after stating the pase: It was chiefly objected to the validity of defendant’s recovery, that the profits of the contract claimed and allowed as damages, on defendant’s counterclaim, involved too many elements of uncertainty to be made the basis of a legal award of prospective damages, and the same should have been rejected, on the ground that they áre “speculative” ' and “contingent,” but we are of opinion that the objection cannot be sustained.
It is well established, that where there has been definite and absolute breach of a contract which is single and entire, that all damages, both present and prospective, suffered by the injured party, may and usually must be recovered in one and the -same action, and, when prospective damages are allowed, they must be such as were in reasonable contemplation of the parties, and 'capable of being ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty. This requirement as to the certainty of damages recoverable is frequently said to exclude the idea of profits, but this statement must be understood to refer to the profits expected by reason of collateral engagements of the parties, or the profits of a going concern to arise from current sales and bargains which are yet to be made and dependent, to a great extent, on the uncertainty of trade and fluctuations of the market. Accordingly, it has been held that profits of an old established business may sometimes be allowed as damages, when they can be ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty, and, under like circumstance,; the prospective profits to arise from the contract declared on are also recoverable.
The doctrine is stated in Hale on Damages as follows: “In an action for damages, the plaintiff must prove, as part of his ease, both the amount and the cause of his loss. Absolute certainty, however, is not required, but both the cause
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and tbe amount of the loss must, be shown with reasonable certainty. Substantial damages may be recovered though plaintiff can only give his loss proximately.” Hale on Damages, p. YOj quoted with approval by this Court in
Bowen v. Harriss,
148 N. C. And further, on p.. Yl: “A difficulty 'arises, however, where compensation is claimed for prospective losses in the nature of gains prevented: — but absolute certainty is not required. Compensation for prospective losses may be recovered when they are such, as„iu the ordinary course of things, are reasonably certain to ensue. .Reasonable means reasonable probability. Where the losses clanked are contingent, speculative, or merely possible, they cannot be allowed.” On this subject, the same author, pp. Y2 and Y3, quotes with approval from the opinion of
Selden, J.,
delivered in the case of
Griffin v. Colver,
But profits or advantages which are the direct and immediate fruits of the contract entered into between the parties; stand upon a different footing. These are part and parcel of the contract itself, entering into and constituting a portion of its very elements; something stipulated for, the right to the enjoyment of which is just as clear and plain as to the fulfillment of any other stipulation. They are presumed to have been taken into consideration and deliberated upon before the contract was made, and formed, perhaps, the. only inducement to the arrangement. The parties may indeed have entertained different opinions concerning the advantages of the bargain, each supposing and believing that he had the best of'it; but this is mere matter of judgment going to the formation of the contract, for which each has shown himself *25 willing to take the responsibility, and must, therefore, abide the hazard.
Such being the relative position of the contracting parties, it is difficult to comprehend why, in case one party has deprived the other of the gains or profits of the contract by refusing to perform it, this loss should not constitute a proper item in estimating the damages.
The doctrine so clearly defined and stated by these authorities, is approved and applied in decisions of our own Court, and well-considered cases in other jurisdiction.
