempted was claim under Section ference with un- could not be maintained that the claim Management Relations of the Labor was not law because der federal provides: between signatory to labor contract a between of contracts Suits for violation the Teamsters. Pаrsec and organization and a labor employer an services for Seaboard performs Parsec may be employees ... representing unloading cars. loading and railroad the Unit- court of district Teamster, Dougherty, employed was par- having jurisdiction of the ed States to a operator. a crane Pursuant Parsec as ties ... agreement with Par- bargaining 185(a). does A court district 29 U.S.C. § Teamsters, fire Parsec could sec and jurisdiction subject matter not have just cause. Seaboard Dougherty nonsignatory to a collec- over contract, and was party to this not a where tive April employer. Dougherty’s nonsignatory rights or duties Occupational Dougherty complained to U.S.C. complain OSHA. 29 11(c) Safety Occupational individuals who 1. Section 660(c). retaliatory prohibits actions Health Act interpretive in the terms and conditions The interests in uniformity are not stated Service, Hospital, predictability require of the contract. Nurs that labor- Union, disputes Employees be resolved refer- ing Home and Public require ence to federal law also Property Local Ser that the No. 47 v. Commercial meaning given vices, Cir.), phrase a contract or term F.2d Inc. 755 cert. subject interpreta- federal uniform Thus, questions relating tion. (1985) (S.E.E.U.). to what L.Ed.2d S.E.E.U. parties agreement agreed, to a labor court erred in held that a district dismiss legal consequences and what in- were ing pendent state law tortious interfer tended to flоw from breaches of that nonsignatory ence claim on the agreement, must be resolved refer- merits, ruling that the claim should have ence to uniform federal whether prejudice been dismissed for want without questions such arise in the context of a Thus, jurisdiction.2 the district court in suit for breach of contract or a suit properly Dougherty this case held that alleging liability in Any tort. other re- could not maintain his action Sea sult would elevate form over substance However, pursuant board to Section parties and allow to require- evade the Dougherty and are of diverse by re-labeling ments of their con- § citizenship, permitting federal courts to ex tract as claims for tortious breach of subject jurisdiction ercise matter over these 1332(a). parties. 28 U.S.C. § Lueck, 211, 471 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at 1911. that, Supreme The Court has held where The Court continued: the resolution of a state law claim is sub- focus, analysis then, stantially dependent Our must on on the of the wheth- er the bargaining agreement, applied terms of a collective tort action ... as [state] non-negotiable here confers the claim must be treated either as a state law Sec- rights employers employees tion on or preempted 301 claim or dismissed as inde- pendent right any by of federal labor law. Allis-Chalmers established con- v. tract, instead, Lueck, 202, 1904, or whether evaluation U.S. S.Ct. (1986). inextricably the tort claim is L.Ed.2d 206 The intertwined central issue with consideration of the terms this case is claim of of the whether state law labor contracts. If the state tortious tort law interference with a labor contract purports meaning to define the signed who has not relationship, law is preempted. contract is I do not think it is. preempted. Lueck, employee brought an a state Id., 213, 471 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at 1912. (in court) against law tort claim state an Significantly, the Court stated that: employer and insurer for the bad faith han- every dispute concerning employ- Not dling disability of an The insurance claim. ment, tangentially involving provi- or disability plan collectively had been bar- ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍bargaining agree- sion aof for, gained and the collective ment, pre-empted by 310 or other three-part proce- established a (em- provisiоns of the federal labor law. disability grievances, dure to settle admin- added) phasis joint union-employer istered commit- Supreme 211, The tee. Court held that 471 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at 1911. preempted by claim was federal labor specifically pass judg- law The Court refused to though even sounded in independent, the action tort. ment on whether an state-im- (9th Cir.1984); agreement among 2. There is not full the circuits Housing, 743 F.2d 1341 Loss v. Fifth, Seventh, (7th Cir.1982). on this issue. The and Ninth 673 F.2d 942 Blankenship, Two agree provides jurisdic permitted Circuits that Section 301 circuits have tortious interference non-signatories only non-signatories. tion over in limited cir with contract claims over Lo 472, cumstances. Carpenters Journeymen Local Union No. 1846 cal United Association v. Cir.1982), (11th