*1 FIRE v. CALVERT JUDGE U. S. DISTRICT WILL, et CO. INSURANCE al. June Argued April 1978 Decided
No. 77-693. *2 an J., judgment announced the Court’s and delivered Rehnquist, joined. JJ., opinion, in which White, Blackmun, and Stewart, Stevens, J., concurring post, Burger, opinion judgment, p. filed an 667. J., J., dissenting opinion, post, filed a filed a dis- p. C. Brennan, JJ., senting opinion, Burger, Powell, Marshall J., in which C. post, joined, p. 668. argued petitioner.'
Milton With V. Freeman the cause Kronstein, Lyons, him on Dennis Werner J. the briefs were G. *3 Stanley Kaplan. A. Fire respondent Louis the Calvert argued Loss cause for L. Weiss- him on brief was Michael Insurance Co. With Kendall filed a man. Thomas J. Weithers and D. Griffith under respondent for Mutual Co., brief American Reinsurance in petitioner. of (4), support Rule Court’s Rehnquist of judgment announced Justice Mr. opinion which Court, and an in delivered Stew- Justice Mr. joined. and Mr. art, White, Justice Justice Stevens Mr. Appeals August On the Court of for the 15, 1977, Seventh ordering peti- granted petition for of Circuit writ mandamus tioner, judge of the United States District immediately” to proceed “to Northern District Illinois, Act Exchange adjudicate upon claim based the Securities Insurance by Calvert Fire brought respondent, of 1934 and despite the against Co., Reinsurance American Mutual substantially identical between pendency proceeding of a 792, the Illinois courts. 560 F. 2d parties same in Colorado felt recent decision in Appeals The Court of that our States, 424 United U. S. River Water Conservation Dist. v. granted We compelled issuance writ. certiorari to consider the propriety the use of mandamus to review a District Court’s decision defer to concurrent state proceedings, 1008, and we now reverse.
I Respondent casualty Calvert writes property and insurance. operates American Mutual pool whereby a reinsurance num- of primary ber protect insurers against themselves unantici- pated losses. in Membership pool requires pay- both the premiums ment of by pool members and indemnification pool the event that losses exceed those which premiums are joined pool early calculated. Calvert April but year notified American Mutual of its election to rescind agreement by which it became a member. July
In 1974, American Mutual sued in the Circuit Court of Cook Ill., to County, pool obtain a declaration that agreement between it and Calvert was in full force and effect. Six months later, Calvert its answer to that suit asserted pool agreement that the was not against enforceable it because violations American Mutual of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of the Illinois Se- Maryland curities Act, Securities Law, and the state common law fraud. With its answer Calvert filed a $2 counterclaim seeking million in from damages American *4 Mutual on all of the grounds it up that set except defense for the defense based on the Securities Exchange ofAct 27 of Act, § Since that 48 902, Stat. as amended, 15 U. C.S. (1976 granted § 78aa ed.), the courts of the United jurisdiction States exclusive to enforce Act, the on Calvert day complaint same filed a United States District Court for the Northern District of seeking damages Illinois from American Mutual for an alleged violation of Rule 10b-5, § CFR 240.10b-5 (1977), issued under 10 (b) § of the Act, 78j 15 U. C. (b) (1976 ed.). § Joined with this Rule 10b-5 grounds other asserted count were claims on each based American action. by it defense to Mutual’s state-court February In more after had 1975, than seven months it its but than one month after begun action, state-court less counterclaim in action Calvert had filed answer and Mutual complaint and its federal American court, for moved to dismiss or abate the latter. The claim dismissal based on reinsurance was the substantive assertion that agreement “security” meaning within was not 1933 or 1934 Act. The motion to abate was based before proceedings fact that the state commenced six months every the federal included claim and defense except damages claim based on Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act. May
In substantially granted Will American 1975, proceeding Mutual’s motion defer the federal until completion observing of the state tentative that a proceedings, already by trial date had been the state court. Federal set litigation of duplicatiye the same issues would therefore be rejected He that the court wasteful. Calvert’s contention proceed should of its exclusive with entire case because jurisdiction noting the 1934 the state court Act, under provide equitable sought by bound to relief Calvert was recognizing a valid Rule 10b-5 claim as defense to the Only damages action.1 claim for under Rule state Calvert’s subject was exclusive 10b-5 to the stayed aspects Petitioner therefore fed- court. all Calvert’s subject eral action to' the concurrent both recognizing “only very Calvert’s limited claim for courts, explicitly Calvert's in the action it answer contended was purchase security” “entitled to rescission of its of the aforesaid because of alleged App. sought Rule 10b-5 violation. to Pet. for Cert. D-5. It equitable Id., complaint. relief in E-6. identical its federal See Weiner Shearson, (CA9 1975); v. Hammill & 521 F. 2d Aetna State Altheimer, (CA7 1970). 2d Bank F.