Oldham v. Kerchner,
A proper application of these principles to the facts presented fully support the ruling of his Honor-below, in submitting the question of prospective damages for the consideration of the jury, these facts affording all the data for an award of such damages with reasonable certainty. ' While we agree with his Honor that for breach of this contract, recovery for both present and prospective damages is permissible, we' are of opinion that there was error to the plaintiff’s prejudice in the rule by which a substantial portion of the damages was directed to be ascertained. On this question his Honor charged the jury, that in case a breach of contract was established, as claimed, the defendant was entitled to recover as damages the difference between the amount, the plaintiff had agreed to pay for the work and the cost of performance. This was the' entire statement of the trial Judge in reference to the rule by which the damages should be admeasured, and though somewhat general in its terms, is a correct rule as to .all the damages which had been occasioned at the time of breach; but there was evidence offered tending to show that this contract would have required some years in its performance beyond the time" when a breach was established, and, as
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to this prospective damage, that to arise in the time required for performance after such breach, the correct rule would be the' present value of the difference between the contract price and the cost of performance. We hold, as stated, that recovery for this prospective damage can be had, but defendant is only entitled to the present value of his contract, and, . in so far as such damage is allowed by anticipation, proper allowance should be made for the fact that present recovery is had for damage that would only have accrued at a future time. This position as to the correct rule for determining' values to arise and accrue in the future, when a present recovery is allowable, is very well illustrated in the case of
Pickett v. R. R.,
And while the authorities hold that one recovery is to be had for the entire damage, predicated on values as they existed at the time of the breach of the contract, and that it is error .to admit testimony as to actual changes in the market values or the cost of labor and material that may arise after that date, see Hawk v. Lumber Co., ante, we deem it not amiss to say that competent witnesses who speak to this question, should always be sufficiently advertent to the fact that such fluctuations are not unlikely to occur, and Courts and juries should be careful to see that proper allowance is made on that account in fixing the amount of a present recovery, by reason of such' damage.
*27 Speaking to tins question, and in support of the view that tlu* principle referred to is of the1 substance and to be given its proper weight by the jury, Nelson, Chief Justice, in Mastertons Case, supra, said:
“The constituent elements of the cost should be ascertained from sound and reliable sources; from practical men, having experience in the particular department of labor to which the contract relates. It is a very easy matter to figure out large profits upon paper, but it will bo found that these, in a great, majority of the cases, become seriously reduced when subjected to the contingencies and hazards incident to actual performance. A jury should scrutinize with care and watchfulness any speculative or conjectural account of the cost of furnishing the article that would result in a very unequal bargain between- the parties, by which the gains and benefits, or, in other words, the measure of damages against the defendants are unreasonably enhanced. .They should not overlook the risks and contingencies which are almost inseperable from the execution of contracts like the .one in question, and which increase the expense independently of the outlays in labor and capital.”
Objection was further made that the defendant and other witnesses were allowed to give to the jury their opinion of the profits per thousand feet. These witnesses, or some of them, had given their statement and estimate of the cost per thousand feet to cut and haul and deliver these logs at a point where the tug-boat could get them, and the testimony (.bjected to, while in the form of an opinion, was nothing but an estimate by them of the difference between the costs of performance and the contract price, making their testimony nothing really but an estimate of value, and thus bringing the same clearly within the general rule by which opinion evidence is available. Sedgwick Damages, sec. 1294.
But, apart from this, it will be noted that the witnesses who gave this testimony had personal observation and knowl *28 edge of tbe facts -and conditions, and they were all said to be experienced lumbermen. Testimony of tliis kind, from such a source, is coming to be more and more allowed in investigations of this character, and the Courts are disposed to admit “opinion evidence” when the witnesses have had personal observation of the facts and conditions, and from their practical,training and experience are in a condition to aid the jury to a correct conclusion. While not expert testimony in the strict sense of the word, it is coming to have a recognized place in the law of evidence.
McKelvey‘speaks of it as. “expert testimony as to facts.” McKelvey on Evidence, p. 230, and, in reference to it, this author says that it is nothing more than ordinary testimony as to facts given by witnesses specially qualified by observation and experience to give-it. And,' further, on p. 231: “There are two classes of witnesses who are ordinarily spoken of as experts. . The one embraces those persons who, by reason of special opportunity for observation, are in a position to judge of the nature and effect of certain matters better than persons who have not had opportunity for like observation. Eor' example, one who has had opportunity to observe the running of trains may testify as to the speed of an ordinary train. Such witnesses are really not experts in the strict sense of the term; they are only specially qualified witnesses. Any person, having been placed in the same position, and having had the same opportunity for observation, could give like testimony.”
The testimony offered comes clearly within this principle, and its admission has been sanctioned by authoritative decisions here and elsewhere.
Britt v. R. R.,
148 N. C.; Tay
lor v. Security Co.,
The question of plaintiff’s liability and the amount of recovery were submitte’d to the jury in one and the samé *29 issue, and for tbe error indicated in tbe opinión, a new trial is directed on tbe entire issue.
New trial.