86 Ga. App. 12 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1952
In the special ground the defendant sets out that the court stated the allegations of the indictment, which were that the taking of the check and money was wrongful, fraudulent, and by intimidation, and with intent to steal the same; and also charged that “Robbery is the wrongful, fraudulent and violent
It was held by this court in Goolsby v. State, 24 Ga. App. 330 (2) (100 S. E. 768), that where, after giving to the jury the allegations of the indictment, the court charged that “robbery” is defined in Code § 26-2501 as “the wrongful, fraudulent, and violent taking of money, goods or chattels from the person of another by force or intimidation, without the consent of the owner,” such charge is not subject to the criticism that it failed to instruct the jury on the question of intent to steal being a necessary ingredient of the offense of robbery, and that the charge given covered the elements of robbery. The court said that, if fuller instructions as to intent were desired, a timely written request therefor should have been given. Blackshear v.
It is true that intent is a substantive element in the commission of robbery, and a failure by the court so to instruct the jury trying a robbery case is cause for a new trial. Blackshear v. State, supra. This is true in a case in which one contention of the defendant is the absence of such intent (Sledge v. State, 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. E. 756), and in the case at bar the defendant contends that there was no intent to rob, but that the money and check were collected bona fide to settle a trespass on the property of the defendant’s brother and were voluntarily given and paid to him by the prosecutor for that purpose. Crawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701 (17 S. E. 628); Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293.
There was no written request here to charge further on intent to steal, and the charge given as to intent was adequate. No error appears from this special ground.
The evidence authorized the verdict finding the defendant guilty of robbery. There was evidence from which the jury were authorized to find: that Starlen J. Corley, Charles Bursts, Joe Tibbetts, and E'. F. Corley went on a deer-hunting trip into the mountain regions of northern Georgia, near Blue Ridge; that they were in two pickup trucks; that they drove onto an old trail and stopped at an old deserted homesite, having the remains of an old barn, which was on a mountain side; that the defendant came up and informed them that they were on his brother’s property, and the only way they could leave was to pay $100; that they “were going to pay $100, or I will shoot it out with you”; that this money was required by the defendant’s brother’s wife; that the defendant had a gun in his hand when he made this threat, and he continued to curse and threaten the four men until they, in fear of their lives and to prevent trouble, paid to
It follows that the court did not err in overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.