660
monetary 1934 Act as a viable damages under the Securities May 9, B-9. On App. claim in court.” for to Pet. Cert. Judge argument question on basic Will heard oral security pool whether Calvert's interest the reinsurance yet within meaning 1934 Act. He has rendered on a decision that issue.2 stay
Judge
rejected
Will
motions
reconsider his
two
interlocutory
certify
appeal pursuant
order and refused
an
to 28
(b).
May
peti-
1292
On
Calvert
26, 1976,
§
S. C.
Circuit for a
Appeals
tioned
Court
for the Seventh
to ad-
directing Judge
proceed
writ
mandamus
Will to
judicate
Nearly
later,
its Rule
14 months
10b-5 claims.3
August
granted
petition
15, 1977,
Appeals
Court
Judge
“proceed immediately
and directed
with Cal-
Will to
vert's claim for damages
equitable
relief under the Securi-
Exchange
ties
Act of 1934.”
2d,
560 F.
at 797.4
2
court, however,
The state
The
has reached a decision on the issue.
security,
Circuit
agreement
Court concluded that the
not a
and there
was
fore struck the federal
On
issues from Calvert's answer and counterclaim.
interlocutory appeal
affirmed, holding
an
Appellate
the Illinois
agreement
security
meaning
was not a
the 1933
within the
of either
that,
any event,
(b)
McCarran-Ferguson
or the 1934 Act and
2
of the
§
Act,
(b) (1976 ed.), exempted
15 U. S. C. 1012
reach
insurance from the
§
Co.
federal securities laws. American Mutual Reinsurance
Calvert Fire Ins.
(1977), pet.
App.
52 Ill.
3d
state-law claims or federal claim based on 792, 794 n. 2. claims, Although petition only Calvert’s addressed its Rule 10b-5 holding logic supports went on to note: “The behind our this case claims, Act as the Act conclusion well claims, 2d, improper.” at 797 was n. F.
661 granted certiorari We to consider Will's contention of impermissibly- issuance of writ mandamus interfered with the discretion of a district court to control its 434 (1978). own docket. U. 1008 S.
II disposition The correct hinges large part of this case on appropriate by of inquiry employed standard to be appeals of in determining whether to writ of mandamus issue a to a district court. On of appeals direct a court has appeal, authority broad aside or reverse” an “modify, vacate, set order of may a district and it further action court, direct such may just on remand “as under the circumstances.” 28 By U. C. under All 28 contrast, § S. Writs Act, appeals may § U. S. C. 1651 of of (a), courts issue a writ only “necessary mandamus when or of their appropriate aid respective jurisdictions.” simple showing of error Whereas may suffice to obtain a appeal, reversal direct to issue a writ under under- mandamus such circumstances “would mine power appellate the settled limitations an States, Will United interlocutory court to review orders.” v. (1967). 389 U. 98 n. 6 90, S. reaffirmed in cases such as Kerr v.
