Lead Opinion
While confined in a county jail,
A close reading of appellant’s papers discloses that the gravamen of his complaint is that he had the right to a full hearing, with all of the traditional trial safeguards, that he was denied such a hearing, and that his confinement amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.
The legal weakness and sparsity of facts presented to the court in the pleadings and affidavits of both parties were so infirm as to virtually invite summary judgment. However, before granting this relief, a court must search the record to determine if any facts are alleged which do state a cause of action. In so doing ‘ ‘ any other form of evidence, documentary or otherwise, may also be used ” (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 7B, CPLR 3212.15, p. 436).
In his complaint, appellant asserts that ‘
In his affidavit, the respondent Sheriff implicitly asserts that appellant somehow violated the discipline of the jail, but he fails to state in what manner this was done.
In the Second Circuit casе dealing with the right of prisoners to bring civil suits (Sostre v. McGinnis,
If detention officials did not have to give reasons for their actions in punishing or withholding privileges from an inmate, they could in effect, act in an unconstitutional manner safely screened from court or administrative review. (See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate,
Since we can construe the Sheriff’s affidavit to aver that he acted in a legitimate manner, “ to maintain the discipline and order of the jail ”, that question of fact will have to be resolved at trial by the fact finder.
Appellant’s main complaint appears to be that he was denied a hearing before being sent to the isolation cell. He asserts he had a constitutional right: to notice; tо present witnesses; to testify on his own behalf; to cross-examine witnesses; to be represented by counsel, or counsel substitute; to an impartial hearing examiner; and to a decision based on the evidence. Both parties concede that appellant had been afforded none of these alleged rights.
Appellant’s asserted constitutional right to the panoply of protections cannot be sustained by current case law on the facts of this case. However, respondents’ apparent assertion that appellant is nоt entitled to any due process safeguards is equally without merit.
The trial court recognized the minimal due process requirements spelled out in the Sostre case {supra) but felt the case
We do not wish nor intend to make due process safeguards turn on whether a court chooses to define a particular punishment as “ substantial ” or not. Suffice it to say, that the punishment meted out in this case must carry with it at least the minimal safeguards afforded by the due process of law. Confining someone in a segregation cell is not a minor punishment. Equally important, an inmate’s prison record may have a great effect on the future punishment he will receive and may even affect his chances for parole. (See Hudson v. Hardy,
The requirements of due process are not static; they vary with the elements of the ambience in which they arise. (See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.,
In any event, on the fact pаttern alleged in this case, appellant was entitled to a rudimentary administrative hearing at least. Although the rights he claimed may have been greatly over-exaggerated, a cause of action does lie for the denial of the rudimentary rights spelled out in this decision.
Appellant asserts correctly in his complaint, that he has the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. That such cruel and unusual punishment can occur within the four walls of a prison cannot be gainsaid. (See, e.g., Church v. Hegstrom,
Punitive segregation is utilized in every State in the Nation. (See President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice: Task Force Report: Corrections [1967], pp. 50-51.) Merely confining an inmate in a segregated cell does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. There are, of course, some cells that are so subhuman as to constitute such punishment even for a very brief confinement. (See, e.g., Wright v. McMann,
In Sostre, the inmate was kept in punitive segregation for over one year but the confinement conditions, although “ severe ” (Sostre,
As unaрpealing as the cell appears, it hardly compares to the condition of the strip cell in La Reau v. MacDougall (
The time spent in the punitive segregation, the underlying offense, the conditions of the cell, and the physical and mental health of the inmate all are factors to be weighed in determining whether punitive segregation in the questioned instance is cruel and unusual. However, it should be kept in mind that conditions must be “ barbarous ” or “ shocking to the сonscience ” (La Reau, supra, at p. 978) before they can be termed cruel and unusual punishment. The criteria are the standards of society. Merely confining a man to imprisonment of any type may seem barbarous to some Judges, but it clearly not so to society at large.
