102 F. 28 | 8th Cir. | 1900
This is an appeal of Charles B. Wilkinson, the receiver of the property of the Bine Bluff Water & Light Company, from an order of the circuit court which refused to allow him 12,500 additional compensation for his services as receiver subsequent to a decree of foreclosure rendered on January 23, 1893, and which also refused to award him $750 in payment of the services of attorneys at law whom he had employed to prepare and present his reports. In a suit brought by the Washington Trust Company of the City of New York, the trustee for the mortgage bondholders, against the mortgagor, the Pine Bluff Water & Light Company, the appellant, Wilkinson, was appointed receiver of the property of the water and light company on October 24,1891; and the works of that company were operated under his direction as receiver from that time until some time in September, 1893, when they were, delivered to the purchaser under a decree of foreclosure which had been rendered in the case on January 25, 1893. The decree of foreclosure allowed to the appellant, Wilkinson, $0,500 as compensation for his services as receiver, and appointed him special-master to make the foreclosure sale and to carry out the provisions of the decree. He sold the property under the decree for $240,000 on April 5, 1893. On December 15, 1894, he filed his report as receiver, and on the same day his separate report as special master. In the reports filed at this time he did not ask for any further compensation as receiver, nor for the payment for services of attorneys in preparing these two reports, although he now complains that he has not been allowed $2,500 additional compensation for his services as receiver between January 25, 1893, and September, 1893, and that he has not been allowed $500 which he paid to Mr. H. D. Wood for preparing and
There was* no error in the order of the court striking out the $750 paid by the appellant for the services of attorneys in preparing and presenting his reports as receiver and master. It is one of the indispensable personal duties of a receiver and of a master to make a report of his acts, and of his receipts and disbursements, to the court •which appoints him. ' If he is incapable of keeping accounts and of reporting his receipts and disbursements, he ought not to accept the appointment. But if he does accept it, and his reports, like those in hand, involve nothing more than a simple narrative of his acts, and an account of his receipts and disbursements, he cannot be permitted to receive compensation for the discharge of these, his personal duties as receiver, and to charge the trust with moneys expended by him to hire others to discharge them for him. Such allowances would pay twice for the same services. In ordinary cases the making and presentation to the court of reports of the acts, receipts, and disbursements of receivers and masters is one of their indispensable duties. The com-
A or was ihere .any substantial ground for a challenge of the order of the court below refusing to allow the appellant $2,500 additional compensation as receiver. It is true that from the entry of the decree of foreclosure ou January 25, 1893, until September, 1893, the works of the water and light company were operated under the direction of the appellant as receiver. But it is equally true that they were actually operated by one of his employes, to whom the trust estate paid §250 per mouth for his services, that the court had allowed to the appellant $6,500 for his services as receiver, and that it allowed him $2,500 for his services as special master, during these very eight months between the date of the decree and the delivery of the property to the purchaser. The only question presented by the appeal here is whether it was unreasonable for the court below to refuse to allow him an additional compensation of $2,500. We are of the opinion that the action of the circuit court in the premises was just and right, and, even if the issue were doubtful, we should not disturb or reverse its action unless the record disclosed a clear mistake of fact, or a plain error of law. A court of equity has the power io fix the compensation of the receiver it appoints. He is its creature, — -one of the means by which it exercises its power. In the administration of a trust by a court through its receiver, the chancellor, who appoints, supervises and directs his action, necessarily knows, better than any record can teach an appellate court, what his appointee has done, and what is a just and reasonable compensation for his services. His allowances of this character ought to be, and are, largely discretionary with the chancellor, and they should not: be disturbed unless there has been a manifest disregard of right and reason. Trust Co. v. McClure, 49 U. S. App. 43, 45, 24 C. C. A. 64, 65, 78 Fed. 209, 210; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 537, 26 L. Ed. 1157; Stuart v. Boulware, 133 U. S. 78, 82, 10 Sup. Ct. 242, 33 L. Ed. 568.
The principles and rules of equity to which we have adverted have long been settled, and have been uniformly applied to cases of this character for centuries. In view of this fact, the course which this receiver has pursued is unwarranted and reprehensible. He conceded in his final report that he has had in his possession a balance of $6,676.85, which belonged to the beneficiaries of the trust he was administering ever since 1894. On their petition for an account and for the payment of the balance to them, the court' ordered him to make a final report in 1898. In January, 1899, he made his report, in which he sought: to obtain from the trust $3,250 more than he was entitled to receive. The court which appointed him, and which had the right to- fix his compensation, refused to allow this $3,250, and ordered him to pay to the beneficiaries $7,176.85. He has paid nothing to the beneficiaries, — not even the $6,676.85 which he concedes to he due