As repeatedly we have Court, United States District and 394, (1976), S. Holland, Bankers & Cas. Co. v. 379, U. S. Life appellate jurisdiction “traditional use the writ aid of both at common law and in the federal courts been to con has fine prescribed an inferior court to a lawful exercise authority or to it it compel exercise its when Assn., Milk so.” Roche Evaporated duty is its to do v. 26 (1943). peti Calvert makes no contention that jurisdiction. Rather, tioner exceeded the bounds his has entering Court, order, it contends that the District do authority duty has refused “to exercise its when it is its no so.” Ibid. that, There can be doubt where a district court persistently adjudicate reason without refuses may case properly it, appeals before the court of issue writ “in order that exercise the of review [it] Comstock, given by Insurance law.” Co. 16 Wall. jurisdiction could appellate “Otherwise the be de feated purpose authorizing the writ the statute thwarted unauthorized action of the court obstruct Roche, ing appeal.” supra, at 25:5 *7 To say appeals power that court of has the to direct a proceed district judgment court to to “when pending case duty it is do S., its 319 so,” 26, to at the standard but states does not decide this or any particular other case. It essential that moving of show party satisfy “the burden ing right that its issuance the writ is 'clear and indis ” putable.' Co., quoting Bankers & Cas. supra, 384, at Life Duell, United States v. 172 (1899). 582 576, U. S. Will urges that Calvert does not have a indisputable” “clear and right adjudication to the of its claims in District Court regard without the concurrent state To that proceedings. issue we now must turn.
Ill It is well established “the pendency that of an action state court is no bar proceedings concerning same matter in having jurisdiction.” the Federal court McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. 268, equally 282 It is well set- tled that a district is “under compulsion no to exercise jurisdiction,” Co., Brillhart v. Excess 316 Ins. U. S. 5A example classic proper protect issuance of the writ to eventual appellate jurisdiction Products, Hermansdorfer, is Thermtron Inc. 423 v. U. S. 336 (1976), in which a case had been remanded state to the courts on grounds utterly unauthorized controlling statute. The dissenters in that urged Congress case had intended to bar all review of remand orders, not that mandamus would have been inappropriate absent such a Id., bar. at J., joined by 354 (Rehnquist, J., C. Burger, Stewart, J., dissenting). controversy may more expe- be settled (1942), where decisions Although most our ditiously state court. duplicative or dismissals of stays discussing propriety between two have conflicts actions concerned Co., C-O-Two g., Mfg. Kerotest e. courts, Landis v. Co., (1952); North Equipment Fire S.U. recognized we have American 299 U. S. analogous pre- circumstances those cases in relevance In at 817-819. River, S.,U. here. Colorado sented See committed largely “care- both the decision is situations, id., of the district court. fully considered judgment,” McClellan, In always has so clear. power This been indicated those this Court presented here, similar to facts Court had properly issue where District might the writ pro- stayed in deference to concurrent authority well an automatic exercise ceedings.6 Such day Congress when had authorized appropriate been have duplicative courts, for relief in the federal so that fewer claims state and fed- concomitant between litigation tension *8 overlap the be- rarely However, could result. as eral courts claims Court increased, state claims and federal tween arise when it recognized situations would often soon that the state courts. be to defer to appropriate would as well vexa- “Ordinarily it would be uneconomical declaratory judg- proceed in a tious for court to a federal in pending a state court ment where suit is suit another by governed not federal law, presenting issues, same issue, but that held, the writ should This Court there not required Judge show Appeals cause should have District Court of why presented an affidavit to Judge writ not issue. Carland should substantially the basis attempting to his order on of this Court defend in record As that affidavit before completed proceedings. state was sufficiency “pass upon of Appeals, of did not this Court Court S., question," at proceedings to orders those authorize Appeals to do so the first instance. but directed the Court parties. between the same Gratuitous with interference orderly comprehensive disposition court a state litigation Brillhart, should be supra, avoided.” at 495. largely decision such committed circumstances the discretion of the Fur- district court. 316 S.,U. River, Colorado thermore, supra, at that such 820, established equally deference appropriate when even matters substantive law are involved in the case.
It is true virtually that Colorado River emphasized “the unflagging obligation juris- of the federal courts to exercise the given diction S., language them.” at 817. U. That underscores our conviction exercise district should its discretion with this factor in it in mind, way but no under- mines the conclusion Brillhart that the decision whether to to the defer concurrent aof in the court is, last a matter analysis, committed to the district court's discretion. Seizing phrase obligation” “unflagging in an opinion upheld which court’s correctness decision to dismiss because concurrent final does little bolster a extraordinary claim writ of mandamus such case as this where the District Court has rendered no final decision.