Even assuming the facts to be as appellant has alleged, he has fallen far short of stating such facts as would give rise to a cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment in a constitutional sense. The cell conditions, though spartan, were far from subhuman; the term of confinement was brief; and thеre is no allegation that prison officials knew or should have known that appellant was suffering from some substantial mental or physical affliction. Even though we still do not know what appellant was being punished for, we hold that five days confinement under the conditions spelled out would not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment and it is evident, that the trial court was correct in dismissing this cause of action. The conditions of confinement will be a factor in determining damages,
The lower courts also dismissed appellant’s cause of action bottomed on respondents’ alleged interference with attorney-client mailings. In his affidavit, the Sheriff points out that appellant does not allege that any detention official ordered the permanent seizure of any mail going between appellant and his attorney. However, appellant does allege that several letters sent to several different people failed to reach their destination. It may be that at trial appellant can build a strong enough case on circumstantial evidence to prevail on this cause of action (see Matter of Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N Y 2d 433). Equally important is the Sheriff’s admission to censoring the letters that were written by appellant to his attorney .(see Ex Parte Hull,
In sum, appellant has stated a cause of action for intentional and malicious action on the part of respondents in (1) subjecting appellant to punitive segregation for no legitimate reason (2) failing to give appellant the rudimentary protections of due process and (3) capriciously censoring and perhaps destroying letters sent by appellant to his attorney.
It is apparent that appellant seeks to have this court lay down some generic and far-reaching guidelines for conduct of detention officials and the conditions of prisons. We do not believe this to be our role. (Accord Knight v. Ragen,
In this, respect, we should point out that it would be of great benefit to both the courts and the detention centers themselves if the officials within were guided by a comprehensive set of carefully drafted and closely adhered to rules and regulations relating to prisoners’ rights,
Notes
. We use the term “ detention officer ” and “ detention facility ” in this decision to refer to both State аnd local detention facilities and their employees.
. Even if the Sheriff had spelled out the facts supporting his reason for administering the discipline, there would have been a question for the fact finder to determine. The mere allegation by a prisoner that he did not violate any jail regulations or do anything else to warrant punishment is enough to make out a cause of action since it would be virtually impossible to allege all of the possibly punishable acts he did not commit. It would have been more prudent of respondents to allege the spеcific acts underlying the punishment; however, the Sheriff’s allegation that appellant did commit a breach of prison discipline is harely enough to pose a triable issue of fact and avoid summary judgment for the appellant on this issue.
. The Sostre court did not reach the issue of whether or not there had to be an impartial trier of fact. (See Nieves v. Oswald,
. It has been persuasively argued that detention officials should not be able to open letters flowing from an inmate to his attorney at all (23 Stan. L. Rev. 473, 479, 480).
. The fact that the letter may contain false information or allegаtions attacking detention officials would not constitute good cause. (See Wright v. McMann,
. We are aware and wish to emphasize that the courts are often a poor vehicle to use to air and resolve prisoner complaints. An effective internal grievance procedure, such as the one now being utilized by the Bureau of Prisons for Federal institutions, has the sаlutory effect in many instances of both providing a satisfactory grievance-solving mechanism short of inflammatory litigation and keeping down the significant flow of prisoner complaints into an already overburdened court system.
. Our decision spells out only the minimal legal requirements that detention officials must follow. Of course, rules and regulations may be promulgated which go heyond these minimal requirements. (See, e.g., Minimum Standards and Regulations for Management of County Jails and Penitentiaries of the State Commission of Correction, § 5100.5, subd. [a], par. [6] [7 NYCRR 5100.5 (a) (6)] [outgoing special correspondence cаnnot be read or censored by detention officials].)