Cir.1982); Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489 684 F.2d 721 Georgia Power 932, 335, denied, Guild, Publishing 464 U.S. 104 S.Ct. Newspaper rt. Wilkes-Barre Co. v. ce (1983); (3d Cir.1981), 78 L.Ed.2d 305 647 F.2d 372 Carpenters Southern Cal cert. (1982). Corporation Majestic L.Ed.2d 295 Administrative ifornia duty not create posed prob- major that did similar second underlying interpretation of contract lems be preemption is that Lueck derivative tort preempted. “preserves the central role of arbi- Id., tration” in labor law. 471 U.S. at preemption Court found Lueck S.Ct. at 1915. The Court said: the basis that tort claim for bad-faith handling of an insurance claim could Perhaps the most harmful aspect of the obligations resolved reference Wisconsin [allowing decision the state contract, that were created is that it essentially would allow claim] preempted by hеnce was federal law. The the same suit to be directly in provided itself for a committee to state court exhausting without first disputes. resolve insurance-related grievance procedures established in the Lueck at at 1913. Under bargaining agreement. law, parties power state had the Id. The Court continued: agree to what would constitute “reasonable A permitted rule that an individual to performance obligations under an insur- sidestep grievance procedures available Finally, rights ance contract.” would cause arbitration to lose most of duties involved in the tort of bad-faith fail- effectiveness, (cite omitted) its as well as perform ure to the contract derived eviscerate а central tenet of federal la- obligations established the contract. bor-contract law under 301 that it is Thus, even under state the tort claim arbitrator, court, not the who has the firmly expectations rooted in the responsibility interpret the labor con- parties signed contract, who had the labor in tract the first instance. had and therefore ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍to be evaluated feder- al law. labor 220, Id. 471 U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at 1916. major policy There were two considera may It appear glance at first that the in tions the Lueck decision. The first was district asserting pre court was correct in allowing that terms contract to have differ emption here. Seaboard is accused of a meanings ent under federal and state lаw tortious interference with a labor contract inevitably disruptive “would exert a influ Parsec, Dougherty between and under upon negotiation ence both the and admin if, Ohio law Seaboard is liable without a agreements.” istration of collective Id. at so, privilege to do it induced or otherwise 210, 105 court, S.Ct. at 1910. The at Lueck improperly perform caused Parsec not to 210-211, pages suggests the evils that Dougherty. its contract with Juhasz v. would flow from the absence of uniform Quik Inc., Shops, App.2d 55 Ohio federal contract law include: 235, (1977); N.E.2d Heheman v. E.W. (cid:127) Parties would uncertain be as to what (6th Scripps 661 F.2d Cir. they binding were themselves to when 1981). Dougherty’s The central element of they signed a labor contract. against Seaboаrd is whether Parsec (cid:127) negotiations Contract would made be just cause to fire-Dougherty, had and the immeasurably more difficult the ne- that, district court reasoned since resolu cessity trying to formulate contract dependent upon tion of the claim was an provisions that allowed different just provision cause contract, Lueck mandated the conclusion (cid:127) Disputes interpretation over contract preempted. that the tort claim was This proliferate. decision consistent with other cases was (cid:127) holding that tortious interference with la The same contract term would not preempted by bor contract claims are interpretation, raising have a uniform Dobelman, Hillard v. 774 F.2d possibility See that same contract (8th Cir.1985); Evangelista v. Inland might interpreted differently be in dif- Union, jurisdictions, hindering boatmen’s 777 F.2d 1390 Cir. ferent thus 1985); Assoc., Congressional policy establishing a Peterson v. Airline Pilots (4th Cir.1985), body uniform of federal labor law. 759 F.2d cert. (1986). 88 L.Ed.2d 289 pointed 1063-64 As the Court U.S. out (1986). 213, 105 in page 471 U.S. at S.Ct. at page 1912 “If the state tort purports law significant distinction between all of meaning define the of the contract relation cited and this case is that cases above ship, preempted.” that Allowing law in all of those cases the claims were proceed against state law action to signed the entities who had labor signed contract, who has not the labor contract, decisions, agents. or their Those obligations whose are not definеd Supreme and the behind the Court’s contract, will neither define holding applicable modify nor Lueck are not where relationship the tortious interference claim contractual is made between thé em nonsignatory ployer to the labor con- and the union. tract. One of the basic concerns of Lueck was application