We think it of considerably importance more than did Appeals Court of that Colorado River came before the of Appeals on appeal pursuant to 28 following § S. C. outright dismissal of the action the District rather Court, through than an effort on the part plain- federal-court tiff to seek mandamus. here, Calvert contends and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed, Will’s order deferring the federal “equivalent was to a *9 dismissal.” 560 2d, F. at are loath to our We rest analysis on ubiquitous this for if phrase, carelessly used or precise without a may definition impede it rather assist than underlying sound resolution of the legal issue. action Cal- had Calvert’s Judge if Will dismissed
Obviously, of dismissal appealed could have the order vert Judge such action required have which could Appeals, C. 28 U. S. may just “as be under the circumstances.” Will remained Calvert action, did dismiss the 2106. Since he not § defer based of his decision to urge free to reconsideration case; of the state progress information as to the new dismissal.” not to a “equivalent was deferral extent, least, at of the rule reiteration There are our sound reasons of con- because district court’s decision to defer to the discre- litigation generally committed current state busy seriously that a contend tion of that court. No one can demands competing confronted both with federal trial judge, his and within properly for matters on his time unavail- scheduling difficulties because inevitable with with is not entrusted witnesses, ability lawyers, parties, Had Will calendar. setting his own wide latitude this case setting his own defer simply decided on initiative to his completed, action proceedings were for trial until the state the motion granting “equivalent” been the would-have best have yet would at such action defer, American Mutual mandamus. We highly claim for dubious afforded Calvert result judge accomplished this same think the fact that to defer does favorably party’s on a motion by ruling change underlying legal question. discretion exercise of its
Although Court’s the District interlocutory in proper modification subject to review and convinced Landis, 256-259, 299 U. we are appeal, S., cf. by a writ of mandamus.7 Where ought not to be overridden it approved the writ Although the issuance of in at least one instance we Buy discretion, Leather showing La Howes upon a mere of abuse of dangers against the thereafter we warned soon peremptory writs petitions for the practice. faced with of such a “Courts labels such they to be misled must be careful lest suffer themselves interlocutory of non- power’ review into 'abuse of discretion’ 'want *10 666
a matter is to the of a committed discretion district court, it litigant’s right particular cannot said that a to result is 8 “clear indisputable.” Calvert contends that a district is power without to court stay proceedings, contemporaneous deference to a action, jurisdiction where the federal courts have exclusive over the presented. petitioner issue this is so, Whether or not purported has not to Calvert’s claim for consideration of damages under Act of which Exchange 1934, the Securities is only may concurrently issue which not be resolved yet both It petitioner courts.9 is true that has not ruled this claim. obstinately to Where district court refuses adjudicate a properly appeals may matter court of it, before issue the writ to of the correct “unauthorized action appealable ground they orders on the mere that be erroneous.” Will States, 90, v. United 389 U. S. 98 n. 6 Theatres, Beacon Westover, (1959), Inc. v. 359 U. is
contrary. Both agreed and the Court dissenters that mandamus protect Id., should issue right jury 511; a clear to a trial. at ibid. J., dissenting). The simply (Stewart, that it concluded was “not permissible,” id., postpone jury for the District Court to trial after until equitable most of the relevant issues had been settled in an Here, action before the repeatedly recognized court. we have it is permissible for a jurisdiction district court to defer to the concurrent of a state court. litigant’s right That a proceed duplicative 'to with a action in a fed eral court can indisputable” never to be be said “clear and all made apparent by the more holding our earlier this Term in General Atomic Co. v. Felter, S. 12 power lacks a state court litigation restrain vexatious in the There, federal courts. we reaffirmed the principle “[fjederal fully capable preventing courts are their mis purposes Id., use of harassment.” at 19. only encompassed by other issue the writ was Calvert’s Rule 10b-5 equitable claim for disputed relief. It is not here that the state court has agreement to rescind requests. being Calvert That con ceded, we find argument no merit Calvert’s further statutory that the grant any way distinguishes exclusive aspect case from our earlier decisions which both the state and federal courts power grant had the desired relief. obstructing appeal.” Roche, citing at S.,
Ex parte States, United 241 (1932). U. S. how- Calvert, *11 ever, has neither alleged proved nor a such heedless to refusal proceed as a basis for the peti- issuance of the writ here. Its only tion offers the allegation Judge bare “in effect” Will abated damages in proceedings. claim deference to the state App. Judge hasWill never issued such an order, and sparse record before us will not support any such inference. So far as delay appears, adjudicating in damages claim simply is product of the normal excessive load of in business the District compounded by Court, “the unfortunate conse- quence of making judge litigant” in this pro- mandamus ceeding. parte Fahey, Ex 332 U. 260 (1947). S. 258,
The judgment of the Appeals Court therefore
Reversed. Mr. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment. plurality’s The at opinion, ante, to to 662-663, appears me indicate it regards now fully compatible as the Court’s in decisions Brillhart v. Excess Ins. 316 U.
