215 Pa. 486 | Pa. | 1906
Opinion by
Under the authority of our cases and the testimony offered at the trial, the alleged negligence of the defendant as well as
The learned counsel for appellant mainly rely on the fourth specification of error which raises the question of the power of the court to authorize the amendment of the record after the expiration of two years from the date of the accident. . The pertinent facts in reference to this question are as follows : The plaintiff was injured March 2,1901. On March 24,1902, a praecipe in trespass was filed, but the prothonotary by mistake issued the summons in assumpsit. On April 14, 1902, defendant entered an appearance de bene esse. On March 9, 1903, seven days after the statute of limitations had become a bar the court permitted an amendment to be made correcting the record so as to show that it was an action in trespass as the pracipe called for, instead of assumpsit as named in the summons by mistake. The appellant earnestly contends that the amendment permitted a change in the form of action, which it is argued cannot be made after the statutory period in which to bring the action had expired. This contention overlooks the distinction between cause of action and form of action, as well as the particular facts of the present case. The general rule on this subject is that no amendment can be allowed, the effect of which is to introduce a new cause of action so as to deprive the opposite part}' of a valuable right or to injuriously affect the intervening rights of third parties: Strock v. Little, 33 Pa. 409; Leeds v. Lockwood, 84 Pa. 70; Duffey v. Houtz, 105 Pa. 96; Grier Brothers v. Assurance Co., 183 Pa. 334. It is contended by appellee that the amendment permitted to be made did not change the cause of action. The court below held that it had the inherent power to correct the mistakes of its own officers as they appear of record, and that such mistakes can be corrected at any time during the course of the trial before or after the statute has become a bar. The following cases are cited in support of this position: Ihmsen v. Monongahela Navigation Co., 27 Pa. 267; Marshall v. Oil Company, 198 Pa. 83; Wright v. Eureka Tempered Copper Co., 206 Pa. 274. We agree that if the amendment changed the cause of action in fact it could not be made after the statutory period in which to bring
There only remains one other question to be considered. Did the court commit reversible error in instructing the jury as to the proper measure of damages? We think it did. Indeed, counsel for appellee does not seriously contend that the instructions of the learned court in this respect were correct, but it is argued that, inasmuch as neither plaintiff nor defendant asked for specific instructions as to the measure of damages, it is too late to raise the question now. A number of cases are cited in support of this position. Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. 528, is particularly relied on. It is there said the court will not reverse for inadequacy of the charge on the question of the measure of damages where the verdict is reasonable and moderate. To the same effect is Lewis v. Springfield Water Co., 176 Pa. 237. We agree that a judgment of the court below should not be reversed for inadequacy in the charge if no injury resulted to the complaining party, and the cases above cited announce this rule. The rule, however, does not apply where the charge of the court is clearly erroneous. Under such circumstances, it is not a question of inadequacy, but of error. In every case of negligence it is the duty of the court of its own motion to instruct the jury as to the proper measure of damages. Without such
Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.