131 Misc. 73 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1928
The defendants contend chiefly that since the complaint does not allege that plaintiffs are judgment creditors, this action, which is brought under section 44 of the Personal Property Law (as amd. by Laws of 1914, chap. 507), commonly known as the “ Bulk Sales Act,” cannot be maintained. But it has been held that “ any creditor of the seller, whether his claim has been put in judgment or not, may sue under the act ” (Touris v. Karantzalis, 170 App. Div. 42, 45), and “ that the remedy g'ven by the statute was intended for the benefit of general creditors, as well as judgment creditors.” (Matter of Perman, 172 App. Div. 14, 16.) The plaintiffs herein are creditors. Their claims were absolute and not contingent at the time of the transfer. The nature of their claims has been fully set forth. The instant case is readily disf'nguishable from the case of Silberstein & Son, Inc., v. Cohen (222 App. Div. 249), where a complaint under the Bulk Sales Act was held insufficient by Mr. Justice Martin because the plaintiff did not plead fully the nature of his claim. Some of the cases cited by the defendants in their brief in support of their contention were expressly referred to by Mr. Justice Scott in the Touris Case (supra), where he declined to follow them. Defendants do not distinguish between the ordinary judgment creditor’s action,