diversity case, and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. States, United S. 800 I (1976), a federal-issue case. am not at all sure that this is so. I—as were Mr. Justice Stewart Justice and Mr. in in Stevens —was dissent River, Colorado holding and if the in that I case is think what is, it and if one I assumes, as do not, any that Brillhart has application here, Court cut back on Frank Mr. Justice furter’s rather sweeping language Brillhart, in S., 494-495.*
*“Although Court suit District had under Declaratory Act, compulsion Federal it Judgments was under no to exer- jurisdiction. petitioner’s cise that The motion dismiss the bill was addressed to the discretion court. . . . The motion rested proceeding claim that, pending since another was in a state in controversy parties fully which all matters in between the could be adjudicated, declaratory judgment in the federal court was unwarranted. certainly The of this was determining correctness claim relevant in whether Judge Because Will’s order prior was issued to this Court’s River, decision Colorado and he therefore did not guidance have such I area, join that case affords reversal Appeals’ Court’s of the Court of of a writ issuance of mandamus. The premature. issuance was Appeals require should have done no than more reconsidera- tion of light the case Will in River. Colorado Mr. Justice dissenting. Chief Burger, general am in with Mr. Justice Brennan’s agreement I opinion. I dissenting separately only emphasize write I unnecessary consider it determine the context judicata case whether it would ever res appropriate give effect to which judgment implicating a state-court claim over *12 a courts given jurisdiction. federal have been Our exclusive simply concern here is with the of propriety a federal court’s adjudication delaying of such a to a claim deference state- proceeding. As Mr. Justice Brennan correctly notes, whatever the proper judicata resolution of res issue, federal court an obligation expeditiously remains under consider and resolve those claims which Congress explicitly reserved to the federal courts. I join With minor caveat, Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissent.
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom The Justice, Chief Mr. Marshall, Justice and Justice Powell join, Mr. dissenting.
This
falls
general
case
within none of the three
abstention
Rehnquist
opinion
and the
Brother
categories,
my
there-
jurisdiction
proceed
District
should assume
to determine
rights
parties. Ordinarily
it would be
as well as
uneconomical
proceed
vexatious
declaratory judgment
for
federal court to
in a
suit
pending
where
presenting
another suit is
issues,
state court
the same
governed by
law,
parties.
between the same
Gratuitous inter-
orderly
comprehensive
disposition
ference with
of a state court
litigation
should
avoided.”
in a
principles
govern
bring
it within the
strains
fore
“the
involve
“exceptional”
situations that
class
very narrow
Colo-
jurisdictions.”
of concurrent
contemporaneous exercise
States, United
Conservation Dist.