It is true that tortious state law to labor con- against nonsignatories uncertainty have been tract terms would result in preempted by held to National Labor negotiations and increase the num- 157, 158, Relations’ 29 U.S.C. where disputes ber of over interpreta- plaintiff alleges the conduct for implicated tion. None of these concerns is protected by he was fired was the NLRA. Dougherty’s allegation here. that Sea- See v. Western Electric Com- board Satterfield interfered with the labor contract (8th Cir.1985). pany, 758 F.2d There impact will have no on either the Union's or here, however, allegation is no interpretation Parsec’s of the contract. engaged protect- activities Whether or not the contract was violated the NLRA. Section preemption will still be decided in accordance with fed- upon relationship based between the eral and state applied law will not be contract, claim and the labor the in- while itself, to the contract but rather only to quiry preemption in NLRA is whether the Seaboard’s “extra-contractual” conduct. plaintiff’s protected by conduct is the stat- Accordingly, impact upon it will no have ute, without reference to the contract. negotiation either the or administration of pointed It was out the Seventh Circuit contracts, nor is there reason to pre-Lueck case, in a Blankenship, Loss v. holding nonsignatory believe that liable (7th Cir.1982), 673 F.2d 942 that: for tortious interference with the contract Requiring against non-parties suits for disputes will increase over contract inter- tortious interference with contract to be pretation. however, under state will major policy The other underlying Lueck disruptive upon not “exert a influence permitting was the concern that state law negotiation both and administration plaintiffs claims would allow to avoid the agreements.” cases) (citing collective fundamental labor that contract dis- to the bargaining Parties putes should by be decided in arbitrators agreement will still to be able have their the problem first instance. That is not a obligations respective to one another de- where a tortious interference contract with by termined federal law. being is nonsignato- claim made a validity Id. at n. 6. The of the Seventh ry. The Sixth Circuit has held that non- Circuit's is not affected Lueck. signatory cannot be ordered to arbitrate a Although analyze a court must the contract dispute specific finding labor absent a exists, to determine whether relationship it and between breach, whether there hаs been a order bound the contract is such that it too to resolve whether contract has been S.E.E.U., to bound arbitrate. 755 F.2d at with, tortiously interfered this is not the findings 504. No such have made in been type of that requires preemption case un- this case. der Lueck. Lueck was concerned with the only holding cases that tortious in- preemption modify of state laws that would relationships against non-signatories created labor con- terference Comment, tracts. preempted 86 are Col.L.Rev. federal law have labor