Dissenting Opinion
The majority, in language written with an overly broad pen, has today placed upon all penal institutions including the several hundred village, city and county
Our disagreement with the majority is not to be considered as a holding that a prisoner is not entitled to due process rights. On the contrary, we subscribe to the theory that he is no less entitled than any other person. But, to predicate possible civil liability by way of money damages against jail personnel on the less than flimsy factual claim made in this case is exalting fiction over reality. If a substantially new area of civil liability is to be fashioned out of the manner of operation of a place of detention, certain it is, it should not be created upon the record in this case. The documents before us are not pro se pleadings by any means. The case has been presented to us by experienced counsel. Appellant’s complaint sets forth two causes of action; the first assertedly arising from an alleged improper detention;
The majority correctly conclude that appellant’s cause of action resting on the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment was properly dismissed, but they then hold that appellant ‘
It has been consistently held that there is no constitutional infirmity in segregated confinement per se (Sostre v. McGinnis,
Appellant’s complaint simply alleges that he was placed in solitary confinement for a period of five days in a cell without hot water, too much heat and not enough ventilation. It must be remembered that appellant was in custody and even if the claimed facts of this case could be factually substantiated, we do not view his allegations as rising to the level of 1 ‘ substantial deprivations” evident in Sostre (where there was segregated confinement for 372 days), and other similar cases,
Although speaking in terms of the Eighth Amendment, the court in Sostre noted the limitations on the judiciary and the appropriate scope of any inquiry into penal discipline and maintenance of order. Judge Kaufman there pointed out that: “ For a federal cоurt, however, to place a punishment beyond the power of a state to impose on an inmate is a drastic interference with the state’s free political and administrative processes. It is not only that we, trained as judges, lack expertise in prison administration. Even a lifetime of study in prison administration and several advanced degrees in the field would not qualify us as a federal court to command state officials to shun a policy that they have decided is suitable because to. us the choice may seem unsound or personally repugnаnt
Recognizing our judicial limitations in these areas as well as the rights imposed by the majority upon any prisoners incarcerated in solitary confinement as against the tremendous burdens placed on municipalities by this decision, unlike the majority, we cannot conclude that procedural due process guarantees, to the extent of requiring a hearing, attach under the facts of this case. This is not to say that there are no cases involving solitary confinement where a hearing would be mandated. The purported deprivations do not rise to the level of “ grievous loss ” or “ substantial deprivations ” which in balance outweigh the governmental interest in maintenance of discipline which will be necessarily impaired if not obstructed by the blanket holding of today covering all prisoners transferred for whatever duration to solitary confinement.
Turning to the only remaining сause of action, the alleged censoring of appellant’s mail, we would find as did Special Term that this issue has been rendered moot and that there is no justiciable money damage claim spelled out. Appellant has not demonstrated any direct damages or loss which might entitle him to recovery. By his second cause of action, appellant also sought an injunction “ enjoining Defendants, their agents and employees, from prohibiting Plaintiff to correspond by mail with his attorney ”. As a consequence of his guilty plea to a felony on May 11,1972 resulting in a sentence to a State prison, appellant by his own acts has rendered moot his request for an injunction against the County of Monroe.
The order should be affirmed.
Judges Jones, Rabin and Stevens concur with Judge Wachtler; Chief Judge Breitel concurs in a separate opinion; Judge Gabrielli dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judge Jasen concurs.
Order modified, without costs, in accordance with opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.
. E.g., Ford v. Board of Managers (
. E.g., Wright v. McMann (
Concurrence Opinion
I agree that there should be a modification but on a limited ground. On summary judgment, as this is, the court is not confined to the pleadings.
In the pleading and the rather inadequate papers submitted by appellant оn the motion, there is the bald assertion that he was punished with solitary confinement without cause and without cause being assigned. The bald assertion is never answered by respondents with evidentiary facts; there is only a general denial. I suppose that the bald assertion by plaintiff, if true, almost incredible though it may seem, could not be amplified by further evidentiary facts. The same could not be said of defendants’ bald assertions. There must be at least a description of the punishment imposed, and if imposed, the reasons for the imposition, and whether and how plaintiff was so advised.
I agree that even a prisoner, especially one detained awaiting trial, may not be punished without being advised of the cause and being given some opportunity to respond to the accusation, at least on a summary and informal appearance before an or the administrative prison supervisor not directly involved in the accusation.
Accordingly, I would modify, without costs, and deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but with leave to renew their motion on proper papers setting forth the evidentiary facts relevant to plaintiff’s solitary confinement.