River Water
rado
reaches
opinion
In so
straining,
800, 813-818
U. S.
precedent,
ignores
nor
supported
policy
neither
a result
misapprehends
significance
issues,
legal
difficult
has
decision that
casts doubt
below, and
lurks
years. Moreover, there
nearly
for
unquestioned
stood
juris-
of federal-court
for the abdication
potential
an ominous
virtually
indifference to “the
opinion’s disturbing
in the
diction
to exercise
federal courts
obligation
unflagging
to that
id., at 817—for obedience
them,”
given
important when,
here,
more
as
obligation becomes all
I
exclusive.
dissent.
has made that
Congress
I
re-
Appeals
the Court of
came to
Because this case
for a writ
motion
Fire
Co.’s
spondent Calvert
Insurance
claims
adjudicate
compel
Will
mandamus
Exchange
under the Securities
equitable relief
damages and
Rehnquist
my
I
Brother
with
(1934 Act),
agree
of 1934
Act
obligation
precisely what
to determine
it
essential
Act claims.
adjudicate respondent’s 1934
District Court had to
agreement goes.
my
however, is as far
That,
*13
to the state suit
day Calvert filed
answer
On the same
defense under
containing
it—an answer
against
instituted
recognize
required
the state court was
1934 Act that
commenced an action
Supremacy Clause —it
under
seeking
Act,
relief under the
District Court
Federal
Dis-
provisions.
various state
1933,
Act of
Securities
other
stayed
alleged
complaint,
claims
Court
all
trict
10b-5
money damages under Rule
claim for
Calvert’s
than
Al-
the outcome of the state suit.
pending
Act,
of the 1934
Rule
formally stay the
did not
though the District Court
primary
on the
argument
heard
damages claim and
oral
10b-5
underlying
participatory
issue
claim—whether a
interest
“security”
pool
a reinsurance
is a
District
has
Court
—the
yet
issue,
to rule on this
so Calvert’s
10b-5 damages
Rule
like the rest of its federal
claim,
suit,
suspension.
remains in
27 of
1934 Act,
(1976
Section
C. §
S.
78aa
ed.),
gives
jurisdiction
federal courts exclusive
over
arising
claims
jurisdictional grant
under the Act. This
legislative
evinces
uniform
desire for the
determination of such
claims
tri-
expert in the administration
bunals
of federal
laws
sen-
the national
sitive to
concerns underlying them. When Con-
gress
only
thus mandates that
federal courts shall exercise
adjudicate specified
claims,
the “well estab-
principle1 accepted by my
lished”
Brother Rkhnquist,
—
ante,
Carland,
662—of McClellan
v.
268,
U. S.
pendency
“the
(1910),
of an action in
the state court is no
bar to
concerning the same matter in the Federal
having jurisdiction,” governs
a multo
rely-
Yet,
fortiori.
ing
completely
on the
inapposite case of Brillhart v. Excess
Insurance
In Brillhart, the District Court dismissed diversity suit declaratory judgment because the pendency in state court of a suit between the parties same and involving the subject same matter. The of Appeals reversed, hold- ing that the dismissal was an abuse of In discretion. revers- ing the Court of Appeals, this Court reasoned:
“Although the District Court had suit under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, it 1 See, g., Products, e. Thermtron Inc. Hermansdorfer, v. S.U. Meredith Haven, Winter (1976); 344-345 234-235 *14 jurisdiction.
was under no compulsion to exercise that petitioner’s motion to bill dismiss the was addressed Casualty to the discretion of the court. Aetna Co. v. Quarles, Maryland 2d Consum 321; Casualty F. Co. v. Service, ers Finance Automobile 514; 2d American F. Freundt, Ins. Co. v. 2d 613 The motion F. . . . . upon proceeding rested the claim since was that, another in a court in which all in con pending the matters troversy parties fully adjudicated, between the could be declaratory judgment in the federal court was unwar certainly ranted. The correctness of this claim was rele should determining vant whether the District Court rights jurisdiction proceed assume determine the Ordinarily parties. it would be uneconomical in a de proceed well as vexatious for a federal court to claratory judgment pending suit where another suit is governed' by presenting issues, a state court same law, parties.” the same between Brillhart federal Co., supra, (emphasis Excess Insurance at 494-495 added). readily approval crucial to this Court’s apparent,
As
in Brillhart were two
District Court’s dismissal of the suit
was
First,
absent
because
federal suit
factors
here.
law would
founded on
state rather
than
diversity,
and more
Second,
outcome of the federal suit.
govern the
declaratory judgment.
suit
for a
significantly, the federal
was
federal courts
provision empowering
Under
terms
declaratory judgment
§
suits,
to entertain
U. S. C.
discretionary.
over such suits is
assumption
controversy
“In
within
of actual
provides:
That section
case
United
any
States,
. . .
rights
declare the
appropriate
of an
filing
pleading,
seeking such dec-
party
interested
legal
any
relations of
other
primarily be-
(Emphasis added.)