1483 however, disregards, brought under What Seaboard to be the claims allowed Publishing complaining Co. to OSHA is that retaliation for 301. Wilkes-Barre Cir.1981), (3d Guild, F.2d Dougherty’s claim Newspaper not the for sole bаsis 1143, 102S.Ct. U.S. complaint alleg- rt. His tortious interference. ce (1982); International 71 L.Ed.2d es that: Union, Mining Eastover UMWA requesting dis- action in Seaboard’s Thus, 1985). (W.D.Va. F.Supp. to charge motivated a desire [sic] preempt were state claims though the even filing a against Plaintiff for retaliate given a Section ed, plaintiff was exercising for OSHA and complaint with non-signatory. How remedy against right to right speech of free and his held that Section ever, has this Circuit complain concerning unwar- Seaboard’s jurisdiction matter provide subject not does Company-Union with ranted interference in most instances. nonsignatories over relationships. court this Thus, district affirm the to Thus, ¶ 11, Appendix p. Joint Complaint, without leave case would be to complaining for to OSHA was retaliation Sec gain relief to under remedy: unable allegations three behind one of an bringing prohibited but tion claim. tortious interference ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍fur It not action state removed, allegation is if OSHA Even Congress, in of either the policies ther the speech and unwarranted statutes, freedom or labor enacting the federal relation- employer-union interference with give a third Court Supreme The district court ship allegations with a remain. allegedly interfered has party who effectively issues, leaving amounts no did not rule on these labor contract what immunity.3 panel to review. record for this a non- to sue Allowing member a union Ill interference with signatory tortious implicate any does labоr contract Therefore, the case appears to me that federal application of favoring the policies claim is not because the should be reversed application in Lueck. law found respectfully dis- I therefore preempted. Dougherty’s law to of state sent. law be require the state will not interpret the collective used A APPENDIX this resolution of will the agreement, nor relationship modify contractual C-l-85-1912 Civil No. Dough- employer. the union between COURT STATES DISTRICT UNITED con- with the erty’s tortious is not against Seaboard tract OF OHIO DISTRICT SOUTHERN of the Labor- by Section 301 preempted Act. Management Relations DIVISION WESTERN that, tor- even if argues 9,May Decided 1986 is with contract claim tious interference there dismissed as рreempted, it should be AND ORDER MEMORANDUM enforce action to private of is no cause Judge: PORTER, District Senior Safety 11(c) Occupational of the Section on defend- the Court This is before case 660(c), that Act, 29 U.S.C. and Health § plaintiff’s to dismiss motion ant Seaboard’s against individ- retaliatory actions prohibits alleges Sea- The claim against it. is It complaints with OSHA. who file uals a labor tortiously interfered with board does not create provision this true that defendant plaintiff and contract between Brighton Taylor v. right of action. private plaintiff’s we believe that Cir.1980). Because Parsec. 256 Corp., 616 F.2d possibility of "third where the work sites spectrum of work- impacts a broad issue 3. This Stiglitz, significant. “Union instance, industry, is See interference" construсtion ers. For Makes Who Representation in Construction: largest country’s of terms which is one (1981). Diego 583 L.Rev. 18 San Choice?” employment, decentralized is characterized We need not issue, decide this first be- cause Seaboard’s ground alternative for claim pre-empted is under the rule of Allis- is dismissal well-taken. Seaboard contends Lueck, Chalmers v. 202, 471 U.S. 105 S.Ct. that under the rule of Allis-Chalmers v. (1985), L.Ed.2d 206 grant we Sea U.S. board’s motion and dismiss the claim against (1985),plaintiff’s it. L.Ed.2d 206 tortious inter- ference claim must be pre- dismissed as pertinent facts are following. empted by section 301 of the Labor Plaintiff was employed by defendant Par- Management Act, Relations 29 U.S.C. operator. sec as a crew Parsec and defend- § (Teamsters ant Union 100) Local par- were ties to a agreement. Our starting point in determining wheth- Under agreement, plaintiff could plaintiff's er against pre- Seaboard is terminated just for cause. Parsec empted Allis-Chalmers case. There, loaded and unloaded containers for Sea- the Court held that the pre-emptive scope premises, board on Seaboard’s but of Section 301 beyond extends contract vio- employed was never by Seaboard. Sea- lations. The Court determined that a tort board was not a party to the collective claim pre-empted by Section 301 if the bargaining agreement between Parsec and claim is “inextricably intertwined with con- the Union. sideration the terms of the labor con- alleges Plaintiff of com- because Allis-Chalmers, tract.” supra 105 S.Ct. at plaints he made to Occupational Safety 1912. Conversely, the Court held that if (OSHA) Health Administration about the tort action non-negotiable “confers Seaboard, hazardous conditions at Sea- rights state law employers or employees prevailed board upon Parsec to terminate independent of any right established plaintiff. alleges Plaintiff his termi- contract,” the claim is not pre-empted. nation violated the “just provision cause” short, the Court held that “when resolution of the collective bargaining agreement. of a state-law claim is substantially depend- grievance Plaintiff filed a protesting the upon ent analysis of thе agree- terms anof discharge, which processed to a hear- ment made parties between the in a labor ing before a Joint Committee Team- contract, that claim must either be treated sters and trucking members indus- claim, as a or dismissed pre-empt- as try. alleges Plaintiff the committee was federal labor-contract law.” Id. at unfairly against biased him. (citation omitted). Essentially, plaintiff’s complaint states a policies underlying pre-emption are claim for relief 301 of the several, prominent among but them is the Management Labor Relations 29 Congressional goal promoting uniform- [sic], U.S.C. 1985 for breach of contract ity in interpretation agree- of labor and also against states a clаim the union Id. at 1911. A secondary goal is ments. duty breach of its representa- of fair preservation of arbitration anas essen- tion. Plaintiff also states tial component of self-govern- industrial Seaboard for tortious interference with the ment. at quoting Id. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Navigation Gulf Seaboard’s instant motion seeks dismis- 574, 581, 1347, 1352, 4 L.Ed.2d sal of the claim grounds. on two (1960). First, Seaboard contends that the state law Although the Supreme ap- Court has claim is pre-empted by provisions peared to resolve the question substantial Occupational Safety and Health Sec- of when tort may a claim pre-empted 11(c), by tion 660(c). 29 11(c) U.S.C. § 301, it left for prohibits a analysis § case case retaliatory the actions individ- uals complain delineation of the who to OSHA. The reach of Sixth the doctrine. Circuit 11(c) has held that does not instant motion create raises the § unanswered private right a of Taylor v. Brigh- question action. of broadly how the pre-emption ton Corp., (6th 616 Cir.1980). F.2d 266 doctrine should extend.

