54 F.R.D. 463 | D. Mass. | 1972
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendants Joseph and Mary Susi moved, pursuant to Rule 12, Fed.R.Civ. P., to dismiss this action on the ground they were served with process after being enticed by false representations to come to Massachusetts. The question presented is whether there was such an abuse of the process of this court that the court will not enforce its jurisdiction against the moving parties but will set the process aside. See, e. g., Fitzgerald and Malloy Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U.S. 98, 11 S.Ct. 36, 34 L.Ed. 608 (1890); Union Sugar Refinery v. Mathiesson, 24 Fed.Cas. p. 680 No. 14,397 (C.C.Mass.1864); cf. Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664, 58 S.Ct. 831, 82 L.Ed. 1122 (1938). Compare Buchanan v. Wilson, 254 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1958). At the hearing of the motion witnesses were called by the plaintiff and the moving parties. This memorandum contains the findings and rulings of the court.
The facts may be stated as follows. Plaintiff is a resident of Connecticut. Proceeding pro se
Orlando had no intention of paying the judgment debt to Joseph Susi when he telephoned on March 13, and his representation to Joseph Susi that he would do so was false. Orlando never intended to be at his office in East Brook-field on March 16 when the Susis were to arrive, and he never tried to reach Joseph on March 15 to tell him not to come.
The court concludes that in filing the complaint, in securing the order for Francis to serve the process, and in the steps taken to have service made on the Susis at East Brookfield, the plaintiff, without training in the law, was advised by one with legal skill and experience. No appearance was filed on his behalf until that of J. Francis Hayden on February 18, 1971. The court does not find, and this memorandum should not be read to imply, that the court believes plaintiff was advised by Mr. Hayden before his appearance was filed. All that is here found is that plaintiff was advised by someone with the skill and experience demonstrated by the steps taken and papers filed while plaintiff was acting pro se.
The venue of this diversity action was not properly laid in this district when the complaint was filed, since neither the plaintiff nor the defendants were residents of this district. 28 U.S. C. § 1391(a). A practitioner of experience in Massachusetts might have concluded, nevertheless, in light of Rule 4(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. (1963), that service of trustee process in Massachusetts on Orlando and Hartford effectually seized the property of Susi Contracting Co., Inc. (and probably of Joseph) to the value of the judgment against Orlando, and gave the court quasi-in-rem jurisdiction .over the defendants. See, e. g., Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916); Gulda v. Second National Bank, 323 Mass. 100, 80 N.E.2d 12 (1948). In the case of Nowell v.
It is not clear whether plaintiff knew that jurisdiction over the Susis was subject to attack in light of Nowell, or whether he desired personal service on them to be made in Massachusetts in any event. It is clear, however, as between Orlando and the plaintiff, that only the latter would benefit by the presence of the Susis in East Brookfield. Thus, the court concludes that Orlando made the false representation to Joseph Susi at the behest of the plaintiff, and in making it acted on plaintiff’s behalf.
Accordingly, the court finds the service of process on the Susis in East Brookfield was an abuse of process, and orders that the service be and the same hereby is quashed.
. Plaintiff is not a lawyer, and there is no evidence he has been educated, trained or is experienced, in the practice of law. Yet the complaint he filed is skillfully drawn and shows not only undeniable evidence of the techniques of an experienced pleader but also familiarity with the code provisions relating to jurisdiction of district courts, the meaning of venue, the doctrine of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, and principles of corporation law.
. It is this service that the Susis seek to have set aside.
. It is clear to the court that Joseph telephoned Orlando on March 15 and told Orlando he would arrive the next morning in East Brookfield.