It was
. . . .”
laration
suits is
declaratory judgment
jurisdiction over
cause federal
*15
defer
District Court’s
discretionary
Brillhart
found the
from
is clear
This
permissible.
to
ence
state-court
by Brillhar t —Ameri
cited
approvingly
lower court cas'es
2d 613
Freundt, 103 F.
Co. v.
Automobile Insurance
can
Finance
Consumers
Casualty Co. v.
1939); Maryland
(CA7
Casualty
v.Co.
Aetna
Service,
(CA3 1938); and
2d 514
F.
emphasized
which
1937)
(CA4
Quarles,
lamentable
States.
v. United
Dist.
Water Conservation
River
Colorado
presented
precise issue
River
addressed
In Colorado
we
for a
appropriate
in
is
which it
circumstances
here:
in defer-
before it
proceeding
federal
in situations
proceeding
state-court
parallel
to a
ence
for federal
categories
none of the traditional
falling within
in
situations
in contrast
explained that,
We
abstention.
courts,
more federal
in two or
concurrent
which
is
suit
however,
a federal
recognized,
that even where
These decisions
have unbridled
declaratory
does not
only
relief, a district court
seeks
suit.
a concurrent state
authority
in deference to
dismiss the action
Maryland Casualty
Finance
Co. v. Consumers
in
example, the court
For
2d,
Service, 101
at
F.
observed:
declaratory
discre-
remedy
judgment is . . .
of a
granting of the
“The
finally
may
settle
if it will not
tionary
the court and it
refused
with
merely to determine issues
parties
being sought
rights
or if it is
Surety
Casualty
Co.
already
&
pending. Aetna
involved
cases
however, merely refused,
Quarles, Cir.,
It
not be
where the action suit is court, a state the federal court’s power dismiss suit before it defer parallel ence to the proceeding is limited by the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” 424 atS., Because a federal power district court’s so limited, the circumstances that justify federal-court inaction proceeding deference to a state “exceptional.” Id., must be “exceptional” 818. Just how *16 such circumstances be by must was made clear our admonition that “the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal presence suit due to the of a concurrent state for proceeding judicial reasons of wise considerably administration are more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention.” “ Ibid. previously Since we had noted that of ‘[abdication the obligation to justified decide cases can be under [the only in exceptional doctrine the circumstances abstention] parties where the order to repair to the State ” clearly id., would important countervailing an interest,’ serve at 813, quoting County Frank Mashuda Allegheny v. warranting U. S. 188-189 (1959), the circumstances “for judicial dismissal reasons of wise must administration” rare indeed. present
Such rare circumstances were in River. Colorado in There, staying the decisive factor favor of concurrent federal proceedings federal evinced policy,” was clear “[t]he by the McCarran Amendment, [ing piecemeal of “avoid the] adjudication in rights of water system policy a river that ... recognizes availability of comprehensive systems state adjudication of rights achieving water as the means for [this] goa[l].” comparable policy at 819. No federal S., favoring unitary adjudication In state exists here. fact, as evinced exclusive courts to federal 1934 Act claims, policy determine relevant federal here is the precise opposite require of that found to deference to the state proceeding concurrent Colorado River. analytical framework forth
Ignoring wholesale the set River, vitality opinion Colorado whose is questioned, Rehnquist my seemingly Brother focuses on one of the secondary support four factors the federal dismissal found state initiated case—-the fact that the were finds suit —and factor sufficient before federal here from mandamus insulate the District actions Court’s putting opinion’s case-reading aside the errors— review. Even Brillhart, its McClellan, on flouting its misreliance on case misapplication analyzing Colorado River —and opinion’s own the conclusion still terms, erroneous no compelled authority the District Court had Quite conveniently, opinion of Act claims. Calvert’s 1934 any Rehnquist possible Brother discussion my avoids court’s collateral-estoppel effects the judicata or res Act would have of Calvert’s 1934 defense determination court.3 Act relief Calvert’s 1934 claims for affirmative sure, preclusive effect of a determination To be state-court of the federal courts of a claim within exclusive *17 issue. Res generally Note, and difficult See is an unresolved of Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Effect Judicata: Federal Rev. 1360 Determinations, Prior 53 Va. L. State-Court is appro I it ever confess to serious For doubt myself, to determina judicata to accord res effect a state-court priate courts exclusive of a over which the federal have tion claim should determinations surely for state-court jurisdiction; legal from novo on ruling purely de not disable federal courts Inter- Cotler v. surrounding such federal claims. See questions 3 not held that should Appeals Because of “the the Court light grounds federalism in of the state court on have deferred to unnecessary River," issue it found it to “reach difficult Colorado a collateral of the state would have whether conclusion the court damages for over estoppel effect the Rule 10b-5 claim which F. 2d retained but declined to resolve.” 560 had
675
Assn.,
County Orthopaedic
(CA3
All this I is not to say disagree with the refusal of the opinion my Rehn'quist preclusive Brother to decide what effects the state court’s determination of Calvert’s Rule 10b-5 defense would have in Calvert’s federal so much as isit action, expose opinion’s failing error even to consider judicata/collateral estoppel problem evaluating res adjudicate District Court’s obligation Calvert’s Rule 10b-5 In my claim. regardless judg- whether the state-court view, given collateral-estoppel would judicata effect, ment res or *18 upon it was incumbent in the the District Court —at least expeditiously adjudi- other overriding absence of reasons — If judicata cate at least Calvert’s 1934 Act claims. res effect is prior exclusive jurisdic- accorded the state-court judgment, 676 Act given
tion the federal courts over 1934 claims would be effectively policy and the of uniform and thwarted, effective Act interpretation the 1934 federal administration and A could stay having consequence frustrated. so undesirable a possibly justified only by compelling be circumstances absent adjudication here. On if hand, the other the state-court given judicata collateral-estoppel effect, res or any Act claims will adjudicated have to in federal court event, and there would be no the federal staying reason for transpires proceedings action since nothing that the state adjudication Thus, would affect the claims. proper regardless disposition judicata/collateral the res it estoppel question, is clear a district should not stay which claims over federal courts have exclusive Assn., jurisdiction. Cotler Orthopaedic See v. Inter-County Lecor, supra; Court, Inc. v. United States District F. 2d (CA9 1974).
II Whether evaluated under the “clear abuse of discretion” Buy standard set forth in Howes 352 U. La v. Leather S. States, or 249, (1957), prong under the of Will United v. Assn., 389 U. S. Roche Milk Evaporated (1967), “to permits the use of mandamus compel authority inferior when it [an to exercise court] duty is its to do so,” the issuance of the writ of mandamus the Court of Appeals was proper; simply complete there is “exceptional” dearth of Dis- countervailing circumstances trict Court’s “unflagging obligation” to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction. Rehnquist opinion my asserts, Brother however, purported District Court “has not consideration of Calvert’s claim for damages under Securities Exchange Act of 1934,” simply rather “not but has yet Ante, ruled this claim.” technically at 666. While accurate, this characterization the status of the utterly ignores important below two facts that shed more than *19 of this case. posture procedural illumination the true little a writ, Appeals granted the Court the time First, been before action had damages 10b-5 Rule Calvert’s ruling on the basic years a for than without more Will 2% disposi- for me underlying Second, the claim. issue legal give the state it would the District Court indicated tive, did not disputed transaction court’s determination Act res of the 1934 “security” meaning within the involve a Fire Calvert Respondent to Brief App. judicata effect, of a federal- Calvert thereby depriving E-l, Insurance Co. the exclusive legal issue within determination federal courts. jurisdiction of lie to correct mandamus will has held that
This Court pro- pending state-court improper deference court’s Carland, McClellan ceedings, determination federal-court proper
preserve Westover, Theatres, Inc. v. S.U. Beacon issue, are justifications present, both these here, Where, I questioned. of the writ of the issuance cannot propriety Appeals. Court of affirm the would