1485 (5) damages justification, and sence of thereof.1 is here wheth- presented issue The exact claim interference Interfer quoting 45 Am.Jur.2d a tortious Id. at er the terms with party Moreover, is so intertwined cites the third defendant ence 3.§ that agreement bargaining collective the of tor- cases that have held to several Court 301, or whether by Section pre-empted isit pre-empted are tious interference rights suffi- to enforce seeks a claim such Dobelman, 774 v. 301. See Hilliard § contract to the labor independent of ciently Cir.1985); In (8th Evangelista v. F.2d 886 separate state- as a treatment its warrant (9th Union, F.2d 1390 landboatmen’s claim. law Bottlers, Cir.1985); Pepsi Cola Mitchell v. posi- opposing the mindful that areWe (7th Cir.1985); Inc., Peterson 772 F.2d are, analy- final in the presented us tions Association, F.2d Pilots v. Airline Our task sis, closely balanced. very Cir.1985), (4th cert. has been facilitated the issues weighing (1985). 946, 106 312, 88 L.Ed.2d have received. we memoranda excellent the plaintiff the on two agree with We protect- policies the that contends Plaintiff First, agree that state-law we points. jeopar- not be in Allis-Chalmers is not re- the labor contract of of a state-law recognition by our dized interference analyze the tortious quired to a con- with interference for tortious claim pro- “just of the cause” breach claim. The of plaintiff, resolution According to tract. purpose of a analy- analyzed for the state-law vision can be not involve need claim the collec- according of the to the terms the substantive of tortious interference sis tor- since the bargaining agreement Likewise, agree we tive precepts of § sepa- wholly exists interference goal tious of arbitration not promotion contract, of is a creature the rate Not has in this case. implicated rise Moreover, gives the claim state wrongful discharge the plaintiff processed remedies. only to state-law arbitration, but because claims, plaintiff thus of the Recognition to a is not congres- the undermine not argues, would state- plaintiff’s plaintiff, with interpre- uniformity in the policy of sional the could not be arbitrated law claim Nor would of labor contracts. tation anyway. goal preserving important diminish [sic], the better we think Neverthess sys- in “our role of arbitration central put one forward is the pre-emption view Allis- government.” self of industrial tem reading of Allis- Our by the defendant. Chalmers, at 1915. Supreme us that persuades Chalmers in- that the tortious counter Defendants cautiously in the proceeded has Court analysis of require claim does terference asserts, as pre-emption, area of collective bar- terms substantive sweeping ap endorsed a has rather but authority, defend- agreement. For gaining Indeed, questions. pre-emption proach in Ben- to Cincinnati the Court refers ant view a similar has taken Circuit the Sixth (S.D. F.Supp. 129 Bergey, 453 Inc. v. gals, doctrine pre-emption the reach the follow- 1974), we outlined where Ohio 301 a state- pre-empted and has held recovery tor- ing elements essential to a labor by non-party pressed law claim with tious In Michigan Mutuel agreement. [sic] wrongoer’s contract; (2) (1) [sic] Steelworkers, 774 v. United surance Co. thereof; (3) his intentional knowledge compen- Cir.1985),a worker’s (6th breach; (4) F.2d 104 ab- of its procurement ex- protecting the (e)the social interests requisite elements 1. Plaintiffs version actor’s and the pectancy the one hand claim are a tortious interference hand. conduct, on the other of action freedom (a) the actor’s the nature of Scripps F.2d 1115 E.W. expectancy (b) [sic] Hehman the nature of Inc., interferes, Shops, 1981), citing Quik Cir. Juhasz conduct (1977), parties, (c) App.2d between 379 N.E.2d the relations 55 Ohio (1939). (d) sought advanced to be interest citing of Torts Restatement actor and bargaining collective agreement,2 recogni- tion of the permit tort would interpretation brought sation insurer suit a union of the labor in contract a “different envi- duty for breach of a arising under the ronment.” Allis-Chalmers, bargaining agreement. collective at Court held that the 1915. It “determination of will not be in the all plain- cases that scope existence and duty will, the which the reasons, tiffs for strategic join both allegedly defendant breached is ‘substan- claims, federal and state-law as is the tially dependent’ upon analysis of the case here. may Plaintiffs often find it terms of bargaining a collective agree- expedient bring the tortious interference Id.,at ment,” 106, quoting Allis-Chalmers, suit in Thus, state court. the anomalous 105 S.Ct. at pre- was therefore situation could arise that two cases involv- empted. ing the same collective bargaining agree- We believe the same required result ment proceed could in pro- simultaneous here. Regardless of how the tortious inter- ceedings in state and federal courts. We ferenсe defined, with a contract claim is believe this is the exact circumstance the terms of agreement the labor will have to Court in sought Allis-Chalmers to avoid. be scrutinized to determine if Seaboard in- Moreover, uniformity is also threatened duced its breach. We do signifi- not find it by recognition of the state in tort terms of cant for purposes our that changed legal consequences that would may interpreted exclusively by federal flow from the breach of Common sense tells collective bar- any that us gaining agreement. for tortious Allis-Chalmers, interference with a See contract is substantially dependent supra upon analysis of at 1911. remedy Plaintiff’s the contract conclusion, itself. Our while breach of the labor contract expand would compelled, not is at least reinforced beyond those available under Section cited holding cases defendant that tor- e.g., back pay reinstatement, to include tious are pre-empted by potential for punitive damages and at- torney fees. damages Such might not alter We are plaintiff’s mindful of point that the respective rights of the contracting defendant’s cases involve suits ei- parties, but their availability clearly makes see, supervisors, ther e.g., Hilliard, supra, the consequences flowing from the breach Mitchell, supra, leaders, or see, union e.g., of the partially dependent upon Evangelista, supra; Peterson, supra, and state law. therеfore apply do in full force Plaintiff argues that this case falls out- instant case where the defendant is not a scope side the of the Allis-Chalmers rule party to the collective bargaining agree- in that it right involves a indepen- created Nonetheless, ment. we find the cases to be dent of the collective bargaining agree- persuasive point plaintiff’s ment, merely but related to way. some state-law tortious pre- interference claim is Allis-Chalmers, See empted supra 1516; at Michi- especially view of the gan Insurance, fact that Mutual require supra would at 106. We bargaining collective disagree. any- The tort of interference with a way. contract is derived from the contract. An interfеrence claim could not exist in the Our holding is based on the conclusion absence of a breach bargain- collective recognition [sic] plaintiff’s state-law ing agreement. supra. See It jeopardize is thus dominant goal more than pre-emption, i.e., agreement. behind related to the the uniform It is interpretation federal dependent very labor contracts. for its existence on the Since the tort clearly implicates state contract itself. 2. See also There, Western Electric plain- Satterfield (8th Cir.1985) court, F.2d 1252 facts by alleged tiff had that he was terminated at the case, pre-empted similar the instant held distributing right-to- direction of defendant for 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Rela- work litеrature other union members work- tions Act a tortious interference lawsuit ing on defendant’s site. construction employee against a former nonparty to the America, UNITED STATES holding insulates recognize that our We Plaintiff-Appellee, plaintiff. How- suit from Seaboard out, correctly points ever, as defendant pre-emption of a has found Circuit Sixth GROS, Defendant-Appellant. Patricia appropriate even of action state cause freeing though results No. 85-3376. Insurance, Michigan Mutual suit. See ‍‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‍Appeals, supra. United States Court Sixth Circuit. the rule of Allis- Having determined that motion, instant we governs the Chalmers Argued Aug. 1986. tor- to treat must determine whether July Decided claim, or claim as a tious interference by federal labor- pre-empted it as dismiss Allis-Chalmers, supra 105 at 1916. Appeals has Court of

The Sixth Circuit court does 301 “a district

held that under § jurisdiction over a subject matter

not have

non-signatory to a collective rights no or duties of the

agreement, where stated in the terms

non-signatory party are contract.” Service

and conditions Proper-

Employees Union v. Commercial Therefore, Cir.1985).

ty, 755 F.2d plaintiffs claim as a 301 if treat

even we dismissed.

claim it must be

ORDER foregoing rea-

Accordingly, for all

sons, plaintiffs claim

hereby dismissed.

Also, Federal Rules of Civil pursuant to

Procedure, no we find that there is Rule delay the entrance of final

just reason to there- on the instant motion. We

judgment judg- to enter final

fore direct the Clerk plaintiffs as to of dismissal

ment

against Seaboard. ORDERED.

SO S. Porter

/s/ David

United States Judge District

Senior

Case Details

Case Name: William Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc. Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union 100 Budco Group, Inc., Seaboard System Railroad

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Jul 22, 1987

Citation: 824 F.2d 1477

Docket Number: 86-3482

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.